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Abstract 
This thesis explores, through the lens of state-business relations, Greece’s 
participation in the process of European integration from 1945 until 1962. During 
this period, Greece’s economy was progressively integrated with the economies 
of Western Europe and in 1962 the Greek state was the first to associate with 
the newly created European Economic Community (EEC). Most authors and 
academics have concluded that Greece’s road to the EEC was driven solely from 
above, as part of the government’s foreign policy emphasizing geopolitical 
motives.  
This study, situates the interrelated problems of (un)employment and economic 
(under)development at the centre of the analysis, arguing, instead, that 
Greece’s road toward Europe was a complex politico-economic process 
considerably influenced by business interests. It shows how and why business and 
state agencies had collectively identified the country’s viability with the 
development of economic and commercial relationships initially with the US and, 
after 1950, with West Germany, aiming to resolve its viability problem and to 
remain within the western capitalist bloc. For these reasons, Greece 
participated in the process of European integration from the very beginning, 
adopting in turn its own European strategy. This strategy included not only the 
aims of the Greek side during the relevant negotiations but, as will be argued, 
the industrial and commercial policies applied were also a substantive part of 
this strategy. Equally, it is claimed that big business and state agencies 
cooperated to formulate and implement these two policies.  
In this way, this research contributes not only to the Greek historiography on 
economic development and to the debate in respect of Greece’s road to Europe. 
It also adds to the historiographical strand on European integration which, 
through a business history perspective, has incorporated business interests in the 
analysis. 
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Introduction  
Recently, Wolfgang Schaeuble, the former German finance minister, claimed 
that in the middle of 2015 almost all European finance ministers agreed that it 
would be preferable for Greece to exit, temporarily, the Eurozone and to 
devalue its currency.1 This was a proposal discussed by Greek left-wing political 
forces at the time, aiming to deal with the unprecedent economic crisis which 
had hit the country in 2009. From 2010 Greece was enforcing consecutive 
structural adjustment programs which entailed an extensive devaluation of 
internal assets. Eventually, Greece remained inside the Eurozone and did not 
follow the proposed alternative. Instead, the internal devaluation continued 
apace. Even if we have much more to learn about the details of these proposals 
and their context, the call for a ‘timeout’ from the Eurozone is a compelling 
challenge to deepen our knowledge about the turbulent politico-economic 
relations of Greece with Europe.  
The association of Greece with the European Economic Community (EEC) back in 
1962, had largely defined a growth model that during the 1960s marked the 
golden age of Greek capitalism. With manufacturing to act as its locomotive, the 
Greek economy was thereafter catching-up with the core of Europe. However, 
by the end of the 1970s this growth model had virtually collapsed. The core of 
Greek industry had crumbled and, following the full membership of Greece to 
the EEC in 1981, both the fiscal and current account deficits became derailed 
reflecting the persistently low competitiveness of the domestic economy. Up to 
the mid-1980s these two deficits had skyrocketed and Greece’s economic 
performance was obviously below European standards.2 The public debt 
accumulated during the 1980s did not fall again.  
Arguably, the roots and the specificity of Greece’s economic crisis should be 
traced back to the course of its post-war economic development, highlighting 
the need to go beyond short-term ahistorical analyses in order to understand the 
 
1 ‘Schaeuble says temporary Grexit idea was backed by euro-group majority’, Kathimerini, 9 
October 2017, http://www.ekathimerini.com/202703/article/ekathimerini/business/temporary-
grexit-idea-was-backed-by-15-nations-schaeuble-claims-in-documentary> [accessed 20 October 
2017]. 
2 Economic crisis and Greece, ed. by Andriana Vlachou and others (Athens: Gutenberg, 2011). 
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origins of Greece’s developmental model and the extent to which it deviated 
from the rest of Europe. Thus, this thesis explores how and why Greece 
participated in the process of European integration from 1945 until 1962. It 
begins in 1945 because it was the year that the shaping of the main politico-
economic aims of the country, in respect to its long-term viability, began and 
ends with the year that the association with the EEC took effect. Greece’s 
participation in European integration is examined through the lens of state-
business relations; the thesis explores primarily how big business and its 
representatives interacted with state agencies, that is, with the government and 
state managers in order to steer Greece towards Europe.   
As will be argued, there is a unilateral emphasis in the Greek literature upon 
state agencies, emphasizing the geopolitical dimensions of Greece’s European 
path. The role of economic and social forces has been marginalized which is a 
common trend in the wider literature on European integration. This thesis will 
argue that business interests played an important role, illuminating in this way 
dimensions of Greece’s participation to European integration which have been 
neglected. In this way, it aims not only to contribute to the Greek literature by 
filling a substantive gap, but it also aims to add to the historiographical strand 
on European integration which has incorporated business and its actions.  
In broad terms, it will be argued that Greece participated in the process of 
European integration because Greek businessmen and state agencies had 
collectively identified the country’s viability and thus the reproduction of the 
socioeconomic system, initially with US financial aid and after 1950 with the 
development of economic and commercial relations with German business and 
the Federal Republic.3 For this reason, Greece had no real choice but to follow 
their plans for European integration adopting, in turn, its own European 
strategy. This strategy was not restricted to the aims of the Greek side during 
the relevant negotiations, rather, it will be argued, that Greece’s substantive 
European strategy was the combination of these aims with the industrial and 
commercial policies which it applied. Again, it will be argued that this 
substantive strategy had been formulated and implemented collectively by 
 
3 The term businessmen is preferred from businesspeople to underline the absence of women’s 
involvement in Greek business at the time.   
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businessmen and state agencies. When the Association Agreement took effect in 
1962, the Greek growth model was an amalgam of import substitution 
industrialization followed by Greece since the 1920s, and the export led growth 
model implied by European integration. 
Since Greece had depended for its viability, predominately on the US and West 
German economies, it is important here to explain what was the content of 
viability as specified by contemporaries. For both businessmen and state 
agencies, Greece’s viability had been largely identified with rapid 
industrialization, aiming to absorb the idle and semi-idle labour force of the 
agricultural sector and to reduce the huge and persistent trade deficit. 
However, the aim of industrialization was not unique to Greece. 
As Alan Milward has shown, industrialization and the modernisation of 
manufacturing ‘as another aspect of employment policy’ was a ‘distinctive 
aspect of the post-war period’.4 What clearly differentiates Greece from other 
European countries, and in particular from those which had formed the core of 
Europe during the 1950s, was the level of industrial development and 
employment.5 In a comparative perspective, during the 1950s Greece was the 
least industrialized country across Western Europe with the lowest ratio of 
labour utilization.6 Moreover, it had the lowest level of income per capita within 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), except for Portugal 
and Turkey. In short, Greece was a poor, agricultural country resembling the 
main features of relative economic backwardness; its association with the 
industrially advanced countries, which had formed the EEC in 1957 was, 
therefore, an integration between unequal partners. 
Importantly, the underutilization of the available labour force and the trade 
deficit, were two inter-related problems which had become acute since the 
1920s yet, were still there during the 1950s.7 For contemporaries, the former 
 
4 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 37. 
5 The Six countries which formed the EEC in 1957 were the Federal Republic, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Belgium and the Luxembourg.   
6 United Nations, Some Factors in Economic Growth in Europe during the 1950s (Geneva: UN, 
1964), ch. I, p. 1; ch. III, p. 6; ch. IV, p. 5.   
7 Alexis Fragiadis, Greek Economy: 19th-20th Centuries (Athens: Nefeli, 2007), pp. 111-148;161-
178.   
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was rooted in the imbalance between the population on the one hand and the 
limited land and mechanical equipment on the other. It was known in Greece as 
the imbalance problem.  
Surveys at the time, although with insufficient and fragmented statistical data, 
had estimated that more than one third of the work force in the Greek 
countryside was periodically or permanently idle and in cities a considerable 
portion were unemployed or employed unproductively.8 In the circumstances, 
this was deemed economically and politically unsustainable by both businessmen 
and state agencies. Economically, the surplus population in the agricultural 
sector meant that incomes and productivity were low, weakening internal 
demand for industrial products and deteriorating competitiveness.9 In turn, 
these weaknesses induced internal prices undermining the internal and external 
value of the currency. As a result, the trade deficit was growing, undermining 
the ability to import capital goods. Under these circumstances, the impoverished 
population was receptive to the calls of the robust and mass communist 
movement. Indeed, mainly in response to the state’s massive repression and 
persecution, the Communist Party and its followers decided to fight for political 
power and the country entered in to a civil war which lasted from early 1946 
until late 1949. Thereafter, the communist movement could seriously threaten 
the rule of law only based upon the strengthening of Greece’s commercial and 
economic ties with the Soviet bloc. This was the perceived economic and 
political challenge to the country’s viability as a capitalist state and economy 
and to which state agencies and businessmen aimed to respond in the post-war 
era. Industrialization was considered as the appropriate answer. 
The underlying rationale was that industry could reach high productivity levels 
because, in contrast to agricultural production which was governed by 
diminishing returns, it was conducive to economies of scale. As it became 
progressively evident, however, increased industrial production necessitated the 
 
8 UNRRA, Plan for the utilization of Greece’s natural resources, Annex II, 2 vols (Athens: UNRRA, 
1947), I, Section II, pp. 1-18. During the 1950s all surveys had derived similar results. It was only 
in 1962 that the extent of the surplus population at agriculture was questioned, see: Adam. A. 
Pepelasis and Pan. A. Yotopoulos, Surplus Labour in Greek Agriculture, 1953-1960 (Athens: KEPE, 
1962). 
9 Production costs at agriculture were also burdened by high domestic prices, for example those 
of fertilizers and irrigation machines which were monopolized. This was a salient feature of the 
domestic economy which was usually downplayed by industrialists and state managers.  
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importation of capital goods and intermediate inputs on a large scale, whereas, 
increasing incomes were channelled predominately to consumer durables.10 As a 
rule, domestic industry was unresponsive to the increasing demand for these 
goods. Since exports, dominated by semi-luxury agricultural products, could not 
follow the tempo of imports, the result was that the trade deficit was growing 
both in absolute terms and as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).11 
This was, therefore, the main structural problem for Greece.12  
The industrial sector was underdeveloped with low productivity. Particularly, 
manufacturing sectors such as textiles, foodstuff and metal-working were 
dominated by a sea of small and inefficient units with obsolete mechanical 
equipment and limited organizational capabilities.13 These units coexisted with a 
small number of big businesses which were price setters and who enjoyed a 
dominant position.14 In other manufacturing sectors, notably cement, paper, 
fertilizers, glass, tobacco, metal producing and tubes, there was only a limited 
number of companies which monopolized the internal market with restrictive 
practices. As was the case in Europe, cartels and syndicates, most of which had 
been formed before 1945, existed in many sectors.  
Moreover, in comparison to other European economies and especially the core of 
Europe, manufacturing was dominated by the traditional sectors of textiles, light 
chemicals and foodstuff, whereas the capital goods sector was quite 
underdeveloped.15 Overall, the technological base of industry was quite 
underdeveloped and only few big businesses had their own research 
departments.16 From this perspective, there was a compelling need for industrial 
modernization and development. Certainly, this effort was the prerequisite for 
the survival of Greece’s vulnerable capitalism and presupposed high investment 
rates which were, in turn, based predominately upon the inflow of capital goods 
and technological transfers which were supplied by the US and, after 1950, by 
 
10 Dim. I. Halikias, The Economic Development of Greece and the Balance of Payments (Athens: 
BoG, 1963).  
11 Appendix 1, Table 8;9. 
12 Fragiadis, Greek, pp. 175-78.   
13 George Coutsoumaris, The Morphology of Greek Industry (Athens: KEPE, 1963).  
14 Howard S. Ellis, Industrial Capital in Greece (Athens: KEPE, 1964), pp. 172-9.  
15 United Nations, Some Factors, ch. III, table 7.  
16 Kostis Vaitsos and Tasos Yannitsis, Technological Transformation and Economic Development 
(Athens: Gutenberg, 2001), pp. 83-108.  
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West Germany. Mainly as a result of its dependence upon these two advanced 
economies for capital goods and technology, as well as the need to increase its 
import capacity to finance investments, Greece was present in the process of 
European integration from the very beginning. It was a recipient of the Marshall 
Plan aid in 1948, participating in the European Payments Union (EPU), which 
aimed to boost intra-European trade, and the attached trade liberalization 
program within the OEEC. In 1957 it participated in the negotiations within the 
OEEC for a Free Trade Area (FTA) and, in the middle of 1959, Greece was the 
first state to apply for an association with the EEC. The Association Agreement 
was signed in 1961 and took effect the following year. The main characteristic of 
this road was that by 1953 Greece had abolished almost all its quantitative 
import restrictions and in 1961 had agreed to abolish tariff protection within a 
predetermined and fixed period. Within this framework, businessmen and state 
agencies interacted to adjust the industrial and tariff policies, a crucial part of 
Greece’s European strategy. 
1. Historiography 
1.1 Geopolitical reasoning and modernization 
The participation of Greece in European integration has been seen mainly from 
above, as part of the government’s foreign policy. In particular, for the period 
until the conclusion of the negotiations for the full membership of Greece to the 
EEC in 1979, Greece’s European strategy has been addressed as if it had been 
formulated and implemented primarily by the then prime-minister, Konstantinos 
Karamanlis and his close collaborators.17 Business interests and their influence 
upon the association and accession strategies are almost absent, substantiating 
 
17 Marrieta D. Minotou, ‘The European Choice of Karamanlis’ Government, 1957-1959’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2002); Konstantina 
Botsiou, Griechenlands Weg nach Europa: Von der Truman-Doktrin bis zur Assoziierung mit der 
Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1947–1961 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999); Evanthis 
Hatzivassiliou, ‘Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-1962’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 30-1, (1995), 187-202; Greece, the West and the Mediterranean 1945-
1962: New Research Approaches, ed. by Konstantina Botsiou and Yannis Sakkas (Thessaloniki: 
University of Macedonia, 2015); Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974-1979: 
The Second Enlargement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 14-34.  
  7 
 
 
 
 
the dominant academic view of a weak civil society driven by the state.18 In this 
respect, the conclusion is that the weak industrial base prevented business from 
fully supporting Greece’s association and accession to the EEC.19  Even 
endeavours to explain Greece’s association utilizing Andrew Moravcsik’s 
analytical framework which proposed that state agencies primarily consider the 
interests of domestic producers, have reached the conclusion that Greece’s 
European policy was an exclusively state-led strategy defined by Karamanlis and 
his close associates.20 This unilateral emphasis has resulted in a literature which 
has three main characteristics.  
To begin with, it attaches primary importance to the geopolitical reasoning 
within the framework of the Cold War. In this respect, Greek literature shares 
affinities with the state-centric approach on European integration which is 
rooted in the traditional diplomatic history and the realist school of 
international relations. This historiographical strand claims that national policies 
toward European integration were broadly defined by ‘domestic political and, 
especially, foreign and security policy reasons’.21 A prime example of this 
approach is the explanation offered for French European policy during the 1960s. 
It was launched as a significant part of de Gaulle’s ‘Grand Strategy’ and forced 
the process of integration towards an intergovernmental path.22 For the Greek 
case, Panagiotis Ioakimidis, assessing the position of Greece in the European and 
regional systems since its independence in the early eighteenth century, sets the 
general framework for the geopolitical reasoning of Greece’s road to the EU.23 
 
18 Panagiotis Ioakimidis, ‘Greece in the European Union’, in Economic History of the Greek State, 
ed. by Thanasis Kalafatis and Evagellos Prontzas, 3 vols (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group Cultural 
Foundation, 2011), II, pp. 681-717. 
19 Kostas Ifantis, ‘State interests, external dependency trajectories and ‘Europe’’, in European 
Union Enlargement: A Comparative History, ed. by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert (London: 
Routledge, 2004), pp. 75-98. 
20 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (Abington: Routledge, 1999); Susannah Verney, 'The Greek Association with the  
European Community: a Strategy of State', in Southern Europe and the Making of the European 
Union, 1945-1980s, ed. by Antonio Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002), pp. 109-156. 
21 Michael Gehler, ‘At the Heart of Integration: Understanding National European Policy’, in 
European Union History: Themes and Debates ed. by Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2010), pp. 85-101 (p. 104).  
22 Garret Martin, ‘Conclusion: A Gaullist Grand Strategy?’, in Globalizing de Gaulle: International 
Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969 ed. by Christian Nuenlist and others 
(Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 291-308. 
23 Panagiotis Ioakimidis, The Position of Greece in the International, European and Regional 
System: Historical Conceptualizations and Contemporary Reality (Athens: Themelio, 2007). 
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Situating Greece within the group of post-war western liberal democracies had 
notable security implications and was additionally considered as a means to 
internal political stabilization and modernization. Thus, the political 
implications of the increasing trade dependence upon the Soviet bloc after 1953 
and the simultaneous internal pressure from the communist oriented party 
United Democratic Left (EDA) explains the association, whereas, the demand for 
a reduction of dependence on the US and the necessity for the consolidation of 
democracy explains accession. Politico-economic considerations played an 
important role, especially in the face of the increasing trade interdependence 
with the EEC after the association. In this respect, the European market would 
absorb Greek exports and modernize the socioeconomic base of Greece.  
The salient feature here is that geopolitical forces were considered as dominant, 
usually treated separately from the economic and social forces which were 
deemed to be only of secondary importance.24 Accordingly, the Greek literature 
has claimed that it was the material calculations of state agencies which had 
specified the national economic interest in relation to the dominant geopolitical 
concerns. This is the second characteristic, and it seems that this kind of 
reasoning has dominated the wider literature which deals with the integration of 
the European periphery to the EEC, and particularly for Portugal and Spain, the 
countries which joined the EEC as full members shortly after Greece.25 This 
reasoning largely follows the highly influential work of the economic historian 
Milward, who claimed that European integration has actually saved the nation-
state from its collapse under the pressure of the Great Depression and the 
second world war.26 Milward has argued that increasing trade flows within post-
war Europe, above all with West Germany, facilitated an export-led growth 
model leading to economies of scale and thus to productivity gains.27 And it was 
West Germany which was the locomotive for, not only did it supply the 
necessary machinery and transport equipment that enabled the post-war 
 
24 Neil Rollings, British Business in the Formative Years of European Integration, 1945-1973 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 4-5. 
25 Loukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1981); Alfred Tovias, ‘The Southern European economies and European 
integrations’, in Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union, 1945-1980s, ed. by 
Antonio Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 
pp. 159-81. 
26 Milward, The European. 
27 Ibid., 119-73.  
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investment boom and the subsequent industrialization/modernization, but it also 
absorbed a significant part of European manufactured exports and surplus 
labour. Thus, industrialization efforts were assisted by comprehensive export 
outlets. Simultaneously, the selective protection at the national frontier along 
with the discrimination that the EPU offered until 1957, and subsequently the 
common external tariff, formed a commercial policy which Milward calls neo-
mercantilism. To put it simply, the export-led growth model combined with neo-
mercantilism was implied by the process of European integration and states 
embarked on the project because it facilitated the much-needed high rates of 
growth. By putting the power and the material calculations of the nation-state in 
the driving seat of the process, however, Milward stresses that BIAs, with the 
significant exception of agricultural interests in France, were virtually unable to 
exercise any direct influence on their states and the integration process.28 This 
was so because their interests were deemed incurably fragmented and thus the 
powerful state was able to impose its will upon them. Certainly, in the Greek 
case, businesses were small by European standards and predominately inward 
looking thus Greek scholars had an additional reason to claim that their actions 
were guided exclusively from above. Not surprisingly therefore, the economic 
historian Iordanoglou has argued that the choice for the association in the 
second half of the 1950s implied, beyond the geopolitical motivations, a decision 
taken by state agencies for an export-led growth model. The rationale of this 
decision was to progressively reverse the adverse effects which the import 
substitution policy followed since the inter-war period had upon the country’s 
economic development.29 He suggested that the export crisis, since 1957, made 
the issue of agriculture a problem seeking an immediate solution, and the 
association provided the appropriate export outlets. However, the issue of 
industry was a strategic one. The argument here is that industry would not 
survive within the limited Greek market. Protection in the long run was not only 
unsustainable due to obligations stemming from the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) but it was also unproductive, in the sense that it 
undermined the potential for economies of scale trapping industry on an 
uncompetitive path. The solution was the delicate exposure of Greek industry to 
 
28 Ibid., p. 251. 
29 Chrisaphis Iordanoglou, ‘Yiagkos Pesmazoglou and the negotiations for the Greek – EEC 
Association Agreement (1959-1961)’, in Ioannins S. Pesmazoglou: Academic, Europeanist, 
Negotiator, ed. by Michalis Psalidopoulos (Athens: Metamesonykties Ekdoseis, 2010), pp. 69-89. 
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foreign competition with the strategic aim of improving export performance. 
The core of this argument was first established and elaborated in relation to the 
Soviet bloc by an authoritative study of Eastern trade.30 It was precisely 
exporting to the uncompetitive market of the Soviet bloc, based on bilateral 
agreements, that would undermine the ability of domestic industry to become 
competitive. Yet the low quality of Eastern machinery and mechanical 
equipment was another factor that would further jeopardize the modernization 
of Greek industry. Equally, the choice for accession in the second half of the 
1970s, beyond the dominant political reasons, is explained by the economic 
concerns of state agencies because of Greece’s export reliance upon the large 
European market.  
Last but not least, it is argued that Karamanlis’ aim was to modernize the 
socioeconomic base and the political system. For example, Kostas Lavdas, 
exploring the organization and representation of the FGI and the adaption of 
state-business relations to the changing public policy paradigm emanating from 
European integration, has claimed that the rehabilitation of state-society 
relations, or their Europeanization and modernization, was as one of the most 
welcomed likely effects of EEC membership and this was among the main aims of 
Karamanlis’ governments.31 Equally, for the period after the accession of Greece 
to the EEC in 1981, this literature is particularly preoccupied with the evaluation 
of the adjustment of Greece’s politico-economic system to that of the core of 
Europe.32 Thus the country’s road to Europe has been addressed as a process of 
Europeanization, or to use a more familiar term in Greece’s contemporary 
history, as part of the modernization of the political and economic structures of 
the country emanating from Europe. In this respect, some have argued that post-
war Greece responded successfully to the modernization challenge emphasizing 
the significant rise in the standard of living.33 Other have questioned this claim 
underlining the mass emigration which took place during the 1960s and the 
 
30 Sotiris Walden, Greece and the Eastern Countries 1950-1967: Economic Relations and Politics, 
2 vols (Athens: Odisseas, 1991). 
31 Kostas A. Lavdas, The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of 
Integration (London: Macmillan, 1997).  
32 Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Papadimitriou, The Limits of Europeanization: Reform 
Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008). 
33 William H. McNeill, The metamorphosis of Greece since the World War II (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1966).  
  11 
 
 
 
 
persistent social inequalities.34 Equally, it is has been argued that the 
anachronistic educational and administrative systems which survived only 
because the right-wing governments treated any attempt for their modernization 
as subversive actions, had undermined a balanced economic development.35  
Overall, the argument is that modernist state agencies acted autonomously for 
geopolitical reasons and big business did not influence the formulation and 
implementation of economic and European policies. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the literature which has incorporated business interests in its 
analysis is quite limited. However, it has reached unexpected conclusions. In 
particular, the unique to date study which directly considered Greek business 
interests in relation to European integration from the middle 1950s to the 
middle 1960s, considered the peak-level representative body of industry, the 
Federation of Greek Industrialists (FGI) and utilized exclusively secondary 
sources.36 In contrast to the dominant view, Nickolas Moussis argued that the 
FGI, primarily because its members were efficient producers, not only supported 
the FTA option but had also considerably influenced the process. Thus, the 
proposals of the federation for an FTA were similar to the basic terms for the 
participation of Greece to this scheme within the OEEC. Yet Moussis suggested 
that these terms were the cornerstone of the strategy of Greece for association 
with the EEC and were largely embodied in the Association Treaty. However, he 
has treated social forces as mere pressure groups which lacked a class identity 
and major political concerns and ignored Greek-German business cooperation.  
A further step has been made in two archival based historical studies which have 
treated business as social forces, that is, with both corporate and wider political 
interests. In particular, Mogens Pelt has argued that the underlying, though not 
decisive, economic force behind Greece’s association to the EEC was the 
necessity for the revival of pre-war Greek-Germany relations.37 The Federal 
Republic financed the Greek developmental plans from 1953 and absorbed a 
 
34 Jon V. Kofas, Under the Eagle's Claw: Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S. - Greek Relations 
(Westport: Praeger, 2003). 
35 David Close, Greece 1945-2004:  Politics, Society, Economy (Thesaloniki: Thyrathen, 2006), pp. 
125-130. 
36 Nicholas S. Moussis, Greek Industrialists and the Association of Greece with the Common 
Market (Brussels, 1967). 
37 Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949-1974 
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006). 
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considerable part of the mounting tobacco surpluses and, later, the so-called 
surplus labour. The role which the prominent Greek industrialist Prodromos 
Athanasiadis Bodosakis, commonly known as Bodosakis, played in the 
engagement with German businesses was crucial, for the majority of the 
financed industrial projects belonged to the Bodosakis industrial group. In turn, 
the Federal Republic aimed to use Greece as an industrial export platform to 
East Mediterranean states. Similarly, it has been shown that the FGI, as well as 
individual businessmen, had conditioned the transition of Greece to democracy 
in 1974, in many respects influencing Greece’s industrial policy and its path to 
Europe.38 First, the FGI utilized the threat of the exposure of traditional Greek 
industry to international competition to press domestically for the strengthening 
of state aid to industry. Second, the businesses which had gained from industrial 
exports to the EEC, pressed the dictatorship to improve its relations with the 
EEC. Third, the federation progressively recognized that the EEC could 
guarantee the socioeconomic system of Greece, backing and influencing 
Karamanlis’ European strategy from 1974.   
Certainly, the dominant historiographical approach has illustrated important 
aspects of Greece’s participation in European integration but the historical 
studies which considered business as social forces have highlighted the 
deficiencies attached to the exclusive preoccupation with state agencies, 
showing that there were hidden dimensions which are indispensable for a 
rounder evaluation of Greece’s road to Europe. This study aims to go a step 
further in this direction by considering the government’s European strategy in 
relation to the economic and social forces which had been actively engaged with 
the main politico-economic target of post-war Greece, namely, rapid 
industrialization which aimed to employ the idle labour force and to balance the 
external account. To do this, there is a need for an analytical framework. 
 
38 Christos Tsakas, ‘Greek Industrialists ahead of the European Challenge: State Strategy and 
Private Interests from the Association with the EEC to the restoration of Democracy’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Crete, 2015). 
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1.1.1 The new historiography 
The Greek studies which considered business as social forces share affinities with 
a growing historical literature which has emphasized societal actors rather than 
central governments and state power.39 Closely following a wider trend in social 
sciences research in the EU, this new strand aims to transcend state-centric 
approaches by applying network and institutional analyses to explain European 
integration from its very beginning. In this respect, its significance lies in the 
fact that this new approach attempts to overcome a dichotomy, inherited from 
political sciences, which concerns the action of business and its impact upon the 
process of integration. This dichotomy is exemplified by Ernest Haas’ neo-
functionalism approach, on the one hand, and Moravcsik’s inter-
governmentalism, on the other. In particular, the former’s detailed political 
study, first published in 1958, initially examined the role played by the various 
domestic pressure groups and political parties of the Six founding members of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).40 Once the need for a solution 
to a functional problem had been fulfilled, with the creation of a supranational 
body, then the key procedure for Haas was the shifting loyalty of BIAs from 
national governments to supranational authorities and their participation in new 
formal supranational business associations in search of tactical solutions to their 
common problems. This procedure induced an automatic process of 
sectoral/economic and then political integration, known as ‘spill-over’. Though 
the proposed automaticity did not materialise during the 1960s for the so-called 
‘empty chair crisis’ substantially questioned the dynamics of the shifting loyalty 
of BIAs. Subsequently, Haas dismissed such functional automaticity in 1968 but 
not the core of his approach.41 In contrast, Moravcsik follows Milward’s 
prioritization of the state and attaches even more weight upon economic 
reasoning.42 However, he argues that national governments primarily consider 
the interests of domestic producers as they are represented by peak-level BIAs 
 
39 Wolfram Kaiser, 'From State to Society? The Historiography of European Integration', in 
Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies, ed. Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 190-208. 
40 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2004). 
41 Ibid., p. xix. 
42 Moravcsik, The Choice. 
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and emphasises the continuous allegiance of business to the nation state. 43 
Certainly, these arguments substantiate the intergovernmental approach. For 
reasons of simplicity Moravcsik assumed fixed preferences at peak-level BIAs, 
essentially bypassing business fragmentation. Importantly, for Moravcsik BIAs do 
not assimilate political ideas or projects which is still the exclusive 
preoccupation of state agencies.   
The new historiography has provided evidence which has enriched the debate 
and relaxed the rigidity of each approach. Initially, the basic assumption was 
that the power of central governments has been diffused by decentralised 
informal and predominately transnational business and political networks44 but, 
progressively, it relaxed this position examining also the influence exercised by 
more formal societal actors with a national and European origin.45 Initially, the 
implication was that the decision making has been diffused to almost non-
hierarchical institutions and the sovereignty and the executive control of the 
nation-state has been hollowed out. Accordingly, the European edifice was 
treated as a multi-level polity from its origin and, sharing affinities with neo-
functionalism and institutionalism, it focused upon post-war transnational 
informal business and political networks as well as upon other societal actors 
such as national BIAs and political parties. In respect to business networks, 
informal cooperation and communication help businesses to overcome 
fragmentation and to establish public discourses which influence indirectly the 
decision-making process. Yet such networks have both economic and wider 
political motivations providing the link between different levels of the European 
polity and the powerless states, transcending national boundaries. Their impact 
can be traced from the national to the global level, though it is the trans-
Atlantic level that is the prime focus when considering the origins of the EEC and 
its formative years.  
 
43 Ibid., p. 42.  
44 Wolfram Kaiser and others, ‘Transnational Networks in European Integration Governance: 
Historical Perspectives on an Elusive Phenomenon’, in Transnational Networks in Regional 
Integration: Governing Europe 1945-1983, ed. by Wolfram Kaiser and others (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 1-17.  
45 Kaiser and Henrik-Meyer, 'Beyond Governments', pp. 1-14. 
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Representative of this approach is Sigfrido Ramirez Pérez’s historical analysis of 
the European Committee for Economic and Social Progress (CEPES).46 This was a 
transatlantic business network with many informal aspects whose action is 
illustrative of the process of integration from a business perspective. Originating 
as an initiative of US big business represented by the American Committee for 
Economic Development (CED), an association which aimed to roll back Soviet 
influence and to promote simultaneously its business interests within an 
international free trade framework which presupposed a united and liberal 
Europe, CEPES was created in the early 1950s and adopted its own European 
neoliberal vision compatible with the strategic aim of an Atlantic unity. The 
European factions of CEPES backed the first steps of European integration and 
subsequently adopted their own economic and political agendas for the course of 
European integration, detaching progressively from the more liberal CED. During 
the early 1960’s CEPES embraced the EEC trade policy and was able to 
influence, in cooperation with the Commission, the negotiations with GATT. 
Certainly, this approach is not new, since Neo-Gramscian scholars have shown 
the influence of transnational business networks in this respect, highlighting the 
CED’s international and European strategies.47 Thus, with the utilization of a 
social class analysis, it has been convincingly argued that after the second world 
war, US businessmen were by themselves able to forge close ties with their 
European counterparts. In turn, this development induced a liberal dimension 
within the core European states and businesses which subsequently contributed 
to the process of integration.   
Still, the importance of the action of national BIAs and governments is 
indispensable. The unfolding of the international economic crisis in 2008, which 
has allegedly halted the process of integration, has highlighted the significance 
of the state and encouraged this new historiographical strand to reconsider the 
power of national governments in the light of their cooperation with more 
organized BIAs implied by the notion of societal actors. The overall picture here 
is that the national peak-level BIAs have supported integration and the 
respective policies of their governments. In this respect, the basis for the 
 
46 Sigfrido M. Ramirez Pérez, ‘The European Committee for Economic and Social Progress: 
Business Networks between Atlantic and European Communities’, in Transnational, ed. by 
Kaiser, pp. 61-84. 
47 Kees Van Der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 2012). 
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formulation of shared interests for BIAs at the national level is traced to neo-
corporatist arrangements and the ability for individual leadership within business 
associations. In particular, the French Conseil National du Patronat Francais 
(CNPF) was pro-European during the 1950s and its stance is attributed, primarily, 
to its president’s leadership and not to any consensus among the business 
community in France which was, on average, protectionist.48 In contrast, the 
strong pro-European attitude of the West-German Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie (BDI), is attributable to its membership which was constituted 
predominately by competitive and export orientated big businesses. During the 
1950s it had been aligned with ordoliberal minded Ludwig Erhard supporting a 
wide Free Trade Area.49 However, below the peak-level there was a variety of 
sectoral views, some of which opted for the EEC option and these latter 
attitudes had facilitated the enforcement of Adenauer’s policy in respect to the 
EEC and the UK.50   
More illustrative here is Neil Rollings’ work which has gone a step further.51 
Rollings has shown that fragmentation was quite evident among UK businesses 
and their attitudes regarding trade effects were, even within the same sector, 
diverse.52 Peak-level BIAs were not always able to overcome such fragmentation 
and, for this reason, Rollings went beyond the peak-level, the Federation of 
British Industry/Confederation of British Industry (FBI/CBI), addressing sectoral 
BIAs as well as the investment strategies and attitudes of individual companies. 
In this way, he was able to show that domestic BIAs and individual companies in 
the UK exercised both a direct and an indirect influence on the course of the UK 
towards the EEC. The Marshall Plan aim for a customs union was considered from 
sectoral and horizontal BIAs, but their actions were limited because their 
interests were primarily oriented towards the Commonwealth. The loose 
 
48 Werner Buhrer and Laurent Warlouzet, ‘Regulating Markets: Peak Business Associations and the 
Origins of European Competition Policy’, in Societal, ed. by Kaiser, pp. 59-83 (p. 61). 
49 Werner Buhrer, ‘German Industry and European Integration: 1947-1957’, in Western Europe 
and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960, ed. by Clemens Wurm (Oxford: 
Berg, 1995), pp. 100-4. 
50 Markus Schulte, ‘Industrial Interest in West Germany’s Decision against the Enlargement of the 
EEC. The Quantitative Evidence up to 1964’, Journal of European Integration History, 3-1 (1997), 
35-61. 
51 Morten Rasmussen, ‘European Rescue of the Nation-State? Tracing the Role of Economics and 
Business’, in European Union History: Themes and Debates ed. by Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio 
Varsori (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2010), pp. 128-49.  
52 Rollings, British. 
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association with the ECSC is attributable to a compromise between sympathetic 
state managers and reluctant sectoral BIAs. Thus, politically, the period until 
1955 was mainly a preparatory stage for business interests. However, at the 
economic level, the re-orientation of trade and, importantly, of investment 
flows from the Commonwealth to continental Europe progressively intensified 
during the 1950s, promoting European companies and economic integration as 
such. In this way, individual companies had exercised an additional indirect 
influence on the political level towards the decision of the UK to seek accession 
to the EEC in 1961. This was an example of the relation between economic and 
political integration. In some cases, British BIAs have influenced more directly 
the European policy of the UK, for example, by consulting other national and 
international BIAs and providing the government with valuable information. 
Additionally, UK peak-level BIAs considered wider political and economic issues 
affecting the business environment. They asked for safeguards during the 1950s 
and their attitudes were influenced by the EEC competition, tax and company 
policies during the 1960s. In turn, these EEC policies in some cases, did 
occasionally strengthen BIAs position. 
Certainly, this new strand has shown the sheer complexity of business action and 
thus the need to consider business at both the national and translational levels. 
This is confirmed by the examination of the formulation of European policies, 
where the role of business appears mixed. For example, the Commission 
privileged UNICE as a representative body for the formulation of the European 
competition policy.53 However, in contrast to the French and German peak 
associations, the European peak-level industrial association was unable to 
influence the process because it was internally fragmented. Instead, for the 
formulation of the EEC’s commercial policy within the GATT in the early 1960s, 
both UNICE and EEC-level sector organizations were consulted and influenced 
the Commission, whereas individual European companies pressed successfully 
both at the European and the national levels to protect their interests.  
 
53 Wermer Buhrer and Laurent Warlouzet, ‘Regulating Markets: Peak Business Associations and 
the Origins of European Competition Policy’, in Societal, ed. by Kaiser, pp. 59-83. 
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1.1.2 Private interests, state policies and European integration 
Summarizing the historiography, the story of European integration has been told 
primarily from the perspective of countries that were the main actors, notably 
Germany, France and the UK. In this respect, Eichengreen provides a 
comprehensive summary of this general trend.54 He has concluded that the EPU 
had made the commitments attached to the Code of Liberalization irreversible, 
promoting intra-European trade and thus economic integration as such. In turn, 
such trade expansion made the restructuring of European industry along export-
oriented lines feasible, whereas Europe’s discrimination improved external 
accounts providing the room for a settlement between capital and labour that 
enabled high investment rates. The underlying reason was that expanded intra-
European trade provided the means to industrial units, notably those with high 
sunk costs, to take advantage of scale and scope and thus to increase 
productivity and incomes. Competitive big business from sectors which were 
conducive to scale and scope, such as German chemical and electrical 
industries, for example, were the main drivers at the economic level and 
supported the initiatives at the political level. This general explanation has 
three main sides that need further clarification.  
First, however significant was export promotion, it presupposed a number of 
peripheral countries that imported a crucial part of the machinery and 
manufactures which were eventually integrated to the new institutional 
arrangement. Since all these countries had collectively formed the EEC, any 
attempt to explain European integration that ignores core or peripheral states 
and their domestic businesses, tends to provide one-sided explanations. Second, 
capital and labour flows were equally significant to the process, but they are 
essentially missing from the picture for the emphasis has been predominately 
upon trade flows. Third, the reduction of the incentives to the private or to the 
public sphere alone cannot provide an adequate explanation in respect to the 
formulation of economic and political incentives and their promotion to the 
international arena. In some cases, it results in a rigid dichotomy between 
economic and geopolitical reasoning.  
 
54 Barry Eichengreen, Reconstructing Europe’s trade and payments: The European Payments 
Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 81-97;121-6. 
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Each approach has addressed these issues either directly or indirectly. Haas has 
demonstrated that geographical spill-over explains enlargement, that is, the 
inclusion of the peripheral states to the core Europe had gained momentum as 
the fear of isolation forced less developed counties to participate.55 It might be 
expected that key social actors on the periphery would shift their loyalty from 
the national to supranational level. Similarly, Neo-Gramscian literature has 
highlighted that the convergent interests of an emerging transnational capitalist 
class have promoted regionalization and particularly the creation and then the 
restructuring of the EEC during the 1980s.56 Obviously, the national segment of 
such a class drives the nation-state to enter this one-way street. In contrast, for 
Milward, European integration simply saved the nation-state from its collapse 
and the question is if this is valid for peripheral states as well. For Moravcsik, the 
distribution of gains accruing to each state from the inter-governmental 
bargaining, is dictated by ‘asymmetrical interdependence’.57 This simply means 
that states which anticipate reaping the most significant benefits may concede 
to demands from states which have feasible alternatives. In respect to the 
significance of capital and labour flows, Rollings and Federico Romero have 
shown clearly their importance for the cases of the UK and Italy, respectively.58 
As far as the origin of the incentives is concerned, the new historiography has 
shown that these should be addressed through the lens of the cooperation of 
business and governmental agencies. What is missing, however, is an analytical 
framework that addresses simultaneously all the elements appropriate for an 
adequate explanation of the forces which drive small countries to integrate with 
advanced economies. 
This can be provided by Harvey’s formulation of geographical political economy 
which has shown that capitalism works through spatio-temporal fixes.59 The 
latter checks overaccumulation crises within one region or state. The main 
 
55 Haas, The Uniting, pp. 313-7. 
56 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration 
(New York: Routledge, 2002). 
57 Ibid., p. 60. 
58 Rollings, British, pp. 43-70; Federico Romero, ‘Migration as an issue in European 
interdependence and integration: the case of Italy’, in The Frontier of National Sovereignty: 
History and Theory 1945-1992, ed. by Alan S. Milward and others (New York: Routledge, 1993), 
pp. 33-58. 
59 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
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features of these crises are those which characterized the Great Depression and 
the economic crisis of the 1970s and beyond:    
Overaccumulation within a given territorial system means a condition of 
surpluses of labour (rising unemployment) and surpluses of capital 
(registered as a glut of commodities on the market that cannot be disposed 
of without a loss, as idle productive capacity and/or as surpluses of money 
capital lacking outlets for productive and profitable investment).60 
Spatio-temporal fix is a process guided by the coordinated efforts of 
businessmen and state agencies. Schematically, the term fix indicates the 
solution to overaccumulation crises through spatial and/or temporal 
displacement of surpluses.61 Spatial displacement predominately takes the form 
of market expansion and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which businesses use to 
create and protect their monopoly power whereas temporal displacement 
usually takes the form of investment in domestic long-term infrastructural 
projects, production and consumption. The important dimension for this study is 
the spatial displacement: the close trading blocs formed after the First World 
War prevented the international free movement of goods and capital and thus 
the overaccumulation problem of the 1930s could not be solved.62 This legacy is 
the key to understand the forces which shaped European integration because 
thereafter it guided the strategies that, as it was hoped, would permit 
international economy to overcome the ‘economic problems that had plagued 
the 1930s and protect against the threat of communism.’63 Indeed, it has been 
shown that the post-war era is characterized by the effort of US state agencies 
and big business to establish a multilateral world trading system and the 
formation of a customs union in Europe was certainly part of this strategy.64 In 
this respect, the customs union was the mechanism which facilitated, and 
partially institutionalized, the movement of such surpluses across national 
borders in the post-war era and was thus one of the main reasons for which, at 
 
60 Ibid., p. 109. 
61 Ibid., p. 87-9;96-101;108-24. 
62 Ibid., p. 140. 
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least until the late 1960s, the recurrence of an economic crisis analogous to that 
of the Great Depression was prevented. For Harvey these increasing cross-border 
exchanges did shape the ‘formation of supra-state administrative structures such 
as the European Union’.65 Certainly, the German post-war economic miracle 
which Milward has shown that marked European integration was made possible 
because, in the first place, export outlets were made feasible through peaceful 
mechanisms which had been largely constructed at the European level for this 
reason. As will argued, the importation of German investment goods and capital 
along with the exportation of Greek labour surpluses to the Federal Republic, 
were two intra-European flows which played a substantive role in Greece’s 
economic development, shaping in turn its participation in early European 
integration. 
However, this does not mean that the process of integration is irreversible, for 
countervailing tendencies are also released and can halt or even reverse this 
process. Indeed, the new historiography has acknowledged that the international 
crisis erupted in 2007 has questioned supranationalism and problematized 
European integration because:  
In times of crisis, only national governments seem to have sufficient power 
to make credible commitments about resources.66   
For Kaiser and Henrik-Meyer, this is especially true for the big and rich members 
of the EU. However, the reasons behind this outcome are not illustrated by 
them. In this respect, Harvey’s analysis indicates that the process of unequal 
geographical development combined with devaluation opens the road for such a 
development. Indeed, as historical experience has shown, when surpluses that 
have been generated within a territory are displaced abroad, they can either set 
in motion developmental and modernization processes similar to those in the 
region of their origin or reproduce uneven geographical development. The 
general outcome is not always clear but it crucially depends not only upon the 
form and the institutional nature of the recipient region or state but also upon 
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the extent to which asymmetrical exchange relations enhance the monopoly 
power of multinational businesses which sell and invest abroad.67 In this respect, 
the Greek case shows that the general result can be mixed and, additionally, 
illustrates some reasons for which the imported capital and technology cannot 
be effectively utilized in relatively backward countries. In any case, the failure 
to develop and modernize can be quite punitive, for the resulting limited 
competitiveness makes assets and labour in the recipient region or state quite 
vulnerable to devaluation. Equally, if one state cannot displace abroad surpluses 
generated within its borders, then it is obliged to internally devalue both assets 
and labour. Since unequal development and devaluation threatens their own 
status and existence, states step back in, aiming to preserve the terms of 
exchange that are most ‘advantageous to the dominant capitalist interests 
working within its frame’ and to shift devaluation abroad.68 Certainly, this 
mechanism can provide a broad guide to study the reasons for which economic 
and political integration can be halted. Overall, these fundamental 
consequences of the movement of capital, labour and goods, provide the room 
for the development of the interaction between businessmen and state agencies 
in relation to European integration.  
Yet capital accumulation has two fundamental extra-economic, that is political, 
preconditions; the guarantee of the rule of money and law.69 The value of the 
currency is fundamental because money enables, in principle through the price 
mechanism, the devaluation of overproduced commodities and the revaluation 
of those in scarcity. The law recognises all legal subjects as private property 
owners and protects their rights, whereas simultaneously it renders the owner of 
the means of production and the owner of the commodity labour power the 
freedom to contract as equals.70 In the post-war era, communism had 
threatened both the private property rights and the price mechanism and 
unemployment and (hyper)inflation acted in the same direction. In the words of 
Barry Eichengreen: 
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Critical to Western Europe’s success was the security of private property 
rights and reliance on the price mechanism.71 
But this was not the only task performed by the state, for its power and political 
legitimation depends crucially upon the healthy pace of capital accumulation.72 
Thus there is a scope for state agencies to go beyond mere regulation. It was 
exactly in the post-war period that states across Europe directly intervened in 
the circuit of capital and they extensively attempted to guide finance and 
investments.73 As a result states adopt projects to cope with problems 
emanating from the circuit of capital and businesses naturally have a direct 
interest in shaping them. Even if in principle there is a division of labour 
between those who are preoccupied with capital accumulation, the 
businessmen, and those who deal with its political preconditions and manage the 
state apparatus, the state agencies, there is clear scope for interaction and 
cooperation between them. The significance of this relationship has been 
emphasised not only by the new historiography, but also from a variety of other 
perspectives.74 Within this framework, different factions of capital, pursue, 
primarily through BIAs but also at the firm level, business accumulation 
strategies aiming to cope with problems emanating from the circuit of capital as 
a whole. In the words of Bob Jessop:       
An ‘accumulation strategy’ defines a specific economic ‘growth model’ 
complete with its various extra-economic preconditions and also outlines a 
general strategy appropriate to its realization.75 
The concept of strategy has been utilized in business history for the political 
analysis of BIAs, as well as for individual companies76 but it does not address all 
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the appropriate elements in considering European integration. The above 
definition provides a broad guide to study the role of business and outlines a 
framework within which BIAs interact with state agencies which can be utilized 
to explain European integration. Firstly, it captures the ability of businesses not 
only to cooperate with state agencies but also to impose constraints upon them 
with economic decisions, especially in regard to investments. Secondly, by 
relating BIAs action to growth models it enables the comparison, both within the 
nation-state and internationally, of business action with the model implied by 
the process of European integration. Thus, it poses the general question: how 
did BIAs deal with the main axis of the export-led growth model implied by 
European integration? Thirdly, it shows how strategies can forge shared 
interests, beyond the solutions identified from the literature review.77 Business 
accumulation strategies include the political preconditions of capital 
accumulation and thus BIAs are obliged to pursue a strategy that reconciles both 
corporate and political interests. Indeed, Greek BIAs and individual businessmen 
had a wider class interest to defend the rule of law and, at a crucial point of 
time in mid-1957, they considered their long-term corporate interest through 
the political prism. These considerations open the way more clearly for business 
action to provide the link between economic and geopolitical reasoning.    
2. Greek politics, state agencies and big business 
The common denominator which underpins almost all of the approaches which 
seek to theorize Greek state-business relations, is that Greek civil society, and 
particularly its capitalist class, is weak and underdeveloped and for this reason a 
hypertrophic state drives the economy and shapes social relations.78 For its own 
reproduction, the state perpetuates the traditional patronage-clientele 
relationship, inherited from its Ottoman past.79 The conclusion in respect to the 
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origin of state policies is that the anemic civil society was exemplified by the 
fact that developmental policies were not induced by organized interests. 
Instead, as Pagoulatos has argued, they were solely state-driven.80  
However, those who have examined the issue more closely have argued that the 
state did manipulate the intermediate levels of society, but the organized 
interests of the ‘bourgeoisie class remains essentially unscathed’ from the state, 
at least until 1974.81  This is what Lavdas essentially meant when he claimed 
that post-war Greek corporatism was asymmetric until 1974.82 Equally 
important, within the international shipping industry, Greek shipowners were 
among the most robust and dynamic businessmen around the world.83 Certainly, 
these suggestions encourage historical research to take Greek big business 
seriously. 
In this respect, this study confirms that the patronage-clientele relationship 
existed and informed state-business interaction, but it also claims that this 
relation cannot capture neither the dominant socioeconomic and political 
divisions in Greece nor the country’s main historical turning points, including the 
association with the EEC. Instead, business accumulation strategies, as defined 
in the previous section, can cast light upon Greece’s contemporary economic 
and business history. Since the independence of Greece in the early nineteenth 
century, there was an evident social and political division which reflected the 
economic status of Greece’s propertied and entrepreneurial classes. On the one 
hand, there were those who were living in Greece and had fought during the 
struggle for national independence headed by the old and domestically powerful 
agricultural families. On the other hand, there were those who were living 
abroad, headed by the robust business communities of merchants and 
shipowners who, as a rule, were much richer and more educated than the old 
families. Progressively, they invested in Greece, primarily in infrastructure and 
Greek bonds but also in manufacturing, pressing simultaneously for a modern 
and liberal state that could safeguard their investments. The economic and 
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political power of this liberal faction explains, among other things, the absence 
of protectionist policies until 1922. Not attributable to the patronage-clientelist 
relation, limited protection is considered responsible for Greece’s anemic 
industrialization from the second half of the eighteenth century until the 
1910s.84 As will be shown, it was only after the Asia minor ‘catastrophe’ in 1922, 
that the import substitution accumulation strategy pursued by domestic 
businessmen did prevail. Moreover, the division between these two dominant 
social strands was reflected at the political level, expressed as an antithesis 
between conservatism and liberalism. In the early 1910s, this had culminated in 
a division between the conservative Popular Party and the progressive Liberal 
Party, known as the rift between anti-Venizelism and Venizelism.85 At the time, 
their common antithesis to the emerging working classes was the salient, but not 
the dominant, social and political feature. Following the Great Depression in 
1929, the measures against communism were intensified and this was especially 
true during the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1941). Moreover, after the Great 
Depression the conservatives represented mainly the interests of industry, the 
leaders of which were concentrated around the powerful National Bank of 
Greece (NBG) and who had progressively adopted ties with German business. 
This expanding business network was to play a decisive role in the development 
of post-war economic and business relations between the two countries, tying 
Greece to the Federal Republic and German big businesses which were the 
locomotives of European integration. However, the liberals tended to represent 
mainly the interests of commerce and shipping, the leaders of which had 
adopted close ties with UK business. This business network also played a crucial 
role, not only actively backing Greece’s European strategy at the political level, 
but also substantiating the core of this strategy at the economic level, the 
attraction of FDI. 
Moreover, from the Nazi occupation onwards, the dominant internal political 
division became that between communism and anticommunism and only 
secondarily between conservatives and liberals. This dominant social and 
political division was exemplified by the civil war which cannot be explained by 
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the patronage-clientele relation.86  Instead, the strong anti-communist character 
of the governments until the early 1960s remained the main feature of domestic 
politics and  in this respect, the palace and the army were two powerful forces 
which symbolized and guaranteed this character and the corresponding 
socioeconomic system.87 This division coexisted with an endemic governmental 
fragmentation and instability.88 Until the end of the civil war, the conservative 
Popular Party ruled in cooperation with the Liberal Party, giving more than 
fifteen coalition governments. Thereafter, and until November 1952, it was the 
centre-left party, the National Progressive Centre Union (EPEK), which formed 
seven governments in coalition with the Liberal Party. The government was 
tentatively stabilized when the leader of the national-army during the last year 
of the civil war, General Alexandros Papagos, united conservatives within the 
Greek Rally party. He ruled from late 1952 until late 1955. From 1952, the 
defeated communist left was represented by the United Democratic Left (EDA), 
which in 1956 and 1958 had shown that it could effectively challenge the Right 
through elections. Still, issues such as Greek-German politico-economic relations 
or the status of Cyprus, could easily produce political earthquakes. Even if its 
power was not unchallenged, the government was further stabilized after the 
elections in early 1956 when Papagos was replaced by Konstantinos Karamanlis 
as the leader of the Right and governed until 1963.  
The above characteristics were also embedded in the state’s institutional 
apparatus. Despite their different views or their adherence to a business faction 
or political party, the most prominent state managers were united under the 
umbrella of anticommunism. Importantly, state administration recruited only 
those who had a ‘Certificate of social beliefs’, a semi-official paper which 
confirmed their anticommunism.89 This practise was widespread until the 1970s, 
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affecting the efficiency of public administration and undermining its 
modernization.90   
It was on the premise of these public structures and agencies that the new 
institutions, which the US imposed progressively after 1946, were established. 
From the middle of 1947 the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) 
supervised the aid program of the Truman Doctrine and after the middle of 1948 
the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) supervised the aid within the 
Marshall Plan framework. Both had been staffed by US state managers and, along 
with the US Embassy, had significant political and economic responsibilities. The 
drachmas portion of the Marshall Plan funds were channelled to the private 
economy through the Central Loan Committee (CLC), a quasi-bank founded in 
late 1948. In 1954 it was transformed into the Economic Development Financing 
Organization (EDFO).  
During this period, two other institutions were charged with the formulation of 
economic policies. To these institutions US state managers participated with the 
right of veto. The first was the Currency Committee established in early 1946 
within the framework of the economic agreement with the UK and which 
formulated and implemented monetary and credit policy. The second was the 
Free Trade Administration (FTAD) which was established in 1947 to supervise 
commercial policy.  
The free aid received implied that Greece had to depart on economic 
development and modernization along the lines defined by US big businesses and 
state agencies.91 Indeed, Greece to a large extent adopted the liberal economic 
measures which the US had suggested and this was especially true in 1953. 
However, even before the termination of the Marshall Plan in 1952, Greece’s 
industry-bank and business-government relations were adapted to the needs of 
Greek-German bilateral relationships because the respective banks and 
governments mediated the flow of German capital to domestic economy and 
thus these relations strengthened. Combined with the features of Greek 
capitalism, such as the family character of business and the strong 
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anticommunism which united businessmen and state agencies at the political 
level, they largely account for the distinct Greek developmental model. Indeed, 
this model essentially resists categorization failing between the ideal types of 
liberal market economies like the US which is based predominately upon capital 
market and arm’s length exchange and coordinated market economies like the 
German which is based upon banks and corporatism.92 As will argued, the 
economic policy had been decisively influenced by the liberal minded economist 
Xenophon Zolotas, who was educated in Germany and since the pre-war era was 
a much-respected scientist. Yet the coordination minister of Karamanlis’ 
governments, Panagiotis Papaligouras, was an influential politician who was pro-
European and aimed to adapt German ordo-liberalism to the Greek 
circumstances. When Zolotas was appointed by Papagos as the head of the Bank 
of Greece (BoG) in 1954, the central bank became the key institution which 
coordinated economic development, and especially the monetary and credit 
policies.93 The importance of the BoG is exemplified by the fact that Ioannis 
Pesmazoglou, a Keynesian economist who became the central bank’s economic 
advisor from 1955 and after 1960 its deputy governor, became Greece’s chief 
negotiator during the negotiations for FTA and the association with the EEC. 
Another important economist was Kyriakos Varvaressos, who was a Keynesian 
scientist influenced by the ‘New Deal’.  
2.1 Organized business interests and big business  
The peak-level representative body of industry in Greece is the FGI, established 
in 1907 and initially included both industrialists and craftsmen. The initiative 
had been taken by industrialists, known as the Zurich Circle, who had 
established big businesses with the assistance of the NBG. Its initial aim was to 
press the state for the enactment of an industrial policy.94 Indeed, until 1922 the 
federation’s import substitution strategy had informed industrial and commercial 
policies.95  The federation was actively involved in politics and its members 
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participated in the inter-war governments. On the eve of German occupation, 
businessmen, and particularly the FGI, had entered the ‘core of politics as a 
mechanism of class identity and strategic planning.’96  
In the post-war era the FGI was a still a quasi-federation, representing both the 
corporate and the wider class interests of Greek big business. In 1946 it excluded 
craftsmen from its membership and became the peak-level industrial association 
in the sense that its members were the owners of the big, by Greek standards, 
manufacturing and mining businesses from all branches across the country.97 
According to the federation’s statute in 1946, the presidents of the other 
sectoral and regional BIAs were occasionally allowed to participate in the 
meetings of its Governing Body, but they were not entitled to vote.98 Other BIAs 
were accepted as official members from the FGI only in 1962.99 Importantly, 
participation in the federation’s elections declined over time.100 
In practice, the FGI considered the views of the dominant sectoral BIAs, as was 
the case when it delivered its opinion to the government on a FTA. Regarding its 
formal internal procedures, the General Meeting of the federation elected its 
Governing Body every two years. The latter, consisting of sixty members, 
transferred most of its power to the eight-member Administrative Committee, 
which was the executive of the federation. This executive consisted of the 
president, three vice-presidents, the secretary general, the treasurer and two 
supervising officers.101 Informally, there was also a steering committee 
consisting of the honorary and ex-presidents which consulted the leading team 
of the federation. This ‘advisory body’ was officially incorporated into the 
structure of the FGI from the new statute in 1962.102 The same year the FGI was 
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accepted as a member in the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations 
of Europe (UNICE). 
From the sectoral BIAs, the most active were four unions which represented the 
dominant part of Greece’s traditional industry and the first business faction 
examined in this study, the large textiles sector and its two main subsectors. 
The Panhellenic Union of Textile Industrialists (PUTI), active throughout the 
period under discussion, represented mainly the cotton subsector and 
periodically acted as the umbrella BIA of textiles. Less active before 1958, at 
least publicly, was the second union of the cotton industry, the Union of Cotton 
Industrialists (UCI). Also active were the representative bodies of the woollen 
subsector, the Union of Woollen Industrialists (UWI) which represented the big 
companies and the Union of Woollen Fabrics Industrialists (UWFI), representing 
the small spinning units. Each industrialist would be a member of two or more 
BIAs, as was frequently the case with the FGI and the textile BIAs.  
The same logic of membership was followed by the three main regional 
industrial associations which were also active throughout the period under 
discussion. The first was the Federation of Macedonian and Thrace Industrialists 
(FMTI), founded in 1915, which represented the industrialists of North Greece 
which was also dominated by the textile industry.103 The other two were the 
Federation of Patras Industrialists (FPI) and the Federation of Piraeus 
Industrialists (FPPI), representing industrialists operating around the ports of 
Patras and Piraeus respectively. The main task of the FMTI and the FPI was the 
protection of rural industry against the industrial cluster surrounding the capital, 
Athens, and the port of Piraeus which accounted for more than two thirds of the 
total industrial production in 1956.104 The FPPI, along with the Union of Iron 
Industrialists (UII), represented mainly metal producing and metal using 
companies of the wider Piraeus region which was the second most important 
business faction within manufacturing. 
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The third major business faction was concentrated around the Bodosakis group, 
which included companies from all sectors and had thus adopted ties with 
companies belonging to the other two main sectors mentioned above. The main 
shareholder of the group was Bodosakis himself who had close relations with 
politicians and state managers across the nationalist political spectrum and he 
frequently recruited them to his businesses. In 1949 Bodosakis had majority 
participation in the chemical and mining industrial complex, Hellenic Company 
of Chemical Products and Fertilizers SA (AEEXPL), the arms industry Greek 
Powder and Cartridge Co (EPK), the textile company Hellenic Wool Industry SA 
(EER) the wine company Greek Wine and Spirit SA (EEOO), the chemical company 
Greek Tire Industry Co and the Vasileiadis shipyard. At the time, the first two 
companies were by far the biggest companies in Greece whereas all the above 
were the largest within their sectors. According to the ECA, the group, 
monopolizing several sectors of the economy, produced about 22% of total 
output in manufacturing and 15% in mining.105 In 1946 Bodosakis also acquired a 
complex of industries and mines in Cyprus which dominated the island’s market 
and exported to the Middle East. His companies were represented within several 
BIAs, for example, the AEEXPL was represented by the FGI and the Greek Mining 
Enterprises Association (SME) which represented big mining companies. 
As will be shown throughout the thesis, even if all the above business factions 
participated in the FGI, the leadership was not always representative. From 1945 
until 1951 the president and dominant figure of the federation was Christoforos 
Katsabas, who came from textiles and was the main shareholder of the dominant 
textile industry Peiraiki-Patraiki SA (P-P). From 1952 until 1955 the FGI was led 
by Alexandros Tsatsos, a liberal businessman and the main shareholder of the 
cement industry AGET SA. In 1956 FGI’s president was Nikolaos Dritsas who 
represented the metal using sector situated at Piraeus. From early 1958 the 
president was Georgios Drakos, the main shareholder of the electrical appliances 
company Izola SA and in early 1960 came Leonidas Kanellopoulos, who had 
stakes in the cement industry, Titan SA and the AEEXPL. 
The fourth business faction was initially concentrated around energy and 
transportation. The most important companies were the Athens Piraeus 
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Electricity Ltd (HEAP) and the Electric Transportation Company SA. They 
provided electricity and transportation services to the Athens-Piraeus region, 
respectively. Both belonged to the General Hellenic Company SA, known as 
Power Group, which was controlled by UK companies.106 Progressively, two 
prominent Greek businessmen, Alexandros Tsatsos, mentioned above, and Stratis 
Andreadis cooperated with this group. Andreadis was a prominent shipowner 
who was initially involved in transportation and banking and who controlled the 
Commercial Bank. Progressively, he became engaged in manufacturing, forming 
the second major business group in Greece. Andreadis was also the president of 
the Greek Ship-owners Association (GSU), the representative body of shipowners 
situated at Piraeus. These two businessmen, cooperating within the Industrial 
Development Corporation SA (IDC), bridged domestic industry with the inward-
looking fraction of shipping capital. Such ship-owners invested mainly in sectors 
related to their international activities such as shipbuilding and oil refineries, 
opening the road for FDI in Greece. Certainly, the merchant marine was 
traditionally the most competitive and dynamic sector of Greek 
entrepreneurship. 
Importers were mainly represented by the local Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry where industrialists were in the minority.107 The most important of 
these was the Athens Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ACCI). From trade 
BIAs, important also was the Athens Trade Association (ATA). Exporters were 
represented by the Panhellenic Exporters Association (PEA) which had been 
established in 1945, representing agricultural unions and companies along with 
tobacco and mining companies. Tobacco companies were also represented by 
the Federation of Greek Tobacco Traders (FGTT). 
This study has confirmed the existence of several informal networks which linked 
businessmen and the state apparatuses, though it has only scratched the surface 
and much more work needs to be in this direction because the historiography has 
not yet considered them. This study will primarily consider the main institutions 
and committees which were the formal channels of state-business relations. To 
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begin with, the FGI was represented formally to the Boards or the Supervisory 
Councils of the BoG, the CLC and the EDFO. Importantly, FGI members had 
adopted close ties with the NBG. Simultaneously, the federation participated on 
several ministerial committees, such as the Industrial Council (IC) which 
delivered its opinion to the government on the importation of machinery and the 
licensing of new industries by the state. Additionally, the FGI participated on the 
committee, created in 1953, which evaluated the applications for foreign direct 
investments. Equally important was the Permanent Tariff Committee (PTC) 
which was a committee within the economics ministry composed of high-ranking 
state managers and peak-level business representatives. This committee had 
been established in 1910, charged with the revision of the customs tariff at the 
time and after the war it remained powerful, rejuvenated in 1953, when the 
abolition of import quotas necessitated the upgrading of tariff protection. 
Moreover, the FGI participated in the Anti-dumping Committee which had been 
established within the finance ministry in 1955, charged with the enforcement of 
the new anti-dumping law. 
As will be argued, businesses were either represented or they participated 
directly in institutions charged with the formulation of long-term planning 
thereby playing a substantive role in the decision-making process. To begin with, 
the most important of these institutions was the Reconstruction Organization 
(RO) created in 1946 and succeeded by the Greek Marshall Plan Committee in 
1947. In early 1948 the Marshall Committee was transformed into the Supreme 
Council for Reconstruction (ASA). In late 1948 the establishment of the 
Implementation Service of the Reconstruction Plan (YSESA) followed and both 
were incorporated within the coordination ministry and were merged with the 
permanent delegation to the OEEC.108 After 1951 several ad hoc committees 
attempted to institutionalize business interests, such as the Council of 
Productive Forces. This was a quasi-formal meeting forum between the 
government and the main BIAs which occasionally was associated with a loose 
federation of the main industrial and commercial BIAs, except for the FGI. It was 
 
108 The Greek Permanent Delegation to OEEC was initially headed by the engineer Alexandros 
Verdelis, president of the Technical Chamber of Greece (TCG). He was very soon replaced by the 
engineer Professor Leandros Nikolaidis, subsequently recruited by Bodosakis. Both supported 
energetically the adoption of heavy industry. Since August 1955 the delegation was headed by 
Theodoros Christidis, a conservative and highly ranked official of the Athens Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (ACCI) during the inter-war period. 
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this Committee of Productive Forces which was mainly preoccupied with the 
reduction of the labour costs. In 1951 the FGI participated with the US mission 
and the Greek government in a tripartite committee for the formulation of 
industrial policy but it was a short-lived effort. New efforts for the formalization 
of state-business relations at the highest level were made in April 1956 when 
they attempted to collect data for tariff protection and the formulation of an 
industrial policy and a new developmental plan. Very soon, however, European 
integration conditioned these initiatives. The agricultural and industrial 
committees for the specification of Greece’s response to the FTA, established in 
April 1957, were later morphed into the Research and Organization Committee 
for Economic Planning (ROCEP). From this institution emerged a new set of 
industrial policies and the first comprehensive developmental program in 1960. 
In late 1959 there followed the IDC, charged with the implementation of the 
industrial plan within the framework of the Greek-German economic and 
business relations.  
3. Sources 
Most historians have predominately utilized foreign archives to reconstruct 
Greece’s post-war history and this is understandable given the significance of 
the external factor. However, in this way domestic forces which were equally 
important have been underestimated or even neglected. Thus, the absence of 
any systematic consideration of organized business interests during the period 
discussed was the first difficulty which this research had to address. The 
identification of the basic structure of business interest representation and the 
collection of basic information for the main industrial BIAs of the time, required 
an extensive reading of various economic and business magazines and 
newspapers. Valuable in this respect, were the Vovolinis Archive held at 
Gennadius Library and the unclassified Ioannis Frangos Archive held at the 
Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive. This latter archive, among various 
primary and secondary material for the tariff policy and the attitudes of 
businessmen and state agencies for European integration, included minutes of 
the Permanent Tariff Committee and correspondence with BIAs for a short 
period after import liberalization in 1953. Never accessed before, it provided a 
panorama of the main BIAs upon which this study is largely based. The above 
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sources, combined with the official publications of the main BIAs, such as their 
annual reviews, and the Bulletins of the FGI and the ACCI, guided the research 
further. They offered a first but valuable insight in respect to BIAs’ public 
attitudes towards the evolving European integration and Greece’s situation 
within the process. However, once the main BIAs were identified and their 
published attitudes specified, the responses for the status and the accessibility 
of the FGI and the PUTI archives were not encouraging. For this reason, the 
research entered the phase of the consideration of primary sources looking in 
two directions. The first were mainly bank and business archives, aiming 
primarily to consider individual companies and the finance structures of 
industry. The second were public archives and individual collections, aiming to 
consider state agencies in respect to Greece’s European policy, as well as the 
industrial and commercial policies applied. From both kinds of archives, it was 
expected that business interests would be traced back in their interactions with 
the concerns and the priorities of state agencies. Indeed, a variety of archives 
included primary sources in respect of the political action of individual 
companies and of various BIAs.    
In respect of the consideration of individual companies and business finance, the 
Historical Archives of the Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation was of 
paramount importance. In particular, the CLC and the EDFO sub-archives made it 
possible to trace back the development of the main companies financed by the 
counterpart funds and to examine their investment strategies. It was thus 
helpful to approach the dominant business interests represented within the high 
echelons of the FGI and other BIAs. The National Bank of Greece Historical 
Archive along with the Currency Committee Archive held at the General State 
Archives of Greece were also helpful in this respect. 
The Bank of Greece Archive, and especially the Zolotas sub-archive which has 
become accessible only recently and was thus utilized for the first time for such 
research, provided crucial information to the first reaction of Greece to the FTA 
highlighting the largely underestimated role of the BoG in the formulation of 
Greece’s European strategy. Importantly, this archive contained much of the 
correspondence of Konstantinos Karamanlis with Ioannis Pesmazoglou, Greece’s 
chief negotiator for both the FTA and the association with the EEC.     
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The Democratic Centre Union Archive and the Sofoklis Venizelos Archive, 
contained valuable material for the period of the Marshall Plan. They included 
correspondence with both organized BIAs and individual companies, casting light 
upon business demands, their justification and their impact upon the 
formulation of economic policies. Equally, the Diomedes Archive offered 
material for the formulation of the developmental plans during the 
reconstruction period and the input from business.   
The research in the Diplomatic and Historical Archives of the Foreign Ministry 
was time consuming but the material was quite useful. Much of this material has 
been utilized for the first time here helping to illustrate dimensions of Greece’s 
road to Europe which were, until now, blurred. In particular, it provided primary 
sources for Greece’s foreign economic and commercial policies, including their 
European dimension. Of primary importance was the correspondence of the 
ministries involved with the permanent delegation to OEEC, as well as the 
material for analysing Greek-German economic and commercial relations. 
Crucially, such material was also provided by the Constantine Tsatsos Papers 
held at Gennadius Library. Equally useful for these policies were the archival 
collections held at the Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation. Additionally, 
these collections offered information about the interaction of business and state 
agencies for the formulation of the industrial and tariff policies and for the 
export incentives to industry. In addition, the published archival collections of 
the Foreign Ministry and Konstantinos Karamanlis were also utilized as were the 
digital archives of OEEC and GATT. Moreover, the official publications of many 
state organizations and ministries provided useful information.  
 
4. Structure of the thesis  
The thesis consists of three main parts which contain six substantive chapters 
plus this introductory chapter and a concluding chapter. The main parts follow a 
chronological order. The first part considers the developments from the 
immediate post-war years until the termination of the Marshall plan and the 
subsequent internal economic reforms in early 1953 which had reversed the 
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deteriorating course of the Greek economy. These reforms included the 
devaluation of Drs by 50%, the abolition of quantitative restrictions and the 
legislation of the favourable treatment of FDI. The second part examines the 
period until the collapse of the negotiations for FTA in 1958, which marks the 
end of an important episode in early European integration and coincides with the 
conclusion of the Greek-German economic agreement which tied even more 
Greece to the locomotive of European integration. The final part concludes in 
1962, when the Association Agreement took effect and Greece’s developmental 
path had been largely specified. Each part comprises of two thematic chapters 
and starts with an overview of the main politico-economic developments of the 
period, explaining how they were related to the process of European integration. 
Each overview serves as the introduction to the two thematic chapters which 
follow. These two chapters within each part consider the main axes upon which 
state agencies and businessmen interacted to guide Greece’s participation in 
European integration. In a broad sense, the first axis is based upon the 
endeavour to industrialize and resolve the imbalance problem, primarily 
examining the formulation and implementation of industrial policy and the 
evolution of big businesses in the main manufacturing sectors. The treatment of 
the effort towards industrialization precedes, not only for analytical reasons, but 
also because it was the prime objective of contemporaries and the main 
incentive to adapt commercial relations with third countries and particularly 
with the EEC. Thus, the second axis considers the commercial policy and deals 
directly with the course of the Greek state and domestic big business towards 
European integration.  
The first chapter examines how and why Greece called for US aid in 1946, 
showing how this aid was utilized by the private sector for the development of 
the secondary sector and why this utilization was presupposed to restore the 
pre-1945 patterns of Greek-German economic and business relations. The 
reliance upon US finance and the need to increase import capacity implied that 
Greece had to participate in the international and regional trade liberalization 
schemes advanced by the US. This is the theme of the second chapter, which 
examines the participation of Greece in GATT, the European customs union, the 
Council of Europe and the EPU along with the attached Code of Liberalization 
within the OEEC.  
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Chapter three considers the formulation of industrial policy as a response to 
increasing European competition after the abolition of import restrictions and 
the consolidation of Greek-German economic relations in both the public and the 
private sectors. It shows how and why both businessmen and state agencies 
progressively identified the country’s viability within those relationships. In the 
next chapter it is argued that these relationships prescribed Greece’s reaction to 
the progress of European integration. In particular, chapter four examines 
Greece’s reaction to the pressure for tariff disarmament within GAAT and from 
the Low Tariff Club within OEEC.109 Subsequently, it elaborates the response to 
the challenge posed by the plans of the Six for a customs union in 1955 and 
especially the attempt to associate all OEEC members within a wider FTA. 
The fifth chapter explores the formal cooperation between business and state 
agencies to adapt industrial policy to the realities which the formation of the 
customs union in 1959 entailed. Subsequently, it examines this endeavour within 
the framework of the evolution of Greek-German economic and business 
relationships, demonstrating the growing dependence of Greece upon the 
Federal Republic for the solution of the imbalance problem. In the last chapter 
it is argued that this dependence was a prime motive in applying for an 
association agreement with the EEC in mid-1959 and highlights its significance 
for the way that Greece was finally integrated to the customs union. Moreover, 
it considers the deployment of the substantive strategy of Greece towards the 
EEC by elaborating its origins. The concluding chapter returns to the questions 
which the thesis has posed and attempts to incorporate its findings within the 
existing literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
109 The Low Tariff Club included the countries Benelux, Denmark, Sweden and 
Switzerland.  
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 STABILIZATION (1945-1952)  
During the first years of the period 1945-1952, Greece’s socioeconomic and 
political edifice was on the verge of collapse and Greek capitalism was seriously 
threatened. Indeed, following the retreat of the occupation forces in 1944, the 
crippling of both industrial and agricultural production was accompanied by 
hyperinflation and the communist movement claimed power. Under these 
circumstances, in 1945 and 1946 Greece asked and received generous relief by 
the Military Liaison and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA).1   
Within this uncertain politico-economic environment, the demands of Greek 
business were twofold. On the one hand, it had asked for capital inflows and the 
reduction of the production costs by the state, mainly the interest rate, taxation 
and insurance charges, aiming to assist production and to initiate reconstruction. 
On the other, it highlighted the necessity for the preservation of private 
property rights and the rule of law, which meant the defeat of communism and 
the restoration of power of the propertied classes. The Greek government had 
the same priorities, asking for US aid in order to initiate ‘reconstruction’ and to 
restore ‘order’.2 Indeed, the US intervened through the Truman Doctrine in 1947 
and the Marshall Plan in 1948 and the aid provided was decisive in the tentative 
restoration of production and the preservation of the rule of law. From 1947 
until 1952 it provided approximately $1.8 billion of economic and military aid, 
on average 8.3% of the Greek GDP for the years 1948-1952 which covered almost 
entirely both the budget and the current account deficits financing, 
simultaneously, the contact of the civil war.3  At the heart of these US programs, 
and especially of the ERP, were the counterpart funds,4 the Drs equivalent of 
the value of imports financed by the US which were channelled to investments 
 
1 Athanasios Lykogiannis, Britain and the Greek economic crisis, 1944-1947 from liberation to 
the Truman Doctrine (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2002), pp. 53-9.    
2 Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives, Foreign Ministry, Documentary History of Greece, 
1943-1951: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, ed. by Photini Tomai (Athens: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 2011), (hereafter YDIAMP), Greek Government to the U.S. 
Mission in Athens, 7 August 1947, pp. 157-62.  
3 Michalis Psalidopoulos, Supervisors at Despair: American Consultants in Greece, 1947-1953. 
From Paul A. Porter to Edward A. Tenenbaum (Athens: Metamesonykties Ekdoseis, 2013), pp. 41-
7.  
4 Milward, The European, pp. 82-6. 
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only with the approval of the Americans, giving them considerable leverage in 
internal politico-economic affairs. This intervention served also US interests. 
In the post-war era the US emerged as the indispensable capitalist world power 
based upon its superior technology and industrial dynamism characterized by its 
large-scale production. The dominant sections of US big business along with 
state agencies envisioned a post-war international order at the centre of which 
was the support of developmentalism as a generalized goal within a multilateral 
trading system. This was the core of the US Open-Door policy.5 This strategy 
aimed primarily to stabilize US business and the domestic economy, first with 
the achievement of full employment and, second, with the elimination of the 
disruptive overproduction tendencies which were quite evident during the inter-
war years and which had resurfaced after the war. Indeed, US big businesses 
represented by the Committee for Economic Development (CED), had related 
the achievement of full employment and the elimination of the overproduction 
tendencies from the free flow of both investment capital and goods 
internationally.6 Thus, they were clear enough proposing that:      
The wider market resulting from an expanded international trade would 
offer more foreign buyers for goods in the production of which we have 
excess facilities and a comparative advantage, such as aluminum and 
machine tools. We would not thereby be “solving our problem of general 
overproduction,” for we should have to find a market for the goods 
eventually sent us in payment unless we, in effect, gave the exported goods 
away. It does mean that certain of our industries with surplus capacity 
would find abroad a larger receptivity for their products if foreign countries 
were able to gain American dollars by selling their goods on our expanded 
domestic market.7   
Evidently, for the rest of the capitalist world, and especially Europe which had 
suffered severe material damages, this US policy presupposed its economic 
revival and development within a multilateral trade and payments system. If 
Europe continued to follow the pre-1945 path of closed and autarkic trade blocs, 
 
5 Berghahn, American, 288-93;299-301. 
6 Calvin B. Hoover, International Trade and Domestic Employment (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1945). 
7 Ibid., pp. 22-3. 
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it would not be able to trade with the US on a sustainable basis. This would 
mean that the so called ‘dollar gap’ in Europe would be growing, undermining 
the US prime objectives.8 The answer was the revival of both European dollar 
earnings exports and intra-European trade. This, however, was not the unique 
aim of the US. 
For Europe economic reconstruction and development was associated with the 
achievement of two political goals. Firstly, it would guarantee the protection of 
private property rights and restore the power of the ‘propertied classes and 
dominant elites wherever they existed’.9 Secondly, it promised the absorption of 
the idle-labour force and the increase of its purchasing power. Both were 
deemed by the US as prerequisites for the construction of frontline capitalist 
states in the context of the Cold War. For the realization of these objectives the 
US proposed the economic and political integration of Europe along the lines of 
its own experience during the nineteenth century.10 The US claimed that a large 
market was conducive to economies of scale in production and distribution, 
promising to increase productivity and prosperity; such a market could stimulate 
competitiveness, eliminating the dollar gap in Europe and restoring equilibrium 
in international payments. This was the main economic aim of the ERP, which 
from 1948 until 1952 allocated more than thirteen billion dollars to sixteen 
European states which had formed the OEEC for the coordination of this 
purpose. It was expected that by 1952 Europe would have achieved viability, 
which meant that she would not need further aid to purchase US exports. 
At the international level, the pressure for a multilateral trading system was 
channelled through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
whereas, at the European level it took place through the customs union in 1947 
and 1948 but from late 1949 it was pursued through the EPU and the related 
trade liberalization programme within the OEEC. At the same time, the European 
movement, inspired by the war-time resistance leaders, envisaged a federal 
Europe as a means to preserve peace although these efforts were not enough to 
 
8 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (London: Methuen, 1984), 
pp. 162-78.   
9 Harvey, The New, pp.132-6. 
10 Hogan, The Marshall.   
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persuade European state agencies and businessmen who had their own priorities 
in relation to European integration.  
To begin with, the US proposals for a customs union faced opposition from 
Europe and this was especially true of the UK. In August 1947 the French 
proposed a customs union with Benelux countries and Italy and included 
Germany because otherwise they considered that they could not control the 
Ruhr region.11 Despite Ernest Bevin’s attitude that the western ‘defensive 
alliance’ could be based upon the customs union12, the British economic 
ministries13 and the FBI14 rejected this prospect because it was incompatible 
with the preferential trading system with the commonwealth. Because the US 
opposed this British closed trading bloc, the UK proposed a study group to 
consider the customs union ‘away from the American influence in Paris’ only to 
let the matter drop very soon.15  From late 1949, efforts for economic 
integration were renewed within the OEEC framework now through the 
multilateral offset mechanism European Payments Union (EPU), a scheme 
financed by the US, with the aim of promoting intra-European trade and the 
reduction of quotas. 
The French, given the significance of the iron and steel industry, had largely 
conditioned the success of their reconstruction plans upon the control of Ruhr’s 
coal and coke reserves. In early 1950 they proposed a plan to internationalize 
the iron and steel industry and the newly established Federal Republic was quick 
to accept it, for Konrad Adenauer considered that it would lift the limitations 
upon its sovereignty and the restrictions upon German heavy industry.16 The 
reaction of the latter was mixed, with the faction of big businesses preferring a 
cartel arrangement instead of the US ‘antitrust’ input to the Schuman Plan, to 
accept the High Authority of the ECSC for political reasons.17  In the meantime, 
US big business, being in agreement with US state agencies which implemented 
the Marshall Plan, had supported their German counterparts in their endeavour 
 
11 Milward, The Reconstruction, pp. 178-9.   
12 Ibid., p. 180.  
13 Ibid., pp. 184-96.   
14 Rollings, British, pp. 79-82. 
15 Milward, The Reconstruction, p. 184.   
16 Ibid., pp. 305-13.   
17 Buhrer, ‘German Industry’, pp. 102-3; Berghahn, American, p. 323-4. 
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to stop the dismantling of German plants and to lift the Allied restrictions upon 
industrial output.18 Very soon, it was understood that only the Federal Republic 
and its heavy industry could drive European integration, supplying the 
appropriate mechanical equipment for investments across Europe and assisting 
the revival of intra-European trade. Unsurprisingly, the idea of a united Europe 
was ‘strongly supported’19 by German chemical and electrical big businesses 
which were already export oriented in the pre-1945 era, and the BDI had 
welcomed both the EPU and the related trade liberalization.20 Instead, British 
heavy industry was cautious with the ECSC prospect and, mainly for this reason, 
the UK did not participate as a full member.21 These developments were at the 
heart of the first substantive phase of European integration. 
The response of Greek business and state agencies to this phase of European 
integration is largely the theme of chapter two. Certainly, the evaluation of this 
response presupposes an understanding of the complex politico-economic 
situation of Greece. During the occupation the communist oriented resistance 
movement, the National Liberation Front (EAM), had fought against both the 
Nazi forces and their internal collaborators. After the war, the rift between the 
communists and the, mostly right-wing, ‘nationalist-minded’ and anti-communist 
political and social forces, which had ties with war-time collaborators and 
utilized them, escalated dramatically.22 It was an expression of a polarization 
rooted to ‘two diametrically opposite political, economic and social visions.’23 In 
December 1944 the military wing of EAM, which controlled at the time all the 
country except for Athens, was defeated in the Greek capital by the combined 
Greek and British troops. Based upon the territorial status quo which came up 
after the war and agreed subsequently with the USSR in October 1944, the UK 
had decided to dissolve the EAM in order to control Greece, aiming to utilize its 
geopolitical position in order to protect British interests in the oil rich Middle 
 
18 Berghahn, American, pp. 307-12.  
19 Harm G. Schröter, ‘The German Question, the Unification of Europe, and the European Market 
Strategies of Germany's Chemical and Electrical Industries, 1900-1992', Business History Review 
67-3 (1993), 395. 
20 Buhrer, ‘German Industry’, pp. 101. 
21 Rollings, British Business, pp.  83-92. 
22 André Gerolymatos, An International Civil-War: Greece, 1943–1949 (London: Yale University 
Press, 2016), pp. 99-142. 
23 Rizas, From Liberation, pp. 14-5. 
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East region and the Suez Canal.24 Thereafter, mainly in response to the state’s 
massive repression and persecution25, the Greek Communist Party and its 
followers decided to fight for the political power and the country entered in to a 
civil war which started in the middle of 1946 and ended only in late 1949. The 
defeat of the communists confirmed the orientation of Greece towards the 
capitalist bloc and its inclusion in NATO in 1952, providing in turn, military 
security against the communist bloc.26   
The fragmentation of the nationalist-minded political forces made the 
management of this polarization difficult. From 1945 until 1952 about fifteen 
successive governments were formed headed by the pre-1945 traditional leaders 
of the Populist and Liberal parties. After 1945 the royalist Populist Party was still 
headed by its pre-war leader Konstantinos Tsaldaris. Instead, the republican 
Liberal Party had disintegrated into three main segments. The first was the 
conservative centre-right faction headed by Sofoklis Venizelos, Georgios 
Papandreou and Panayiotis Kanellopoulos. The second faction represented the 
republican moderate centre and was headed by Themistoklis Sophoulis. The 
third section was the republican centre-left faction headed by Nikolaos Plastiras 
and Emanuel Tsouderos.  
With only a few exceptions, all governments were coalitions of these parties and 
factions. Their main tasks were to utilize the huge economic aid effectively and 
to mobilize the internal resources for both reconstruction and against the 
communists. There is an agreement in Greek literature that these were largely 
the criteria with which their performance was evaluated by the British until 1946 
and thereafter by the US.27 Until the first post-war elections in March 1946, and 
under the pressure of the British for politically moderate cabinets, the leaders of 
the fragmented liberal party, Papandreou, Plastriras, Petros Voulgaris, 
 
24 Gerolymatos, An International, pp. xi-xii. 
25 There is a huge literature which deals with the roots of the civil war. For the argument 
adopted here see: National Institute for Research and Studies ‘Eleftherios K. Venizelos’, Sofoklis 
Venizelos Archive (hereafter GR/NIRSEV/SVA) 226/13/140, George P. Skouras to Al. Vamvetsos, 
New York, 24 April 1947. 
26 Rizas, Greek Politics, pp. 108-17. 
27 Lykogiannis, Britain; George Stasinopoulos, The Rhetoric of Development: Economic Ideas and 
Economic Policy during the Period of Reconstruction, 1944-1952 (Athens: Gutenberg, 2010); 
Stathakis, The Truman.    
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Panayiotis Kanellopoulos and Sophoulis, formed successive governments.28 The 
Populists, taking advantage of the absence of the communist left and, as 
Venizelos confirmed to AMAG, backed by the ‘rich’ and ‘all capitalists’, gained 
the majority vote in these elections and in September 1946 contracted a 
referendum which opened the road for the restoration of the monarchy in 
Greece.29  
As the civil war was escalated and, at the same time, business profits were 
frequently converted to gold sovereigns, the US pressed Tsaldaris to widen his 
government’s base and in January 1947 Venizelos, Papandreou and Kanellopoulos 
joined the cabinet.30 With the onset of the Truman Doctrine, the US pressure to 
broaden the basis of the government intensified and in September 1947 
Sophoulis joined the government as prime-minister.31 He was replaced after his 
death in July 1949 by the financier and liberal politician Alexandros Diomides. 
From the second post-war elections in March 1950 until November 1952, the 
centre and centre-left, occasionally with the support of the populists, provided 
successive coalition governments. Plastiras governed from April until August 
1950 and he was succeeded by Venizelos who was prime minister until November 
1951. Thereafter, Plastiras again became prime minister and governed with the 
minority participation of Venizelos. These weak governments had to deal with 
the drastic reduction of US economic aid and were obliged, despite their pre-
election commitments to the contrary, to enforce unpopular restrictive 
economic policies yet they did not challenge the established principles of limited 
state intervention and the protection of private property rights. At the time, the 
Americans, who were dissatisfied with the weaknesses of the centre, Spyros 
Markezinis and the ‘leaders of industry, finance and business’32, all supported 
the so-called Papagos solution. Indeed, the leader of the national army during 
the civil war was able to reorganize the right in order to formulate a stable 
 
28 Lykogiannis, Britain, p. 55. Petros Voulgaris was an admiral working at the time for the 
Bodosakis group. 
29 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/14/169, S. Venizelo’s interview with Griswold, 17 July 1947. 
30 Rizas, From Liberation, pp. 301;314-7; Lykogiannis, Britain, pp. 175-7. 
31 Vetsopoulos, The Economic, pp. 63-8; Stathakis, The Truman, pp. 169-72.  
32 FRUS/1951, Vol. IV, The Minister of Greece (Yost) to the Department of State, Athens, 4 
January 1951, p. 46. 
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government capable to carry on the twin objectives of economic development 
and anticommunism.33 In November 1952, he became prime minister.   
The situation at the economic level was equally problematic, and the general 
picture which emerges is that the US intervention saved Greek capitalism and its 
socioeconomic system. In the first place, in 1945 industrial production was less 
than one third of its pre-war level and agriculture less than half. The material 
losses during the occupation, even if the available estimates are not considered 
accurate, were severe and had substantially contributed to this result.34 The 
infrastructure, and especially transportation and communications, had been 
damaged considerably. The Greek merchant fleet had lost about 72% of its pre-
war tonnage. However, with some notable exceptions, the industrial mechanical 
equipment had not been damaged although this equipment had not been 
renewed but it was, in general, obsolete. Mainly as a result of the US aid, in 
1950 industrial production was above the pre-war level whereas the merchant 
fleet had revived even earlier. From 1949 until 1953 the average annual growth 
of GDP was almost 8%, which compared fairly with the trend in Europe, whereas 
industrial production was growing more than 13% annually, which was 
considerably above European standards.35 Yet, from 1948 until 1952, private 
investment in manufacturing was, for the post-war Greek standards, 
exceptionally high as a percentage of GDP but a considerable portion of private 
investments had been directed to housing.36 Public investments were channelled 
primarily to infrastructural works, particularly to transportation and 
communications which were necessary for both military purposes and to assist 
private industrial investments, and secondly to agriculture and housing. 
However, until 1952 the agricultural character of the economy had hardly 
changed and manufacturing was still dominated by its traditional labour-
 
33 Rizas, Greek Politics, pp. 69-108;130. 
34 Panos Kazakos, Between State and Market: Economy and Economic Policy in post-war Greece 
1944-2000 (Athens: Patakis, 2001), pp.57-60;79-86; George Politakis, The Post-War 
Reconstruction of Greece: A History of Economic Stabilization and Development, 1944-1952 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 31-8; Sokratis D. Petmezas, Introduction to the history of 
the Greek inter-war Agricultural Economy (Athens: Alexandreia, 2012), pp. 261-4.  
35 United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe in 1957 (Geneva: United Nations, 1958), ch. II, p. 
3; Appendix 1, table 5. 
36 Appendix 1, Table 3. 
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intensive branches.37 Even more, industry could not absorb the idle labour-force 
and unemployment was still severe.38  
Although about half of the counterpart funds had not been utilized by 1952, they 
had nevertheless contributed to the country’s economic growth. The counterpart 
funds were not fully utilized because they were channelled to cover the budget 
deficit and additionally it was considered by the US mission that their release 
would induce inflation.39 This was because the state budget was constantly 
deficient due to the exceptionally high military expenses on the one hand, and 
the problematic tax institutions along with the ability of the entrepreneurial 
classes to escape taxation, on the other. In the private sector, it was the 
unwillingness and, in some cases, the inability of private businesses to provide 
their part to the investment financed by the counterpart funds. For these 
reasons, very soon state agencies and businessmen turned to the Federal 
Republic for credits.  
The problems with the value of the currency and inflation was severe. The 
occupation period had inherited hyper-inflation which proved persistent until 
1946.40 Thereafter, it remained at high levels, approximately between 10% and 
15%. As a result, savings were not channelled to banks and the internal finance 
mechanism had collapsed. Instead, savings and profits were invested in more 
stable items, mainly to gold sovereigns, commodities and exchange. Given this 
trend and in the absence of a capital market, internal sources of capital were 
not mobilized for the financing of investments.41 This was the basis of the so-
called capital scarcity. It was only with the stabilization programme introduced 
in 1951, that inflationary tendencies were largely checked.  
The balance of trade was desperately in deficit, with exports covering, on 
average, only one quarter of imports.42 This problematic trade balance had many 
roots. The pre-war markets of central and Eastern Europe, and above all 
 
37 Appendix 1, Table 5. 
38 Appendix 1, Table 6. 
39 Vetsopoulos, The Economic, p. 374.  
40 Michael Palairet, The Four Ends of the Greek Hyperinflation (Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Press, 2000). 
41 Appendix 1, table 1. 
42 Appendix 1, table 8. 
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Germany, had been lost; exports were dominated by semi-luxury agricultural 
products which were exchanged for machinery and manufacturing facing 
progressively adverse terms of trade; both the agricultural and the traditional 
industrial sectors had low productivity; the ever-present inflation undermined 
competitiveness even more and, despite successive devaluations from 1944 until 
1949, it widened the gap between domestic and international prices. Last but 
not least, invisibles had dropped significantly from their pre-war level and could 
not cover the huge trade deficit.  
Importantly, the US had financed this deficit whereas Greece’s trade flows were 
redirected to Europe within the framework of the EPU.43 As will be argued, it 
was within this framework that the pre-war and war patterns of Greek-German 
trade had been restored. In 1952 the Federal Republic had absorbed one third of 
Greek tobacco and supplied about one third of the machinery imported by 
Greece. What had not changed in 1952, however, was the structure of Greece’s 
foreign trade and its competitiveness. As a result, the trade deficit was still 
huge.    
That the US financial and military aid rescued Greek capitalism, is almost 
indisputable in Greek historiography. By contrast, the extent to which the US 
economic aid was properly utilized and the reasons it did not restructure the 
domestic economy with the development of heavy industry, are the main issues 
for debate. Some have claimed that the Marshall Plan did not aim to restructure 
the economic base, but only to restore production to the pre-war levels.44  
Others, that the enforcement of the industrial part of the ERP was not among 
the plans of domestic business which resisted the adoption of heavy industry.45 
Another argument is that Greek state agencies resisted the appropriate internal 
reforms asked for by the US.46  Finally, others have claimed that, in fact, the 
Marshall Plan had fulfilled its main tasks, whereas the economy had simply 
limited absorption capacity because releases from the counterpart funds induced 
 
43 Appendix 1, Tables 10;11;12. 
44 Stathakis, The Truman.  
45 Politakis, The Post-War; Stasinopoulos, The Rhetoric. 
46 Michalis Psalidopoulos, Supervisors at Despair: American Consultants in Greece, 1947-1953. 
From Paul A. Porter to Edward A. Tenenbaum (Athens: Metamesonykties Ekdoseis, 2013).  
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inflation.47  This study adds a new dimension to this debate, showing that the 
adoption of heavy industry and core energy facilities presupposed the 
rehabilitation of Greek-German business and economic relations, but this effort 
was not easy because of the Nazi past. The circumstances under which Greece 
asked for US financial aid and utilized this aid to boost industrialization within 
the framework of reviving Greek-German relations, is the theme of chapter one. 
Importantly, this growing historiography has not addressed this period within the 
framework of the first phase of European integration (1947-1955) and has almost 
ignored the significance of Greek-German political and economic relations. Thus, 
the conclusion is that Greece turned to Europe only after 1953. To this 
chronology studies which have considered the issue through the lens of Greek-
US-German relations also agree.48 Instead, those who have considered the issue 
before this year, derive the Greek European stance from the pro-European 
attitude of Greece’s representatives within the Council of Europe during the 
years 1949-1954.49 This study claims that Greece’s formal European strategy was 
cautious and informed by the viability problem as it was defined by the 
interaction of state agencies and businessmen. This is the theme of chapter two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 Apostolos Vetsopoulos, The Economic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan in Greece, 1947-1952: 
The Origins of the Greek economic miracle (Athens: Gutenberg, 2007).  
48 Pelt, Tying, 73-80.  
49 Minotou, ‘The European’, pp. 86-94; Kazakos, Between, 97-8.   
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 The US intervention and the rehabilitation of 
Greek-German economic and business 
relations 
This chapter explores industrialization and its aims within the Marshall Plan 
framework and the evolution of Greek-German economic relations. The first 
section examines how and why in early 1946 a broad circle of businessmen and 
state agencies called on the US to provide financial aid. It shows that their 
declared aims were to obtain the financial and exchange means for economic 
reconstruction and to defeat the communist threat. Indeed, financial aid did 
arrive, and the communist movement was defeated. However, the aid, despite 
the frustration of the US mission and the Currency Committee, provided 
simultaneously the gold and exchange means for the translation of business 
profits to stable values. The second section shows that the US mission had a 
decisive impact upon the priorities established by the developmental plan in 
1948. It intervened in the domestic debate, supporting the businessmen and the 
state agencies which claimed that only the provision of ample and cheap energy 
for the adoption of heavy industry would promote industrialization on a healthy 
basis, capable of absorbing the idle labour force.  
The third section shows that the developmental plan submitted to OEEC in 
November 1948 was not plausible and the US mission stepped back in 1950 
enforcing instead restrictive monetary and credit policies. Simultaneously, it 
attempted to remove the obstacles which the state posed to business, aiming to 
mobilize the gold in which profits were primarily invested. However, the 
adoption of heavy industry had now acquired an indispensable internal dynamic, 
but this was not the unique legacy of the Marshall Plan which produced long-
term results. This is shown in the last section, which follows the implementation 
of the industrial part of the plan. It argues that on the one hand, the 
counterpart funds stabilized the monopolistic position of the main big businesses 
in the internal market, except for those in cotton textiles. On the other, it 
advocates that the realization of the plan presupposed the rehabilitation of 
Greek-German economic relations.  
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1.1  Industrialization plans, capital scarcity and industrial policy  
1.1.1 The pre-war experience 
There is no doubt that state agencies and businessmen in post-war Greece had 
to deal with the restoration of both the substantive and the formal unity of the 
circuit of capital. At the time, this had been identified as Greece’s viability, a 
target which later became the cornerstone of the Marshall Plan. However, the 
discussion for the conditions under which Greece would become viable is rooted 
in the inter-war period, when the term viability first appeared. The substrata for 
the development of the perspectives adopted was the mass labour inflows which 
took place after the Asia Minor ‘catastrophe’ in 1922.1  These inflows had 
signalled the return of the majority of the population with Greek nationality to 
the Greek nation-state. Importantly, this retreat had put an end to the plans of 
Greek nationalism for territorial gains, known as the Greek Great Idea. The 
materialization of these expansionist plans was considered in that it could not 
only ameliorate the overpopulation problem. For both businessmen and state 
agencies it also promised to widen the small internal market and thus to assist 
industrialization and particularly the adoption of big businesses capable of large-
scale production.2 Simultaneously, the mass emigration of Greeks, approximately 
half a million people between 1890 and early 1920s which were directed 
primarily to the US, was interrupted. These developments had two major 
consequences. 
In the first place, they increased the population by almost one fifth at once, 
adding approximately one million two hundred thousand people. In economic 
terms, these inflows had boosted the internal market encouraging 
industrialization. However, it facilitated the adoption of small-scale businesses 
in traditional manufacture and trade, for such businesses required relatively 
small amounts of investment capital.3 Moreover, the refugees had 
 
1 Christos Hadziiosif, ‘Perspectives about the viability of Greece and the role of industry’, in A 
Tribute to Nikos Svoronos, ed. by Vasilis Kremmydas and others, 2 vols (Rethymno: Crete 
University, 1986), I, pp. 330-68.  
2 Hatziiosif, The Waning, pp. 96-7. 
3 Christos Hadziiosif, ‘The refuge shock, constants and variables of the Greek economy’, in 
History of the 20th century Greece: the interwar 1922 – 1940, ed. by Christos Hadziiosif, 5 vols 
(Athens: Vivliorama, 2002), II, Part I, pp. 9-57.   
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simultaneously exaggerated the so-called surplus population problem, attributed 
by contemporaries to the ensuing imbalance between land and population. This 
was perceived to be the main problem of Greece. The dominant view, of the 
ability of Greece to respond adequately, was coming from conservative state 
agencies and was pessimistic: natural resources were neither sufficient to feed 
the growing population nor adequate to support industrialization.4 To be sure, 
this was also the view of the League of Nations at the time.5 
Secondly, they signalled the shrinkage of repatriated capital, which accrued to 
Greek businessmen from their traditional and international economic activities, 
mainly from trade and shipping. This development interrupted an investment 
trend which had contributed to Greece’s industrialization and economic 
development since the 1860s.6 Moreover, especially after the Great Depression, 
in the absence of a stock market, businesses were financed with short term 
capital by the NBG whereas investments were financed primarily from retained 
earnings.7 In the public sector, the resettlement of the refugees required huge 
expenditures which were covered by state loans.8 For contemporaries, agrarian 
overpopulation was thereafter coupled with the exaggeration of the so-called 
scarcity of capital. After 1922, with the significant exception of shipping, 
economic development and industrialization was confined within the fixed 
boundaries of the Greek nation-state. 
The Great Depression in 1929 rapidly deteriorated the imbalances of both the 
external accounts and the state’s budget. In response, the Greek government in 
mid-1932 suspended the convertibility of Drs to gold and the service of the 
public debt, devaluing and imposing extensive exchange controls.9 Thereafter, 
following the general trend in Europe, Greece resorted to autarkic economic 
policies and bilateral clearing trade agreements to promote economic 
development and to balance its external accounts. At the core of this policy was 
 
4 K. D. Sfyris, ‘Under which circumstances Greece can become viable?’, Archives of Economic 
and Social Sciences, 11-3 (1931), 291-354.  
5 National Institute for Research and Studies ‘Eleftherios K. Venizelos’, Eleftherios Venizelos 
Archive (hereafter GR/NIRSEV/EVA) 173/064/28, League of Nations-Financial Committee: Report 
to the Council, June 1933. 
6 Margarita Dritsas, Industry and Banks in Inter-war Greece, (Athens: MIET, 1990), pp. 213-7. 
7 Hatziiosif, The Waning, pp. 260-4. 
8 Dimosthenis S. Stefanidis, The Inflow of Foreign Capital and its Economic and Political 
Consequences (Thessaloniki: University of Thessaloniki, 1931), pp. 231-307. 
9 Mark Mazower, Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis (Athens: MIET, 2002), pp. 239-67. 
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autarky in wheat and the systematization of the protection of industry from 
foreign competition. As expected, the reliance upon tobacco exports, the main 
exportable and exchange earning product, which provided the means for the 
importation of mechanical equipment mainly from Germany, increased 
significantly.10  
Under these circumstances manufacturing, which at the time was dominated by 
textiles, light chemicals and foodstuff, was shielded from foreign competition by 
tariffs and quotas. Despite the restrictions on the importation of mechanical 
equipment, which substantiated the cautious stance of the responsible 
authorities for the prospects of manufacture, such a protection had boosted 
industrialization in the above sectors.11 As was the norm in Europe, in many 
sectors such as textiles and cement, cartels and sales syndicates had been 
formed. Simultaneously, protection had fostered private monopolies with high 
final prices, nourishing industries known as tariff dependent industries.  
Even if the inter-war industrialization could not absorb the idle labour force, 
businessmen insisted on this prospect aiming to legitimating their demands. In 
particular, big business had reacted to the cautious stance of state agencies to 
the prospect of industrialization, claiming instead that this option was not only 
feasible, but also that it was the only one promising to provide a long-term 
solution to the overpopulation problem. PUTI’s president’s public statement is 
representative of business attitudes: 
The demographic problem of Greece during the previous crucial years, as 
the President of the Federation of Industrialists Mr Andreas Hatzikiriakos has 
repeatedly emphasized to the responsible authorities, was not resolved via 
emigration and agricultural [development] or by erecting barricades on the 
roads to the capital city and Piraeus. Instead, it was resolved by Industry, 
which absorbed thousands of working hands.12  
 
10 Mogens Pelt, Tobacco, Arms and Politics: Greece and Germany from World Crisis to World War 
1929-41 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1998). 
11 Supreme Economic Council, The Greek Economy during the year 1938 (Athens: Pyrsoi SA, 
1939), pp. 32-8. 
12 Ioannis Terzakis, ‘Greek Industry & the State, VE, August 1934, 14-6. 
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The discussion among businessmen and state agencies was concentrated upon 
the question of whether the development of new industries, and especially those 
which did not utilize domestic raw materials, was feasible or not. Progressively, 
and especially after the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936, there 
were business interests and state agencies which had considered the adoption of 
heavy industry. The common characteristic of these initiatives was that they 
were based, directly or indirectly, upon German industry. This was especially 
true for the utilization of ores and minerals, such as lignite, bauxite and iron ore 
deposits. Beyond these sectors, German businesses had already monopolized 
telecommunications and radio-casting, adopting also close relations with the 
only developed branch of the metal-using industry, the Bodosakis armament 
company, EPK.13 These economic relations were further developed with the 
bilateral clearing trade agreement between Greece and Germany signed in 1932. 
After 1936 commercial relations were boosted significantly. In 1938 the German 
market was absorbing about 40% of Greek exports and about half of tobacco 
exports. To match the growing value of exports, Greek industry imported 
German mechanical equipment and transportation items. In this way, economic 
relations were very soon expanded to other branches, including the production 
of electricity and transportation, challenging the primacy of UK businesses in the 
field. As will be shown, during the occupation these links were further forged, 
embracing almost all the sectors and branches of the economy.  
The neo-Malthusian reasoning which had guided the actions of state managers in 
the inter-war period was not a Greek novelty. Indeed, that the economic 
problem of Central and Eastern Europe was overpopulation matched with capital 
scarcity, was a politico-economic analysis which had been elaborated after the 
Great Depression by businessmen and state agencies in both Great Britain and 
Germany.14 Yet they had suggested that only agricultural modernization 
combined with limited industrial development, mainly food processing, textiles 
and mining, in the periphery of Europe would absorb the idle-labour force. It 
was also considered that such economic modernization could increase the supply 
 
13 Christos Hadziiosif, The Waning Moon: Industry in Greek Economy 1830-1940 (Athens: 
Themelio, 1993), pp. 118-200; Pelt, Tobacco, pp. 133-81;241-54. 
14 Stephen G. Gross, Export Empire - German Soft Power in Southeastern Europe, 1890–1945 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 253-72; Michele Alacevich, ‘Planning Peace: 
The European Roots of the Post-War Global Development Challenge’, Past & Present, 239-1 
(2018), 219-64. 
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of the much-needed agricultural products and raw materials to the developed 
regions and, in turn, it could increase the periphery’s purchasing power for the 
capital goods produced in the core. This economic doctrine guided a substantive 
part of German businesses which, pressed by the excess capacity induced after 
the First World War, had resorted to cartelization and to their progressive 
expansion to South-eastern Europe under the Nazi umbrella. 15 Certainly, these 
developments were an inheritance that conditioned Greece’s industrialization in 
the post-war era.  
1.1.2 Post-war era 
In the post-war era, the neo-Malthusian reading of the Greek political economy 
was re-stated and elaborated by Xenophon Zolotas in 1945.16 For the dominant 
and most influential economist of post-war Greece, the substantive problem of 
the country was rooted in the ‘tragic imbalance’ between ‘soil’ and 
‘population’.17  Following explicitly the analysis of the League of Nations back in 
1933, he emphasized that the high density of agricultural population was 
translated to an exceptionally low productivity in agriculture whereas the 
prospects of industrialization were limited.  
This claim revitalized the debate which had dominated economic analysis during 
the inter-war period. At the centre of discussion was still the role that industry 
might play towards the solution of the imbalance problem.18 State agencies and 
businessmen were still divided over the prospects of industrialization.19 On the 
one side, there were those who emphasized the limited natural resources, 
mainly with respect to raw materials and fuels, as well as the backward 
technology and the capital scarcity to show that there were objective limits to 
industrialization. For them, among whom in 1945 was Zolotas, the ensuing high 
production costs were prohibitive for the development of a viable, 
internationally competitive industry. On the other hand, there were those who 
 
15 Gross, Export Empire, pp. 272-329. 
16 Xenophon Zolotas, Greece should become viable (Athens: Papazisis, 1945).   
17 Ibid, p. 3. 
18 Christos Hadziiosif, ‘Perspectives about the viability of Greece and the role of industry’, in A 
Tribute to Nikos Svoronos, ed. by Vasilis Kremmydas and others, 2 vols (Rethymno: Crete 
University, 1986), I, pp. 330-68.  
19 Chr. Panagos, ‘The Industrial Potentialities of Greece’, VE, September 1945, 15-6.   
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not only challenged the claim that Greece was poor in natural resources but, 
even more vigorously, emphasized that the problem was that these resources 
had been utilized in a wrong way. Yet, they questioned the extent of capital 
scarcity. For them, this insufficient and problematic utilization could be 
ascribed to organizational and institutional deficiencies of both the private and 
public sectors, to wrong economic policies or even to the social and political 
system itself. Their aim was to show that industrialization, and particularly 
heavy industry, was not only feasible and viable, but also necessary to solve 
Greece’s substantive problems.  
The FGI had adopted an intermediate position. In early 1945 the federation 
clarified that if Greece was to solve its main problems, industrialization was the 
only way forward. However, it exclusively emphasized the need for the 
improvement and extension of existing traditional industries and did not 
consider the development of new branches or the restructuring of Greece’s 
industrial base and the adoption of heavy industry. Simultaneously, it clarified 
the main prerequisite for industrialization.20 This was the cooperation between 
industry and the state to formulate a feasible industrial programme and an 
organization to supervise its implementation which would be left entirely to the 
private initiative. In contrast, it was the state’s cooperation and the 
coordination with the Military Liaison and UNRRA, that resolve the main 
obstacles to industrial progress. For the FGI these obstacles were the acute 
shortages of raw materials and fuels but, above all, the shortage of capital, the 
‘big and tragic problem’.21  
However, this claim did not mean that capital was absent. It has been shown 
that during the occupation period (1941-1944), a considerable portion of 
domestic commercial and industrial businesses was able to accumulate profits, 
mainly in the form of gold sovereigns, either forced to work or voluntarily 
cooperating with the Nazi agencies and German businesses.22 Kyriakos 
 
20 FGI, ‘The Past, Present and Future of our Industry’, VE, February 1945, 16-9; ‘The Annual 
Meeting of the FGI’, VE, March 1945, 23-30. 
21 Stavros I. Kostopoulos, ‘The Organized Appearance of Industry in our Country’, VE, February 
1945, pp. 7-8 (8). 
22 Christos Hadziiosif, ‘The Greek economy as a field of fight and resistance’, in History of the 
20th century Greece: The Second World War. Occupation – Resistance 1940-1945, ed. by Christos 
Hadziiosif, 5 vols (Athens: Vivliorama, 2002), III, Part II, pp. 181-217; Occupation, Nazism and 
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Varvaressos, a prominent economist who headed the BoG during the war from 
abroad, was aware of the profitable cooperation and collaboration of Greek 
banks and industrialists with Nazi forces.23 His conclusion for the main politico-
economic characteristic of the occupation period is fundamental for the 
understanding of Greece’s political economy after 1945 and the notion of capital 
scarcity:    
The new means of payment supplied to the country from Germans were 
translated to money incomes for different classes of the population and 
induced demand, when the supply of virtually every good was incredibly 
rare. The result was the tremendous increase of prices accruing to vast 
profits to a small number of people like merchants, speculators, black 
marketers, industrialists and other people who cooperated with the enemy 
or they were working for its needs. This new class of rich not only satisfied 
its needs through the free market but it also devoted a considerable portion 
of this money to invest in real values in order to guarantee its profits against 
the currency’s devaluation. […] Pursuing the class of speculators and 
exploiters, as it was mentioned above, to safely invest its unlawful profits 
turned quickly to the gold sovereign as the safest mean of investment, 
inducing in turn the well-known incredible increase of its value. The 
disastrous introduction by Germans (after the suggestion of Greek 
specialists!) and the Allies of significant amount of gold sovereigns, secured 
for these speculators the means for which they were seeking.24  
After the war, Varvaressos considered that high domestic prices, which fed the 
robust inflation that had annihilated savings inhibiting productive investment, 
were still attributable to the extraordinary profits enjoyed by both importers 
and industrialists.25 The problem was that gold sovereigns, in which these profits 
were largely invested, functioned as a store of value and thus as the anchor for 
 
the Greek Economy: Official reports and memories, trans, ed. and intr. by Thanasis Giouras, ed. 
and intr. by Michalis Psalidopoulos (Athens: Metamesonikties Ekdoseis, 2015); Vasileios G. 
Manousakis, ‘Economy and Politics in Greece during the Second World War’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2014).  
23 Bank of Greece Historical Archive (hereafter GR/BOGHA), A4/S1/Y3/F9/Τ10, The Bank of 
Athens’ action during the occupation period, no date; GR/BOGHA/A4/S1/Y3/F9/Τ5, Panos 
Kerassotis to the Minister of Supply, 30 June 1945; GR/BOGHA/A4/S1/Y5/F14/Τ1, The Greek 
Currency Problem, 1945.    
24 GR/BOGHA, A4/S1/Y5/F14/Τ1, The Greek Currency Problem, 1945.    
25 ‘Unpublished Letter of Mr Varvaressos to Mr Maben-Athens, 29 September 1945’, Antaios, 
January-March 1947 and May-June 1947, 165-69 and 203-08. 
  59 
 
 
 
 
domestic prices. The solution for Varvaressos was either to stabilize the value of 
the gold sovereign with gold sales by the BoG or to control prices and profits 
from above, taxing simultaneously businesses and prohibiting gold sales. For a 
short period in 1945 Varvaressos, as the BoG’s governor and the government’s 
vice president, attempted to enforce the second solution. This was done for 
three main reasons. Firstly, he considered that these measures were necessary 
for social and moral reasons. Secondly, he aimed to utilize internal resources, 
primarily the accumulated gold, for reconstruction. Thirdly, gold sales would 
sooner or later absorb the limited exchange reserves.   
These were the declared aims of the so-called ‘Varvaressos experiment’ in 1945, 
which faced resistance and fierce public criticism of the FGI on the grounds that 
Varvaressos employed communist practices.26 Once Varvaressos’ policy was 
defeated, Zolotas made concrete proposals for the enforcement of the 
alternative solution which had four pillars.27 First, he suggested the resumption 
of controlled gold sales by the BoG, leaving the stabilization of domestic prices 
to market forces. Second, he proposed the liberalization of imports of goods 
aiming to absorb surplus liquidity, a policy which will be considered in the next 
chapter. Third, he proposed the provision of ample credits to productive 
activities with the simultaneous curtailment of the inflationary finance of the 
budget by the BoG. Fourth, since reconstruction and the new liberal policy 
presupposed extensive external finance, he urged the state to formulate a 
comprehensive plan to specify war reparations and financial claims from abroad. 
Yet Zolotas emphasized the need for the state’s modernization, considering that 
it had ‘insufficient organizational level and action’.28 Furthermore, he stressed 
the need for the state to organize the finance and raw material supply, 
highlighting that it had to cooperate with the private initiative and not to 
impose price and profit controls upon business.29  
Apparently, these suggestions were very close to the core of FGI’s proposals. To 
the constant claims for extensive finance and gold sales, the federation soon 
 
26 FGI, Greek industries and their critics (Athens, 1945). 
27 Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archive (hereafter KKF/KTA), 
1945/11/3/37, Xenophon Zolotas Report to the Advisory Economic Committee, Athens, 20 
September 1945. 
28 Xenophon Zolotas, ‘State and Reconstruction’, To Vima, 10 February 1946. 
29 Xenophon Zolotas, ‘State and Private Initiative’, To Vima, 20 January 1946. 
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added the second pillar of its proposed industrial policy: the reduction of the 
production costs by the state which largely meant the provision of cheap capital 
and the reduction of taxation and insurance costs.30 Yet the core of the FGI’s 
policy and Zolotas’ recommendations was actively defended by the NBG, which 
until 1944 monopolized credits to industry and had considerable stakes in almost 
all the significant industries at the time.31 Indeed, the NBG, aiming to regain its 
pre-war position in the internal market, pressed for credit expansion and the 
continuation of gold sales as a means to control domestic prices.32 As we will be 
shown in the next chapter, the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(ACCI) had formed an alliance with the FGI backing this policy and agreed with 
the federation for a selective liberal commercial policy.  
Furthermore, it was upon these pillars that the Greek government had claimed 
UK financial aid.33 In January 1946, the government signed the London 
Agreement with the UK which was essentially a stabilization programme which 
attempted to enforce orthodox fiscal and monetary policies and implied that 
Greece had to reattempt the utilization of internal finance recourses. The 
programme, which included the devaluation of Drs and the liberalization of 
trade, was supervised by the British Economic Mission, and was backed by a UK 
loan and supplemented by Greek foreign reserves.34 However, the financing of 
the new liberal economic policy came at the cost of Greece’s surrender of its 
responsibility to protect the integrity of money. The note issue, and very soon 
the whole credit policy, was regulated by a new institution envisaged by the 
agreement, the Currency Committee.35 The government had reluctantly 
accepted the US and UK vetoes to the Currency Committee’s decisions, but in 
return it won the continuation of gold sovereign sales.36  
These developments show that there was a substantive agreement between 
peak-level BIAs and state agencies for the gold sales policy and selective trade 
liberalization. On the eve of the civil war, this substantive agreement was 
 
30 FGI, Memo to the government’s President Mr Konstantinos Tsaldaris (Athens, May 1946). 
31 Giorgos Pagoulatos, The National Bank of Greece 1940-2000 (Athens: Historical Archive of the 
National Bank of Greece, 2006), pp. 119-39;163-70. 
32 KKF/KTA/1946/1/14/41, Memo - Georgios Pesmazoglou, 10 May 1946. 
33 GR/BOGHA/A4/S1/Y2/F198/Τ3, Memorandum, London, 2 January 1946.    
34 Lykogiannis, Britain, 140-80.   
35 BoG, Annual Reports for 1941-1946 (Athens, 1947), pp. 18-9. 
36 GR/BOGHA/A4/S1/Y2/F198/Τ8-T9, Record of a meeting, 17 and 18 January 1946.    
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translated into the Greek Reconstruction Claims Committee.37 The Committee 
included the heads of the main industrial and commercial BIAs, the heads of the 
main banks, the leaders of the Liberal and the Populist political parties, as well 
as prominent economists and state managers. It was clear that it had adopted 
Zolotas’ arguments, legitimizing Greece’s territorial claims, demands for war 
reparations and economic aid to the overpopulation problem, the pre-war 
limited economic development and the extensive war destruction. Indeed, this 
was Greece’s foreign economic policy.38 It is impressive that these arguments 
were deployed to the Allies for both territorial claims39 and war reparations.40 
No doubt, there was a broad consensus internally that this would contribute to 
the solution of the ‘acute demographic’ problem.41  
However, territorial claims were refused by the Allies and reparations were 
evaluated as quite insufficient in relation to Greece’s war damage. This outcome 
was considered by almost all the leaders of the nationalist bloc as a great 
injustice to Greece by the Allies.42 Yet the option for a reconstruction plan was 
rejected not only because the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) did not receive such applications at the time but also this 
option was doubtful because Greece had not settled her pre-war public debt, 
which was estimated at about $350 million. Above all, the state was not able to 
repay the vast amount which was deemed necessary for reconstruction, 
calculated approximately at $1 billion. It was for these reasons that the 
Committee and the government clarified that the Allies, and particularly the US 
and not the economically exhausted UK, had the moral obligation to provide 
financial aid to Greece.43 
 
37 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/29/001, Greek Reconstruction Claims Committee, Statement, Athens, 
March 1946.  
38 KKF/KTA/1946/14/1/33, Meeting at the BoG, 30 April 1946. 
39 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1946 Vol. III, Minutes, M.C. Tsaldaris, 3 
August 1946, pp. 110-15.  
40 Athanasios Sbarounis, ‘The German Reparations’, To Vima, 16 February 1946; 
GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/12/012, Athanasios Sbarounis to F. Dragoumis, Athens, 26 June 1946. 
41 Chr. Evelpidis, ‘What and for which reason we claim it’, To Vima, 28 July 1946. 
42 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/16/233, Record of Conversation – Meeting with Hon. James F. Byrnes, 
Paris, 7 October 1946; GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/22/118, Record of Conversation – Meeting with Ern. 
Bevin, Paris, 11 October 1946. 
43 KKF/KTA/1946/14/1/33, Meeting at the BoG, 30 April 1946. 
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Indeed, at the same time, Zolotas, as Greece’s representative to the IMF and the 
IBRD, had preliminary discussions with US economic ministers and highly ranked 
officials aiming to ‘make it particularly clear’ that Greece’s reconstruction ‘had 
to be based mainly upon American financial aid’.44 On the agenda was the 
attraction of private capital but, for Zolotas, US businesses were not ready for 
this option. It was clear that the logic of capital scarcity, which the FGI had 
prioritized the previous year, had prevailed. 
Until August 1946, under the growing financial pressure of the civil war and the 
encouragement of the UK, this logic was substantiated with the dispatch of a 
Greek delegation to the US to ask for financial aid.45  Its head was Sofoklis 
Venizelos, the president of the Committee and the leader of the liberals who 
had formed a secret alliance with Tsaldraris since January 1946.46 The sources 
show that the main aims were the financial assistance for the rehabilitation of 
the Greek merchant fleet47, economic reconstruction48 and the promotion of 
tobacco exports.49 Very soon, the merchant fleet acquired 100 ships (Liberty-
Victory) from the US with the financial guarantee of the Greek state. This move 
had substantially contributed to the revival of Greece’s merchant fleet, which 
thereafter grew at a ‘spectacular’ rate.50 Importantly, Venizelos had stakes in 
his family shipping business which had acquired such ships.51  
The membership of the Committee and the delegation, as well as the interests 
which they mediated, indicated that in Washington a broad circle of 
businessmen and state agencies was represented; it was clearly broader than the 
royalist alliance between prominent industrialists and conservative political 
 
44 KKF/KTA/1946/14/1/8, Xenophon Zolotas report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Washington, 29 March 1946.  
45 KKF/KTA/1946/14/3/13, UK Memorandum, 10 July 1946. 
46 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/13/028, Confidential Attached Protocol, 01 January 1946 
47 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/12/024, Cryptographic Τelegram 4115, Diamandopoulos to Foreign 
Ministry, 8 August 1946; GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/12/071, Manolis Kulukundis to Sofoklis Venizelos, 8 
January 1947; GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/14/090, Greek Shipowners New York Committee INC to 
Sofoklis Venizelos, New York, 26 May 1947. 
48 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/12/055, Michalis Ailianos Report, Washington, 22 August 1946. 
49 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/29/004, Gouras memo to Ministry of National Economy (Copy), 
Washington, 28 August 1946. 
50 Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, 1945-1975 (London: The Athlone Press, 1993), 
p. 130.  
51 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/09/001, G. Moatsos to S. Venizelos, New York, 5 October 1946. 
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forces, which was concentrated around the Populist party.52 The US did respond 
and in early 1947 a US mission arrived in Greece to evaluate the needs. 
However, the gold sales policy faced the fierce criticism of the Currency 
Committee, and later of the US mission. Soon after exchange reserves had been 
virtually exhausted in November 194653, the member of the Currency 
Committee, Patterson, informed Tsaldaris that during 1946 about $19 million 
had been consumed by gold sales and bitterly pointed out that: 
‘It is also clear that this policy has permitted a very small group of 
merchants, traders, industrialists and speculators to avoid the financial risks 
resulting from the unstable internal and international financial position of 
their nation.’54 
At the same time, Varvaressos, equally bitterly, observed for domestic 
businessmen that: 
‘They continue undisturbed, and protected by the governments, the 
exploitation of the problems of our country and the misery of the people.’55 
Varvaressos was not alone, but there were voices which condemned to the prime 
minister the internal gold standard for the same reason: 
‘Unfortunately, the same persons, utilizing the same methods, exploit the 
misery of our people today, as they did during the occupation.56    
Accusations were directed primarily toward businessmen who converted profits 
and credits to gold sovereigns, sustaining a profitable arbitrage and a parallel 
gold market. The NBG was included in this picture, for it continued to support 
credit expansion and gold sales, claiming its pre-war position from the Currency 
Committee and the BoG.57 Meanwhile, the State Department, informed by 
 
52 Rizas, From Liberation, pp. 150-1. This alliance, aiming to restore monarchy, was headed by 
Spyros Markezinis and was financed primarily by the FGI president Katsabas and the tobacco 
industrialist Papastratos.  
53 KKF/KTA/1946/14/5/39, Patterson to Prime-minister, Athens, 20 November 1946.    
54 KKF/KTA/1947/23/1/11, Patterson and Gregory to Tsaldaris, Athens, 18 January 1947. 
55 KKF/KTA/1946/14/5/91, K. Varvaressos to Mr President, Washington, 30 December 1946.  
56 KKF/KTA/1946/14/2/38, N. Darveris to Mr President, Athens, 21 June 1946. 
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Varvaressos of the situation in Greece, clarified to Venizelos that the adequate 
utilization of internal resources was a precondition for the US financial aid.58 It 
proposed a tax reform, emphasizing direct taxation and the taxation of 
occupation profits, the utilization of foreign deposits held by Greeks abroad and 
asked for measures to save exchange. The aim was the mobilization of hoarded 
gold, exchange and commodities, although this conditional dimension was not 
comprehended by the dominant coalition. When the American Mission for Aid to 
Greece (AMAG) arrived, the FGI president Christoforos Katsabas rejected that 
gold hoarding was the rule for FGI’s members. For the federation, among those 
who were buying gold sovereigns were industrialists as well as ‘merchants and 
professionals and farmers and ranchers and doctors and journalists and servants 
etc.’59 It was clear that the FGI attempted to diffuse responsibility for gold sales 
but the AMAG and the Currency Committee were not convinced. 
It was within this framework that Paul Porter, the head of the US mission, had 
targeted a pro-German ‘small clique’ which was the invisible power of the 
country aiming to utilize ‘foreign aid’ for the ‘reproduction of its privileges’.60 
The expectations of the FGI for US aid had been outlined after the 
announcement of the Truman Doctrine. At a meeting with Venizelos, the FGI’s 
president, Katsabas, citing the solution of the overpopulation problem as the 
prime justification for the federation’s proposals, considered that the US finance 
would remove the balance of payments constraint to investment, eliminating the 
obstacles which had inhibited industrial development since 1932. Such capital 
inflows would set in motion the internal circuit of capital, boosting the building 
activity and supporting the extension and development of the existed traditional 
branches. 61 At the meeting, the FGI exclusively defended the interests of 
textiles, paper, colour, cement and mining sectors. Clearly, at this meeting the 
interests of the Bodosakis group were not represented by the federation. 
Instead, Bodosakis had utilized other channels to direct the allocation of the US 
 
58 KKF/KTA/1946/15/1/47, Report, Sofoklis Venizelos, no date.  
59 Archives in the Gennadius Library, Constantine Vovolinis Papers (Hereafter GR/GL/KAV) File 
482, Christoforos Katsabas to Sofoklis Venizelos, 18 November 1947.  
60 Paul A. Porter, Wanted: A Miracle for Greece: the diary of a presidential envoy, January 20 - 
February 27, 1947, intr. by Michalis Psalidopoulos (Athens: Metamesonikties Ekdoseis, 2013), p. 
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61 ‘The Future of Greek Industry’, VE, June 1946, pp. 11-4; GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/14/145, Minutes 
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funds, as he was prepared with the acquisition of AEEXPL and the recruitment of 
UNRRA’s head Buell Maben. This move had not been welcomed by the 
government’s head, because Maben was ‘angling for the job of directing 
whatever money is sent to Greece.’62  
1.2 The developmental plan: energy and heavy industry or the 
road to salvation 
1.2.1 The evolution of perspectives 
Meanwhile the discussion for the prospects of Greece’s industrialization 
continued apace. The report of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), submitted in late 1946 at the request of the Greek 
government, played a substantive role.63 It confirmed what was already known: 
agricultural productivity, mainly due to the little land per family, was low and 
only land reclamation, extensive irrigation and mechanization would improve it. 
Yet it was the first international institution which went a step further, 
concluding that even an optimistic estimate for agricultural development was 
not sufficient to deal with the surplus population problem. Instead, such 
improvements would create even more labour surpluses and thus 
industrialization was the only long-term solution for Greece’s problems. This was 
a substantial contribution to the internal debate but what the report did not 
clarify was what kind of industry was conducive for Greece.   
This was still debated by the two major rival business interests and state 
agencies. The arguments were deployed in their attempt to legitimate their 
demands from the US financial aid. At its centre was the viability of heavy 
industry and particularly the question of whether such units would be 
internationally competitive or not. Those who were close to the FGI, claimed 
that this was not feasible; high production costs and the lack of domestic 
technology implied that they would not be competitive. Thus, existing industry 
would be prioritized, and new branches would be considered only on an ad hoc 
 
62 KKF/KTA/1947/23/7/4, Frary to K. Tsaldaris, 21 February 1947; KKF/KTA/1948/29/1/3, K. 
Tsaldaris to Washington Embassy, Athens, 11 January 1948. 
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basis.64 In contrast, those who were close to the Bodosakis group, the UNRRA 
mission and the Technical Chamber of Greece (TCG), advocated that the 
opposite was true.65 For them, traditional industry was tariff-dependent and 
only the provision of ample and cheap energy for the adoption of heavy industry 
would reduce general production costs, providing external economies for the 
development of the other branches. Yet it emphasized the necessity for the 
processing of domestic ores and minerals on the grounds that it would 
substantially ameliorate the balance of payment problems. With the 
improvement of the investment climate, private savings hoarded in gold, 
exchange and commodities, would be mobilized for investments in housing and 
the traditional industry later on. In an impressive shift, Zolotas had now 
elaborated this argument following Ioannis Zigdis, the UNRRA’s member charged 
with the formulation of the organization’s developmental plan.66 Certainly, this 
plan was the epitome of the vision which pursued the restructuring of Greece’s 
economy within a free market economy.  
It was obvious that perspectives and aims diverged, and that businessmen and 
state agencies were divided, but there were factors which united them. The 
substance of the factor of cohesion is highlighted by the programme of the 
Communist Party. The communists shared the belief that Greece was not poor in 
natural resources, claiming that the adoption of heavy industry was necessary. 
However, they advocated that it was feasible only with central planning and the 
restriction of private property rights. Indeed, in 1947 Dimitris Batsis had 
published a study which advocated that Greece had a rich mineral wealth, but 
its efficient utilization should be based upon industrial planning and public 
ownership. The Communist Party had adopted his proposals.67 Among the main 
responsibilities of the state was to channel funds from the traditional sectors of 
 
64 National Bank of Greece Historical Archive (hereafter GR/NBGHA), 1/44/1/29, Frixos 
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Reconstruction and Development of Greek industry’, VE, October 1947, 17-8; Frixos 
Georgakopoulos, ‘The Specificity of Industry’, VE, March 1948, 19-20. 
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the economy to those of heavy industry, especially for the production of iron and 
steel as well as for heavy chemicals.  
1.2.2 Industrialization plans and business interests 
Even if the above strains between antagonistic business interests were evident, 
the Reconstruction Organization (RO), which was created for the specification of 
Greek financial demands to international organizations, was able to include in its 
technical plan proposals for the extension and development of the traditional 
industry as well as for the adoption of new branches, such as metallurgy and 
heavy chemicals.68 These proposals, although economically unjustified, 
reflecting the severe administrative deficiencies and the political polarization, 
left no room for complaints. Indeed, the FGI was satisfied with the plan and 
wished that the government would adopt it.69 Importantly, the RO had justified 
its proposals upon the need to ameliorate the ‘sharp demographic problem of 
overpopulation’70, and the reader should bear in mind that all the subsequent 
plans, with no exception, were based upon the same justification which was 
always shared by the FGI. 
The RO, to which the federation was represented by its president, Katsabas, had 
largely fulfilled the expectations of the FGI for the appropriate form of formal 
state-business relations. This seems to be also true for the successor of the RO, 
the Greek Marshall Plan Committee established to prepare Greece’s plan for her 
finance needs within the Marshall Plan framework. However, this plan was not 
able to reconcile the major competitive business interests and was badly 
drafted. The industrial plan for the adoption of heavy industry had been 
submitted to the Paris Conference by Greece’s representative and president of 
the TCG, Alexandros Verdelis.71 Instead, the revised plan submitted to 
Washington after the failure of the Paris Conference included only the FGI 
proposals and was restricted to the extension of existing industries alone. Even 
more, agricultural development was prioritized and only a few new industries 
 
68 For a comparison between the different plans of the period and their finance, see Appendix 1, 
table 4.  
69 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1946 (Athens: FGI, 1947), pp. 36-45. 
70 Reconstruction Organization, Reconstruction Programme of the country (Athens: RO, 1947), p. 
3. 
71 YDIAMP, Ambassador Dendramis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, 15 November 1947. 
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were widespread in other sections of the proposal, showing that more moderate 
financial claims had made it difficult to reconcile divergent business interests. 
As expected, Zolotas, who had shouldered the mediation of the plan to 
Washington, informed the government that it had received quite a cold 
reception in the US because the proposals were ‘exaggerated, contradictory and 
inadequately documented.’72 He suggested to the government to cooperate 
without hesitation with AMAG officials in Athens to improve it by justifying the 
proposals. This pressure culminated in the creation of the Supreme 
Reconstruction Council (ASA) charged with the formulation of the plans.  
However, the industrial section of AMAG aimed exclusively at the restructuring 
of Greece’s industrial base and excluded textiles and other existing traditional 
branches from its proposals for the first year of the Marshall Plan.73 In sharp 
contrast, when the federation was asked to re-state its proposals for the first 
year, insisted on the extension and improvement of only the existing industry:   
We insisted on the logic that the existing industry should be prioritized from 
the allies’ aid for its renewal and extension, because only from it [the 
existing industry] will the improvement of the trade balance be fast and 
adequate. The existing industry has the organizational capacity, the 
technical executives and the experience to absorb the aid in a systematic 
way.74   
As it turned out, the federation was progressively excluded from the formulation 
of the reconstruction plan. In July 1948, when the ECA in Greece had replaced 
AMAG, the federation claimed that it had lost contact with the US mission. 
However, the FGI was able to incorporate its demands in the proposals for the 
first year, which ASA’s vice president, Konstantinos Gounarakis, had submitted 
personally to OEEC.75 As Zolotas and Zigdis claimed when they both resigned 
from the ASA for this reason, projects of secondary importance were given 
priority in relation to the basic hydroelectric/lignite facilities and the new 
 
72 Ibid., Economic Advisor Zolotas to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, 18 December 1947, 
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industries.76 The last attempt for the inclusion of the existing traditional 
industries to the Marshall Plan was made by the ASA member Konstantinos 
Nevros, who, since the inter-war period, had been a board member of Bodosakis’ 
chemical corporation.77 There is evidence that this proposal had been 
incorporated by ASA but the ECA in Greece was adamant. As Gounarakis claimed 
to his colleges within the ASA, the finance of both the existing traditional 
industry and the new branches was not feasible because:  
We cannot make both simultaneously, because here exists a fundamental 
disagreement with the American Mission. We took drop by drop the aid to 
existing industry, for they are to the standpoint that industrialists have 
money etc.78   
Obviously, the Greek side had understood that the US mission did not aim to 
finance traditional industry not only because some sectors, such as tobacco and 
textiles, overproduced, but mainly because business had accumulated gold; the 
mobilization of internal capital resources, and especially of the gold, was the 
salient feature of the Marshall Plan. The proposals of the NBG and ASA clarified 
the aims of the domestic banks and big businesses in this respect. Their heads 
claimed that the counterpart funds should be deposited with the NBG and 
utilized by this bank exclusively.79 In particular, they proposed that these funds 
would be translated to both short and long-term finance to industry, aiming to 
resolve Greece’s capital scarcity which, as the FGI’s president had insisted, had 
affected industrial reconstruction and in general economic development in the 
inter-war period. To tame the inflation which this expansionary policy entailed, 
gold sales would be unlimited, and the BoG had to utilize invisible earnings for 
gold purchases. At the same time, the FGI accused those who denounced 
industrialists’ practice of investing in gold of behaving like ‘communists’.80 
However, the government had fully embraced these proposals and pressed the 
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78 GR/NPFA/ADA/FO01/SF1/SE010/FI002/IT0025, ASA, Minutes of the Supreme Committee, 
Athens, 9 November 1948. 
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US mission to finance this policy. Given that ECA was afraid that this would 
further increase prices through speculation and induce capital flight, the result 
was that it initially excluded the NBG entirely from industry’s finance with 
counterpart funds.81 Very soon Alexandros Diomidis resigned from ASA leadership 
for this reason and under Greek pressure the ECA eventually included the NBG to 
the Central Loan Committee (CLC). This was a public entity charged to allocate 
the released counterpart funds with loans exclusively to the private sector via 
applications through all banks.  
As expected, the four-year plan submitted to OEEC did not include the dominant 
traditional industries, except for foodstuffs. 82 Instead, it prioritized the energy 
programme and the adoption of heavy industry. This was a decisive break with 
the past which had long-term consequences. With the 1948 Plan, viability was 
identified primarily with the exploitation of water (Achelous) and lignite 
(Ptolemais) reserves to produce ample and cheap energy necessary for the 
adoption of heavy industry and, secondarily, with the expansion of the existing 
traditional labour-intensive industries. In 1948, mainly oil fuels and to a lesser 
extent, lignite reserves produced about 710 million kwh and the aim was, by 
1953, to increase it to 1,710 million kwh. At the centre of the hydroelectric 
energy programme were five facilities aiming to produce from the middle of 
1952 onwards 1,193 million kwh annually with the Achelous plant alone 
producing 730 million kwh. The updating of the existing thermoelectric 
facilities, mainly those of HEAP, aimed to contribute only as a supplementary 
source of supply. The plan proposed that lignite should replace oil fuels and 
included the extraction and exploitation of the lignite reserves, prioritizing the 
Ptolemais industrial complex which was indispensable for the realization of the 
whole plan. It would supply not only energy but also raw materials for the other 
major projects: nitrogen for fertilizers, ammonia for the soda plant, which in 
turn would supply the alumina plant, as well as metallurgic coke to produce iron 
and iron-nickel. These projects were the basis for the creation of a ship-repair 
plant and the subsequent development of the machine industry. Along with the 
sugar and oil refineries, these core projects consumed the bulk of the proposed 
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funds in manufacturing and mining. It was a predominately import substitution 
plan, aiming to create external economies for the whole industry with 
complementary investments, thus improving the investment climate and 
inducing the mobilization of the accumulated gold for the development of 
traditional industry and building. The final aims were to absorb the surplus 
population and to balance the desperately deficient external accounts. 
1.3 The implementation of the plan, industrial policy and the US 
mission  
The feasibility of the plan was very soon challenged from all directions. The ECA 
in Washington, the OEEC, the head of the Greek Coordination and 
Implementation Service of the Reconstruction Plan (YSESA) responsible for its 
implementation, and very soon its own creators, all agreed that the plan was not 
plausible. Indeed, during 1949 the plan was revised twice and in January 1950 
the ASA announced its further curtailment insisting, however, upon the necessity 
for the financing of the core projects on the grounds that the civil war had 
delayed progress.83  
In August 1950, Zolotas offered a comprehensive overview of the utilization of 
the counterpart funds up to that point in time. He observed that during the first 
two years about 60% of the scheduled Drs funds had been absorbed, from which 
67% had been channelled to building and transportation and only 3% to energy, 
mines and industry.84 Even more, the priorities had been reversed and the 
programme for the secondary sector overturned.  
At the time there were a number of opinions to try and explain this failure, 
which more or less are reproduced from the literature. The dominant view was 
that, as both the coordination minister and the head of the delegation to OEEC 
claimed, the OEEC members refused to support Greece’s industrialization simply 
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because it would affect their own industrial interests.85 Instead, Zolotas had 
publicly defended the position that there was a severe coordination problem 
between the different institutions involved, mainly between YSESA, CLC and the 
Currency Committee, which rendered public authorities vulnerable to private 
interests and thus investments were ‘symptomatic’ and not planned.86  
From its side, the US mission emphasized the governments’ reluctance for to 
reform.87 In repeated memos to the government it insisted that the 
rationalization of public administration and especially of the tax system was a 
precondition for the successful implementation of the plan.88 However, it had 
already become clear that the US mission had raised severe doubts about the 
feasibility of the core projects.89 Very soon, the US mission stepped back, 
reducing the amount of aid substantially and enforcing instead a stabilization 
programme along the lines suggested by the IMF official Sturc.90 This new policy, 
compatible with the militarization of the ERP after the outbreak of the Korean 
war, confirmed, as the ECA informed Greece officially very soon afterwards, 
that the core of the developmental plan had been essentially postponed.91 At 
the heart of the programme was now the curtailment of the persistent 
inflationary pressures and the reduction of the budget deficit. Releases from the 
counterpart funds for both public and private investments fell substantially for 
the next fiscal year (1951-52) and in early 1952 releases for the core projects 
nearly froze.92 It was clear that the integrity of money was prioritized by the US 
mission, posing new limits for the interaction between businessmen and state 
agencies. 
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Both businessmen and state agencies, who had been actively engaged with the 
implementation of the plan, had resisted the US decision to terminate the core 
of the plan. The government and the ASA claimed that the civil war had delayed 
reconstruction progress not only because it had prevented the appropriate 
organizational rationalization. Above all, war and defence expenditures drained 
considerable resources, necessitating the budget’s inflationary financing by the 
central bank and the transfer of more than half of the available counterpart 
funds to cover the ensuing deficits.93 They claimed that it was for this reason 
that reconstruction was postponed and called the US to grant free aid instead of 
the proposed internal devaluation. The base-line argument was that Greece’s 
viability was undermined and thus increased unemployment along with 
persistent poverty which threatened social cohesion and the people’s loyalty to 
the common defence against communism. The FGI had backed this argument, 
repeating the need for ample short-term finance and claiming that all business 
profits after 1945 had been invested in the development of industry.94  
The reasons for the insistence upon the core projects had been elaborated by 
the new plan submitted to OEEC in January 1951.95 Drafted by Zolotas and 
Gounarakis after consultation with the FGI and ACCI, it restated the significance 
of the core projects for the productivity of the economy as a whole, and 
consequently for the overpopulation problem. However, the plan simultaneously 
recognized that the contribution of economic development to the 
overpopulation problem was limited, suggesting additionally mass emigration. It 
was the official acceptance that the ERP had not resolved the substantive Greek 
problems, but that the governments would continue upon the same path looking 
simultaneously for alternatives. Once more, Zolotas’ arguments had been 
embraced by the government.96 It was within this framework that Varvaressos 
was called by the Plastiras government in late 1951 to report on the prospects 
for the Greek economy. 
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Departing from the well-known argument that Greece was poor in natural 
resources and capitalizing upon the experience of reconstruction, Varvaressos 
utilized the prevailing orthodoxy within the Bretton Woods institutional regime 
to deepen the pessimistic claim that Greece’s viability was in fact undermined 
by the adoption of heavy industry.97 He shared the ECA’s emphasis upon the 
need for the rationalization of public administration and the necessity, which 
the reduction of the financial aid entailed, to prepare the economy for a 
currency devaluation with a strict deflationary programme. Moreover, he 
claimed that the small internal market prevented industry from reaching 
economies of scale, fostering instead internal monopolies with high production 
costs and profits which undermined industrialization providing expensive 
intermediate inputs. He indicated that these two factors reproduced the 
prevailing business practice and the root of capital scarcity, namely the 
investment of profits in gold, exchange and commodities and not in productive 
facilities. Thus, questioning directly the extent of the surplus population 
problem, he suggested the improvement of agricultural production and 
productivity and proposed the development of light consumer goods industry, 
with small production units to process mainly agricultural products, and a huge 
building programme.  
As expected, all the prominent state managers and politicians, like Zolotas, 
Zigdis and Chrysos Evelpidis, attacked Varvaressos’ suggestions reiterating the 
well-known arguments around the feasibility and necessity of heavy industry.98 
Their combined and aggressive reaction highlighted the fact that the optimistic 
view had become the indispensable orthodoxy in Greece. It closed the public 
debate in respect of the feasibility of heavy industry for many years. During the 
next decades, each government was judged by its effectiveness in respect of the 
adoption of the core projects proposed in the viability plan, a development that 
played a substantive role in the consolidation of Greek-German economic 
relations.  
 
97 Kyriakos Varvaressos, Report on the Greek Economic Problem, intr. by Kostas P. Kostis 
(Athens: Savvalas, 2002); United Nations, Measures for the Economic Development of Under-
Developed Countries (New York: UN, May 1951). 
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1.3.1 Industrial Policy 
The industrial division of the US mission was in agreement with the FGI’s claims 
regarding the obstacles to business in 1948.99 It considered that such a policy 
would mobilize the accumulated gold, which in November 1949 was calculated 
to be worth about $400 million.100 Within the framework of its own proposals for 
a body to report for ‘any single issue related to reconstruction’, the ECA 
accepted in early 1950 the FGI’s old demand for a tri-partite committee with 
state, ECA and FGI representatives to work upon an industrial charter.101 There 
is an indication that this committee compensated for the exclusion of textiles in 
the plan. Indeed, despite the continued efforts of Katsabas, the FGI and the 
PUTI for the opposite, the cotton industry was not financed.102 In the midst of a 
representation crisis within the FGI, in March 1950 Katsabas returned to its 
leadership and despite his fierce criticism of the Marshall plan for misallocation 
of the funds, he declared that the US mission was ready for cooperation with the 
federation.103 A comparison between the committee’s recommendations and the 
ECA’s attitude show that in early 1951 there was still a fundamental agreement 
between the industrial division of ECA and the FGI.104  
The US mission’s actions were deployed within this framework. On the one hand, 
in 1950 the ECA pressed for the registration of shares to facilitate authorities to 
detect tax evasion and proposed the taxation of undistributed profits, despite 
business resistance. The implication was that big businesses were not taxed 
which was contrary to the needs of the budget and even more to the liberal 
principle of tax equality which could forge a social environment conducive to 
investment. For these reasons, it continued to emphasize direct taxation 
preparing the authorities for the introduction of a more rational tax system. On 
 
99 The head of ECA’s industrial division, Reginald E. Gillmor, had defended the FGI’s proposed 
industrial policy. See his article written in July 1948 in: Michalis Psalidopoulos, Supervisors at 
Despair: American Consultants in Greece, 1947-1953. From Paul A. Porter to Edward A. 
Tenenbaum (Athens: Metamesonikties Ekdoseis, 2013), pp. 197-216.     
100 ‘The US Mission asks for the formulation of a national industrial policy’ To Vima, 12 November 
1949. 
101 YDIA/1950/120/8, Conversation of Prime-minister with a US Committee, 14 February 1950.  
102 Katsabas, Believing, p. 276-7; PUTI, ‘Today’s situation of the cotton industry’, VE, October 
1950, p. 533. 
103 ‘The Annual Assembly of the Industrial Federation [1949]’, VE, March 1950, pp. 15-20. 
104 ‘Measures to promote Industry’, VE, April 1951, 35-6; GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/16/054, C. Calvert 
to C. Tsatsos, Athens, 31 March 1951. 
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the other hand, it abolished the anachronistic inter-municipal taxes (Law 
843/1948) and attempted to record and control the decentralized legal entities 
which drained unspecified resources from industry in the form of a labyrinth of 
third-party charges (Laws 630/1948, 1532/1951 and 1619/1951).105 These 
measures were constant demands of the FGI. 
Moreover, the US mission and the government increased depreciation rates (Law 
942/1949) and granted tax reliefs for imported machinery and transportation 
during the ERP period (Law 1419/1950). Later, the government attempted to 
promote the decentralization of industry granting the above incentives on a 
wider scale for investments out of the Athens-Piraeus region (Law 2176/1952).106 
Simultaneously, the ECA attempted to improve the accounting and cost systems 
of companies and updated book keeping, making it compulsory to all 
entrepreneurs (Laws 578/1948 and 810/1948). The words of a prominent 
industrialist describing the situation which prevailed in businesses in early 1948 
are representative:  
Until that time everything was moving and transferred under the unwritten 
laws of the black market. About eighty or even ninety percent of the 
purchases of raw materials and of other products was made under the label 
A.T., which meant without invoice.107  
An adequate accounting and costing system were preconditions for the CLC 
loans, and thus big businesses were pressed to improve them. These measures 
were the root of the constant complaints that big businesses were penalized by 
the tax system.  
1.4 The implementation of the plan and the reclamation of 
Greek-German economic relations  
The re-equipment of Europe by German heavy industry is an undeniable fact that 
had placed German businesses and the Federal Republic at the forefront of 
 
105 The Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive (hereafter ELIA) Ioannis Fragos Archive (hereafter 
IFA), Unclassified Material (hereafter UM), Third Party Taxes in Greece, Athens, October 1952. 
106 Stylianos Poulopoulos, Report: Fiscal Measures for the Facilitation of Industrial Investments 
(Athens: Coordination Ministry, 1953). 
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European reconstruction and economic integration.108 Certainly, this re-
equipment presupposed two interrelated processes, firstly the revival of German 
industry itself and secondly the adoption of economic links between the 
Germans and the European countries. The main problem of the first process, 
however, was that the Allies’ policies of denazification, dismantling and 
deconcentration/decartelization of German big businesses, which aimed to 
prevent Germans from launching another war and were largely confirmed at 
Potsdam and Paris conferences in 1945, were at odds with this prospect.109 After 
all, the aims of the ERP and particularly the recasting role of German big 
business for European reconstruction contradicted this kind of policy.110 As 
expected, such economic necessity combined with the ‘fight’ of German 
business leaders and their international counterparts against such policies, 
resulted in their progressive reversal.111 In any case, the implementation of 
these polices was limited. The persecution of German big businesses was limited 
and restricted to the Nuremberg trials and until January 1951, businessmen 
found guilty were granted amnesty by the US.112 Dismantling of German plants 
largely ceased by 1948 and only a few big businesses were deconcentrated.113 
Moreover, in 1952 the Allies agreed in London to relieve the public finances of 
the Federal Republic, reducing by half both its pre-war and post-war debts. As 
part of the agreement, which was signed in early 1953 and is known as the 
London Debt Agreement, all countries agreed to cease demands for war 
reparations.     
For similar reasons, that is economic necessity combined with political action, in 
the rest of western Europe ‘businessmen and high officials who had profited 
from the occupation suffered little’.114 In Greece the situation was more 
complex because of the acute economic crisis and the civil war; even if wartime 
collaboration among the ‘bureaucratic and business elites’ was ‘significant’ it 
was war resisters rather than collaborators ‘who were likely to find themselves 
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113 Berghahn, American, pp. 307-13.  
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tried and imprisoned.’ 115 Indeed, within an anti-communist political 
environment, Greek businessmen largely escaped trials for collaboration or they 
were acquitted116 and Germans who had committed economic and other crimes 
in Greece during the occupation had the same fate.117 As it will be argued in the 
remaining two sections, in the Greek case, businessmen and state agencies had 
collectively contributed substantially to the second process.  
Economic relations between Greece and Germany had strengthened during the 
inter-war period but immediately after liberation they were largely interrupted. 
However, by 1950 they had been partially restored, and were finally embodied 
in the trade agreement signed in October 1950 between Georgios Papandreou 
and Ludwig Erhard. As we will see in the next chapter, this agreement was 
important because it tied the Greek economy to the premature process of 
European integration within the EPU framework and was the predecessor of the 
economic agreement signed in November 1953, which had inextricably tied the 
construction of core projects with German finance and technology. In short, 
their significance lies in the fact that it was mainly due to these relations that 
Greece followed the plans of the Federal Republic for European integration.  
During negotiations, Papandreou had indicated that ‘the orders to German 
industry for the realization of reconstruction is a precondition for a successful 
solution to the tobacco issue.’118 It became obvious very soon, however, that the 
opposite was also true; the realization of the projects presupposed the solution 
of the tobacco issue. The projects, to which Papandreou explicitly referred, 
were core facilities proposed in the plan; the nitrogen, soda and alumina plants, 
as well as the Aliveri and Ptolemais thermoelectric facilities. Indeed, the efforts 
for the signing of the agreement initiated in early 1950, when it was clear that 
the ECA had essentially refused to finance the core projects of the plan. It was 
agreed that the respective capital imports would not affect normal trade, but 
they will be contracted beyond such imports. Significantly, the agreement 
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118 YDIA/1950/148/6, Georgios Papandreou to Prime-minister, Frankfurt, 11 October 1950.  
  79 
 
 
 
 
presupposed the full restoration of Greek-German economic relations and 
German reparations played a substantial role in this respect. 
German reparations, which were allocated during the Paris conference in 
December 1945 and for which Greece was dissatisfied, as we have seen in the 
first section, were derived from two sources and their allocation was supervised 
by the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (IARA).119 The first category (List A) 
included mainly German property rights and interests to companies and public 
assets outside the Federal Republic and the second (List B) ships and plants 
derived from dismantling within its borders. The companies and assets in Greece 
of the first category had been confiscated by the Greek state in 1944 (Mandatory 
Law 13/1944) and the aim was to progressively liquidate them. The significance 
of these properties was not only their value on paper but, more importantly, 
they included key companies and interests in services, manufacturing and mining 
and they could become again the entry points of German businesses in Greece. 
The reparations for Greece included in the second category were limited, but 
the List B acted as a yardstick for the formulation of the industrial plans. Both of 
them, contributed to the development of economic relations between the two 
countries. Indeed, one of the most significant results of the List B, was its 
influence upon the reconstruction plans.120 At the time, the FGI, in contrast to 
Bodosakis, did not target the restructuring of Greece’s industrial base and this 
became evident when it essentially refused to participate in the specification of 
the technical plan upon which Greece’s claims for the List B would be based. For 
the TCG, which had articulated the proposal that was eventually submitted to 
IARA to outline Greek demands, the federation’s claims of the List B were 
restricted to 10% of its total value. At the time, the value of this list was 
estimated about $100 million but subsequent calculations reduced the amount to 
$35 million. However, the TCG’s proposal was the basis for the subsequent plans 
for the adoption of heavy industry by the RO, the UNNRA and eventually by the 
ASA and ECA.  
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The Greek government had shown an exceptional interest in German confiscated 
companies which, according to IARA’s Agreement signed by Greece in January 
1946, could not return to German ownership or control. Until October 1947 the 
government had not liquidated any single asset of the German properties.121 
Instead, and despite the pressure of the US Embassy to the contrary122, in May 
1949 Greece excluded itself unilaterally from IARA’s procedure for the resolution 
of the conflicting claims upon German Enemy Assets including all the valuable 
German properties in Greece (List A). It particularly exempted twelve industrial 
and commercial companies and all mining companies without exception.123 In 
October 1949, the government legislated its right to confirm unilaterally the 
confiscation of the said properties which consisted of thirty-seven companies 
(Legislative Decree 1138/1949). However, since the new trade agreement 
necessitated the establishment of economic links for reconstruction, the 
government passed, on 25 October 1950, a new law which eventually opened the 
road for the reclamation of the property rights of these companies from those 
who were minority shareholders during the occupation period and/or third 
parties (Mandatory Law 1530/1950). As will be shown, German businesses, 
mainly Siemens AG and Alfried Krupp, had exercised pressure for this outcome in 
their endeavour to regain the Greek market. The problem, however, was that 
many minority participants had collaborated or were accused of collaboration. 
From their side, both Greek businessmen and state agencies were interested in 
utilizing German credits and technology for reconstruction and thus for 
economic viability.  
Under these circumstances, Papandreou informed the German side that the 
government had announced in the Greek parliament its decision to treat German 
state properties equally with those of Italy and expressed his hope that the 
Federal government would be ‘ultimately satisfied’.124 As the General 
Accounting Office of the finance ministry later implied, it had been secretly 
agreed, because it contradicted IARA’s regulations, that the Greek state would 
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return or sell all these properties to Germans.125 In any case, the Greek state did 
not sell these German assets to third parties; instead they were progressively 
returned to Germans. The road for the purchase of the confiscated public 
properties from the Federal Republic officially opened in March 1952.126  
The links between businessmen and state managers, rooted both in the war-time 
and pre-war economic relations, were multiple and the following cases are both 
important and illustrative. The AETE SA was a subsidiary of Siemens-Halske AG in 
telecommunications, the Siemens SA of Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG in electrical 
installations/equipment and the AERE SA of Telefunken & AEG in radio-casting.  
All of them operated before the war and had been granted monopolistic 
privileges. During the occupation, stuffed with Greek personnel and managers 
and with the minority participation of Greek businessmen and the NBG, they 
were all working for the Nazi forces.127 Some of these businessmen, like Ioannis 
Voulpiotis, were convicted collaborators. After liberation, all these subsidiaries 
were confiscated so the German parent companies subsequently utilized these 
pre-war and war-time Greek-German networks to reclaim their position in the 
Greek market. Evidence show that this pressure had officially started at least by 
1949 and in 1950 clearly intensified.128 The result was that until 1952 Siemens 
AG was very close to this aim; Greece was receiving Siemens telephones and the 
government had decided to expand telecommunications with a direct assignment 
to companies which operated the ‘automatic ‘Siemens’’ but with a public tender 
for other equipment.129 In the field of radio-casting, attempts were not 
successful but there was an extensive network working to this purpose. 
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1.4.1 The implementation of the plan in the secondary sector 
In the remaining part of this section the implementation of the industrial part of 
the plan within the framework of the revived Greek-German economic relations 
will be analysed. Until the middle of 1951 the bulk of the CLC loans to private 
business had been granted and thereafter, with the noticeable exception of EPK, 
were given only supplementary loans.130 Until the middle of 1954 the CLC had 
granted $10 million to energy, $51.1 to manufacturing and $4.3 to mining.131 The 
Power group, and particularly the HEAP, had received 88% of the loans to the 
energy sector. With the loans to manufacturing and mining, the Bodosakis group 
was granted 23%, two cement companies - 11.5%, three metal producing 
companies - 8.7%, four metal working companies - 5.11%, two wool industries - 
6%, three light chemical companies shared about 3.3%, one leather company 1% 
and a wine company 1%.132 The rest had been allocated to small companies.   
The US company Ebasco was employed by the Greek government to report on 
the enforcement of the energy part of the plan, which was ultimately the basis 
of industrialization. Its intermediate report in middle 1949 had faced severe 
criticism from the advocates of heavy industry.133 This was because it promoted 
the uneconomic thermoelectric facilities at Aliveri, instead of Ptolemais which 
was a strip-mining company, thereby undermining the prospect of the 
construction of the nitrogen and soda plants. Yet, for hydroelectric power it had 
proposed the construction of Ladon and Bodas facilities which were of minor 
importance, and had adopted an ambivalent position towards the Achelous 
project. The implication was that the adoption of heavy industry and the 
construction of the corresponding energy facilities would not be simultaneous as 
it had been scheduled one year earlier. Rather, electrification would follow 
industrialization.  
Hydroelectric facilities, particularly the Ladon and Bodas plants, were included 
in Italian reparations in 1949 and constructed by the Italian company Societa 
 
130 Historical Archives of the Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation (hereafter GR/PIOP) 
GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS1/FI1, General Recapitulation, 31 December 1958, pp. 1-73 
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Edison of Milan.134 The exploitation of Achelous river for the production of 
energy and the exclusive right to utilize the energy for the adoption of 
metallurgical and chemical industries, had been granted to two US companies 
before the war.135 It was only in April 1951 that the government renounced the 
contract but the ECA refused to finance its construction.136 The project was 
finally included in Italian reparations in 1952, committing Greece to construct it 
only with Italian companies until 1958.137 Under these circumstances the 
importance of thermoelectric facilities was growing.138 Nevertheless, the 
situation here was even more complex. 
The ECA in Greece had announced in late 1948 that the contracts with German 
companies for the ‘geological survey and the analytical studies for the refinery 
of ores and lignite’ were under negotiation.139 Certainly, this confirms the claim 
that by 1948 the ‘strategic shift’ of US policy for German’s recasting was in ‘full 
swing’.140 This section claims that this shift was even more true for the Greeks, 
tracing back the continuities with the pre-1945 era. Until October 1949, the 
coordination ministry had collected surveys for the utilization of lignite deposits 
based predominately upon German studies. These studies were oriented towards 
the refining of lignite with methods compatible with the simultaneous 
production of nitrogen and metallurgic coke.141 Showing the continuity in Greek-
German economic relations, all had been based upon a German study of the 
inter-war period whereas AEEXPL had provided data from its own research 
department. Within this framework, the thermoelectric facilities at Aliveri was 
the first major public infrastructure project which utilized lignite and was 
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indeed undertaken by German industry, as it was included in the trade 
agreement in 1950.142  
The road for this development had opened with the refusal of the Greek 
government in 1946 to receive the Vremi’s thermoelectric facilities provided by 
German reparations. These facilities would provide the intermediate solution 
until the enforcement of the energy plan. The HEAP, which monopolized energy, 
had been publicly accused by business circles at the time that it was behind this 
refusal. The newly established Public Power Corporation (PPC) confirmed later 
that this was indeed the case.143 Under these circumstances, the HEAP was 
financed beyond the initial provisions of the plan.144 This expansion was 
uneconomic because its facilities were not near to lignite mines and was thus 
obliged to burn imported oil, undermining the basic aims of the energy 
programme.145 Finally, despite the disagreement of the industrial minister, Leon 
Makkas, who was backed by the FGI, the ECA and the PPC subordinated HEAP’s 
expansion to Ebasco’s plan.146 Importantly, the expansion of the group had been 
based on German businesses before the Greek-German agreement of October 
1950.  
Since 1936 the Power group was mainly equipped by Siemens AG and AEG. During 
the occupation it had been taken over by AEG.147 At least from the middle of 
1950 HEAP had agreed for a new AEG turbine, supported this time by the FGI.148 
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During 1951, it was obvious that HEAP continued to consider the expansion of its 
facilities exclusively with German equipment.149 This was also true for the 
branch of the group which had undertaken the construction of the electric 
railway connection of Piraeus and Kiffisia. This branch, controlled by Nikolaos 
Vlangalis and Stratis Andreadis since the middle of 1950, consumed eventually 
$1.6 million or 37% of the CLC loans to transportation. The new equipment 
delivered the next year was from Siemens-Man.150  
The most important case, which illustrates how economic necessity was 
combined with coordinated business and political action to restore Greek-
German economic and business relations, is the Ptolemais project. In 1939 the 
Greek-American citizen George Filis had signed a contract with the state for the 
exploitation of Ptolemais’ deposits. During the occupation the contract was 
denounced and Siemens-Halske had been involved in the plans.151 In June 1946, 
the Tsaldaris government restored Filis’ rights and, thereafter, the contract was 
renewed for the Hellenic-American General Lignite Products Company Inc, to 
which Filis had assigned all the rights and obligations arising from the contract. 
Filis was the chairman of ‘The Justice for Greece Committee’ in the US, and he 
was in contact with Venizelos and Tsaldaris, informing them, confidentially, of 
his actions in the US to try and resolve Greece’s economic problems, including 
gold transfers.152 After the termination of the civil war, Tsaldaris recommended 
special attention be given for the renewal of the Filis’ contract on the grounds 
that he was a ‘special Greek’.153 Indeed, amidst allegations that the government 
had tricked the ECA in Greece, undermining the whole reconstruction 
programme, the Filis’ company continued as the Ptolemais contractor.154  
Very soon it was proved that the company was not ready to start any work and 
its share capital had been deposited on the expiration day in December 1950 in 
 
149 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/28/159, HEAP Report, 23 September 1951.  
150 KKF/KTA/1950/46/2/10, Stratis Andereadis and Nicolaos Vlangalis to Konstantinos Tsaldaris, 
Athens, 5 October 1950. 
151 Hatziiosif, The Waning, pp. 192-4.  
152 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/12/051, G. Filis to Sophocles Venizelos, 16 August 1946; 
KKF/KTA/1947/23/1/15, Unsigned Cryptographic Telegram, G. Filis to K. Tsaldaris, Buffalo, 27 
January 1947.  
153 KKF/KTA/1949/35/3/40, Cryptographic Telegram 7084, K. Tsaldaris to Foreign Ministry, New 
York, 8 November 1949.  
154 ‘The Filis’ extension was misappropriated’, To Vima, 9 December 1949; ‘The Scandalous 
Cession’, Eleftheria, 11 December 1949. 
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Drs and not in dollars, violating the terms of the contract.155 Until the middle of 
1950 the project was considered impossible, but optimism had returned 
immediately after Papandreou’s trip to the Federal Republic in October 1950. 156 
This is an indication that Papandreou had negotiated the realization of the 
Ptolemais project. In any case, in March 1951 it was revealed in public that the 
majority shareholder had become Konstantinos Gertsos, a controversial 
businessman accused of collaboration by business circles.157 He was the owner of 
Industriebau AG of Zurich, the commercial agent of various German industrial 
firms in Greece, and among his close associates was Katsabas.158 To be sure, the 
president of the FGI had been also accused of collaboration but he was 
eventually acquitted.159 
Upon the insistence of Papandreou, and despite severe reservations, the 
concessionaire was granted by the CLC in the middle of 1951 a $13.8 million 
loan. Particularly, in respect to Gertsos’ guarantees for his contribution, the BAA 
had reported that ‘legally neither the letters from suppliers nor the deposit with 
the Swiss Bank have any significance’ but they were simply ‘moral 
undertakings’.160 It was under these circumstances, that the technical survey 
and the machinery, as well as the credits for the concessionaire’s contribution, 
were now scheduled to come from West Germany with the mediation of the 
Industriebau AG.161 Gertsos’ company would receive $0.6 million for its services. 
As expected, works at Ptolemais from the concessionaire never went beyond 
research drilling for minerals and in the middle of 1952 the company asked for 
advances beyond the contract’s provisions. As if this was not enough, these 
 
155 ‘The Ptolemais Contract’, Antaios, March 1951, pp. 131-4. 
156 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS5/FI52020/SFL5, HEAP, Application and Information Bulletin, 1 August 
1949, 3-4; GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/31/214, Meeting for HEAP, 22 November 1950.  
157 YDIA/1946/31/2, Special Collaborators’ Court Investigator to Foreign Ministry, 25 July 1945. 
158 The Gertsos’ family, with stakes at Greek aniline industry which supplied textiles, had 
accompanied in 1947 and 1948 Katsabas to Germany, mediating the purchase of new machinery 
for P-P, see: Christoforos Katsabas, Believing in the future (Athens, 1966), pp. 268-75.  
159 Kousouris, Trials, p.404; ‘The President of Industrialists Mr Katsabas was called to apologize 
for Collaboration’, Eleftheria, 11 January 1947; ‘Mr Katsabas was acquitted’, Eleftheria, 9 March 
1947. 
160 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS7/FI73017/SFL4, BAA Report No 253, 15 June 1951, p. 32. 
161 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS7/FI73017/SFL2, CLC Minutes, 8 May 1951, pp. 2-15; 
GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS7/FI73017/SFL5, Industrial Project, no date, pp. 18-28; Ibid, Calvin J. 
Adams to CLC, 3 May 1951, pp. 29-33; The technical survey was carried out by the 
Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg A.G. (MAN). The share capital was $0.4 and the project 
would cost about $19 million.    
  87 
 
 
 
 
severe delays resulted in the abrogation of a new plant scheduled by the PPC.162 
However, Greek-German business relations were not restricted to the above 
cases alone. 
It has been convincingly claimed that Bodosakis’ cooperation with German big 
businesses after 1953 was catalytic for the revival of Greek-German economic 
relations.163 The archival sources utilized here show that this cooperation had 
started at least by 1949. Yet there is a clear continuity between the pre-1945 
and post-war periods. Indeed, before the war Bodosakis had adopted relations 
with German businesses primarily via the armament industry EPK.164 During 
occupation, the entire Bodosakis group had worked for the occupation forces.165  
Some of its companies were accused of collaboration even by business 
associations.166 In late 1946, when it had become obvious that the US would step 
in to provide financial aid, Bodosakis acquired the internal chemical monopoly 
AEEXPL. This was a vertically integrated industrial and mining complex, which 
produced fertilizers, glass products, refractories and pesticides. The group 
participated in reconstruction plans mainly with this company: the companies 
which belonged to the group before 1945 were not included in the ERP but they 
were financed by the Currency Committee. The only exception was EPK, which 
had been ‘pillaged by the occupying forces’, and the company had estimated 
that the value of the machinery and raw materials ‘stolen’ was about $50 
million.167  
In 1949 the AEEXPL’s investment strategy was two-fold: firstly, it aimed to 
consolidate its position internally with the modernization of its mechanical 
equipment for the existing branches and secondly to expand its works to heavy 
industry.168 In respect of the first aim, until the middle of 1951 AEEXPL had been 
 
162 GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/28/169, PPC Memo to Coordination Minister, Athens, 15 November 1951; 
GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS7/FI73017/SFL3, Hellenic-American General Lignite Products Co, INC, to 
CLC, Athens, 17 October 1952; 40-2; GR/NBGHA/1/2/23/1, PPC, Report for the fiscal years 1950-
51 and 1951-52, Athens, 5 November 1952, pp. 67-8. 
163 Pelt, Tying, p. 73.  
164 Pelt, ‘Germany’. 
165 Manousakis, ‘Economy and Politics’, pp. 543-609. 
166 The ACCI had included the ‘Hellenic Wools SA’ to economic collaborators: YDIA/1946/31/2, 
ACCI to Ministry of Justice, 27 July 1945. 
167 General State Archives of Greece, Currency Committee Archive (hereafter GR/GAK/CCA) 
639/3/7, EPK to Currency Committee, Athens, 26 March 1949. 
168 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32018/SFL29, Notes of Meeting with Mr Kanellopoulos, 16 
November 1949, p. 22. 
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granted $8.2 million for its four main departments and $1.4 for its three mines. 
The company was treated by both the ECA and the CLC as a special case on the 
grounds that Bodosakis cooperated effectively. With an ECA proposal in May 
1950, the cash contribution to the projects took the form of a personal 
guarantee by Bodosakis, initially in a reserved deposit for a future share capital 
increase. The next month, the CLC made a new decision enabling Bodosakis to 
withdraw his money and, latterly, it was agreed that AEEXPL would capitalize 
profits for its contribution. It was obvious that the company had exceeded its 
borrowing capacity and a complementary loan in June 1951 was granted only on 
the condition that applications for new projects would not be accepted by the 
CLC.169 The company was already indebted, and its share capital was less than 
20% of total liabilities in 1951 so, very quickly, it had violated all the terms of 
the loans.170 
In respect to the second aim, the production of iron, nitrogen and petrol, all 
from domestic iron ore and lignite deposits, using German mechanical 
equipment and technology, were among the company’s plans before the war.171 
Certainly, during late 1930s AEEXPL was cautious for the viability of such plants 
in Greece but it is important that after the war it returned with similar plans. In 
1946 the its research department, and Bodosakis personally, had provided 
UNRRA’s Committee for the Utilization of Greece’s Natural Resources with 
studies which proposed the adoption of heavy industry.172 The core of these 
studies, adopted subsequently by UNRRA, were essentially still the above plans 
which were based upon German technology, showing the continuity with the 
inter-war period.173 This continuity was substantiated by the AEEXPL, which 
applied for the soda and nitrogen plants having already asked the German 
company ‘Lurgi-Warme’ to contact the relevant technical and economic studies 
 
169 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32018/SFL9, CLC Board Minutes, No 118/3-5-1950;122a/18-5-
1950;124/24-5-1950;134/24-6-1950;183/11-5-1951;190/6-6-1951, pp. 11-89. 
170 Appendix 1, table 15. 
171 Leonidas Kanellopoulos, ‘New method for iron production’, Technical Annales, 1 July 1937, 
585-9; Leonidas Kanellopoulos, ‘New methods for lignite gasification for the production of 
nitrogen and petrol’, Technical Annales, 1 July 1937, 585-9; 
172 UNRRA, Plan for the utilization of Greece’s natural resources, Annex I: Synopsis of technical 
and economic data (Athens: UNRRA, 1947), pp. vi-ix. 
173 UNRRA, The Mineral Wealth of Greece (Athens: UNRRA, 1947). 
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from late 1949.174 However, as these projects were linked to the Ptolemais 
project, they did not materialize. This continuity was more evident in mining 
and metallurgy. 
Business historians have shown how major German businesses, such as Alfried 
Krupp, were rebuilt after the second world war.175 Alfried Krupp had been 
condemned in the Nuremberg trials for slave labour and plundering in occupied 
Europe. He was sentenced to twenty years and his property was confiscated. In 
January 1951 he was given amnesty and he was thereafter devoted to rebuilding 
his firm. As a precondition for the return of the confiscated companies belonging 
to his firm, in July 1952 he agreed verbally that he would not be engaged with 
the production of iron and steel domestically. Thus, a main part of his business 
strategy was to build plans mainly in underdeveloped countries which followed 
import substitution policies, such as Mexico, Brazil and India. As will be shown, 
Greece was part of this endeavour for Alfried Krupp was in contact with 
Bodosakis from at least late 1951, aiming to undertake projects included in the 
plan. This cooperation proved significant for the revival and consolidation of 
Greek-German economic relations. 
The AEEXPL’s doubts in early 1947 were representative of the fears for the 
economic viability of iron metallurgy in Greece. The blast furnace because of 
the lack of domestic metallurgic coke and the small internal market; the electric 
furnace, which was smaller and required less coke, because of its high energy 
needs.176 All the relevant studies were coming from this company and 
emphasized the necessity to utilize the chrome and iron nickel ore deposits at 
Larymna mixed with iron pyrites, the main by-product of fertilizer production. 
The first step was made with the attempt to utilize nickel ores.  
 
174 GR/GAK/CCA/639/3/11, AEEXPL to Currency Committee, Athens, 16 February 1950; Ibid, St. 
Kostopoulos to Currency Committee, Athens, 27 March 1950. 
175 Harold James, Krupp: A History of the Legendary German firm (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), chapter 7. 
176 Ar. Dreleres, ‘The Iron industry in Greece, VE, January 1947, 21-2;28. 
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Before the war, the mining companies which exploited Larymna’s mines were 
controlled by the Krupp group.177 The entire output was exported and processed 
in Germany with the Krupp-Renn method for its needs in iron-nickel. Being the 
sole nickel ore mine in continental Europe, mining at Larymna reached a peak to 
cover the growing war needs during the occupation. Since nickel was a strategic 
mineral, in 1940-1941 the Italian company AMMI had attempted to acquire the 
fields and the result was that after liberation the ownership of the most 
important of these mining companies, which had all been confiscated by the 
Greek state, was blurred. Its ownership was claimed by the Italian company at 
least from 1947, but Bodosakis and a UK company were also interested in the 
mines. Italy’s government, being aware that behind Bodosakis was Alfried Krupp, 
pressed at all levels associating AMMI’s rights with all the pending economic 
bilateral issues. With the support of the Greek government, AEEXPL eventually 
acquired the right for Larymna’s exploitation with a long-term contract ratified 
in September 1952.178 Simultaneously, Bodosakis travelled to the Federal 
Republic and signed with Alfried Krupp the terms for the joint exploitation of 
Larymna’s mines.179 Nickel iron ores would be processed using the Krupp-Renn 
method which did not require metallurgic coke and was based upon a pilot study 
made by Alf. Krupp for Larymna in late 1951. The main product was iron nickel 
pebbles (Loupen), which would be exported exclusively to German for further 
processing by Alf. Krupp to produce iron-nickel.180 The plans did include the 
production of iron domestically, but this was considered to be the second step. 
This was not the only effort for the production of iron domestically. In 1946, 
there were three companies which operated small Siemens-Martin and electric 
furnaces along with rolling mills to produce steel and its main final products, 
namely steel bars, sheet steel and wire.181 Long before the October 1950 Greek-
 
177 Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, Konstantinos Papakonstantinou Archive (hereafter 
KKF/KPA) Unclassified Material, Finance ministry to Foreign, Coordination and Industrial 
ministries, Athens, 22 August 1951. 
178 KKF/KPA/Unclassified Material, Italian Delegation Memorandum, Athens, 23 May 1951; Ibid., 
Italian Embassy to E. Averoff (copy), Athens, 15 September 1952; GR/NIRSEV/SVA/226/21/118, 
Novas to Sofoklis Venizelos, Rome, 1 July 1952. 
179 Hatziotis, Prodromos, p. 282. 
180 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3/FI3/P102/SFL1, Contract between ‘Alfr. Krupp’ and ‘Lipasmata’, 31 
October 1952, pp. 6-38; FOA3/SE6/SS7/FI72048/SFL22, AEEXPL Report for the research upon the 
trade of Larymna’s metallurgy products, August 1953, pp. 77-84. 
181 Hatziiosif, The Waning, pp. 165-74; Coordination Ministry, Iron and Steel Metallurgy: Data for 
the adoption of Iron Metallurgy in Greece, Ad. Deligiannis (Athens: YSESA, 1950). 
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German agreement, these companies were quite interested in German 
machinery.182 In 1947 and 1948 their main shareholders travelled to Germany to 
evaluate plants provided by reparations and by late 1947 the Greek delegation 
to IARA had already obtained a study by the Demag AG Duisburg for complete 
German metallurgic facilities. The study had claimed that even the chrome iron 
ores would be processed profitably on this basis. However, Greek industrialists 
rejected the proposal to jointly operate the German blast furnace and claimed 
separately steelwork installations, each one for his own company, reproducing 
the existed fragmented structure and setting a precedent. 183 Subsequently, iron 
metallurgy was incorporated in the plan in 1948 only upon the insistence of the 
ECA. However, until the middle of 1949 the US mission had already raised doubts 
about the coke blast furnace. In June 1949, Greek industrialists had moved in 
the opposite direction now claiming the German metallurgic facilities, but they 
proposed to operate the blast furnace only at half capacity. One month later, 
without the prior consultation of the ECA, the government asked for complete 
iron and steel metallurgic facilities from German reparations. The plant was 
indeed granted, but the ECA rejected this option on the grounds that it was 
uneconomic. For the Greek side, the US mission had ignored the Mackenzie 
Engineering Ltd study, designed precisely to guide the US mission policy for the 
German blast furnace which had indicated the economic viability of the 
project.184 Despite the coordinated efforts of businessmen and state agencies to 
show the viability of the project and its significance for the domestic 
economy,185 since its materialization presupposed US finance, the furnace was 
eventually sold as scrap. As a result, the three existing companies proceeded 
with the modernization and extension of their steelwork installations, using 
grants of about $5 million. As we will see in chapter three, their output was 
eventually expensive and of low quality, consumed entirely by their own plants 
and thus metal working companies were obliged to import their raw material 
from abroad. 
 
182 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32041/SFL6, Coordination Ministry, Report, no date, pp. 12-21; 
Ibid, Economic and Technical Report, Athens, 27 February 1949, pp. 22-37. 
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184 GR/BOGHA/A5/S1/Y7/F20/, YSESA Memo, Athens, 11 March 1950.    
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  92 
 
 
 
 
This diverse departure for the metal producing companies was additionally 
burdened by their low contribution to the projects financed by the CLC loans. 
Each company was obliged to contribute about 30% of the total investment, the 
other financed by the CLC. Indeed, their contribution reached this level, but its 
main part was pre-existing fixed capital: fresh capital offered from industries’ 
own sources was, on average, no more than 6%.186 As it clearly emerges from the 
CLC archives, this percentage is representative of the owners’ contribution to 
investments financed by the counterpart funds. As a result, almost all companies 
financed by the CLC were already indebted, and this became a permanent 
feature of Greek business. 
The reliance upon foreign capital and technology as well as the obstacles for 
their inflow, are well summarized by the case of the oil refinery. Domestic 
industrialists claimed that despite the initial acceptance of this investment by 
the ECA, it had later refused it because the interests of foreign oil companies 
would be affected.187 However, they also claimed that they lacked the 
technological capacity and the capital to develop such a complex investment so 
foreign capital was necessary.188 In addition, their proposals for the construction 
of the refinery asked for special treatment as the companies interested in the 
refinery in 1951 stated that a tax exemption on profits for the first twenty years 
was a precondition for foreign capital to invest in Greece.189 As chapter three 
will show, this project was also materialized by German businesses. 
Last but not least, during this period business relations between Greek 
shipowners and German big businesses were also forged. State agencies had 
been also involved as well, showing that they cooperated in this crucial field. 
Immediately after the Greek-German trade agreement in October 1950, the 
Greek Embassy at Bonn had instructed Papandreou to include tanker orders to 
Hamburg shipyards.190 Indeed, from 1951 the orders of the prominent Greek 
shipowner Aristotle Onassis had ‘literally revived from ashes’ three major 
 
186 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3, Various files. 
187 The Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive, Ioannis Frangos Archive, Unclassified Material 
(hereafter GR/ELIA/IFA/UM), ‘ELBYN: Report on the establishment of an oil refinery in Greece’, 
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188 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, S. Restis & Co: Note on the establishing of an oil refinery in Greece, 17 May 
1951. 
189 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, ELBYN: Report, 08 January 1951. 
190 YDIA/1955/23/2, N. Kabalouris to Military Mission at Berlin, Hamburg, 2 November 1950. 
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German shipyards.191 As will be shown, such cooperation had crucial implications 
for Greece’s participation in European integration. 
1.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that during this period the parameters within which 
Greece’s political economy evolved over the next decades were defined: rapid 
industrialization to solve the imbalance problem. Business was instrumental in 
this outcome for the FGI supported this solution from the inter-war period, 
asking for an import substitution strategy. Yet the federation actively backed 
the gold sales policy and defended the notion of capital scarcity upon which 
state agencies were based in asking for US financial assistance in order to 
resolve the imbalance problem. Equally important, businessmen and state 
agencies agreed that the main danger was coming from the communists. 
Certainly, it was the combined efforts of businessmen and state agencies which 
had resulted in the US intervention. 
The evidence presented has also shown that it is simplistic to advocate that 
domestic business was indifferent to the adoption of heavy industry, judged 
from the FGI’s stance alone. The federation was, indeed, against the 
development of heavy industry but the Bodosakis group, which at the time 
controlled more than one fifth of Greek manufacturing, had decisively supported 
this option. Even more, state agencies were divided and there is evidence that 
there were actually two camps, one close to the FGI and the other close to 
Bodosakis. The US mission was decisive in supporting those in favour of the 
adoption of heavy industry.   
The plans for energy and heavy industry did not materialize not only because the 
US mission stepped back very quickly and the Greek state agencies had resisted 
reforms. Evidence also show that under the ideological umbrella of 
anticommunism were legitimated policies like gold sales and major projects 
were granted to businessmen only because they were political friends. The fate 
of the Ptolemais project is the epitome of the prevailing state-business relations 
 
191 Gelina Harlaftis, ‘The Onassis Global Shipping Business, 1920s–1950s’, Business History Review 
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in this respect. Equally important, the construction of major projects was based 
upon German businesses and technology from the very beginning, and 
progressively after 1950, upon German finance. Among the main problems for 
their progression was that many of the Greek agencies of German companies, 
the confiscated companies, had a Nazi or a pro-Nazi past. The attempts to 
circumvent these ‘obstacles’, for example for the Ptolemais and Larymna 
projects, illustrate the peculiar circumstances within which Greece attempted 
to industrialize during the first substantive phase of European integration. They 
also illustrate how German big business revived in the post-war era and was able 
to re-equip Greece.   
Even if the allocated counterpart funds to the secondary sector was limited, 
they stabilized the internal position of the main big businesses and this was 
especially true for the Bodosakis group, the Power group, the two cement 
industries, along with a handful of metal-producing and metal-using companies. 
As we will see in the next chapter, this came at the cost of their progressive 
exposure to international competition. 
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 Encountering the customs union, the Code of 
Liberalization and the European Payments 
Union (EPU) 
This chapter examines the formulation of Greece’s European strategy within the 
framework of US intervention and the need to promote exports to German, 
which had entailed Greece’s participation in the international and regional trade 
liberalization schemes. The chapter comprises of four sections. The first section 
explores the accumulation strategy of the FGI after 1945, showing that it was an 
import substitution strategy as advocated by the federation since at least the 
1920s. The federation, on the basis that domestic production costs were high, 
asked on the one hand for the liberalization of imports for essential foodstuffs 
and raw materials and, on the other, for restrictions of imports of final goods 
produced domestically. For exports, the federation demanded direct export 
subsidies and the granting of the drawback right. For its realization, the FGI had 
formed an alliance with the ACCI and the government at least from late 1949, 
pressing simultaneously for uninterrupted gold sales and the utilization of 
private exchange. This set of policies, applied since early 1946, was 
subsequently questioned by the US mission which imposed import restrictions 
and asked for the progressive reduction of the tariff protection of industry.  
The second section begins with the participation of Greece in the GATT which 
took place under the guidance of the US. To promote agricultural exports, the 
Greek state reduced tariffs for industrial products and attempted to form an 
alliance with Middle Eastern states, aiming to channel its industrial exports to 
these markets. The section then proceeds with the analysis of Greece’s strategy 
towards the customs union and the proposals for liberalization within the 
European movement. Since Greek industry was uncompetitive, suffering from 
low productivity, Greece rejected the customs union in 1948. The next year it 
elaborated its European strategy with the European movement. Capital inflows 
and labour outflows to Europe, along with the promotion of agricultural exports, 
were the main preconditions for Greece’s participation in European integration. 
Subsequently, with US encouragement, Greece adopted the Code of 
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Liberalization which very soon proved that the opening up of the economy was 
premature.  
The resumption of trade relations with the Federal Republic is examined in 
section three. The reduction of US aid underlined the dependence of Greece 
upon the German market which absorbed Greece’s overproduced tobacco and 
supplied he reconstruction goods esteemed by both businessmen and state 
agencies as vital to the solution of the imbalance problem. Pressing for the 
removal of the obstacles which the Nazi past had inherited, German businesses 
and the Federal Republic accepted the Greek appeal, aiming to regain not only 
the Greek market, but also Middle Eastern markets too. This was facilitated by 
the EPU multilateral offsetting mechanism, casting light upon the forces which 
drove integration between unequal partners. 
The last section considers the policies adopted to promote exports and to 
preserve exchange after the reduction of US aid. It is shown that they aimed to 
deal with the overvalued Drs, but they were rejected by the GATT and the 
devaluation in early 1953 was chosen as the alternative. Subsequently, it 
evaluates the export performance of Greek industry financed by the counterpart 
funds, illustrating the pressure which the FGI exercised upon the government to 
devalue.   
2.1 FGI and its fellow travellers encounter the Foreign Trade 
Administration  
2.1.1 Exports and production costs 
During the 1920s the FGI had noted that Greece was still an agricultural country 
and underlined the need to boost industrialization. To achieve this goal, the 
federation claimed that Greece had to emulate the industrial and commercial 
policies which had stimulated the industrialization of the advanced economies: 
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We are most interested in the tactic prevailing at the time in today's major 
industrial powers because it was the system which created the industrial 
acme of these states and it was therefore completely successful.1   
As Hatzikiriakos explained, this system was protectionism underling that ‘free 
exchange’ inevitably ‘destroys’ infant industry.2 In particular, he claimed that 
protection had enabled industries, such as British, German and French, to grow 
undisturbed within their internal markets. Subsequently, these industries were 
able to reach further economies of scale assisted by dumping their surplus 
production abroad. This was the core of the accumulation strategy which the FGI 
considered to be appropriate to boost Greece’s industrialization. It was a clear 
import substitution model and for the federation its realization presupposed 
three state policies.3 Firstly, the state had to prohibit imports of manufactured 
goods produced domestically. Secondly, it had to abolish all the obstacles and 
charges for the importation of both raw materials and machinery. Thirdly, it had 
to facilitate exports with the drawback right.  
In 1945 the accumulation strategy of the FGI had hardly changed from the inter-
war period. For the federation, the industrial policy during 1945 had prevented 
the revival of production and this simply meant that it had also prevented the 
‘saturation’ of domestic needs and consequently industrial export plans for the 
year 1946 which had ‘collapsed pitifully.’4 Conversely, a ‘healthy’ industrial 
policy would very soon enable internal consumption needs to be satisfied, 
opening the road for an ‘export programme to neighbourhood countries’.5 For 
this reason, it asked state to return tariffs and taxes of imported raw materials 
(drawback right) and to abolish other production costs, such as municipality 
taxation, when manufactured goods were exported.6 The US intervention forced 
the federation to further clarify its proposed policy. Its rationale was clarified in 
its reply to the Porter questionnaire particularly for industrial exports in January 
1947.7 For the federation, limited exports were the result of the still low level of 
 
1 Andreas Hatzikiriakos, Industrial Policy (Athens: FGI, 1929), p. 16. 
2 Ibid., p. 17. 
3 Ibid., pp. 13-14;23-29; Nikolaos Dedes, ‘The national significance of Industry and Handicraft 
and the state’s mission, VE, August 1934, pp. 9-10. 
4 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1945 (Athens: FGI, 1946), p. 9. 
5 ‘The Future of Greek Industry’, VE, June 1946, pp. 11-4. 
6 FGI, Memo, p. 24. 
7 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1948 (Athens: FGI, 1949), p. 39-40. 
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production, high domestic prices and high transportation costs. Import 
liberalization of essential goods and raw materials would, directly or indirectly, 
reduce labour and other production costs. This import policy, along with state 
export subsidies derived from a levy imposed upon non-essential imported 
goods, would encourage industrial exports.  
Thus, the federation had not opposed the liberalization of trade, introduced 
alongside gold sovereign sales by Greek governments from late 1945. As it 
argued, the reason was that it would reduce domestic prices and costs. The list 
of liberalized items did include some industrial products, but in early 1946 
domestic production barely exceeded 40% of the pre-war level and thus imports 
posed limited pressure upon domestic production. Essentially, the list was 
dominated by basic foodstuffs and raw materials which would be freely imported 
either by letters of credit or against shipping documents.8 This import policy was 
also a constant demand of the ACCI.9 From its side, the British were ambivalent, 
and research has shown that they had accepted this liberal trade policy mainly 
for political reasons.10 Based upon the above selective liberal commercial policy, 
businesses represented by the FGI and the ACCI had formed an alliance with the 
government after March 1946. It was this policy that was rejected by the AMAG 
in the middle of 1947. Instead, as will be argued below, the US mission 
attempted to organize the introduction of the Greek economy to the 
international circuit of capital from above by consolidating extensive 
quantitative import restrictions, adopting a new subsidization system and 
guiding the whole commercial policy within the OEEC framework.  
The first substantive measure adopted by the US mission was the systematization 
of the import system which, following Porter’s report recommendations, was 
already applying extensive quantitative restrictions from early 1947. The Foreign 
Trade Administration (FTRAD) from October 1947 onwards adopted a tight 
control upon imported goods through a complex system of import licencing, 
aiming primarily to preserve exchange. About half of these imports were 
registered on the public accounts and were allocated by the state, or state-
 
8 ‘The Ministerial Decision for Imports’, To Vima, 16 February 1946. 
9 KKF/KTA/1946/11/4/1, ACCI to Th. Sofoulis, Athens, 15 January 1946. 
10 GR/BOGHATSF/3/1/2/201/10, Greek Government – BEM – UNRRA, 27 February 1946; 
Lykogiannis, Britain, pp. 144-5;180-90. 
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controlled agencies, aiming to control prices. The bulk of these imports were 
basic foodstuffs, fuel and nitrogen fertilizers.11 Importers had a direct economic 
interest to contact these imports. On the grounds that ‘mass imports’ would 
reduce domestic prices, the ACCI asked for their privatization and the abolition 
of quantitative restrictions for ‘some basic’ goods and ‘raw materials’, utilizing 
private exchange for this purpose.12 This was precisely the FGI’s argument 
communicated to both the government and AMAG by two memos sent in March 
and May 1948, respectively. In particular, the federation considered that free 
‘mass imports’ of 15-20 essential products, raw materials and spare parts, would 
reduce internal prices and subsequently production costs.13 The FGI’s and ACCI’s 
demands were in turn identical to those employed by finance minister, Helmis, 
to AMAG. Actually, two draft memos of Helmis to AMAG’s governor Griswold 
included entire sections of the two FGI memos verbatim notably those that 
concerned mass imports.14  
These demands were rejected out of hand by the US mission, reminding 
authorities that the trade deficit, and particularly the dollar-gap, was huge.15 As 
far as imports by private exchange were concerned, the fear was that this 
practice would encourage demand for foreign exchange in the free market and 
consequently increase exchange price, thus causing speculation and capital 
flight which would simultaneously increase the value of gold sovereigns and 
subsequently domestic prices thereby initiating a vicious inflationary cycle. For 
this reason, as it was clearly explained in the memos of the coordination 
ministry and the ASA head, Diomidis, who had also asked for the utilization of 
private exchange, all these claims were accompanied by demands for the 
intensification of gold sovereign sales as an inti-inflationary measure.16  
The second substantial policy concerned exports. Specifically, exports in 1946 
covered only 12% of imports and their state promotion was of paramount 
 
11 YDIA/1950/115/1, Ministry of National Economy to Foreign Ministry, Athens, 14 January 1950. 
12 ‘The Issue of Exports. Chambers’ Common Memo’, ACCI Bulletin, March 1948, pp. 85-6.   
13 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1947 (Athens: FGI, 1948), p. 52-3; FGI, Greek Industry and the 
European Recovery Programme (Athens: FGI, 1948), pp. 22-3.     
14 KKF/KTA/1946/14/6/50-51, To his Excellency Mr. Griswold, 1948; KKF/KTA/1948/29/9/4, In 
respect to the Economic Sector, 1948. 
15 KKF/KTA/1948/32/2/28, 3 July 1948.  
16 GR/NBGHA/1/2/22/86, Coordination Ministry Memo, 2 February 1948; 
KKF/KTA/1948/29/5/25, Al. Diomidis, Memo for free Exchange, 15 June 1948.  
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importance. Naturally, AMAG made it clear in July 1947 that any decision for 
export subsidies had to be postponed until the arrival of its head in Athens.17 
Indeed, the introduction of the exchange certificates was the second measure 
adopted by the FTRAD. It attempted to check the adverse effects of the low 
productivity and the overvalued Drs on the balance of trade by subsidizing 
exports by means derived from a tax imposed upon imports. The FGI agreed with 
both the necessity and the scope of the measure, but it expressed its 
dissatisfaction because it had not been consulted by AMAG officials.18 However, 
the federation soon asked for additional measures.  
For the FGI under-consumption prevented the realization of industrial 
production. It proposed that manufactured exports should be promoted by any 
means, either by free exchange or by private barter.19 In the first case, the 
exporter would assign half of the exchange received plus the price of the 
exchange certificates to the BoG, and with the other half he would import 
products from the import lists.20 As was mentioned above, an equivalent demand 
for private exchange from Greek businessmen was rejected by the US because it 
would raise domestic prices and capital flight. As far as exports through private 
barter were concerned, this was also a constant demand by the Panhellenic 
Union of Exporters and the ACCI. It was an export policy already applied by the 
ministry of national economy and such exports as a percentage of total exports 
which accounted for 33% in 1947, 31% in 1948 and 26% in 1949.21 Because basic 
exportable products, mainly tobacco and minerals, were not absorbed through 
clearing or bilateral agreements, they were promoted by private barter. In this 
latter case, they were additionally subsidized by a premium which was above 
the exchange derived from the export at the official rate plus the exchange 
certificates. This meant that goods imported through private barter were more 
expensive than those imported through clearing or bilateral agreements by an 
amount theoretically equal to the premium. The result was that imports through 
private trade dragged domestic prices upwards for many products, accruing 
simultaneously excessive profits for importers through clearing or bilateral 
 
17 YDIAMP, AMAG Chief Griswold to PM Maximos, 16 July 1947, p. 148. 
18 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1947 (Athens: FGI, 1948), pp. 16-7; FGI, The Greek Industry 
during 1948 (Athens: FGI, 1949), p. 35. 
19 FGI, Greek Industry and European Recovery Programme (Athens: FGI, 1948), pp. 56-7. 
20 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1947 (Athens: FGI, 1948), pp. 56-7. 
21 BoG, Annual Reports, various years.  
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agreements. Naturally, the aim of the ministry of national economy was to 
restrict them.22 However, because of the substantive lack of competitiveness, 
private barter was promoted and, when it was rescheduled in March 1949, the 
lists included resin products, cement and cotton textiles.23 Despite this kind of 
subsidy, exports of these products was almost absent.  
The third substantial policy adopted by the FTRAD was the direct guidance and 
supervision of the bilateral negotiations of Greece with OEEC countries for the 
utilization of the drawing rights allocated through the ERP for the first fiscal 
year.24 The ECA aimed to boost intra-European trade in order to reduce the 
dollar gap on the continent and for Greece it covered the trade deficit with the 
OEEC participants with $66.8 million.25 The FGI had a direct interest in the 
negotiations because Greek agricultural exports were largely exchanged with 
both consumption goods and capital goods. Again, finance minister Helmis had 
proposed that Greek delegations should include highly ranked FGI officials, 
suggesting specifically Alexandros Tsatsos, Konstantinos Nevros, Simeon 
Siniosoglou, and Georgios Drakos.26 However, the three delegations, eventually 
charged to conduct direct negotiations, did not include industrialists. Instead, 
they were headed by highly ranked state managers of the ministry of national 
economy, all supervised by Theodoros Christidis and Konstantinos Lavdas in Paris 
and Granby from the FTRAD in Athens.27  
2.1.2 Imports and production costs 
The affinities between the pre-war and the post-war accumulation strategy of 
the FGI are even more clear in the field of protection. For both state agencies 
and businessmen, it was exactly the complex customs tariff and the extensive 
import quotas for manufactures, to which the inter-war rapid increase of 
industrial production was mainly attributable. Based precisely upon this 
 
22 ‘The Problem of Private Barter’, ACCI Bulletin, August 1948, pp. 388-90; ‘One Side of Private 
Barter’, ACCI Bulletin, October 1948, p. 457.  
23 ‘Private Barter: The new system’, ACCI Bulletin, April 1949, pp 137-43.  
24 YDIA/1949/118/3/1, History and Status of Greek Bilateral Negotiations as of December 17 
1948, 18 December 1948.  
25 YDIA/1949/118/3/1, Political Affairs Council, 9 November 1948.  
26 GL/KAV/1099/3, Finance Minister’s Memo, Paris, 11 October 1948.  
27 YDIA/1949/118/3/1, Foreign Ministry to Greek Delegation to UN, Paris, 25 October 1948.  
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experience, they subsequently derived the necessity for protection of both 
existing and future industries.28  
The pre-war customs tariff applied to specific duties.29  During the war, it had 
been amended but in early 1945 its structure and logic were still untouched.30 
After the war, since it was still predominately a specific customs tariff and thus 
duties were not calculated as percentages of the price of each imported good 
but were charged specific amounts, it could not be easily adjusted to the price 
index which had sky-rocketed. Even if as a rule adjustment followed the rhythm 
of devaluations, to the extent that devaluations did not match inflation, general 
protection lagged behind pre-war levels. For this reason, in early 1948, the 
customs duties were of limited importance for fiscal purposes.31 
The FGI had first mentioned the customs tariff as a bulwark to foreign 
competition in 1946 when trade was liberalized, but it had not asked for its 
adjustment to the price-index because this would affect prices.32 Instead, the 
FGI related its adjustment to labour costs, showing that for the federation the 
level of tariff protection was primarily a function of domestic production costs. 
However, in 1948 the pressure from below for tariff protection was still limited, 
simply because import quotas provided definite protection for almost the entire 
industrial production. This is clear from the import lists published by the 
ministry of national economy and the FTRAD during the years 1948 and 1949. 
This was feasible because AMAG estimated that the government’s protectionist 
policy, based on the need to preserve the ‘capital and the labour employed’ and 
to conserve foreign exchange, was ‘clearly necessary’.33 This reasoning was valid 
to the US mission even for imported goods, like textiles, which were cheaper 
than those produced domestically. In other words, in 1948 there was a consensus 
between the FGI, the Greek government and the AMAG for the necessity of 
 
28 RO, Reconstruction Programme, pp. 39-52; FGI, Greek Industry and European Recovery 
Programme (Athens: FGI, 1948), pp. 12-3; ‘The restrictions of Greece’s external trade’, 
Bulleting of the Customs Tariff Directorate (hereafter BCTD), 1949, no 2, pp. 69-74. 
29 ‘Metallic drachmas: Historical Evolution’, BCTD, 1949, no 2, pp. 62-5; Ioannou L. Fragou, 
Customs Economy (Athens, 1959), pp. 140-3;210-6.  
30 YDIA/1946/139/3, Finance Ministry to Foreign Ministry, 13 April 1945.  
31 KKF/KTA/1948/29/1/6, Memo: For Custom Duties receipts, Finance Ministry, 12 January 1948. 
32 FGI, Memo, pp. 21-2. 
33 ‘The American Mission and Greek Foreign Trade’, ACCI Bulletin, March 1948, pp. 127-9.   
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industrial protection as the appropriate means for achieving the country’s 
viability.  
However, this reasoning was progressively challenged. In early 1948 AMAG had 
recruited the American specialist, David Lynch, to report on the status of the 
Greek customs tariff. The report challenged directly the scope of the customs 
tariff and indirectly the existing state-business relations which had been 
nourished simultaneously.34 Firstly, the report criticized the complexity of the 
customs tariff, urging its simplification. Secondly, it suggested the adoption of 
the League of Nations’ classification and its transformation from specific 
customs tariffs to ad valorem ones. Thirdly, despite the fact that general tariff 
protection was limited, some industries enjoyed unreasonably high protection. 
The report firmly pointed out that selective protection had resulted in the 
creation of private monopolies and had led subsequently to high domestic prices. 
For these reasons, the US official asked the state to protect only viable, existing 
or future industries and sectors. It concluded with a clear mandate for 
uneconomical and unviable industries: modernization or liquidation.  
For Greek state managers liquidation of uncompetitive industries meant, at least 
in the short term, that the ability of the economy to absorb the surplus 
population was reduced and subsequently the endeavour to reduce domestic 
prices and production costs was endangered. This was clearly depicted in the 
plan submitted to OEEC in November 1948 which recognized that tariff 
protection should consider real costs so as to reduce prices and extraordinary 
profits.35 The alternative was indeed modernization, which was pursued through 
the Marshall Plan, but for the FGI this prospect was handicapped by high 
production costs. For this reason, the federation claimed that the level of 
production costs was the only appropriate criterion for the adoption of the tariff 
policy and in general for the level of protection.36 Thus Lynch’s suggestions 
challenged the core objectives of the post-war industrialization endeavour as 
 
34 David Lynch, ‘Report for Greece’s Tariff Policy, BCTD, 1949 no 2, pp. 3-47; ‘P. Papatsonis 
Memo’, 22 April 1948, BCTD, 1949, no 3, pp. 45-51.   
35 ASA, Provisional, p. 129.  
36 Dionysios Matzoulinos, ‘The Genova Agreement for Tariff and Trade, ACCI Bulletin, February 
1949, 42-4; Dionisios Matzoulinos, ‘The Tariff Agreements of Greece at Annecy’, VE, February 
1950, p. 16; Dionisios Matzoulinos, ‘The Greek industry of the Annecy Agreement’, VE, March 
1950, p. 20;    
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they had been conceptualized and pursued by domestic state agencies and 
businessmen through the utilization of the Marshall Plan.  
2.2 Entering the international arena: too early and too weak  
The US aim of fostering self-sufficiency through the ERP funds and its intention 
to relate it with a European customs union was a well-known fact at the 
coordination ministry. Certainly, the Greek Marshall Plan Committee had based 
its proposals upon these two dimensions stating that Greece had started to 
explore the potential of a Greek-Turkey customs union and it was also a 
founding member of the European Customs Union Study Group.37 The sources 
show that Greece considered seriously only the Greek-Turkey customs union as 
compatible with its export business interests to the Middle east region, whereas 
the European customs union was rejected. On the one hand, for Greece, 
European markets, and especially the German one, were of paramount 
importance because tobacco exports were the backbone of total exports. Their 
importance lay not only in their significance for the maintenance of political 
stability in the northern provinces which produced the bulk of tobacco but, as it 
became obvious in the previous chapter, it constituted the balance of payments 
defence for economic development. On the other hand, as contemporaries 
argued, this market threatened its vulnerable industrial base.  
2.2.1 Better at the top of the East than in the tail of the West  
The consultations for the Greek-Turkey customs unions were intertwined with 
the negotiations for the enforcement of the US Open Door policy at the 
international level. The coordination ministry had comprehended that the draft 
charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO) was essentially the US’s 
commercial policy aiming to establish ‘free trade and the clause of most 
favoured nation’.38 Multilateral trade challenged Greece’s commercial policy 
which, aiming primarily to promote tobacco and raisins, was based instead upon 
bilateral agreements and discrimination. Pressed by the huge trade deficit, the 
 
37 GR/NBGHA/1/32/1/34, Coordination Ministry, ‘The Marshall Plan and the foundation a 
European Customs Union’, 1947; Ibid, Greek Committee for European Economic Cooperation, 
Introduction, December 1947.   
38 YDIA/1947/143/1, Alexis Kyrou to Coordination Ministry, New York, 17 October 1947. 
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Greek delegation arrived at Havana with the clear ‘mandate to accept 
everything, as far as it could guarantee the tariff free placement of tobacco’.39 
For the protection of industry, the delegation had no specific demands because 
the government was aware that this issue would be sufficiently covered by the 
demands of other countries.40 The issue did not pass unnoticed by the FGI, which 
subsequently complained about the above priority. However, for the federation 
the real issue at stake at Havana was whether underdeveloped states could 
protect their industries unilaterally or whether the prior approval of the 
organization was necessary.41 It seems that these demands were indeed covered, 
because Greece retained the right to impose import quotas and tariff 
restrictions and, additionally, to discriminate via bilateral agreements at least 
until 1952.  
At the negotiations, Greece sided with middle and far east countries and in 
December 1947 they made a common proposal for mutual preferential tariffs. 
This initiative was related to Greece’s effort for import penetration to the 
Middle East with industrial products, a prospect which was discussed periodically 
among business circles at the time.42 Indeed, the Middle East had been the main 
market targeted by the FGI at least since the 1920s.43 In fact, it was a pre-war 
market for AEEXPL, which exported fertilizers during the inter-war era and 
Bodosakis had targeted this region for industrial exports back in 1942.44 It was 
within this framework that the Greek-Turkey customs union was pursued, but 
the prospects were not encouraging as both countries were agricultural and thus 
not complementary economies.45  
However, it was recognized that Turkey could potentially absorb manufactured 
goods such as metalworking products like agricultural tools and machinery or 
aluminium and enamel utensils. The list also included cement, textiles, resin 
products, fertilizers, glass and paper and as the ACCI reported, the prospects for 
 
39 YDIA/1947/143/1, P. Papatsonis, For the course of the discussions at Havana’s International 
Conference, Havana, 10 December 1947.  
40 YDIA/1947/143/1, Anagnostopoulos Report, Ministry of National Economy, Athens, 16 
November 1947.    
41 Matzoulinos, ‘The Genova’, 42-4.  
42 ‘Our Exportable Products’, ACCI Bulletin, August 1948, pp. 359-64.   
43 GR/NIRSEV/EVA/173/170/42, FGI to the President of the Government, Athens, 12 May 1930. 
44 Pelt, Tying, p. 72. 
45 YDIA/1948/153/1/1, I. Fragos Report, 24 January 1948; Ibid, K. Argyros Report, 6 February 
1948; Ibid, I. Komitsas Report, 2 January 1948.   
  106 
 
 
 
 
the wider Middle East market were similar.46 Despite reports which mentioned 
that Greek products were expensive for the Middle East, there was evident 
euphoria among state managers because they considered that the Havana 
Charter enabled Greece to dominate the Middle East region industrially. As was 
stressed by Ambassador Pappas, ‘better at the top of the East than in the tail of 
the West.’47 Thus, whereas Greece was oriented towards the Middle East as a 
future export market for industrial products, for its overproduced tobacco and 
raisins it was instead oriented towards European markets. This prospect, 
however, endangered domestic industry.  
As the Havana Charter was facing obstacles, negotiations for international trade 
were running in parallel through tight bilateral negotiations based upon the 
clause of most favoured nation. In February 1948, the US Embassy had urged 
Greece to implement Lynch’s recommendations to prepare the customs tariff for 
negotiations at Annecy, insisting upon the necessity for its simplification, its 
transformation to ad valorem tariffs and the adoption of new classifications.48 
However, two months later the customs tariff was pretty much the same. As 
expected, the Greek delegation at Annecy discussed the issue directly only with 
the US and eventually the customs tariff transformation to ad valorem was 
postponed and Greece had to adjust duties to cover fluctuations in the gold 
price above 20%.49 As far as the criteria for tariff protection were concerned, 
the US Embassy had departed from the Lynch suggestions and instead it was 
closer to the FGI and Greek state managers, suggesting the criteria should be 
domestic prices, the exchange rate and the demographic problem. For the FGI 
there was no doubt that GATT, by prioritizing tariff disarmament, simply 
threatened to flatten the Greek economy50 thus the federation urged the 
government not to adopt Lynch’s criteria.51  
The delegation departed for Annecy with the formal instructions to protect the 
gains at Havana and for industry to defend ‘fair protection where needed’, 
 
46 ACCI, The Chronicle of the Sixties 1941-1947 (Athens: ACCI, 1948), pp. 305-6.   
47 YDIA/1948/181/1/2, Political Affairs Council, 09 July 1948.   
48 YDIA/1949/151/7, Finance Ministry, Transmission of US Embassy’s Report, 15 February 1949.  
49 YDIA/1949/151/8, Memorandum of conversation, 19 April 1949; Ibid, Papatsonis to Foreign 
Ministry, Annecy, 23 May 1949. 
50 FGI, Federation of Greek Industries 1907-2007, p. 330. 
51 Matzoulinos, ‘The Genova’, p. 42.   
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considering the status of existing and potential industries.52 A close reading of 
the sources shows that the strategy employed was even closer to the position of 
both the FGI and the US embassy. At the ministerial meeting, preoccupied with 
the formulation of the negotiation strategy, the coordination minister, 
Stefanopoulos, suggested that Greece should defend the ‘status quo of industrial 
protection until it becomes an industrialized nation.’53 The continuation of this 
status quo was supported by arguments which resembled the FGI’s rationale. In 
particular, Diomidis as a precondition for the previous reduction of production 
costs through the utilization of the ERP funds and by finance minister, Helmis, 
on the lack of any data indicating the level of protection. As the delegation’s 
head stated, Greece accepted tariff reduction only when they did not affect 
‘existing and necessary’ industries.54 The negotiations at Annecy did include 
tariff concessions for Greek industry opposed by the FGI but this was not the sole 
criterion for the federation’s attitude towards the GATT. 55 First, the federation 
was aware that Greece’s participation in GATT was inevitable because the US 
had shown a special interest in this. Secondly, the domestic economy could not 
be isolated from international markets. Thirdly, the structure of Greek trade 
meant that it was unavoidable for Greece to open its borders to manufactured 
imports to promote agricultural products.  
2.2.2 The customs union 
The study group was charged with the responsibility of examining the prospect 
of a European customs union by reporting on the consequences of tariff 
reduction on national economies and to prepare the harmonization of national 
customs tariffs. For these reasons, it established the Economic Committee and 
the Experts Committee respectively. In March 1948, the study group specified 
the competencies and the programme of the Economic Committee and 
subsequently it received preparatory reports of the participating countries. The 
Greek finance ministry consulted with the FGI which reported on the 
 
52 YDIA/1949/152/5, Instruction to the Greek Delegations departing for Annecy, no date.   
53 YDIA/1949/152/1/3, Minutes of Meeting for the position of Greece at Annecy, 30 March 1949.   
54 YDIA/1949/151/6, Council of Political Leaders, 17 May 1949. 
55 Matzoulinos, ‘The Genova’, 42.  
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consequences of tariff disarmament upon these products.56 The customs tariff 
division of the ministry reported subsequently to the Economic Committee that 
Greece, as a special case, was not able to participate in the customs union 
because this would severely affect its state budget, its exchange reserves, 
capital and the labour employed in industry. Since it was not clear whether 
European state monopolies would absorb tobacco and raisins, the report 
concluded that the consideration of the customs union would be feasible for 
Greece only after its appropriate industrial development, which presupposed a 
reconstruction plan and capital inflows.57 Employing identical arguments, 
finance minister, Helmis, made it clear that the Greek economy was not ready 
to join the customs union at this stage.58 In October 1948, the Economic 
Committee, based on the reports of the participating countries, published its 
general report.59 It stated that it would consider each economic sector 
separately and it was clear that the customs union was essentially postponed. 
Both the finance and foreign ministries expressed their satisfaction, stating once 
more that Greece needed time for its reconstruction in order to resolve its 
overpopulation problem.60  
2.2.3 The European Unit Movement and the elaboration of Greece’s 
formal European strategy 
This familiar argument was not really different from that advocated within the 
European movement. As shown in the introduction of this part, the Greek 
position had been derived from the government’s pro-European public attitude. 
Certainly, there was a rhetoric from the Greek side claiming that a federalist 
Europe would stop ‘fraternal disputes’.61 A close reading of the sources shows, 
however, that there was an expectation that a united Europe could undertake, 
in the future, the role of the US. Indeed, there were those who claimed that a 
‘European Union’ would ‘guarantee’ Greece’s sovereignty and ‘save’ its 
 
56 Dionysios Matzoulinos, ‘Towards a European Customs Union’, ACCI Bulletin, November 1948, 
500-3.  
57 ‘The Evolution of the Economy and the Tariff Policy of Greece’, BCTD, 1949 no 3, 3-10.  
58 YDIA/1948/189/3, Finance Ministry to Foreign Ministry, 25 May 1948.  
59 ‘Announcements: for the works of the Customs Union Study Group’, BCTD, 1949, no 3, pp. 23-
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60 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Foreign Ministry to Finance Ministry, 16 December 1948; Finance Ministry to 
Foreign Ministry, 21 December 1948. 
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economy.62 Beyond this, this rhetoric might have had the motive to reassure the 
US. In particular, the head of Greece’s delegation to the OEEC, who had been 
asked to assist with the work of Greece’s representatives to the Council of 
Europe, was clear enough. Being close to the OEEC’s reality, he considered that 
the commercial interests of European states had finally conditioned their 
attitudes within the movement and believed that the ‘European economic 
cooperation’ was only an ‘American fantasy’.63 Yet he suggested that the 
government supported the initiatives backed by the US simply because Greece 
received American money within the OEEC.   
Certainly, the expectations of Greece from a united Europe were not clear in 
1948 but they were progressively shaped and in 1949 they were clarified 
constituting its formal European strategy. In April 1948 at the Hague, where the 
Congress of Europe took place formalizing the European federalist movement, 
Greek business summarized what its domestic economy needed from a united 
Europe. The ACCI’s head, Apostolos Poulopoulos, initially mentioning that 
Greece was still at war, asked for preferential treatment for Greek agricultural 
products. Similarly, he claimed protection for industrial production not out of 
‘mere economic interest’ but for the protection of ‘social life and economic 
activity’.64 The Greek stance was further clarified one year later at Westminster, 
where the Council of Europe was established. However, Greece’s participation in 
the Council was uncertain. At the time, the majority of Greek resistant leaders 
were still involved in the civil war and it seems that this had weighed 
considerably on the leaders of the European movement. Indeed, Paul-Henri 
Spaak had rejected Greece’s participation in the formal European movement 
because, as Makkas informed Tsaldaris, the civil war continued.65 Certainly, the 
participation of Greece in the Westminster conference required coordinated 
diplomatic efforts, including the endeavour to overcome Spaak’s objection.66    
 
62 KKF/KTA/1949/37/1/52, Nik.G. Rodopoulos to Konstantinos Tsaldaris, Athens, 1 November 
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64 ‘The Hague Conference’, ACCI Bulletin, May 1948, p. 235.   
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Under these circumstances, the Hellenic League for European Cooperation 
attempted to link coherently for the first time, Greece’s European policy with 
the core objectives of Greece’s developmental strategy. The League’s report for 
the European Economic Union was prepared by a special committee headed by 
the economic advisor of the foreign ministry, Kouklelis, assisted by the FGI’s 
vice president, Alexandros Tsatsos, and ACCI’s head, Poulopoulos.67 The report 
had two parts, each with quite different reasoning. The first part enumerated 
the likely results of the Economic Union for the Greek economy. First, the Union 
would provide export outlets for its overproduced agricultural products and 
minerals. Second, it would employ its fleet with European reconstruction cargos 
and attract more tourists. Third, Greece hoped that, within the Union, it would 
find the appropriate capital to fund its economic development, replacing US aid 
when it was terminated. Last but not least, the Union would absorb Greece’s 
surplus population.  
The second part was indeed different. From an industrial point of view, Greece 
was not able to participate in the Union until it took its final political shape and 
becomes able to accept immigrants. The development of its industry was seen as 
the only way to absorb the provincial semi-idle labour force and, in this way, to 
increase productivity and income in the agricultural sector, providing, in turn, 
the means to boost internal demand for industrial goods. Thus, considering its 
exceptional circumstances, the Greek state would not reduce its ‘barriers to 
trade’ before industrialization and reconstruction.68 As Kouklelis clarified, the 
report was based upon the assumption that industrialization was the only 
solution to the Greek ‘problem’ posed by the labour inflows which, following the 
Asian Minor ‘catastrophe’, had ‘disintegrated the existing balance between the 
population on the one hand and the land and production equipment on the 
other.’69 It was clear that the imbalance problem, as it had been elaborated by 
Zolotas, was at the centre of Greece’s formal European policy. Certainly, 
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69 YDIA/1951/34/3/1, Political Affairs Council, 08 March 1949.  
  111 
 
 
 
 
Kouklelis was a close collaborator of Zolotas and in October 1948 they had both 
visited the US economics minister to discuss Greece’s participation in the ERP.70 
At Westminster in April 1949, Kouklelis delivered a speech which attempted to 
reconcile the two contradictory parts of the report and attract the interest of 
the participants.71 The Greek delegate spelled out that the achievement of 
economic unification, which would undoubtedly increase incomes across the 
Union, was impeded by the resistance of the affected national economic and 
business interests. If unification was to progress, it was suggested that the Union 
had to adopt tax capacities to collect a piece of the anticipated increased 
income. The tax, through a Pan-European Insurance Fund, would be utilized to 
compensate directly the primarily industrial, affected interests. As Kouklelis 
explained to the foreign ministry, in his mind were the ‘Greek tariff dependent 
industries’.72 It was a manifestation of the logic of capital scarcity which, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, was the outcome of close state-business 
interaction. Kouklelis’ report, and especially his proposal for the Fund, was 
subsequently embraced not only by the foreign ministry but also by both the 
finance and foreign ministries and was defended as the formal European policy 
of Greece.73  
2.2.4 The EPU and Code of Liberalization 
The stance adopted within the EPU clarifies the substantive European policy of 
Greece. After the termination of GATT negotiations, the foreign minister was 
receiving reports which emphasized that the Council of Europe at Strasburg in 
August 1949 had triggered European unification.74 For this reason the foreign 
ministry established an inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Cooperation 
(CEC), to closely watch the economic developments in Europe and to coordinate 
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the Greek response.75 However, as the ECA had renewed its effort for European 
unification through the OEEC, now encouraging a multilateral trade and 
payments mechanism, the committee very soon came across the Code of 
Liberalization and the EPU with which it was subsequently preoccupied.   
The EPU was funded by the ERP and provided credits for the multilateral offset 
of bilateral imbalances between participant countries which was a strong 
incentive for deficit countries.76 Instead, for surplus countries the EPU was 
attractive simply because it was accompanied by the elimination of trade 
barriers. As expected, from the middle of 1949 Greece was in favour of 
transferable drawing rights because this meant flexibility in the search for 
essential and reconstruction goods among the different participant countries.77 
Since Greece was obliged to import non-essential items, a multilateral clearing 
mechanism was considered to improve this ability.78 Yet Greece was treated by 
the EPU as a structural deficit economy which meant that it was granted an 
initial credit balance above its quota. This meant that it was not subjected to 
the pressure for gold payments to the union, but once it had exceeded its initial 
credit balance it was obliged to search for other sources to finance its intra-
European trade. Thus, the abolition of import restrictions was inevitably the 
issue at stake and, as it was matched with the enforcement of the Annecy 
agreements which took effect on 1 March 1950, it again posed the question of 
the appropriate balance between protection and liberalization.   
The ministry of national economy had constructed its own committee which 
included the FGI’s vice president and ACCI’s head, to consider the trade 
liberalization proposals. On 1 November 1949, the committee published its 
results.79 It repeated what was the common position among the majority of state 
managers and businessmen since 1945: the necessity for privatization and 
liberalization of trade for a number of essential goods in order to reduce prices 
and, additionally, the utilization of private exchange. The FTRAD had consulted 
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77 YDIA/1949/118/2, P. Vahaviolos Report, 25 June 1949.  
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this ministry but it had again followed the trodden path liberalizing trade only 
for non-essential foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods not 
produced domestically at the time.80 Yet the Greek government was praised by 
the FTRAD because it had accepted Greece’s trade liberalization without asking 
for reciprocity in respect to her agricultural products; for the FTRAD this would 
serve ‘as an example to follow’ for some ‘larger and more influential 
countries’.81  Under these circumstances, Greece liberalized about 56% of private 
trade without much friction by businesses. 
However, the pressure for further liberalization was growing within the OEEC 
and the inclusion on the list of domestically produced manufactures was 
imminent. This opened Pandora’s box. The FGI leaders, Katsabas, Iliopoulos and 
Karelas, who were also in charge of the ACCI’s industrial section, were alarmed. 
At the ACCI’s meeting on 18 January 1950 they asked the chamber’s governing 
body to consider import prohibition of manufactured goods that were produced 
domestically, a move which infuriated importers. Subsequently FGI officials 
attempted to downplay the incident but the tension between commerce and 
industry within the ACCI was clear.82 The disagreement was mainly about textile 
imports. Following the devaluation in 1949, prices had shown an upward trend 
for cotton fabrics and the FTRAD had publicly supported import liberalization of 
cotton textiles to this upward tendency.83 This competitive pressure triggered 
the formation of committees within all the relevant ministries and the BoG, 
usually with the participation of FGI and ACCI officials, charged to deal with the 
appropriate form of protection. Overlapping competencies, fragmentation and 
confusion were all evident.84 Until the end of the year much of industrial BIAs’ 
effort was consumed by pressing the government to either re-impose 
quantitative restrictions or to increase tariff protection.85  
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Within this turmoil, very soon CEC was preoccupied with the evaluation of the 
effects of trade liberalization upon domestic industry.86 All the participants, who 
were in permanent and regular contact with the FGI through a number of 
committees, were convinced that domestic production was handicapped by high 
production costs and thus the appropriate response to the Code of Liberalization 
was analogous tariff protection.87 Zolotas, the dominant and much respected 
Committee member, was also alarmed because trade liberalization would 
endanger the whole industrial programme. He proposed subcommittees for 
direct consultation with industrialists to formulate the appropriate response.88 It 
was clear that the new payments union, discussed with the participation of 
Greece’s delegates to OEEC within the CEC, was evaluated through the prism of 
trade liberalization. 89 The guiding principle for these subcommittees would be 
Zolotas’ conception of the appropriate tariff policy. He was between FGI’s 
emphasis upon production costs and Lynch’s prioritization of long-term economic 
viability. For Zolotas, domestic production should be protected because the 
‘overpopulation problem was still unresolved’ but the customs tariff had also to 
consider ‘economic viability’ according to the priorities of the ‘industrial 
programme’.90 The FGI, from its side, grounded the claim for tariff protection on 
the familiar, and common among state managers, argument that 
industrialization and reconstruction had been delayed in Greece for three years 
thus a transitional period beyond 1952 was necessary. 
State managers had additional reasons to be anxious about Greece’s prospects. 
As the Greek delegate at OEEC explained, the main problem was that Greece’s 
basic export products were agricultural and thus they were registered on public 
accounts; trade liberalization would not really benefit Greece’s limited export 
capacity.91 Indeed, once the ECA announced the reduction of free aid, the 
coordination ministry received a report which explained the right to re-impose 
quantitative restrictions.92 Two months later it was informed that in October 
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1950 Greece had already consumed more than half of its initial credit balance 
and the OEEC Managing Board, after examination of the German problem, would 
consider ‘restriction’ of liberalization.93 Finally, in January 1951 Greece re-
imposed import quotas, a move which for the EPU Board was ‘wise and 
realistic’.94 
The reasons for the suspension were explained in the updated programme sent 
to the OEEC in January 1951.95 It emphasized that liberalization had 
disproportionately affected the Greek trade balance because imports from 
participating countries had increased by 14.7% whereas exports only by 9.3%. 
Greek exports were particularly handicapped because they were registered on 
the governments’ account. However, the deep and structural weakness which 
prohibited Greece’s participation in ‘European integration’ was her low 
productivity which was rooted not only in the unequal distribution of natural 
resources in Europe, but also to Greece’s ‘imbalance problem’.96 The increase of 
import capacity for industrialization was thus necessary and the middle-war 
experience with Germany was still fresh. 
2.3 The revival of Greek-German commercial relations 
Consideration of Greek-German commercial relations clarifies even further 
Greece’s participation in early European integration. After occupation, re-access 
to the German market was among the top priorities of the Greek government.97 
Business was equally interested and from May 1948 the main commercial BIAs 
and the FGI formed the Committee for Trade Relations with Bi-Zone, which 
aimed to promote the resumption of pre-war bilateral trade relations. 98 With 
the assistance of the US mission, by 1949 three agreements had been signed 
between Greece and the responsible authorities in West Germany which 
regulated bilateral commercial relations. Importantly, they were limited in 
scope and Greece’s deficits were financed by the predecessor schemes of the 
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EPU. Under the pressure of mounting tobacco surpluses99 and, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, the need to procure mechanical equipment and technology 
for reconstruction, in October 1950 a trade agreement between Papandreou and 
Erhard was signed within the EPU framework. Despite the difficulties in 
enforcing it, the agreement re-established the pre-war patterns of Greek-
German trade. Until 1952 Greece exported about one third of its tobacco to the 
Federal Republic, from which it imported one third of its mechanical 
equipment.100 Until that year, Greece’s exports to the German market covered 
about 30% of total exports.101 This percentage was substantially above the 
respective percentages of the main European trade partners of the Federal 
Republic.102 The circumstances under which such trade dependence became 
possible is an important aspect of Greece’s road to Europe neglected in Greek 
historiography. 
The revival of trade with West Germany was not the only objective of Greece, 
for it had also asked for the assistance of the US and the UK for the payment of 
the tobacco pillaged by the Nazi regime during the occupation.103 The main 
perpetrator during the occupation was the German tobacco industry Reemtsma 
of Hamburg, which before the war absorbed nearly half of Greek tobacco 
exports to Germany. After the war, this company controlled about 40% of the 
German tobacco market. As the Greek trade representative to the Tri-Zone 
reported, any attempt by Greece to include Reemtsma of Hamburg in the list of 
war criminals faced fierce criticism and resistance from the company.104 
Certainly, the Greek delegation emphasized that it was in the interest of Greece 
to cooperate rather than to heckle Reemtsma, especially because, at the time, 
the company was already charged in Germany with ‘collaboration’ with the Nazi 
regime and was additionally threatened with ‘decartelisation’.105 Similarly, the 
Greek government’s decision not to accept the suspension of prosecution of 
German war criminals in September 1949 faced an adverse reaction in Germany, 
and Greece’s representative to the Tri-Zone warned the foreign ministry that it 
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could ‘undermine our economic interests during this crucial moment’.106 In June 
1950, during the preliminary discussions on the trade agreement with the 
Federal Republic, Erhard had made the successful outcome of the negotiations 
conditional on the suspension of the prosecution of economic criminals. The 
pressure was especially acute for the representative in Greece during the 
occupation, who had, meanwhile, become a highly ranked state manager in the 
Federal Republic.107 The economics ministry, which conducted the negotiations, 
agreed to the suspension in case the persecuted were not war criminals 
according to the definition of the Allies.108 The justice ministry outlined the 
brutal actions of the persecuted but it disassociated these actions from 
Reemtsma as a legal entity and the Third Reich: 
These perpetrators were living in Greece before the war. During the 
occupation, motivated by their selfish interests alone, they wore the outfit 
of the German Officer and under the threat of guns they scrounged from 
Greek producers tobacco, colophon and other resin products, of which the 
biggest proportion was sold here on the black market and the remaining 
quantities were sold to Germany.109 
This disassociation opened the road to fulfil Erhard’s aims and the resumption of 
the negotiations. One day before the arrival of Papandreou in the Federal 
Republic, the Greek government informed the Germans that it had suspended 
the prosecution of ‘Hess and Wenkel’, as it had been asked.110 This kind of 
pressure was continuous and different sources confirm it. For example, one year 
later, as foreign minister Evangelos Averoff stressed that the German 
ambassador in Greece continued to press towards this direction:  
The most important of these issues is that he underlined that the List of War 
Criminals included people who have today responsible position in Germany 
and occasionally deal with valuable Greek interests and who had just 
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happened to serve at German Units which were in Greece in the recent 
past.111 
In early 1952, the Plastiras government responded, releasing the war criminal 
‘Andre’ and accepting that German economic criminals could be judged 
thereafter in the Federal Republic instead of Greece (Law 2058/1952).112 The 
pressure was not restricted in this field alone, but it was also exercised about 
the return of trademarks to the confiscated German companies which operated 
in Greece during the occupation and were still active. Again, the German side 
warned that this would play a ‘very serious’ role in the ‘future economic 
relations’ between the two countries.113 The relationship of the agreement and 
its background with the process of European integration, in the first instance in 
the form of the multilateral clearing mechanism provided by EPU, was well 
summarized by the Greek embassy in Bonn after the conclusion of the November 
1950 agreement:  
It is written here that with the singing of the trade agreement about $15 
million Greek exports and $45 German exports were accepted bilaterally and 
it is underlined that this was feasible only because Greece accepted to grant 
a considerable number of dollars from the EPU funds for the importation of 
capital and consumption goods. Greece is also praised because it is the only 
European country which accepted the return of confiscated old German 
trademarks, except for three. For the payments agreement, it is emphasized 
that it was the first between Germany and a foreign country within the 
EPU.114 
During this period, Greek-German commercial and economic relations had some 
permanent features which, as we will see, played a role in Greece’s 
participation to European integration.115 Firstly, Greek exports to West Germany 
covered approximately one third of its imports from the same country whereas 
trade relations resembled the pre-war patterns, as mainly tobacco was 
exchanged for machinery and transportation items. Secondly, tobacco exports to 
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Germany were inhibited because, from 1944, the US Virginia tobacco had largely 
replaced eastern tobacco varieties. For this reason, the US assistance to regain 
the German market was always considered decisive by the Greek side and it was 
asked repeatedly by the Greeks. In particular, they asked the US authorities to 
press the Germans within the EPU framework to reduce Virginia imports and, 
during negotiations for an association agreement in 1960, to agree for EEC’s high 
external tariff for tobacco. Thirdly, the Federal Republic pressed for the 
rationalization of tobacco production and, in general, for agricultural reforms. It 
emphasized the significance of prices and quality or the need to replace existing 
production with products which had high demand in Europe, such as Virginia 
tobacco instead of the traditional eastern varieties. Fourthly, the tobacco trade 
in Germany was traditionally in private hands and the Federal state could only 
influence purchases directly with fiscal measures.  
The objectives of the Federal Republic and German businesses, as evaluated by 
the Greek side, cast light upon these forces which drove European integration 
between unequal partners. The interpretation of the agreement by the Greek 
consul, and later the ambassador in Germany, is illustrative.116 As the 
restrictions rooted in the occupation period were progressively lifted, German 
businessmen, in close cooperation with the Federal government and particularly 
with Erhard, were seeking to regain their ‘natural’ export outlets with the 
application of a commercial policy along the ‘pre-war lines’.117 These outlets 
were the pre-war traditional Balkans and Middle East markets. Of these markets, 
Greece was of particular importance not only because of its reconstruction 
needs but also because of Greece’s cordial economic and political relations with 
the Arab world. It was under this wider objective that Greece’s application for 
tobacco exports was evaluated by the Federal government and German 
industrialists. Specifically, the law for the reduction of tobacco tax would be 
discussed by the Bundestag in relation to these plans. The fiscal dimension of 
the measure, in a difficult time for the public finances of the Federal Republic, 
was subordinated to this objective. For these reasons, German tobacco 
industrialists, above all Reemtsma, were called upon to show their ‘anti-
communist solidarity’ with Greece by importing tobacco. The conclusion that the 
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Greek consul had reached was that the western world, and particularly the 
Federal Republic, protected Greece from the ‘communist threat’ because 
Greece was significant for ‘German foreign trade’.118 For the Greek side, 
geopolitical concerns were inseparable from business interests.     
2.4 The road to devaluation  
The Greek-German agreement, which followed the reduction of US aid, tied 
Greece even more to Europe and the process of integration. However, European 
markets were an opportunity for Greek agricultural products but not for its 
industrial ones. Since 1950 trade liberalization for agricultural products was 
virtually stagnant within the OEEC because almost all countries were 
protectionist. In early 1950 the French pressed for a European Agricultural 
Community outside the OEEC institutions aiming to find guaranteed ventures for 
their surplus agricultural production but no progress had been made by 1951 
because no state accepted this solution.119 The Greek government pressed 
France for Greece’s participation in this scheme because exclusion would further 
deteriorate its already limited exports. As expected, it was eager to participate 
in this community only on the condition that its main overproduced exportable 
products, mainly tobacco, raisins and wine, were included.120 From 1952 efforts, 
known as the Pool Vert initiative, were relaunched with a proposal for a 
common market for agricultural goods with standardized prices and an external 
tariff regulated by a kind of a High Authority like the ECSC. In early 1953 the 
French rejected this prospect because they preferred ‘separate single-product 
marketing agreements on surplus commodities’ and the issue was virtually 
frozen until 1955.121 The Greek government appeared quite cautious about the 
common market because of Greece’s limited competitiveness. Instead, it 
favoured the preferential treatment of its main agricultural products from its 
major European markets. However, since this latter option was not feasible and 
fearing its exclusion from a scheme which was confined at the time to the Six 
alone, Greece did not reject the prospect of a common market but, certainly, it 
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was not the preferred solution.122 This was all the more so because industrial 
exports were expected to be quite limited, so negative European integration was 
treated as a danger rather than as an opportunity. However, in 1951 the FTRAD 
continued to press for liberalization, stating that Greek industry was now mature 
enough to face foreign competition.123 In contrast, the state attempted to 
increase tariff protection for several agricultural and industrial goods but mainly 
for fiscal purposes.124 However, these attempts were criticized within the GATT 
and they were soon abolished.125 Clearly, Greece was pressed to open its borders 
for manufactures but resisted. 
As long as Greece had shut its door to the premature endeavour for European 
economic unification through trade liberalization, the pressure upon its balance 
of payments was growing because US aid was ending whereas its competitiveness 
was still handicapped by low productivity and an overvalued currency induced by 
increasing domestic prices.126 Ioannis Enepikidis, an economist working for the 
US Embassy in Greece who had ‘very close’ relations with the FGI127, had made a 
thorough analysis of the EPU in November 1950.128 On the one hand, he had 
welcomed the EPU because not only did it provide the means for imports but 
also the much needed flexibility which the multilateral clearing mechanism 
provided. On the other, he had emphasized that Greek exports were expensive 
and since they were primarily registered on public accounts from the participant 
states, the prospect for the balance of trade was ominous. He observed that the 
early exhaustion of the initial credit balance forced Greece to ‘enrich foreign 
exchange by increasing exports and by encouraging domestic production.’129 
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Simultaneously, the FGI itself proposed measures to ameliorate the balance of 
payments problem. The proposal took its final shape in January 1951 in a memo 
signed by the FGI, the Panhellenic Exporters Association, the Athens Traders 
Association and the Tobacco Federation.130 The memo was an updated version of 
the demands made by the business community back in May 1946. Firstly, for 
imports it asked for the liberalization of essential goods and raw materials 
alongside the utilization of private exchange. The solution of private exchange, 
aiming to enrich foreign reserves, had also been advocated by the minister of 
national economy, Averoff, who subsequently resigned because the ECA in 
Greece refused this option.131 Importantly, the ECA was based upon the 
recommendations of the IMF official, Sturk, who had reported that this would 
intensify capital flight and speculation.132 Second, in respect to exports, the 
business memo proposed a National Export Council for coordination and low 
interest rates for export finance. Essentially, the memo recommended the 
abolition of the exchange certificates and the direct promotion of exports by 
subsidizing high domestic production costs and compensating for the overvalued 
Drs.  
Indeed, exchange certificates had not worked according to the calculations of 
the FTRAD, and in July 1949 a new levy upon imports was introduced. As it was 
explained, the aim was to mop up excessive earnings accruing from private 
barter and to subsidy exports which were handicapped from the overvalued Drs. 
Following the devaluation in September 1949, however, the State Department 
informed Greece that the UK and France considered that the levy was an 
‘extraordinary’ tax incompatible with GATT regulations and they ‘might not wish 
to sign on October 10 the Protocol of Accession to the GATT as it affects Greece, 
if the tax in question was retained in force’.133 The levy was abolished by 
ministerial decision the next day and, taking advantage of the devaluation, 
private barter was restricted in early 1950 and subsidies were now channelled 
through a complex procedure which recognized agricultural and mineral 
products as ‘loss making products’ and were subsidized accordingly. The new 
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reduction of US aid, and particularly the termination of the indirect aid in 1951, 
very soon forced the re-introduction of the levy establishing multiple exchange 
rates. Exchange certificates were abolished in the middle of 1951 and the levy 
extensively subsidized ‘loss making products’ despite complaints from affected 
countries.134 In August 1952 direct aid was further reduced and Plastiras’ 
government attempted to improve the balance of payments by extending and 
increasing the levy to further subsidise exports.135 These lists, beyond 
agricultural products, always included mineral products which, in most cases, 
were subsidized by more than 50%. Manufactured goods, basically resin products, 
cement, textiles and agricultural machinery, were included but it seems that 
this policy was on an ad hoc basis. For the FGI, the pressure for subsidies 
particularly grew after 1950 because several sectors overproduced, and the 
federation continued to emphasize this dimension in each annual report.136 It 
was clear that a more coherent solution was necessary.  
In 1951 the trade deficit skyrocketed and in 1952 it improved only slightly.137 
However, this improvement was attributable to commercial policies which faced 
severe criticism from several countries within the GATT. The decisive move 
which, following the reduction of US aid, checked low productivity and the 
overvalued Drs enabling Greece to introduce its economy to the international 
circuit of capital was the devaluation of Drs by 50% on 9 April 1953. 138 Based 
upon the stabilization programme aiming to check inflation, the devaluation 
redefined the basic aspects of the commercial policy. Firstly, it balanced the 
external value of the currency eliminating one factor behind limited 
competitiveness. Secondly, it was followed by the abolition of almost all import 
quotas for private trade, a measure which was legitimized by the necessity to 
deal with the inflationary tendencies released by devaluation. Thirdly, the levies 
which were imposed upon imports were abolished and the entire subsidy system 
was rescheduled. Equally important was that devaluation boosted invisible 
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earnings and facilitated capital inflows. Such exchange and FDI, progressively, 
replaced the US economic aid.  
Devaluation was a major change indeed, which attempted to introduce Greece 
to the first substantive phase of European integration. Historical research has 
shown that the discussion on the overvalued Drs in early 1952 was between 
currency reform along the lines of the German reform in 1948 and the 
devaluation of the existing currency - Drs. Eventually, in October 1952 the US 
mission opted for devaluation and the final decision was taken before 23 January 
1953.139 The necessity for devaluation had brought together economists like 
Zolotas and Varvaressos and politicians across the political spectrum.140 The way 
that domestic industry was involved in the devaluation, however, is entirely 
missing from Greek historiography but in what follows, it will be shown how 
business had increased pressure on the government to find a solution to Greece’s 
limited competitiveness.     
2.4.1 Business and industrial exports  
As we have seen, the drawback right was the FGI’s demand dating back to 1946. 
In February 1949 the federation had associated it with potential exports of 
several sectors to neighbouring countries and ‘especially to the Middle East’.141 
The same year the federation had created a list of thirty exportable products to 
Turkey amounting to $14 million but it had asked for export subsidies which had 
also been rejected.142 Eventually, in April 1951, the Tripartite Committee and 
the US mission granted to industry the drawback right so as to enable its 
participation in NATO’s rearmament programme.143 Not surprisingly, and 
consistent with FGI’s overall strategy to emphasize high production costs, the 
efforts of the federation were thereafter concentrated upon the subsidising of 
labour and other costs by the state as a substantive precondition for industrial 
exports. And it was precisely this kind of subsidy which was included in draft 
 
139 Psalidopoulos, Supervisors, pp. 129-30 and 139. 
140 Varvaressos, Report, pp. 375-406; GR/BOGHA/A2/S3/Y4/F1/Τ1, Considerations for Economic 
Policy, X. Zolotas, Athens, 28 November 1952; Stasinopoulos, The Rhetoric, 306-10; Rizas, Greek 
Politics, pp. 104-5. 
141 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1948 (Athens: FGI, 1949), p. 12. 
142 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Joint Greek-Turkish Committee, Minutes No 2, 19 September 1952.     
143 ‘Measures to promote Industry’, VE, April 1951, 35-6; Ioannis Fragos, ‘Measures of Customs 
and Tariff nature’, BCTD, 1952, no 14, 3-21. The law was published in June 1951. 
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laws aiming to amend the drawback Law 1851/1951. However, until the end of 
the period discussed in this chapter, and despite the federation’s pressure, 
these draft laws were never ratified.144 Demands for direct subsidies were more 
complicated. 
In April 1952, when Greek diplomats had also started negotiations for a security 
pact with Yugoslavia and Turkey, the Turkish government asked for a free trade 
zone with Greece considering it as the first step toward a customs union 
between the two countries.145 For Greece the basic aim was to exchange 
industrial goods with agricultural Turkish products, amounting to approximately 
$14 million annually or about 14% of total Greek exports in 1951. Greek 
businesses were called to declare their potential exports to Turkey, calculated 
on the assumptions that the existing export incentives, mainly the level of 
subsidies, would be retained whereas Turkish tariffs would be abolished. For this 
reason, the FGI was represented on the committee, established in early 
September 1952, to research the field. However, the federation’s representative 
did not come to the committee with a coherent proposal. Instead, after close 
cooperation with the FGI and individual industrialists, it was the ministry of 
industry which reported that only a handful of businesses were interested in 
exporting to Turkey under the above conditions.146 The result was, that 
projected exports amounted approximately to $7.8 million, almost half of the 
initial target. Significantly, the rest of industry asked for additional internal 
measures and export incentives to industry.147 These new business demands 
followed the expanded lists for the levies and subsidies to both agricultural and 
industrial products introduced in mid-1952, which were facing severe criticism 
within the GATT and many members were considering retaliation.148 Yet the 
discussion between businessmen and state agencies was taking place in October 
1952 simultaneously with the final consultations between the US mission and the 
 
144 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Papatsonis Memo to Finance Minister, Athens, 15 November 1951; ‘The view 
of Chr. Katsabas’, Imerisia, 27 February 1952; ‘The report of Mr Al. Tsatsos for the year 1952’, 
VE, April 1953, 13-9. 
145 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, A. Bakalbasis to Foreign Minister, April 1952. 
146 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Nickolaos Sideris, For the ability of industrial exports to Turkey, 24 October 
1952. 
147 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Greek Delegation to the Joint Greek-Turkish Committee, Minutes No 5, 10 
October 1952.     
148 YDIA/1952/110/6, Papatsonis to Foreign Ministry, 11 November 1952.    
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Greek government for the devaluation and the necessity for a new stable 
government to enforce it.149  
Following the inauguration of the Papagos’ government in November 1952, only 
four businesses confirmed to the ministry of industry that they were able to 
export to Turkey without additional subsidies.150 The potential exports were 
calculated to reach only $6.6 million. This outcome was overshadowed by 
Varvaressos, the BoG’s governor in early 1945 who had collided with the FGI, 
whose report of January 1952 had claimed that high domestic prices were 
attributable to high industrial profits enjoyed by domestic private monopolies 
and not to high production costs.151 The ensuing debate within the Greek 
committee for the free trade area did touch upon these issues and the roots of 
the apparent inefficiency of Greek businesses. The committee’s head, 
Bakalbasis, emphasized that businesses had not taken advantage of the 
counterpart funds, and the performance of Greek industry was disappointing.152 
In agreement with Varvaressos’ argument, he pointed out that since the inter-
war period the prices of manufactures had grown much faster than those of the 
agricultural sector. From its side, the FGI delivered to the committee a memo 
explaining that manufactured exports were fundamental to the development of 
industry stating that it was embracing the report of the ministry of industry and 
that it was eager to participate in the proposed free trade area. Simultaneously, 
it explained that high production costs, such as high interest rate and third-party 
taxes, all attributed to the inconsistent industrial policy, inhibiting industrial 
exports. The next month, the committee sent to the coordination ministry two 
interim reports stating that the main problem for the free trade zone with 
Turkey was that industrial exports were handicapped by high production costs 
and the overvalued Drs.153 A few days later, the devaluation was announced.  
 
149 Psalidopoulos, Supervisors, pp. 129-32.  
150 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Nickolaos Sideris, For the ability of industrial exports to Turkey, 2 February 
1953. The cement industries Aget SA and Titan SA would export $4.2 million, the chemical 
conglomerate AEEXPL $1.8 and the enamel utensils company Pitsos $0.6. These companies were 
already experienced to the Turkish market.    
151 Varvaressos, Report, pp. 165-91. 
152 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Greek Delegation to the Joint Greek-Turkish Committee, Minutes No 13, 3 
February 1953.     
153 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Greek Delegation to the Joint Greek-Turkish Committee, Minutes No 18, 
Athens, 10 March 1953.     
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2.5 Conclusion 
Until 1952, US intervention had saved Greek capitalism by providing the 
economic means for the financing of reconstruction, balancing the external 
accounts and for the conduct of the civil war. Moreover, the US intervention had 
challenged the existing state-business relationship which reproduced a 
speculative pattern within the domestic economy. However, it had not resolved 
the so-called imbalance problem, for industrialization had not proceeded as 
scheduled: the energy programme and the plans for heavy industry had not 
materialized whereas unemployment along with the balance of trade deficit 
were still there.  
For the achievement of these objectives state agencies cooperated with big 
businesses, many of which were firmly dependent upon German technology and 
finance, aiming to promote the revival of the pre-war Greek-German patterns of 
economic and commercial relationships. Such efforts intensified officially from 
1949 and their results were embodied in the 1950 Greek-German economic 
agreement, tying Greece economically and commercially with the locomotive of 
European integration earlier than other European countries. How this became 
possible is a complicated story and here it has been argued that the continuities 
in cooperation of businessmen and state agencies of the two countries before 
and after the war were decisive to this outcome.  
This period was also important for the formulation of Greece’s formal strategy 
towards European integration. It has been shown that one should be careful to 
derive Greece’s stance from the government’s public declarations alone. Greece 
had refused to participate in all the proposed liberalization schemes, except for 
the Code of Liberalization, in which it had participated only because it was 
attached to the EPU and certainly after US pressure. In any case, it withdrew 
very soon. In addition, Greece’s formal strategy toward European integration 
had been informed by the imbalance problem, as specified through business-
state interactions examined in the previous chapter. In this respect, the 
implication of Greece’s strategy was that, unless trade liberalization was 
accompanied with the simultaneous movement of capital and labour, integration 
was unsustainable for the less developed countries on the periphery.    
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Given Greece’s low productivity, the real difficulty for both Greek state 
agencies and businesses was the way that Greece would promote its agricultural 
exports in Europe without endangering industrialization. Even with difficulties 
caused by the fact that agricultural trade was not liberalized, European markets 
absorbed the semi-luxury agricultural exports, but they were a danger for 
industry. Also, Greek industrial exports were still almost absent from Europe, 
showing that from the very beginning Greece was not able to participate on 
equal terms in the process which underpinned the road to the Treaty of Rome. In 
any case, Greece had not adopted basic industries and the formation of the ECSC 
was hardly mentioned. The alternative was industrial exports to the Middle 
Eastern and Turkish markets, in which the FGI had been interested since the 
inter-war period. The endeavour to penetrate these markets, quite visible from 
this period, forged the common ground between domestic industry and German 
business in relation to European integration.  
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 THE DECISION (1953-1958) 
During the period 1953-1958 Greek capitalism was tentatively stabilized and was 
able to participate, albeit still in an exceptional manner, in the process of 
European integration which, since 1955, had entered its second substantive 
phase. From 1953 until 1957 GDP was growing irregularly but on average by 6% 
annually, a rate which was lower than the previous period, though it was 
satisfactory compared to other European economies.1 Similarly, the annual rate 
of growth of industrial production was on average 10% which was below the 
previous period, however, it was still above the trend in western Europe. 
Importantly, the right-wing political forces were able to form a single party and, 
more or less, stable governments which enforced significant liberal economic 
measures which had long term effects.  
Once the Marshall Plan was terminated in 1952 and US financial aid was 
substantially reduced, the devaluation of Drs by 50% followed in April 1953 which 
aimed to facilitate capital inflows and to balance the huge trade deficit. This 
substantive measure was accompanied by two core state policies. The first was 
the adoption of a law that targeted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), granting 
them considerable tax incentives and favourable terms for capital repatriation. 
The second was import liberalization, particularly the abolition of import 
restrictions and the relaxation of exchange controls aiming not only to contain 
inflation but also to open the economy to foreign competition. This set of 
policies, which underlined the power of the state vis-à-vis individual 
businessmen, created a new environment for the interaction of businessmen and 
state agencies for it altered the exchange terms with the international economy, 
intensifying competition. An equally important economic development in this 
period was that in 1955 inflation was eventually tamed and from the next year 
savings returned to commercial banks.2 The internal finance mechanism had 
been restored, credit policy relaxed, and investment capitals was progressively 
available to businesses through commercial banks.  
 
1 United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe in 1957 (Geneva: United Nations, 1958), ch. II, p. 3; 
Appendix 1, table 5. 
2 Xenophon Zolotas, Monetary Equilibrium and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965), pp. 45-94. 
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However, the structure of the economy had hardly changed.3 Despite 
improvement, the interest rate was still high and the level of total investment 
still below European standards.4 In relation to the previous period, public 
investment as a percentage of GDP fell considerably in all sectors except for 
energy, and total private investment increased only slightly.5 However, the 
composition of investments became even more problematic. Private investment 
in manufacturing dropped from the high levels of previous years. Even if the 
state did invest in manufacturing, investments in the secondary sector were 
exceptionally low as private savings were channelled predominately in to 
housing. For contemporaries, this investment trend undermined industrialization 
and the prospect of resolving the imbalance problem.6 As the BoG underlined, 
whereas western economies had achieved full employment, in Greece, 
unemployment and underemployment were estimated to be at the dangerously 
high levels of the previous period while the trade deficit was still huge.7 These 
developments had undermined the legitimation of the state apparatus and 
progressively questioned the capitalist character of the state and the 
accumulation process.  
Following the inauguration of the Papagos government in November 1952, the 
centre split again and thereafter it remained fragmented, facilitating the right 
political forces to govern for more than ten years without interruption.8  The 
main features of these governments were their anticommunist character and 
their emphasis on economic development. But the right did not rule 
undisturbed. Papagos’ government was destabilised in late 1954 when Markezinis 
initially resigned as coordination minister and then withdrew from the 
government. Meanwhile, the communist oriented United Democratic Left (EDA) 
sought progressively, after Stalin’s death in 1953, for political alliance with the 
centre-left aiming for a democratic regime that would enable Greece to 
approach the USSR on both economic and political grounds. The local election in 
 
3 Kostis Vaitsos and Tasos Yannitsis, Technological Transformation and Economic Development 
(Athens: Gutenberg, 2001), pp. 46-8;86-7.  
4 United Nations, Some Factors in Economic Growth in Europe during the 1950s (Geneva: UN, 
1964), ch. IV, table 4.  
5 Appendix 1, Table 3. 
6 An indication for these reasons can provide the ratio of investments to output, as it was 
measured at the time, see Appendix 1 Table 2. 
7 BOG, Bank of Greece Governor’s Annual Report for 1956 (Athens: BoG, 1957), p. 13.  
8 Rizas, Greek Politics, pp. 131-170;175-6;183. 
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November 1954, where EDA’s candidates gained a majority vote in Greece’s 
three main urban regions, offered a reminder to state agencies and businessmen 
alike, of the dangers of continuing unemployment and poverty for capitalism in 
Greece.  
This reminder was repeated in the elections of February 1956 and especially of 
May 1958. Following the death of Papagos in late 1955, Karamanlis rallied the 
main segments of the right with a part of the Liberal Party within the newly 
created party National Radical Union (ERE) and ruled the country until 1963. This 
part of the Liberal Party, mainly Evangelos Averoff and Konstantinos Tsatsos, 
was to play a crucial role in Greece’s participation in European integration. 
However, in early 1956 Karamanlis was able to form a government only because 
the electoral system had been designed to reduce substantially the 
parliamentary representation of the Democratic Union, a coalition which had 
eventually gained the majority of the citizens’ vote and included almost all 
centre parties along with the EDA.9 In February 1958 the coordination minister, 
Papaligouras, along with fourteen parliament members of ERE, withdrew from 
the government and overthrew Karamanlis. This move of Papaligouras, who 
carried out the negotiations with the Federal Republic at the highest level after 
Markezinis’ resignation, was encouraged by Bodosakis but the reasons behind 
this support are not known.10   
In the following elections in May 1958 Karamanlis, backed by the US, regained a 
majority, but the EDA become the main opposition, gaining support particularly 
in the two main urban regions, Athens and Salonica.11 The EDA had rejected the 
FTA prospect vigorously and defended instead the eastern orientation of 
external trade as a solution to the trade deficit, insisting on the necessity for 
the connection of imports with exports.12 The proposals of the main opposition 
were neither politically coincidental nor economically without basis. The still 
unresolved Cyprus issue was a fertile ground for the nourishment of anti-NATO 
and anti-American sentiments, especially because of the ‘rumoured’ 
 
9 Nicolakopoulos, The Cachectic, pp. 196-214. 
10 Rizas, Greek Politics, pp. 192-200. 
11 Nicolakopoulos, The Cachectic, pp. 224-51. 
12 Higher School of Industrial Studies, The European Economic Community: Ten days of Reports 
and Discussion (Athens, 1957), pp. 258-64. 
  132 
 
 
 
 
establishment of intermediate ballistic missiles in Greece and the Balkans.13 
Economically, the huge military expenses, associated by the EDA with the US 
military demands and not with Greece’s defence needs, drained considerable 
amounts from the budget and the state made little effort to improve the living 
and educational standards. Yet exports to OEEC countries and the EEC were 
continuously decreasing from 1956 whereas bilateral accounts with Eastern 
countries had unspent balances. It was for these reasons that economic 
development and industrialization were prioritized by the Karamanlis 
government from early 1956.   
However, the attempt to increase production and employment faced the 
balance of payments constraint.14 The problem was that imports as a percentage 
of GDP were growing faster than exports. This adverse trend is attributable 
mainly to three factors. Firstly, it was the increasing reliance upon imported 
machinery, manufactured goods and chemicals; increased production 
necessitated the importation of capital goods and intermediate inputs, whereas 
increasing incomes were channelled predominately to consumer durables. As a 
rule, domestic industry was unresponsive to the increasing demand for these 
goods. Secondly, the composition of exports was roughly the same as 1952, 
showing that devaluation had made little difference in diversifying foreign trade. 
Indeed, the value of chemicals, manufacture and machinery (SITCS 5-6-7) 
imports increased from 44% of total imports in 1952 to 57% in 1958.15 After 1955 
exports were essentially stagnant and the country entered a severe and 
prolonged export crisis.16 The main reason for this development was that Greece 
still exchanged predominately agricultural luxury products and minerals for 
machinery and consumer durables, very much resembling the inter-war trade 
patterns. Thirdly, and related to this, both agriculture and industry were still 
uncompetitive thus the trade deficit was growing both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of GDP.  
 
13 Nicolakopoulos, The Cachectic, pp. 196-214. 
14 Halikias, The Economic. 
15 Appendix 1, Table 9. 
16 Appendix 1, Table 8. 
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The geographical patterns of foreign trade changed during this period only in 
respect to exports.17 Whereas imports from OEEC countries accounted for 60% of 
total imports in 1952 and 1956, the respective percentages for exports were 76% 
and 60%. The difference, for which the trade balance with the Federal Republic 
and the UK was largely responsible, was covered primarily by Eastern markets. 
As the export crisis continued apace, the Eastern bloc had absorbed about 22% of 
total exports in 1959 and its share was growing constantly.18 Greece was among 
the most dependent Western European states in this respect.19 This development 
was behind the deterioration of the trade balance particularly within the EPU. 
Still, trade with the Federal Republic was at the heart of Greece’s foreign trade 
and the former had considerably strengthened its position as a supplier of 
machinery whereas it absorbed about one third of Greek tobacco.  
The problem was progressively becoming more and more complex because the 
trend of Greece’s main trade partners, the OEEC members, was towards the 
lowering of tariffs for industrial products and the maintenance of non-tariff 
barriers for agricultural products. These trends were at the heart of European 
integration. Until 1950 all European economies had revived and were entering 
their golden age, led primarily by the Federal Republic and its capital-intensive 
big businesses.20 The Netherlands was another typical example of the economies 
which had embarked upon export-led growth. For these European countries this 
growth trend presupposed, beyond the reduction of quotas, the lowering of 
tariffs. Indeed, since 1952 the Low Tariff Club pressed within the GATT and the 
Council of Europe for the lowering of the tariff barriers. Once the European 
Defence Community (EDC), which aimed to integrate German troops into a 
European army, was rejected by France, the Club returned in October 1954 
within the OEEC with a similar plan for a European free trade zone.21 In an 
analogous but more coherent move, the Netherlands’ foreign minister, Beyen, 
proposed to the Six in December 1952 that the EDC should be tied to a customs 
union, which would contain an ‘automatic and irrevocable procedure for its 
 
17 Appendix 1, Tables 10;11;12;13. 
18 Appendix, table 11. 
19 Walden, Greece, II, pp. 71-85. 
20 Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence (London: Verso, 2006), pp.43-51;67-78; 
Eichengreen, The European Economy, pp. 80-1. 
21 Milward, The European, pp. 185-96. 
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completion.’22 In February 1955, he returned with a similar plan. These two 
efforts, along with the proposals for the extension of the ECSC’s High Authority 
to ‘further sectors’23, like transportation and energy, made by Belgium and 
France respectively, culminated in the Messina conference in June 1955. One 
year later, based upon the Spaak report, the Six decided at Venice to go ahead 
with the customs union and a market for nuclear power. By March 1957 the 
Treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom had been signed by the Six. 
Meanwhile, being anxious about the effect of the EEC’s external tariff upon the 
Commonwealth’s trade and preferential system, the British government, 
supported by British business on the condition of a long transition period and 
safeguards, proposed in the mid-1956 a wider, and exclusively industrial, Free 
Trade Area (FTA).24 This scheme, by associating the customs union with all OEEC 
members, was compatible with British economic interests because it maintained 
the trade preferences within the Commonwealth without endangering access to 
the large European market under construction. This effort was backed by 
German businessmen and Erhard because the majority of German businesses 
were competitive enough to prefer a wider free market rather than a closed 
trade bloc, as was considered to be the case with a customs union.25 However, 
French big businesses were more protectionist about such a wide market and 
supported the customs union cautiously, asking for extensive safeguards.26   
During these years the issue of agricultural trade was ‘only of secondary 
importance’ because industrialization was the absolute priority.27 Within the 
OEEC liberalization of agricultural trade was in standstill for European countries 
were still vehemently protectionist and in 1955 one-third of this trade was still 
subject to quotas.28 The provisions of the EEC treaty were vague in this respect, 
but it was visible that a more or less protected market capable of absorbing 
preferentially the surpluses generated from the major agricultural producers, 
such as the French, would finally be established.  
 
22 Ibid, p. 189. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Rollings, British, pp. 94-119. 
25 Buhrer, ‘German Industry’, pp. 106-7. 
26 Moravcsik, The Choice, p. 109. 
27 Ibid, p. 224. 
28 Ibid, pp. 308-10. 
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This integration process enabled big businesses to expand and to take advantage 
of scale and scope, circumventing the overproduction tendencies which after the 
First World War had boosted cartelization in Europe whereas after the Second 
World War there were fears that this tendency could resurface.29 Seen from this 
perspective, European integration was a process which prevented an 
overaccumulation crisis within national borders. As might be expected, the trend 
among big businesses suitable for economies of scale and mass production was to 
support the reduction of the barriers to trade. However, this support could take 
different forms. For example, automobile companies in Italy and France backed 
the customs union only as a neo-protectionist market. Instead, chemical and 
electrical big business in West Germany supported a wider trade bloc.30 In 
contrast, the trend among businesses with limited capacity for economies of 
scale, such as textiles in the UK, West Germany and France, was more cautious 
for the customs union and asked for extensive safeguards.31  
The endeavour of state agencies and Greek businessmen to guide economic 
development within this changing environment and their response to the 
progress of European integration, are the main themes of this part. In this 
respect, Greek literature has addressed the action of state agencies and 
businessmen separately. For the former, the emphasis has been given to their 
initiatives to steer economic development without consulting big business32 and 
has been underlined that the decision for an FTA was taken from above and was 
essentially of a geopolitical nature.33 As chapter three will argue, however, as 
part of Greece’s response to European integration, state agencies and 
businessmen interacted to adapt the industrial policy, now attempting to boost 
investment under the pressure of growing foreign competition. Simultaneously, 
the state and a crucial part of domestic business identified industrialization with 
the consolidation of the Greek-German economic relationships. Indeed, the 
geopolitical dimension alone is not adequate for an overall evaluation of 
 
29 Edward E. Masson, Controlling World Trade: Cartels and Commodity Agreements (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1946). 
30 Pérez, ‘The European’, pp. 61-84; Moravcsik, The Choice, p. 108. 
31 Rollings, British, p. 110; Moravcsik, The Choice, pp. 96;109. 
32 Kazakos, Between, pp. 163-85.   
33 Konstantina E. Botsiou, ‘The US and the participation of Greece to European integration’, in 
Greece, the West and the Mediterranean 1945-1962: New Research Approaches, ed. by 
Konstantina E. Botsiou and Yannis Sakkas (Thessaloniki: University of Macedonia, 2015), pp. 109-
24.   
  136 
 
 
 
 
Greece’s path to Europe. As will be claimed in chapter four, the progress of 
European integration had posed a fundamental economic dilemma to Greece. On 
the one hand, participation would either stimulate economic development 
internally by accessing new foreign markets and taking advantage of capital 
inflows or, instead, it would induce import penetration, clearing uncompetitive 
units and exacerbating both unemployment and the balance of payments 
difficulties. This latter possibility would necessitate restrictive internal measures 
which meant internal devaluation, incompatible with the objective of rapid 
industrialization and thus dangerous for Greek capitalism. On the other hand, 
exclusion meant that, firstly, Greece’s exports to its traditional European 
markets, mainly to the Federal Republic, would be disturbed. Secondly, since it 
was judged that the common market would accrue economies of scale to its 
participants only, the productivity gap between Greek and European business 
would grow even more, affecting the already low competitiveness of the 
domestic economy. Obviously, Greece’s developmental path was at a crossroad, 
but the outcome was not specified unilaterally by the government.  
For the reaction of businessmen, the main argument was that the FGI supported 
the FTA option only because its members were predominately efficient big 
businesses.34 Certainly, in Greece small scale and labour-intensive businesses 
prevailed, except for a few big businesses financed by the counterpart funds 
which were large by Greek standards and were conducive to economies of scale. 
However, as will be shown in the following two chapters, they were not so 
efficient as it has been claimed. Even if some of them could indeed withstand 
European competition, the key to understanding their response is their 
increasing need for imported capital and technology, the ties which many of 
them had adopted with German businesses as well as the political concerns of 
both the FGI and the leadership of the emerging liberal business faction. 
 
34 Moussis, Greek, pp. 95-107;128-32.   
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 Continuing efforts for external finance and 
the consolidation of Greek-German economic 
relations  
This chapter explores the endeavour to adjust industrial policy as a response to 
increasing European competition, the evolution of Greek-German economic 
relations as an attempt to resolve Greece’s imbalance problem and the evolution 
of selected big businesses financed by the counterpart funds within this 
framework. It is divided into three sections. The first section traces back the 
interaction of organised business with state agencies for the adaptation of the 
industrial policy and the formulation of an industrial programme as part of 
Greece’s substantive strategy towards early European integration. It shows that 
the liberal business bloc welcomed the law for FDI whereas the peak-level BIAs 
asked for analogous incentives for domestic industrial investments. Under the 
pressure by the plans for an FTA, these efforts culminated in the formulation of 
the ROCEP. This was a business-state organization charged with the above 
competencies and resembled the demands of the FGI dating back to 1945. 
The second section illustrates the circumstances under which the consolidation 
of Greek-German economic relationship took place. On the one hand, the 
German side pressed for the rehabilitation of the pre-war and war position of 
German businesses and the return of confiscated properties and companies. On 
the other, Greece was dependent on solving the imbalance problem through the 
development of these relationships. It is clear that both businessmen and state 
agencies considered that German capital and technology inflows were 
indispensable for the adoption and modernization of key industries, and thus for 
the realization of core of the developmental plan. In addition, a first round of 
bilateral negotiations for labour outflows to the Federal Republic had taken 
place.    
The last section examines the evolution of the most important big businesses 
which were representative of the main manufacturing sectors. The aim is not 
only to show their response to import liberalization but also to explore their 
developmental strategies as a basis for the consideration of their attitudes 
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towards European integration in the next chapter. These companies were all 
internal monopolies, except for the company P-P which had a dominant position 
in textiles. Moreover, they were all recipients of counterpart funds, consuming 
about 46% of the funds to manufacturing and mining up to 1954 and about 55% to 
1958.1 Their main shareholders were among the leadership of the FGI and other 
meso-level BIAs. Finally, this section examines the emergence of the first foreign 
direct investments related to shipping capital, which were to play their role in 
the formulation and implementation of Greece’s European strategy.  
3.1 Industrialization plans, industrial policy and capital scarcity 
3.1.1 The search for external finance, the business reaction and the 
updated industrial policy 
Following the official termination of the ERP in the middle of 1952, Zolotas 
reported that the continuation of the investment programme required to solve 
Greece’s viability problem presupposed the continuation of external finance.2 
He insisted particularly on the necessity of FDI and the continuation of US 
military aid, aiming to finance economic development along the lines 
established by the 1948 plan. Indeed, in May 1953 the coordination minister, 
Spyros Markezinis, was in Washington hurriedly seeking $100 million to finance 
the new developmental plan. As was the case with all the plans published during 
this period, it pursued the realization of the projects proposed in the initial 
plan.3 However, the response was not so encouraging. The US government would 
provide only $20 million in free aid and assist Greece to find additional funds 
from institutions like the IBRD. However, the public debt issue had not been 
settled and Greece could not access international funding institutions.4 The US 
also assured that it would assist the Greek government in attracting the interest 
 
1 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS1/FI1, CLC-EDFO General Recapitulation, 31 December 1958, pp. 1-73. 
2 GR/BOGHA/A2/S3/Y4/F1/Τ1, Considerations for Economic Policy, Xenophon Zolotas, Athens, 
28 November 1952. 
3 KKF/KKA/7A, Reconstruction Programme: Years 1946-1958, pp. 1536-63. 
4 The BoG had rejected the IBRD loan suggesting that the country would receive funds only in the 
form of foreign free aid because state budget was overburdened with both development and 
military expenses, see BoG, Bank of Greece Governor’s Annual Report for 1954 (Athens: BoG, 
1955), p. 34.  
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of American capital to invest in Greece.5 Indeed, during this trip by 
Marekezinins, the US and the Greek governments agreed for the favourable 
treatment of FDI in Greece, culminating eventually in law 2687/1953.6 This law 
‘privileged’ foreign capital offering extremely favourable conditions for 
manufacturing, mining, building and shipping investments.7 Pending since late 
1949, the law updated the measures proposed by the reconstruction plan which 
targeted FDI and capital assets owned by Greek citizens and businessmen living 
abroad to cover the balance of payments deficit and to finance the 
developmental effort. Significantly, the law was incorporated into the 
constitution of Greece and could not be amended or abolished by a single 
government.  
The liberal business bloc welcomed the prospect of US investment capital and, in 
general, FDI. At the conference of the Greek chambers of commerce in May 
1954, the prospects for the long-term financing of the economy were extensively 
discussed. Three proposals were made by the general secretary of the ACCI, 
Christos Panagos, who was himself an industrialist with interests in commerce. 
Firstly, he asked for the restoration of the internal finance mechanism and 
stated that the issue had been analysed repeatedly by the FGI. Secondly, he 
insisted on the necessity of untaxed reserves for the re-investment of profits. 
The third proposal was external finance, which was discussed in more detail 
although Panagos was pessimistic that US private capital would offer a solution 
to the ‘scarcity of Greek capital’.8 He argued that Greece was not conducive for 
such investment and investors would prefer the stability of the US economy. 
Despite this negative prospect, Panagos insisted that the necessity for FDI in 
Greece was highlighted by the still high interest rate. For Panagos, foreign 
capital would absorb the idle work force and produce spill-over effects across 
the whole economy with the creation of new sectors and export-oriented 
companies. 
 
5 FRUS/1952-54, Vol. VII, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernigan), 7 May 1953; pp. 822-4; Ibid., 
The Mutual Security Administration to the Greek Minister of Coordination (Markezinis), 
Washington, 15 May 1953, pp. 831-2. 
6 ‘The draft law for the attraction of foreign capitals’, VE, June 1953, p. 11. 
7 Howard, Industrial Capital, p. 276. 
8 ‘The Report of ACCI’s Secretary-General’, Chr. Panagos, in ACCI, First Conference of the Greek 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Athens: OCCC, 1955), pp. 243-8. 
  140 
 
 
 
 
This rationale had also been embraced by the FGI at that time. The federation’s 
president from May 1952 was Alexandros Tsatsos, the owner of the cement 
industry AGET SA and a liberal industrialist who, as will be shown, had adopted 
relationships with companies concentrated around the Power group and shipping 
capital. At the conference, he was more optimistic about the prospects of US 
private investment than Panagos.9 He stated that exported American capital was 
insignificant given the size of the US economy but was essential for the needs of 
Greece. As a member of the committee responsible for the FDI at the 
coordination ministry, Alexandros Tsatsos confirmed that there were signs that 
US capitalists were interested in investing in Greece suggesting that ‘everyone 
should contribute’ in this direction.10 The FGI president linked the prospects for 
FDI with an industrial climate conducive to domestic investment too and this 
attitude was also dominant within the textiles representative body. However, 
the PUTI had made clear to the coordination minister that it would not accept 
FDI within its sectors under the privileges of the 2687/1953 law.11  
Demands for incentives to domestic investors were stated again in an FGI memo 
to the coordination minister, Papaligouras, the following year where the solution 
of the financial problem was also prioritized. It was emphasized that foreign 
businesses asked for legislative stability, tax concessions and high depreciation 
rates which were also preconditions for the investment of the idle domestic 
capital. Beyond the claims for working capital the federation emphasized the 
inadequacy of the Economic Development Financial Organization (EDFO), which 
since August 1954 had replaced CLC for the provision of long-term finance 
derived from the counterpart funds. It asked for low interest rates and criticized 
the new terms introduced by EDFO, according to which, each company had to 
contribute 50% of the investment financed. In addition, the FGI emphatically 
returned to its proposals for a stable and conducive environment to investment 
as part of its industrial policy based upon solid data for manufacturing.12 For the 
federation, the underlying reason for the need to intensify the investment effort 
was imported competition: 
 
9 ‘The speech of FGI’s President Alex. Tsatsos’, in ACCI, First Conference, pp. 273-6. 
10 Ibid., p. 274. 
11 ‘PUTI Memo’, Imerisia, 25 October 1953. 
12 FGI, The Greek Industry during the years 1954 and 1955 (Athens: FGI, 1956), p. 1-15.  
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Greek Industry has to fight with competition from foreign industries. The 
major pending problem is exactly the ‘scarcity of capital’, which poses 
difficulties to the normal course of companies.13  
If until 1956 the measures to boost industrial investments had been informed by 
the opening to international competition from import liberalization within the 
OEEC, from 1957 they were largely a response to the concrete steps for tariff 
disarmament taken in Europe, particularly the FTA and the customs union of the 
Six. From this point of view, the domestic industrial policy applied since 1953 
was part of Greece’s substantive strategy towards European integration.  
In 1955 the provision of long-term finance was still problematic, and the 
government had accepted that it was fragmented and not systematic.14 Yet the 
EDFO could not collect the growing unpaid loans and even if it was endowed 
with more than $10 million from the unutilized counterpart funds, its long-term 
finance was quite limited.15 Until the end of 1958 it had provided only $11.9 
million worth of loans to manufacture, as will be shown in section three of this 
chapter, $13.8 for the Ptolemais facilities.16 Obviously, the level of the funds 
was significantly lower than the Marshall Plan period. Indeed, investments were 
financed predominately by long-term credits from abroad, self-finance and 
growing short-term finance.17 Since FDI was still limited, the result was that 
manufacturing investment as a percentage of the total investment was 
continuously falling from 1953. In 1956 this percentage had reached a low point 
which was half of that in 1952 and industrial production in 1956 was stagnant.18 
The FGI attributed this investment inertia, and the subsequent production 
stagnation, to the scarcity of investment capital, the inadequate protection and 
stagnant agricultural income.19 Moreover, it put the blame on the state for 
inaction and an incoherent industrial policy.  
 
13 ‘Sofoklis Venizelos declares’, VE, July 1955, 19-22 (20). 
14 ‘The meeting at the FGI’, VE, June 1955, 15-9. 
15 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE1/SS4/FI1, Report of the General Manager to Board of EDFO, 26 May 1955, 
pp. 19-37. 
16 Appendix 1, table 4.   
17 The Greek Economy during the year 1957 (Athens: BoG, 1958), pp. 122-3.   
18 The industrial index which the FGI published the production level was 125 in 1953, 155 in 
1954, 160 in 1955 and 162 in 1956 (1939=100).  
19 Christoforos Stratos, ‘The stagnation of industrial production is alarming’, OT, 06 December 
1956. 
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It was true that the Karamanlis government had, since early 1956, intensified 
efforts for industrialization.20 Significantly, the inauguration of the Karamanlis 
government coincided with the permanent taming of inflation. Under the 
guidance of the BoG, efforts had been concentrated upon the restoration of the 
internal finance mechanism since 1954, promoting the attraction of public and 
private savings from commercial banks and their appropriate channelling to 
industrial investment.21 Once this had been achieved, in 1957 commercial banks 
were obliged to channel 30% of their annual increases in deposits to long-term 
finance for productive investment.22  
Equally, Papagos’ government had already introduced measures which 
resembled the demands of the business community. With the Law 2901/1954, 
retained earnings, up to 10% of corporate annual revenue, were not taxed if 
invested whereas depreciation rates increased.23 In early 1955 the Law 
3213/1955 was introduced for provincial industry, which concerned industrial 
investment exclusively beyond the Athens-Piraeus industrial region.24 This law 
was of decisive importance because it introduced incentives that later were 
granted to the whole of industry. It abolished all taxes and duties for imported 
machinery, increased depreciation rates and reduced the interest rate along 
with other parafiscal charges.25  
From early 1957 the PUTI had highlighted that incentives to industry, aiming to 
modernize mechanical equipment and to reduce high production costs, was a 
precondition for Greece’s entrance to the FTA.26 Very soon, as will be shown in 
the next chapter, this became the common denominator of all industrial BIAs 
and the business community. Once the decision to join the FTA had been taken, 
the FGI and the PUTI intensified their pressure for new measures to assist 
industrial investment. They essentially proposed the extension of the incentives 
given to provincial industry to the whole of industry. The provincial FMTI and FPI 
 
20 Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, Konstantinos Karamanlis Archive: Facts and Texts, 12 
vols (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1992-1997), (Hereafter KKAFT), II, pp. 54-5. 
21 Ibid., pp. 74-80.  
22 BOG, Bank of Greece Governor’s Annual Report for the year 1957 (Athens: BoG, 1958), p. 73.  
23 The Greek Economy during the year 1958 (Athens: BoG, 1959), pp. 55-8.    
24 The Athens-Piraeus region accounted for more than two third of industrial production in 1956. 
25 The term parafiscal charges refers mainly to third party taxes, which were charges on 
agricultural and industrial products accruing to a number of public entities.   
26 Georgios Gavril, ‘The Textiles of the Countries of Europe and the EFTA’, VE, March 1957, 19-
27.  
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indicated that the measures included in the law were not enough.27 From its 
perspective, the ACCI highlighted the necessity of incentives for mergers and, in 
general, for concentration in industry and commerce as the appropriate 
response to the competitive challenge posed by the FTA.28 The first measures 
which extended the above incentives for provincial investment to the whole 
industry and advanced those already granted, aiming simultaneously to facilitate 
mergers with additional tax incentives, were adopted in 1957 as Laws 3765/1957 
and 3746/1957.29 The next year corporate taxation was simplified.30 The fact 
that the measures for provincial industry were expanded to all industries 
nationally once the decision for participation in the FTA had been taken, is a 
clear indication that incentives to industry were not ‘inherently susceptible to 
particularism’ as Pagoulatos has argued.31 Instead they were the outcome of 
state-business interaction which aimed to promote industrialization as a means 
to strength Greek capitalism in the face of growing foreign competition, 
constituting thus a crucial part of Greece’s substantive European strategy.  
3.1.2 Planning and the adaption of state-business relations 
It has been argued that in the second half of the 1950s it was the government 
alone which had understood the ‘necessity for the coordination of the 
developmental effort’.32 This is certainly another expression of the widespread 
belief that the state had acted autonomously or had just followed clientelist 
policies. However, there is no doubt that the FGI, as the representative body of 
Greece’s industrial class, had repeatedly highlighted the necessity for an 
industrial programme, claiming its participation to its formulation and 
implementation at the highest level.33 In February 1956 it offered a reminder 
that there was a severe vacuum in respect to comprehensive data for industry, 
linking it directly to the absence of any coherent industrial policy and 
 
27 ‘Industrial Problems’, in ACCI, Second Conference of the Greek Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (Athens: OCCC, 1958), pp. 135-69.  
28 ‘For the merge of similar businesses’, ACCI Bulletin, July 1957, 5-7.     
29 Psalidopoulos, History, pp. 220-1.     
30 For the institutional deficiencies of the Greek tax system which discouraged industrial 
investments see: Zoi Pittaki, ‘Walking a Tightrope: Business, the Tax System and Tax Conscience 
in Greece, 1955-1989’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Glasgow, 2016). 
31 Pagoulatos, Greece’s, p. 41. 
32 Kazakos, Between, p. 82.   
33 FGI, The Greek Industry during the years 1954 and 1955 (Athens: FGI, 1956), pp. 8-11.  
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programme.34 The next month, once the Karamanlis government had been 
inaugurated, the federation reiterated this argument to the new coordination 
minister Helmis, who agreed that a survey for the status of industry was a 
precondition for the enactment of developmental and commercial policies.35 
Indeed, in April 1956 the government formed the Programme Council, charged 
with the formulation of an economic programme. As its membership indicates, 
this council was an effort to revive the patterns of formal state-business 
relations prevailing in Greece before the US intervention in 1947. Particularly, it 
was headed by Zolotas and its main participants were the NBG’s vice president 
and the FGI’s president.36 However, for unknown reasons, this council did not 
proceed as scheduled. Thus, on 9 July 1956, the federation returned once more 
with its old demand, asking again the coordination minister for the cooperation 
of the private and public sectors for the formulation of a ‘healthy’ industrial 
policy and an economic programme.37 For the FGI this endeavour presupposed a 
study of the economy, particularly the ‘collection of data and their systematic 
processing’ for the whole economy, above all, for manufacturing.38 Indeed, such 
a state-business committee, which included the FGI’s president and board 
members, took place at the BoG at the end of August 1956.39 Subsequently, the 
‘committee for the survey of industrial problems’ as it was named, met Helmis 
regularly and was preoccupied primarily with the finance terms and the 
protection of big business.40 Yet, by the end of the year, the Greek Statistical 
Service had collected the first data regarding industrial establishments.41  
There are no available sources to extract the subsequent development of this 
effort and evaluate its significance, but the whole endeavour undoubtedly 
gathered momentum a few months later when the issue of the FTA had already 
become the main concern of businessmen and state agencies. At the annual 
meeting of the BoG in April 1957, the FGI’s vice president asked for a 
consultative economic committee with clear objectives and means: 
 
34 Ibid., p. 26.  
35 ‘It will be conducted a survey’, Imerisia, 8 March 1956. 
36 KKAFT, II, p. 52.  
37  ‘Greek Industry is Admirable’, VE, August 1956, pp. 31-5.   
38  Ibid., 32.   
39 ‘Foreign Experts will assist the Committee’, To Vima, 29 August 1956, p. 6. 
40 ‘Legislation for public procurement will be improved’, Imerisia, 16 September 1956; ‘Improved 
Finance’, Imerisia, 19 September 1956. 
41 ESYE, Statistics in Greece (Athens: National Printing Office, 1961), p. 25. 
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A Permanent Economic Council aiming to specify the general framework of 
our economic policy should be created. The determination of this framework 
presupposes the study of contemporary economic data of the country, as 
well as the investigation of its future prospects, in order for the country to 
develop and to cast off the title of an underdeveloped economy.42   
He pointed out that this new form of state-business organization should be 
assisted by all the relevant state services and should include BoG officials, 
members of the commercial banks, representatives of the ‘productive forces’ 
and other ‘personalities’ and experts.43 He mentioned that the committee 
should take place within the BoG, because the central bank had the ‘expertise’, 
the ‘means’, the ‘authority’ and the initial data, all appropriate for any 
coherent economic policy and programme.44 Just a few days later, the FGI 
explicitly related the study of the economy to the terms under which Greek 
industry would participate in the ongoing process of European integration.45 
Indeed, the government in March 1957 had formed a ‘central committee’, with 
the participation of the FGI and prominent state managers, to report on the FTA. 
Three months later, from this committee another one had emerged, the 
Research and Organization Committee for Economic Planning (ROCEP) which 
shared considerable similarities with the FGI’s proposals. At the very first 
meeting of the ROCEP in September 1957, the coordination minister, Helmis, 
who was its chairman and simultaneously supervising the negotiations for the 
FTA within the OEEC at the time, outlined its main purpose:  
At the moment, I would not ask for any programme. This will become 
feasible with the systematic exploration of the sectoral data and the 
problems of the economy. Then, based on the detailed and comprehensive 
research of the data and their problems, the programme will constitute the 
basis of our economic policy.46 
The general secretary of the committee, the highly ranked BoG official, 
Spentzas, was charged with the coordination of the everyday functions of the 
 
42 Christoforos Stratos, ‘The foundation of Permanent Economic Council’, OT, 25 April 1957, p. 1. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 ‘The Industrial Committee’, OT, 23 May 1957, p. 14. 
46 KKF/Georgios Spentzas Archive (hereafter GSA), 28/4, Minutes No 1, 12 September 1957. 
  146 
 
 
 
 
institution and was the official link to the government and the BoG. The new 
institution was composed of six main committees and various subcommittees.47 
The participants came from four main categories: a) state managers, usually at 
the level of general secretary of the ministries or above b) bank executives, 
usually the vice presidents c) business representatives, mainly from the 
governing bodies of the FGI and the ACCI and d) academics. Essentially, this new 
organization was an updated version of the RO and ASA, very close to the 
federation’s demands from 1945 in respect of its organization and competences.  
The substantive difference from the previous organizations was that it was not 
supervised by the US mission. Rather, the ROCEP worked within the framework 
of the rapidly improving Greek-German economic relations. The structural 
prerequisites for this development were already there. Indeed, as the trade 
ministry was informed, from late 1952 the Federal Republic accumulated 
surpluses to its external accounts. 48  
3.2 The consolidation of Greek-German economic relations and 
the road to salvation 
The rehabilitation of Greek-German economic relations and the settlement of 
the issues of German occupation have both been treated in a systematic way but 
separately.49 As was shown in chapter one, however, there is a need to address 
these two dimensions together. This is because in this way the circumstances 
under which Greece pursued its industrialization and finally participated in 
European integration can be illustrated.  
In November 1954, Markezinis, the chief negotiator of the Greek-German 
economic agreement signed one year earlier at Bonn, made a peculiar statement 
in parliament. He advocated that the Greek delegation to the Federal Republic 
 
47 The six main committees were a) Central Committee, responsible for the guidance of the work 
of the other committees and the elaboration of their results b) Committee for Primary 
Production c) Committee for Secondary Production d) Committee for Public Works, 
Transportation and Commerce e) Committee for Fiscal and Credit Issues and f) Committee for 
the Methodology of the Programme.   
48 YDIA/1953/92/1/2, Tsimikalis to Trade Ministry, Bonn, 11 April 1953 and 14 April 1953.  
49 Pelt, Tying, 68-89; Despina-Georgia Konstandinatou, War debts and war criminals in Greece: 
In search for moral and material justice after the B’ World War (Athens: Alexandreia, 2015), 69-
117;371-405. 
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had ‘reversed’ the usual programme of such official visits.50 As he explained, the 
delegation had initially visited the provincial industrial regions and only in the 
end did it arrive in Bonn to sign the agreement. Indeed, all the available sources 
suggest that Markezinis arrived in Bonn in order to confirm and guarantee with 
the Federal Republic, commitments and credits for public and private projects 
agreed mainly between the Greek businessmen Voulpiotis and Bodosakis on the 
one hand, and the German companies Siemens AG, Telefunken-AEG and Alf. 
Krupp on the other.  
The pressure which had been exercised by German businesses, the Federal 
Republic and their agents in Greece is well summarized by an anonymous letter 
without recipient and date. According to this letter, the return of the 
confiscated properties to the Federal Republic and to German individuals, the 
recognition of the property rights of various confiscated companies and the 
restoration of the pre-war position of Siemens AG and Telefunken-AEG, would 
‘contribute decisively to a favourable outcome for the Greek-German trade and 
economic-political relations’.51 Indeed, the letter included the salient features 
of the agreement which had three main parts.52 The first was a protocol for the 
guarantee of the finance of the main developmental projects with DM 200 
thousand, half of which was for Ptolemais and Larymna. The second, which 
included only secret letters which were not made public and remained for some 
months hidden, envisaged the restoration of Siemens AG and Telefunken-AEG’s 
pre-war and war position and the third, consisting also of secret letters, 
promised the return of German public and private confiscated properties on 
favourable terms. As we have seen in chapter one, these developments had been 
underway at least since 1949. 
In respect to property, until the middle of 1954 these letters had had been 
translated into Law 2912/1954 which returned a number of public properties to 
the Federal Republic. At the time, the General Accounting Office had reacted to 
this concession, not only because it contradicted IARA regulations but also 
 
50 EDHK/HA/32/03294/003, Parliamentary Minutes, 24 November 1954, p. 5. 
51 KKF/KKA/431/2/19, Unsigned document, no date; KKF/KKA/431/2/15, Siemens-Halske A.G. 
and Siemens- Schuckertwerke A.G. to Siemens Greek Electrotechnical SA, Munich, 29 May 1953. 
52 KKF/KKA/3A, Agreement, Bonn, 11 November 1953, pp. 1010-12; Ibid, Protocol, Bonn, 11 
November 1953, 1013-14; Ibid, Letters between Spyros Markezinis to Ludwig Erhard, 11 
November 1953, pp. 1015-22.  
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because it had cost Greece about $1 million. This result added to the quite 
unfavourable accounts in respect of total reparations, for it had been calculated 
by the General Accounting Office that German reparations from all sources did 
not exceed $20 million while those from Italy were more than $110.53  
By March 1953 it had been agreed that 75% of the expansion plan for 
telecommunications would be covered by Siemens and Halske AG and in October 
1953 the agreement had been signed. One month later, the new agreement 
included an offer by Siemens AG for an expansion plan triple the first. Yet 
Siemens AG had proposed considerably higher prices in relation to the previous 
agreement and Voulpiotis had asked for an exceptionally high commission for his 
work.54 For radio broadcasting, the agreement now incorporated the proposals of 
Telefunken which had been rejected the previous year. Despite Markezinis 
claims to the opposite, both developments had been prepared behind the scenes 
by Voulpiotis who had cooperated with the Greek government during the whole 
agreement.55 By April 1954, Markezinis had resigned and in November he 
withdrew from the Papagos government and the ruling party, accompanied by 
twenty-seven associates and parliamentary members. As a German delegation, 
headed by Erhard, was to arrive to discuss the implementation of the 
agreement, the content of the secret letters concerning the German companies 
were revealed forcing Markezinis’ team to make this move. However, Markezinis 
still claimed that these were not binding according to international law, but 
Erhard had a different opinion.  
The issue was re-examined by Papaligouras and Erhard during the negotiations in 
Athens a few days later. During the first day of the negotiations the 
developmental plan and particularly all the main projects of Greece at the time, 
namely the Ptolemais, Larymna and the Oil refinery, were discussed. At the 
meeting, Papaligouras asked for a time extension to the agreement for 
Ptolemais and the refinery. Erhard agreed, but he simultaneously pressed for 
 
53 YDIA/1958/7/3, Protocol for Economic Cooperation, 11 November 1953; Ibid, Ludwig Erhard to 
Spyros Markezinis, 11 November 1953; YDIA/1955/23/7, Directorate General Accounting Office of 
Finance Ministry, Memo for German Properties, 13 November 1954. 
54 KKF/KPA/1955/15/1, Siemens and Halske to Spyros Markezinis, München, 7 November 1953, 
pp. 76-83; Ibid, General Comments for the proposals, 15 September 1954, pp. 108-14. 
55 KKF/KPA/1955/12/1, Parliamentary Inquiry Committee, Meeting No 9, 16 March 1955, pp. 23-
68. 
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direct assignment to German companies and not for international tenders. The 
same day, Papaligouras accepted the binding character of the secret letters and 
agreed to enforce the agreement with Siemens AG but he repeatedly asked 
Erhard to cancel the obligations attached to the letter for Telefunken-AEG 
because radio broadcasting was exclusively controlled by the US mission.56 The 
next day, the German side accepted this demand and in exchange it received, 
free or on favourable terms, the remaining confiscated public properties.57  
During 1955, Voulpiotis still mediated the interests of the German companies 
and the Greek state.58 The Siemens AG board member, Mattei, felt comfortable 
to submit a new offer to Papaligouras on the basis that the Greek market 
belonged ‘exclusively to Siemens’.59 However, the new offer was still 
considerably above international prices. Even more, Voulpiotis, who updated the 
proposals of Siemens AG asking for a high commission, and supported in his 
effort by OTE officials, pressed the government by all means available, accusing 
the vice minister of transportation of bribery because the ministry had rejected 
his proposals.60 Indeed, the transportation minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, in 
July 1955, supporting his deputy minister, rejected the offer at the last minute. 
Having distanced himself from the negotiations and Siemens’ practices, he was 
very soon appointed as Greece’s prime minister succeeding Papagos. However,  
he refused later on to acknowledge any relationship between these two 
developments.61 Evidently, the developments with Siemens AG and its 
representatives in Greece had produced a political earthquake, for Markezinis 
was considered as Papagos’ successor and Bodosakis had worked towards this 
possibility behind the scenes.62 However, subsequent developments show that 
Greek-German economic and bilateral relations continued undisturbed.  
Indeed, in September 1955 the new economic agreement between the two 
countries aimed to expand economic cooperation, including provisions for the 
 
56 YDIA/1955/23/7, Greek-German Negotiations on 17th November, Minutes, Athens, 18 
November 1954. 
57 YDIA/1955/23/7, Greek-German Negotiations on 18th November, Minutes, Athens, 19 
November 1954. 
58 KKF/KPA/1955/15/1, I. Voulpiotis to P. Papaligouras, Athens, 12 April 1955, pp. 134-5. 
59 Ibid, Minutes between Panagis Papaligouras, M. Armack and Siemens representatives, Bonn, 29 
April 1955, 136-7. 
60 KKF/KPA/1955/13/1, I. Voulpiotis to Al. Papagos, Athens, 4 August 1955.  
61 KKAFT, I, pp. 251-3.  
62 Rizas, Greek Politics, p. 146. 
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guarantee of credits beyond that of November 1953. The aim was to include not 
only big projects but also the modernization of small-scale industry, 
predominately textiles, which German businesses refused to provide credit for 
because they were considered insolvent.63 In any case, German businesses 
participated in the expansion of the OTE network and facilities by 60% and 
Siemens SA alone had signed a contract for 42% of the plan.64 Furthermore, by 4 
November 1955, the Greek government had informed the Federal government 
that it had joined IARA’s procedure for German properties.65 The next month, it 
incorporated into domestic law the London Debt Agreement on German external 
debts, signed in February 1953.66  
Representative of the shift towards German businesses and the continuity of the 
relations between the two countries was the decision to construct an oil 
refinery, the first built in Greece. On the basis of an international tender, 
published in August 1953, the construction and exploitation of the refinery, as a 
private company, had been granted to Elbyn SA which was the agent of Shell SA. 
However, with the mediation of Lavdas and Andreakos, who was director general 
of Gertsos’ Industriebau A.G. of Zurich and had travelled to the Federal Republic 
during the negotiations in November 1953, the initial decision was cancelled by 
Markezinis. By January 1955, the construction of the refinery had been granted 
to the German company Hydrocarbon GMBH.67 It was clear that German business 
interests had been consolidated. Indeed, by March 1956 German companies had 
provided credits within the framework of the November 1953 agreement for all 
the main projects which had been constructed or were under construction.68  
At the same time, the two governments had initiated preliminary discussions for 
a migration agreement. Until 1956 there was a migration agreement with 
Australia, which along with the US absorbed annually more than half of Greek 
migrants.69 The BoG had calculated that the idle labour force in 1955 was about 
 
63 YDIA/1955/23/2, Greek-German Negotiations on 19 September, Minutes, Bonn, 23 September 
1955. 
64 KKF/KPA/1955/16/2, Rapport Law, 9 July 1957, pp. 52-80.   
65 Announcement published in Official Gazette of the Greek Government, Volume 1, No 80, 6 
March 1956.   
66 Konstandinatou, War debts, p. 74. For this agreement see section four in chapter one. 
67 EDHK/HA/8/00893/007, History of Refinery, various documents. 
68 Appendix 1, table 7. 
69 Fragiadis, Greek, p. 167.   
  151 
 
 
 
 
30% of the total labour available and both demographic and employment trends 
indicated that the problem would deteriorate.70 According to the central bank, 
total annual migration covered only a portion of the annual increase of the 
labour force whereas manufacturing was not able to absorb more labour.  
Following the migration agreement signed with Italy in 1955, the Federal 
Republic had approached Greece which was always interested in resolving its 
‘imbalance’ problem in this way.71 In October 1956 the foreign ministry, on the 
grounds that bilateral economic relations had been ‘completely restored’ 
encouraged this prospect.72 However, objections had been raised by the labour 
ministry because the German side had asked for the preferential treatment of 
German citizens in Greece. Moreover, Greece’s conventional migration 
agreements with OEEC countries were based upon the most favoured nation 
clause and this posed additional problems.73 The issue did not proceed, but by 
the middle of 1957 an unspecified number of Greek miners from Belgium and 
unskilled laborers directly from Greece had flocked to the Federal Republic. 
They had arrived following the ‘myth’ of an easy access to employment but they 
had been eventually absorbed into the black market, putting additional pressure 
for a migration agreement upon the Greek government.74  
When in the middle of 1957 bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic 
resumed at ministerial level to discuss Greece’s participation in the second 
phase of European integration, it was agreed that the imbalance problem would 
be resolved with German capital inflows.75 These were divided into two 
categories. The first would finance infrastructural facilities and basic industries. 
It targeted projects of the second energy programme, mainly the Achelous 
facilities and the newly scheduled Ptolemais power plants. An extension of the 
facilities at Larymna for nickel pebbles and the production of iron from chrome 
iron ores were also discussed. Papaligouras had also shown a special interest in 
the nitrogen and the aluminium plants. For the former, an international tender 
 
70 BoG, The Greek Economy during the years 1955-1956 (Athens: BoG, 1957), pp. 211-29.   
71 YDIA/1956/10/3/2, S. Kapetanidis to Foreign Ministry, 12 October 1956. 
72 YDIA/1956/10/3/2, Foreign Ministry internal document, 3 October 1956. 
73 Ibid., Labour Ministry to Foreign Ministry, Athens, 22 November 1956. 
74 YDIA/1957/72/4, S. Kapetanidis to Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 26 July 1957. 
75 KKF/KKA/3A, Negotiation Minutes at Federal Ministry of Economic Co-operation, 7 July 1957, 
pp. 961-974.  
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had already been published and its construction was claimed by German and 
Italian companies.   
The second category included mixed Greek-German companies targeting 
primarily the Middle East markets. The interest of Izola SA for such joint 
ventures was mentioned as the prime example. At the time, Erhard was eager to 
utilise funds from the Marshall Plan to offer tax incentives to German companies 
for this purpose. From his side, Papaligouras proposed that Greece would 
provide incentives beyond the law for FDI. In the end, it was agreed that both 
sides preferred a bilateral establishment agreement to facilitate German FDI, 
rather than to wait for a solution within the OEEC.  
Unsurprisingly, during the negotiations the German side had explicitly 
conditioned the progress of the bilateral relations upon the solution of the 
remaining issues of the Nazi past.76 These issues have been examined 
analytically in the previous two chapters, namely the return of confiscated 
properties to Germans, compensation for pillage during the Nazi occupation and, 
related to this, the treatment of German war criminals. In particular, the 
Federal Republic pressed Greece to return a trademark of the confiscated 
German company Osram SA, to deal with the compensation demands from the 
war perpetrator Reemtsma of Hamburg and to resolve the issue with the war 
criminal Max Merten, arrested in Greece three months earlier.  
3.3 The response of industry to competition   
In contrast to the Federal Republic, which after 1952 accumulated surpluses on 
its external account, Greece generated persistent deficits and one reason for 
this was that domestic big businesses underutilized their productive capacity. It 
is important here to emphasize that at the time this was the analysis of both the 
central bank (BoG) and the FGI.77 Yet in 1963 it had been suggested that the low 
capacity utilization in Greek industry during the 1950s was behind the low 
productivity of big businesses, showing that this was indeed a widespread belief 
 
76 KKF/KKA/3A, Negotiation Minutes at Federal Ministry of Economic Co-operation, 7 July 1957, 
pp. 973-4.  
77 BoG, The Greek Economy during the years 1955-1956 (Athens: BoG, 1957), pp. 135-53; ‘The 
FGI Memo’, VE, June 1955, 38.   
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among state managers and businessmen.78 However, the issue has not been re-
examined. With a few but noticeable exceptions, Greek historiography has not 
considered Greek business and its relations with the state apparatus after 
1952.79 However, the analysis of corporate strategies of the big businesses 
financed by the ERP is a precondition to understand their attitudes in relation to 
European integration. Since their leaders were also the leaders of the FGI, this 
analysis allows the study to approach the origins of the federation’s European 
strategy. From the sources consulted here, it appears that underutilization was 
acute for a category of companies or sectors which had not renewed their 
mechanical equipment, like textiles and foodstuffs, although it was not 
restricted to them. Significantly, there was also a second category which 
included several big businesses which had renewed their mechanical equipment 
with the counterpart funds and could not reach the optimum level of 
production.  
3.3.1 Foodstuffs and textiles: outdated machinery, small size and the 
financial risk of new investments 
For the first category, the ROCEP had estimated that in foodstuffs, utilization in 
the canning industry in 1957 was about 35% and in the juice industry at about 
50%.80 The general picture here was that small-scale units employed outdated 
machinery and produced predominately expensive and low-quality products. 
Only additional investment and merges for the creation of large-scale units was 
considered could improve the situation. Overall, this was also the case with 
textiles81, which had suffered the most from import liberalization and this was 
true for both cotton and woollen subsectors. In early 1955, PUTI had calculated 
that the cotton industry employed about 68% of existing spindles and 75% of the 
weaving mills, calculations that had been accepted by the NBG.82 Taking as a 
basis the two eight-hour shifts, capacity utilization was 54% and 40% 
 
78 Coutsoumaris, The Morphology, pp. 302-8.  
79 Shipping industry has been considered in: Harlaftis, Greek, the Bodosakis group in: Pelt, Tying, 
and the Greek subsidiary of the French aluminium conglomerate Pechiney SA in: Kostas Kostis, 
State and Businesses in Greece: The History of ‘Aluminium of Greece’ (Athens: Polis, 2013). 
80 ROCEP, Basic Committee for Primary Production: Agricultural Industry, 5 vols (Athens, 1959), 
II, Issue 21, pp. 11-6.     
81 Appendix 1, Table 19. 
82 ‘The Issues of textile industrialists are presented’, Imerisia, 20 October 1955; NBG, 
Developments and Problems of Greek Industry: A’ Cotton Industry (NBG, June 1957), p.44. 
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respectively. The situation was even more severe in the woollen industry, where 
even big businesses with new equipment had ceased their operations.83  This 
severe underutilization had analogous consequences upon unemployment and 
textile BIAs emphasized the issue repeatedly to legitimate demands for tariff 
protection and financial support.84  This adverse trend was substantially reversed 
with the tariff and credit measures adopted in the middle of 1956 and late 1956 
respectively. In 1957, domestic production did claim 98% of the market increase 
and in 1958 about 81%.  
The underlying problem was that the textiles industry was largely 
uncompetitive. Certainly, old equipment and firm size were two factors which 
had contributed substantially to this outcome in cotton textiles.85 In cotton 
yarns, where import penetration was negligible, 25 spinning units had reached 
the optimal size and utilized 73% of the spindles. At the weaving subsector, 
where import penetration had jumped from 7% in 1952 to almost 30% in 1956, 
only six weaving units had the optimal size and utilized only 20% of the weaving 
mills. The rest was spread out in an unknown number of small family, and 
apparently uncompetitive, units which employed old and non-automatic mills.  
Yet, as the P-P paradigm illustrates, even for big textile businesses overcapacity 
was a difficult issue to deal with. P-P, the largest cotton company, did respond 
to foreign competition and in 1954 embarked on an aggressive, mainly import 
substitution, investment programme. Its primary aim was to reduce general and 
direct costs by modernizing and concentrating its production lines, expanding its 
output by 50%.86 The results of the investment programme were that in 1958 
yarn output was already 13% above the level of 1954 whereas fabrics increased 
by almost 80%. The company was able to fully utilize its engineering capacity 
but, being labour intensive and having over expanded and overdiversified, it 
 
83 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS5/FI109, A Study for Greek Woollen Industry, 10 Ιουνίου 1959; NBG, 
Developments and Problems of Greek Industry: B’ Woollen Industry (NBG, July 1960). 
84 ‘The view of Textiles for import liberalization’, Imerisia, 23 January 1955; ‘PUTI: Measures for 
the protection of Industry’, Imerisia, 15 March 1956. From liberalization until early 1955, 17,000 
workers had lost their job whereas in early 1956 textiles main federation calculated that from 
89,000 workers registered in 1943, it employed at the time only about 43,300. 
85 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS5/FI137, Considerations about Cotton Industry in Greece, 10 August 
1959, pp. 1-30; GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS5/FI547, EDFO, Study: Cotton Industry – Market conditions, 
12 March 1962, pp. 31-42. Except otherwise mentioned, import penetration is calculated by the 
author as the ratio of imports to total supply M/(P+M). 
86 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3/FI93237/SFL3, Economic and Technical Report, no date, pp. 102-8. 
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could not gain economies of scale. General costs remained at the level of the 
previous years, whereas interest payments had skyrocketed, reflecting 
increasing indebtedness and the need for credit sales. Thus, equity capital was 
40% of total liabilities in 1954, and in 1958 it was only 22%.87 Competition was a 
challenge even for price setter companies. At the cost of increasing 
indebtedness, on the eve of the decision of the FTA the P-P was regarded by 
Katsabas as ‘an industrial complex absolutely synchronized’ and able to compete 
internationally.88 
3.3.2 Consumer durables, machines and metal producing: the inability 
to emulate the first movers. 
To the second category belonged sectors which were more or less conducive to 
economies of scale, such as consumer durables, machines and metal producing. 
These sectors belonged to what has been called the Second Industrial Revolution 
and was not coincidental that they were monopolized from big businesses. The 
reasons for underutilization varied from sector to sector but responses shared 
affinities.  
For Izola SA, which produced electrical appliances, the underlying problem was 
that the low added value assembling line was almost entirely dependent upon 
imported raw materials which were all the main parts of the electrical 
appliances. In 1956 they accounted, on average, for 65% of the final price.89 This 
consumed exceptionally high amounts of working capital, translated to severe 
shortages of raw materials. The result was that capacity utilization for this 
department in the middle of 1956 was still 40% when EDFO had calculated that 
the optimum level was above 80%. For the EDFO, this had severe consequences 
because it prevented mass and continued production, increasing 
disproportionately general production costs. Upon these calculations, was 
legitimated tariff protection which totalled 62% for fridges and 100% for stoves. 
The result was that from 1955 until 1958 stove sales had increased by 286% and 
 
87 Appendix, tables 15;16. 
88 P-P, Annual Report 1956, 29 June 1957, p. 43. 
89 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3/FI32001/SFL12, Sarandopoulos Report, 28 July 1956, pp. 186-212. 
  156 
 
 
 
 
for fridges the respective increase had reached an astonishing 511%.90 Whereas 
total sales for the period 1954-1958 had doubled and direct costs followed by 
73%, general costs increased by 278%, interest payments by 224% and 
depreciation by 266%. It was evident that general costs represented increasing 
expenditures for the reorganized distribution function whereas increased 
interest payments revealed the adverse capital structure of the company on the 
one hand, and its endeavour to expand credit sales on the other.91 An important 
development here is that, whereas until early 1956, Izola SA had stuck to its 
decision to not expand due to its adverse financial position, in 1957 it initiated 
intense discussions with foreign firms, among which was Siemens AG as we have 
seen, aiming to modernize its facilities in order to respond to the FTA challenge.   
This trend was not restricted to consumer durables, but was also evident in 
machines. Technica Malkotsis SA was an infant company, financed by the ERP for 
the mass production of oil engines aiming to cover entirely domestic and 
agricultural irrigation needs. The BAA had repeatedly emphasized the need to 
increase utilization for the reduction of unit costs, but in 1954 utilization was 
about one third and this had severe financial consequences as the company did 
not repay its debts to EDFO.92 The initial problem here was that the type of 
engine produced was not of the appropriate size and quality and the ABG, the 
state-owned agricultural bank which absorbed and distributed almost the entire 
engine production, had resorted to imports. The company, encouraged by the 
CLC, improved the engine and its main shareholder repeatedly emphasized the 
need for continuous production, pressing the ABG to increase and regularize 
purchases.93  As these purchases were indeed below the optimum level of 
production, the company responded again. First, it created its own sales 
department aiming to cover the difference between the projected optimum 
production level and ABG orders. Second, in 1955 it diversified and in 
cooperation with Siemens AG, embarked upon the production of electrical 
 
90 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3/FI32001/SFL12, Report for Izola SA market, 13 November 1961, pp. 
264-271. 
91 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3/FI32001/SFL15, Various documents; Appendix 1, tables 15;16. 
92 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32013/SFL12, BAA Report No. 378, Athens, 3 December 1953, pp. 
71-84; GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32013/SFL7, National Mortgage Bank of Greece SA - 
Introductory Report, 30 April 1954, pp. 176-7.  
93 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32013/SFL2, CLC to Coordination Ministry, 4 January 1954, pp. 169-
71; Ibid., Technica Malkotsis SA to EDFO, 24 September 1954, pp. 181-7. 
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engines to cover anticipated demand due to the expansion of electrification 
which the Ptolemais project entailed. Siemens SA was thereafter the sole buyer 
and distributor of this new electric engine. Until late 1957, production had 
increased enough to reduce unit costs, but there was still ample room for 
further reduction as capacity utilization was still estimated by EDFO to be only 
50%.94 For this reason, Malkotsis’ plans were to utilize this capacity by dumping 
on Middle east markets.95  
Even more severe were the problems at heavy industry. The Steel and Tinplate 
SA (SST SA), the unique sheet steel producer in Greece, resembled almost all the 
reasons for which heavy industry was uncompetitive. To begin with, its 
mechanical equipment was imported and had been designed for bigger 
markets.96 Yet, due to financial difficulties, the firm sourced various pig iron 
qualities from different producers, adding new problems to the already 
problematic production lines. Even more, there was an obvious lack of expertise 
for such complex processes and financial difficulties to pay for foreign and 
experienced line managers. Instead, sales managers were proliferated, resulting 
to poor management and high general costs. Yet there were factors which 
increased production costs. At first place, the ECSC competitors had access to 
cheap pig iron, which accounted for more than half of total inputs.97 Equally 
important, Belgium producers were dumping the Greek market.98 The result was 
that capacity utilization was low, the output was expensive and of low quality 
and the company was accumulating debts. Indeed, equity capital from about 27% 
of total liabilities in 1952, fell to about 10% in 1957.99  Yet the EDFO 
recommended that ‘the production process is irrational and expensive because 
of the small output but in principle the process is the same as elsewhere in 
Europe’.100 Under these circumstances, in early 1957, the company was 
 
94 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32013/SFL27, EDFO Report, 25 May 1958, pp. 24-45. 
95 KKF/KKA/6A, Agricultural Ministry, Memo, 28 August 1958, pp. 635-8.  
96 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32041/SFL7, BAA Report No. 443, 18 January 1955, pp. 180-92. 
97 SST, Report of the Steel and Tinplate SA for the 1953, Piraeus, 27 June 1954; 
GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32041/SFL7, EDFO – Conclusions, 30 June 1957. 
98 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32041/SFL27, EDFO Report, 24 June 1958. 
99 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32041/SFL34, Balance Sheet 1952, p. 55; 
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encouraged by its German supplier Klockner to export to the Middle Eastern and 
Turkish markets in order to reach the optimum size.101 
Import liberalization had initially threatened the financial viability of the metal 
producing companies, which survived only because they were granted 
considerable tariff protection. The general trend here was that the Siemens-
Martin and electric arc furnaces of Halivurgiki SA and the Hellenic Steelworks SA 
could not adequately respond to the increasing needs for raw steel, whereas the 
rolling mills were underutilized. From 1955 until 1958, imported ingot inputs had 
doubled but, since available stocks were limited, scrap consumption was almost 
steady covering less than one fourth of total steel consumption with downturn 
tendencies.102 This development underlined that the structure of the steel 
industry was approaching its limits. Yet capacity utilization was about 50% for 
three eight-hour shifts but in 1958 the situation had improved significantly and 
there were already plans for new investments.103 This advanced utilization had 
positive results upon production costs. As data for the Halivourgiki SA indicate, 
average costs increased after 1953, reflecting the adverse effects of devaluation 
upon raw material prices.104 It was in 1958 that the company eventually reaped 
the benefits of advanced utilization when the output increased by 40% whereas 
average costs had declined by 23%. In any case, the downturn tendency of the 
general costs since 1953 is obvious.105 For the main steel products, the situation 
was different. Import penetration for reinforcing bars and wires was about one 
third and for sheet steel it was two thirds.106 In all cases import penetration was 
reduced mainly because tariff protection increased.107  
Protection had not always the same results for, in some cases, it discouraged the 
required modernization. Indeed, capacity utilization at manufacturing branches 
which had not renewed their mechanical equipment, such as that of screw 
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products, was disappointing.108 Here, external dis-economies were quite evident, 
for the raw material provided by internal producers was completely unsuitable. 
However, tariff protection enabled screw producers to increase market share. It 
seems that such protection did not encourage investment in the sector, for the 
EDFO had shown that their main shareholders were reluctant to invest and to 
modernize equipment which was obsolete.109 Thus, general costs and 
administrative expenses were constantly disproportionately high, underlying 
both the family character of the average Greek company and inadequate 
management.  
3.3.3 Bodosakis group: the reliance upon German technology and 
finance  
The agreement between Bodosakis and Alfried Krupp in November 1952 included 
the exploitation of Larymna mines, but since the efficient production of iron and 
iron-nickel presupposed domestic metallurgic coke, they also had preliminary 
negotiations for the Ptolemais project. At least until January 1953, the MSA had 
decided to terminate the contract with Industriebau AG and encouraged the BAA 
to explore the utilization of the loan.110 In March 1953, the BAA confirmed that 
the project was indeed ‘completely unrealistic’ and no real progress had been 
made until that time.111 The same month, Bodosakis agreed with Markezinis to 
undertake the Ptolemais facilities carrying out its own technical study, whereas 
the delivery of Larymna’s installations from Germany had already started. In May 
1953, Bodosakis agreed for Ptolemais with Krupp’s representatives in Athens, 
and in August he visited the Federal Republic for further negotiations.112 Two 
months later, he had already agreed with the government the interest rate with 
which the CLC would finance the Ptolemais project.113 As expected, the Larymna 
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and Ptolemais were the basis of the November 1953 agreement. Until May 1956 
cooperation had proceeded significantly and Bodosakis, somehow self-
complacently, stated to German journalists who had visited his companies: 
Personally, I am happy because through the still smoking ruins of the second 
world war I realized the opportunities for economic co-operation between 
our countries and I promoted it with devotion and unbending persistence. 
Thanks to German capital and the German technical assistance, important 
reconstruction projects were built in Greece, some of which you have the 
opportunity to visit today. You might have realized that four fifths of the 
machinery come from German.114 
On the eve of the decision for the FTA the relations between Bodosakis and 
Alfried Krupp were still cordial, but by June 1958 they had ‘broken’.115 The main 
reason were developments at Larymna and Ptolemais. For the former, the 
problem was that the Krupp-Renn method was not appropriate for the processing 
of Greek nickel ores alone, and thus the iron pebbles produced were not 
commercial and Krupp had refused to deliver them at reasonable prices.116 The 
attempt of Bodosakis to produce Ferro-Nickel failed and Larymna terminated its 
operations in early 1958 with almost all pebble production stocked. This 
development had a domino effect on the entire group and especially to the 
viability of Ptolemais. It was within this context that Bodosakis, as will be shown 
in chapter five, turned to the French company Le Nickel. 
Given the significance of the Ptolemais project for the whole economy, 
Bodosakis was able to press the government to improve the terms for the finance 
by the EDFO as well as for the sale of output to PPC and the Greek State 
Railways (GSR).117 Indeed, from the total cost of the project, estimated at 
$20.92 million, AEEXPL and Bodosakis would contribute only $3 million, the EDFO 
$13.83 and Alfried Krupp $4.09. The Krupp group was scheduled to furnish the 
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mechanical equipment which amounted to $14.25 million.118 The facilities 
included the extraction of raw lignite, one plant for the production of semi-coke 
for Larymna’s metallurgy and one plant for the production of briquets for the 
GSR. Half of the raw lignite extracted would be sold to PPC’s new 
thermoelectric plant at a price that essentially subsidized coke sales to Larymna 
and briquette sales to the GSR, the second and the third sources respectively.119 
Since Larymna could not absorb semi-coke, Ptolemais lost approximately one 
third of its projected revenue. As if this was not enough, the German 
installations were not able to process the Greek lignite and additional capital 
and research was needed to produce the briquets of the agreed quality. As a 
result, the GSR refused to deliver them and there were severe overruns to the 
project which Bodosakis was obliged to cover by contract.120 As expected, the 
prospects of Ptolemais were deemed to be quite ominous.121   
The situation at AEEXPL, the locomotive of the group, was not much better. The 
problem here was that even if the plants were working in full capacity supported 
by the state with the explicit aim to reach economies of scale122, the company 
was not able to cover domestic needs at reasonable prices, which were 40%-50% 
above its foreign competitors.123 The precise reasons for such inefficiency are 
not known, but BAA had calculated that devaluation, which had doubled the 
price of imported raw materials and the interest paid in foreign currency, was 
largely the cause behind the increase of 30% of the fertilizers’ unit costs after 
April 1953.124 In any case, the firm argued that only additional investments in all 
departments would improve this unfavourable situation.125 This prospect, 
however, was not plausible for the financial position of the group had 
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deteriorated significantly.126 Under these circumstances, the reliance of the 
group upon the EKP had grown. 
It has been shown in chapter one that EPK had actually been regenerated due to 
NATO orders which eventually amounted to $11 million. In the middle of 1953, 
the company received $23 million of additional orders and thus its entire output 
was absorbed by the Greek state and NATO.127 As soon as NATO terminated its 
orders to EPK, a development that threatened the devaluation of valuable assets 
that had not yet depreciated, the Greek embassy in Bonn paved the way for 
arms exports to the new member of the western war-alliance, the Federal 
Republic.128 In April 1956, the Federal government did include EPK in its 
potential suppliers, underling its significance for the bilateral economic relations 
between the two countries.129 Subsequently, the company pressed for orders and 
the issue mobilized Greek politicians and state managers at the highest level, 
including the palace.130 Certainly, Bodosakis had cordial relations with the 
palace and EKP’s board member Charalabos Potamianos was the king’s personal 
secretary.131 Yet the most senior officer of the palace, Pavlos Leloudas, was on 
the payroll of several big businesses, including the Bodosakis group.132 When 
Greece was about to report to the FTA, the EKP was still one of the three 
central themes discussed between Greece and the Federal government.133 During 
the negotiations in July 1957, mentioned above, Erhard confirmed Bonn’s 
intention for orders and in October 1957, a contract between the Federal 
ministry of defence and EPK was indeed signed.134 The company did receive 
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orders, but they were below expectations. Thus, simultaneously concrete plans 
for the joint production of cranes and gantries with Demag AG were adopted 
plus an export oriented joint venture with the German company Klockner.135  
The latter aimed to utilize AEEXPL’s sales network in the Middle East.  
Similar problems and prospects faced the wine company EEOO. This company 
had cartelized the domestic market with two companies, but it still suffered 
from underutilization and was thus obliged to reorganize its structure selling 
several plants after 1954.136 In the middle of 1956, the company, which was 
Greece’s main wine producer and exporter, had identified its viability with the 
increase of wine exports to the Federal Republic, its traditional market.137 As 
expected, wine exports were an issue always present in bilateral negotiations 
and was included in the economic agreements signed in 1954 and 1957.  
To summarize the status of big businesses in the above sectors, in many cases 
mechanical equipment was not designed to process Greek raw materials 
(Larymna-Ptolemais), and in others was designed for bigger markets, as was the 
case with the rolling mills (SST SA-Halivurgiki SA-Hellenic Steelworks SA). Yet its 
efficient operation required expertise and know-how which Greek managers 
missed (SST SA). Imported technology was not easily incorporated and, in most 
cases, machinery could be efficiently utilized only with complementary 
investments. In general, the mechanical equipment financed by the ERP was 
underutilized and all these businesses required additional investment and 
technological transfers to withstand competition and German businesses were 
the first to approach. From their side, these German businesses had their own 
interests in relation to Greece. Business groups such as Alf. Krupp, had 
accumulated funds and targeted investments abroad, making plans specifically 
for the Middle East region.138 Overall, as German business circles publicly 
claimed, they were interested in utilising the Federal budgetary and external 
surpluses for investment in underdeveloped countries.139 The reasons which had 
informed the German endeavours for such expansion were the same as the pre-
 
135 KKF/KKA/6A, Memo of the Greek Government, Athens, 14 August 1958, pp. 501-9.  
136 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS6/FI15, EEOO, Ioniki Report, 4 August 1956, pp. 14-7.  
137 Ibid., EEOO Information, 4 April 1956, pp. 12-3. 
138 YDIA/1956/15/2, Tsimikalis to Trade Ministry, Bonn, 21 March 1956.  
139 ‘A German plan for underdeveloped countries’, OT, 6 June 1957.  
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1945 era.140 As it was publicly claimed, along the pressure for the utilization of 
the accumulated surpluses, the economic development of backward countries 
promised that they would be able to supply raw materials and energy to the 
Federal Republic and in turn to import capital goods. State support was 
indispensable for the realization of these objectives. Following the July 1957 
agreement, the Greek embassy at Bonn informed that the Federal government 
enabled the unlimited exportation of investment capital and was also eager to 
finance businesses abroad on the condition that German participation was above 
50%.141 From its side, the FGI was positive about German credits because the 
creation of the ‘Common ‘Market’ and the FTA required the renewal and 
modernization of Greek businesses, and the federation suggested its members 
take advantage of this opportunity.142 Certainly, there were projects which had 
already materialized within this framework. In early August, Viamax SA, an 
importer of German cars to Greece since the inter-war period, announced that it 
had agreed to assemble ‘Mercedes’ buses and cars in Athens.143 It was a period 
that the need for the intensification of German capital and technology inflows 
due to European integration was widely acknowledged. Indeed, Zolotas was very 
soon analysing at Düsseldorf the prospects of the Greek economy and called 
German businessmen to invest in Greece providing capital and 
entrepreneurship.144  
In the majority of the businesses discussed, beyond their modernization, a wider 
market was also necessary. As a rule, overcapacity could be ameliorated with 
additional demand coming either from agricultural income and state purchase 
within a protected environment or potentially from the Middle East markets. All 
manufacturing sectors were interested in the internal market but a crucial part 
of big business considered that an additional solution was the cooperation with 
German industry targeting mainly the Middle East markets. This endeavour 
would substantiate the accumulation strategy pursued by the FGI since the 
1920s.   
 
140 Gross, Export Empire,pp. 253-72.  
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143 ‘Viamax’, Eleftheria, 6 August 1957. 
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3.3.4 Cement companies: the champion 
But there was another sector which had successfully implemented this 
accumulation strategy. Indeed, for the two cement industries, namely AGET SA 
and Titan SA, which by agreement still shared the internal market, there is a 
different story to tell. Both were shielded from foreign competition due to high 
transportation costs and the raw materials were internally available, except for 
oil. Thus, they were able to take advantage of a rapidly growing internal 
demand, which for the period discussed had increased by 122%. For the EDFO 
and the companies, this demand led growth was attributable to both internal 
and external markets. Internal demand was clearly based upon the building 
boom and the public infrastructure works.145 Exports, boosted initially by NATO 
orders and then by the growing needs of Middle East states and Turkey, 
increased fivefold in 1952 and until 1955 they accounted for one fifth of internal 
production.146 Thereafter exports showed a downturn tendency, but they still 
had a substantial role to play. For example, Titan SA dumped surplus cement 
production on these markets to retain full capacity utilization.147 Certainly, 
cement had substantiated the corporate strategy promoted by the FGI.  
Driven by such a demand, both companies were able not only to fully utilize 
their engineering capacity, but there were times that they struggled to meet 
such a demand. The result was that their unit costs did not follow the tempo of 
input price increases. Thus, Titan SA for the period 1952-1954 increased its 
production by 36% and unit costs increased by 25% when oil inputs had doubled, 
and costs had absorbed the exchange differences affecting loans in foreign 
currency due to devaluation. The benefits of full utilization became apparent in 
1958, when input prices had been stabilized. During this year, the output of 
Titan SA increased by 10% whereas its unit costs declined by 13%.   
 
145 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS6/FI1011, Technoeconomic Report – ‘TITAN’, Athens, 2 May 1955, pp. 
44-81. 
146 AGET SA, Fiscal Year 1954, 5 May 1955.  
147 GR/PIOP FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32004/SFL16, Report for ‘TITAN’, Athens, 14 June 1957, pp. 9-12. 
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3.3.5 The newcomers: FDI and the repatriation of shipping capital 
Meanwhile, the Greek owned merchant fleet, adopting primarily a low-cost flag 
of convenience and building its ships at low cost because of mass orders, was 
able to take advantage of the boom in international sea-borne transport and to 
become among the biggest fleets internationally.148 Many prominent Greek 
shipowners were interested in investing in Greece with privileges beyond those 
offered by the law 2687/1953, aiming to back their international activities. It is 
during the period discussed in this part, that a new business bloc emerged 
concentrated around this inward-looking faction of Greek shipping capital. As it 
will become clear in the next chapters, this business faction actively backed 
Greece’s European strategy.  
It is true that despite the efforts to attract FDI such investments were limited, 
until the application to the EEC for association in the middle of 1959. The 
coordination ministry had received 105 applications which proposed total 
investments amounting to $76.3 million.149 It had accepted 33 applications and 
until the end of 1958 about $12.4 million had been invested in the industry in 
the form of FDI taking advantage of the law 2687/1953.150 In addition, some 
investments had been granted additional incentives beyond those provided by 
this law, the most important of which were two contracts with prominent Greek 
shipowners.151 The first was for the Greek airlines and was signed with Aristotle 
Onassis in 1956.  
The second concerned the shipyard at Skaramagas. Discussions for its 
construction had started in 1954 and in September 1956 Stavros Niarchos signed 
a contract with concessions beyond the law for FDI.152 It was an effort towards 
the vertical integration of the shipping industry and, for the state, the 
construction of the Hellenic Shipyards SA was significant, as it was a greenfield 
investment to a sector defined by the plan as strategic. Moreover, it adopted 
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ties with prominent businessmen at the time as the initiative had been 
undertaken with Stratis Andreadis, a shipowner and the leader of the Greek 
Shipowners' Association (GSU), who was the vice president of the shipyard. 
Among its board members figured Nikolaos Vlangalis, with stakes in the Power 
group, and Alexandros Tsatsos, the ex-president of the FGI.153 This was the 
initial core of this new business faction. 
Importantly, when Papaligouras discussed the increase of German credits with 
Erhard in September 1955, the German finance minister had asked for 
guarantees by the Greek state for the construction of ships from German 
shipyards. Papaligouras’ answer was negative, mentioning, however, that there 
were already negotiations for the building of four ships in German shipyards 
worth $10 million, and that ‘The Greek merchant shipping could absorb 
unlimited credits.’154 These Greek-German business relations were expanded to 
internal activities. Niarchos had decided that the main dock of the new shipyard 
would be constructed by the German company ‘Collonwerke’.155 In addition, in 
early 1957 Niarchos and Andreadis agreed with Alfried Krupp for a survey to 
explore the terms and the feasibility of an iron metallurgy plant capable of 
supplying the shipyard, the domestic steel plants and even to make exports.156 
The first results were announced by Alfried Krupp himself in the middle of May 
1957 in Athens, on his way to the Middle East where he was making plans for 
economic penetration.157 At his meetings with the government and businessmen, 
he defended the viability of the iron metallurgy and discussed the extension of 
the facilities at Ptolemais and Larymna.158 Certainly, the plans were serious and 
the shipyard along with the ‘iron-metallurgy’ were presented by Andreadis at 
the General Assembly of the GSU in the middle of 1957 as ‘exceptionally 
encouraging’ moves of ‘Greek Shipping.’159 This is important, because, as we will 
see in the next chapter, it was precisely the time that business and the 
government were preparing to report on Greece’s participation to FTA. Until 
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late 1957, Alfried Krupp had reported quite positively on the feasibility of the 
blast furnace but Demag AG and the US company Koppers International Ltd, now 
made their own plans.160  
3.4 Conclusion 
It has been argued in this chapter that import liberalization and the law for FDI 
had alarmed business circles and notably the FGI, which subsequently intensified 
efforts to adapt and shape industrial policy and planning. Very soon, this effort 
was culminated in the provision of investment incentives and credit easing firstly 
to provincial industry and, when the issue of the FTA emerged, at the national 
level. This was a response to European integration and was thus part of Greece’s 
substantive European strategy. In addition, under the pressure of the proposed 
FTA and the insistence of the FGI, state-business relations bounced back to an 
organizational scheme which resembled the structure and competencies of the 
Reconstruction Organization and the ASA. 
This period was also important for the consolidation of Greek-German economic 
relations. The resignation of Markezinis in 1954 highlights both the significance 
and the problems attached to this rapprochement. It was confirmed that Greek 
businessmen, recapitulating upon pre-existing relations with German businesses 
and state agencies, had the decisive role in the conclusion of the November 1953 
agreement. The agreement opened the road to the strengthening of bilateral 
relations between the two countries and, during the following years, Greece 
attempted to resolve the imbalance problem within this bilateral framework: on 
the one hand with capital and technology inflows, appropriate for industrial 
development and modernization due to increasing European competition and, on 
the other, with the attempt to export labour surpluses. 
The endeavour for German capital and technology inflows is understood 
considering the main businesses financed by the ERP. In the first place, the turn 
to German business was true even for textiles, which were struggling with 
underutilization and low competitiveness mainly due to small unit size and 
obsolete equipment. In September 1955, there was an endeavour from 
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Papaligouras to persuade the Federal Republic to guarantee credits to these 
units. At the same time, the leader of the cotton sub-sector was able to 
modernize because it did not require cutting edge technology, though this was 
made at the cost of increasing indebtedness. For the big businesses which 
belonged to the Bodosakis group and to other key sectors conducive to 
economies of scale, such as metal using, and which required the incorporation of 
recent technological innovations to overcome underutilization, the pressure for 
modernization was intense. As a rule, in cooperation with state agencies, they 
turned to German industry aiming not only to modernize but also to export to 
Middle Eastern markets which were also targeted by German big businesses. Last 
but not least, the emerging business faction around shipping capital had also 
adopted ties with German industry at a crucial time with respect to Greece’s 
decision for an FTA. Importantly, this faction was interested in privileged FDI, 
challenging the existing status in manufacturing. As will be argued in the next 
chapter, these developments are crucial for the evaluation of the attitudes of 
big businesses and the formulation of Greece’s European strategy. 
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 From the abolition of import restrictions to 
the acceptance of scheduled tariff reduction  
The first section follows the developments from early 1953 until the middle of 
1955, when businesses and state agencies intensified efforts for tariff protection 
as the only way to protect domestic industry, rejecting any initiative for tariff 
disarmament independently of its origin, be that within the GATT or the OEEC. 
Instead, they pursued the upward revision of the customs tariffs whereas import 
liberalization was supported only by importers and the liberal business faction, 
represented by Alexandros Tsatsos within the FGI. When the US rejected 
demands within the GATT for unilateral tariff reductions, Greece, as part of its 
European strategy, adopted a set of alternative measures for industrial 
protection.  
The second section examines the first domestic reactions to the plans of the Six 
to go ahead with a customs union and to the subsequent endeavour within OEEC 
to specify the terms under which all its members would be associated with the 
Six within a wider Free Trade Area (FTA). It is clear that the Greek government 
followed the cautious stance for tariff reduction as defined in 1953. The 
alternative of the Eastern bloc was not feasible not only for political reasons but 
there were also economic difficulties. The PUTI feared Eastern dumping and, 
more importantly, exports to the USSR presupposed the importation of 
mechanical equipment which was supplied predominately by the Federal 
Republic. In contrast, the FGI, led by the liberal business faction until early 
1956, had supported the initiative of the Six and called on the business 
community to prepare for the imminent reduction of tariff walls. Meanwhile, the 
trade deficit was growing again, and the BoG had identified that Greece’s low 
productivity was the real cause of this development.     
The next section is preoccupied with the examination of the circumstances 
under which the decision of Greece to join the FTA took place in June 1957. It is 
clear that the government was cautious and actually not prepared for the 
developments in Europe which came mostly as a surprise thus from early 1957 
the coordination of Greece’s response took place within the BoG. The central 
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bank examined the issue closely and argued that exclusion would further inhibit 
already low productivity. Within this framework were formed committees with 
the participation of representatives of the big businesses within each sector 
which reported on the prospect of the FTA. The traditional business sectors 
asked for extensive safety clauses whereas the liberal faction asked the 
government to accelerate the process. Eventually, Greece’s formal European 
strategy was an updated version of Kouklelis’ report of 1949 within the Council 
of Europe.   
The last section, capitalizing upon the previous chapter, shows that economic 
and commercial relations with the Federal Republic was a catalyst for the 
decision to go ahead and participate in an FTA. Beyond this, it is claimed that 
the real strategy was not the negotiation position of Greece alone but, instead, 
it included the adaption of the protection regime. In this way, it elaborates on 
the double fold character of Greece’s European strategy visible only through 
state-business relations. 
4.1 The interplay between tariffs and quotas (April 1953 – late 
1954)  
4.1.1 The PTC and the traditional business sectors  
Immediately after import liberalization the FGI reassured its members by 
guaranteeing that finance minister Konstantinos Papayannis intended to defend 
himself within the Permanent Tariff Committee (PTC) the need for appropriate 
tariff protection.1 Evidence show that this committee, established back in 1910 
for the revision of the customs tariff at the time, played a substantive role in 
the formulation of Greece’s commercial and European policies. Indeed, the 
finance ministry called PTC to revise the outdated customs tariff in order to 
protect the infant and developing industries. The final declared aim was to 
protect the ‘national’ capital and ‘national’ labour.2 Simultaneously, the finance 
ministry underlined Greece’s international commitments and the FGI urged its 
members to submit to the PTC all the data upon which the delegation at GATT 
 
1 GR/NBGHA/33/10/1/10, FGI Circular 1250, Athens, 30 April 1953.  
2 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Konstantinos Papayiannis to Permanent Tariff Committee, Athens, no date. 
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would be based for the relevant negotiations.3 However, while Greece was 
rapidly moving towards tariff protection, the trend both globally and within 
Europe was in the opposite direction. The foreign ministry was informed that the 
lowering of the tariff burden was the aim of the revised France plan within the 
GATT and of the Low Tariff Club proposals within the Council of Europe.4  
Greece reacted to both these plans vigorously and the Permanent Tariff 
Committee (PTC) was the institution that framed this position. For the 
committee, all the sources of pressure for tariff disarmament were treated as 
‘identical’ and the respective plans were rejected out of hand.5 In respect to 
GATT, the most favoured nation clause was questioned because it had brought 
negotiations to a deadlock. As far as Europe was concerned, the PTC insisted 
that it was an antinomy to ask Greece to reduce its tariff level for industrial 
products when the other, highly industrialized European states, did not reduce 
quotas and other barriers for their agricultural imports. In addition, the 
committee concluded, Greece’s negotiation position had been undermined due 
to her unilateral import liberalization. Importantly, this was to become Greece’s 
permanent commercial policy which informed its European strategy. The 
consideration of business attitudes within PTC can cast light upon its roots and, 
in this respect, it is clear that the pressure for tariff protection was quite strong 
and came initially from textiles and the metal producing/using companies.  
The PUTI, which represented mainly cotton industrialists, deployed its business 
strategy in two memos to PTC.6 Clearly, its arguments resembled FGI’s policy 
from 1945 until the middle of 1952. The major textile association justified its 
demands to PTC on the familiar basis that production costs were exceptionally 
high in Greece. It argued that this unfavourable state of affairs was not 
attributable to irrational firm organization rooted in industrialists themselves 
but, instead, despite the difficulties posed by the state, the cotton industry was 
able to produce textiles of advanced quality. For PUTI, inefficiency had two 
roots. First, it was attributable to the exigencies of a small domestic economy, 
exacerbated by inconsistent state policies. Second, it was the productivity gap, 
 
3 GR/NBGHA/33/10/1/10, FGI Circular 1648, Athens, 5 June 1953  
4 YDIA/1953/75/6/1, N. Hatzivasiliou to Foreign Ministry, Geneva, 10 June 1953. The revised 
France plan was supported by the US, Canada, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Denmark. 
5 YDIA/1953/75/6/1, P. Papatsonis Memo, Athens, 15 June 1953.  
6 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, PUTI to PTC, Athens, 4 May 1953 and 4 June 1953.  
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responsibility for which was the unskilled labour force. Thus, on the one hand, 
the small internal market forced industrial units to over-diversify to increase 
capacity utilization. For this reason, they could neither standardize production 
nor adopt mass production methods. This deficiency was estimated to add 15% to 
final prices. Yet it invoked the familiar basis of business demands: parafiscal 
charges, inefficient machinery and energy supplies, as well as high interest rates 
which all added 18.7% to final costs. On the other hand, relatively high wages 
for unskilled labour and the labour productivity gap, accounted for 31.5% of the 
price differentials. For these reasons, invoking the necessity to protect employed 
labour, the balance of payments and the regular supply of the armed forces, the 
PUTI asked for compensatory tariffs ranging from 60% for cotton yarns to even 
more than 100% for cotton fabrics. Identical arguments were utilized by the 
representatives of the woollen subsector.7 The two-metal producing companies 
did not use different justifications for their own demands although they 
emphasized even more the limited internal market.8 Because they were capital-
intensive companies, they underlined that their potentiality for mass and 
standardized production had made the need for the protection of the internal 
market imperative. The same argument was also deployed by metal using 
companies.9 The common denominator of all BIAs was the justification of their 
demands with the phrase national industry, underlying the significance of 
protection as the solution to the problem of surplus population.  
During the consideration of the above demands within the PTC there emerged a 
number of issues, two of which are important here.10 The first was the necessity 
to keep in balance the protection of domestic, intermediate goods suppliers 
which were usually internal monopolies, with the needs of the companies that 
utilized them. As a rule, decisions were biased towards internal producers and 
the problem was essentially perpetuated. In some cases, such as for sheet steel 
and concrete reinforcing bars, it was met with patchy measures. For example, 
substantive tariff reductions for these goods were applied only when they were 
 
7 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, UWI to PTC, Athens, 22 June and 29 October 1953; Ibid., UWFI to PTC, 
Athens, 22 April 1953 and 20 May 1953.  
8 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Hellenic Steelworks SA and Halivurgiki SA to Finance Ministry, Athens, 14 May 
1953. 
9 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, UII to Finance Ministry, Athens, 7 May 1953; Izola SA to Finance Ministry, 20 
May 1953 
10 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, PTC minutes, various dates. 
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exclusively utilized as inputs by domestic manufacturers. The second issue was 
that business demands collided with Greece’s international commitments within 
the GATT. 
4.1.2 The dual retreat 
Within the GATT ‘the government and all business circles’ vigorously defended 
tariff protection, utilizing the familiar principles for the protection of capital 
and labour within industry.11 The corresponding argument was twofold. First, it 
was argued that the abolition of quotas had exposed industry to a great danger 
because the customs tariff was still predominately specific and thus it could not 
adjust to devaluation which had doubled import values automatically. For this 
reason, it adopted a number of measures for the protection of the whole 
industry and particularly for textiles and for iron and steel products.12 Second, it 
was claimed that the concessions of the bounded tariffs, made at Annecy and 
Torquay, had been granted under exceptional political and economic 
circumstances. Furthermore, some of these items were now produced 
domestically from newly created industries. For these reasons, almost all 
concessions were assessed by the finance ministry as disproportionately 
cumbersome and ill-compensated. On these grounds, the government, in close 
cooperation with the FGI and ACCI representatives, attempted to renegotiate 
the concessions beyond the GATT rules. However, under pressure from the US 
government, it was obliged to retreat, conforming with the organization’s 
regulations.13  
Under the leadership of Alexandros Tsatsos, the FGI backed import 
liberalization, facilitating Papagos government to stick to the core of the 
commercial policy applied. Concrete results had further legitimized this policy. 
The FTRAD, assessing the first year of liberalization in the middle of 1954, had 
shown that, until that time, the basic indices had been improving. It firmly 
 
11 GATT/L/117, Article XXVIII, Views of the Government of Greece, 1 September 1953.   
12 YDIA/1953/75/6/4, P. Papatsonis to the Minister of Finance, Number 1, Geneva, 20 October 
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13 YDIA/1953/75/6/3, US Embassy to Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 12 September 
1953; GATT/L/150, Proposal to Prolong the assured life of the Schedules, Memorandum 
submitted by the Greek Delegation, 30 September 1953; YDIA/1954/112/4/1-2, P. Papatsonis to 
Palamas, 28 January 1954.   
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stated that devaluation had restored external accounts whereas liberalization 
had encouraged industrial production and rationalized the internal market.14 
With such results and the support of the FGI, it was easy to close the door to any 
thoughts of import restrictions. As expected, efforts for the renewal of the 
customs tariff intensified.  
The new effort took place simultaneously with the consultations for GATT’s 
statute renewal at the organizations’ ninth session. Greece’s strategy was again 
formulated within the PTC.15 It was again quite cautious and it attempted to 
renew the customs tariff without providing compensations to interested parties. 
Its demands were not supported by the underdeveloped states, with which 
Greece had formed an alliance, because these had other priorities since they 
were protected by quotas.16 Yet, the State Department promised sympathetic 
consideration and flexibility for the re-negotiations of the bounded items, but it 
explicitly ruled out any possibility for the withdrawal of the bounded tariffs 
without compensation.17 Again, the delegation was obliged to step back. 
4.1.3 The questioning of trade Liberalization 
As this first round of negotiations within GATT had not had the anticipated 
results, second thoughts for import liberalization surfaced. In any case, the 
delegate at OEEC in October 1953 had declared that because Greece was still a 
structural debtor within the EPU, the abolition of quotas was of an 
‘experimental nature’.18 In April 1954, Greece was officially exempted by the 
OEEC Council from the common obligations of liberalization and it could 
thereafter suspend the measures already adopted.19 Meanwhile, demands for the 
slowing down of liberalization were coming from different directions.  
 
14 GR/BOGHA/A5/S1/Y7/F14, FTRAD Memo, Athens, 26 July 1954.   
15 YDIA/1954/112/4/1-2, Handwritten letter, P. Papatasonis to Liatis, 3 July 1954.  
16 YDIA/1954/111/7, N. Hatzivasiliou to Foreign Ministry, 4 August 1954. An attached memo gives 
some details for two unofficial meetings of this subgroup with GATT’s secretariat.  
17 YDIA/1954/112/3, Cryptographic Telegram 232, N. Hatzivasiliou to Foreign Ministry, 24 
November 1954; Cryptographic Telegram 12042, Stefanopoulos to Washington Embassy, 26 
November 1954; Cryptographic Telegram 297, Ath. Politis to Foreign Ministry, 29 November 1954.  
18 OEEC, Council Minutes of the 231st Meeting, Paris, 29-30 October 1953.    
19 OEEC, Council Decision C(54)110 (Final), Paris, 28 May 1954.  
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Following the resignation of coordination minister Markezinis in April 1954, the 
Currency Committee member, Zolotas, anxious by the first ominous signs of 
liberalization upon the level of imports, proposed to the prime-minister 
‘administrative measures’ that could ‘de facto’ halt them indirectly.20 However, 
the direct confrontation of import liberalization came from textiles. In the 
middle of December 1953, the PUTI sent a memo to the commerce ministry 
declaiming against the ‘catastrophic dogma’ of import liberalization, implying 
that it was deliberately imposed upon Greece by the US to destroy her industry. 
Nevertheless, cotton industrialists did not publicly propose a concrete 
alternative but they highlighted that the main side effect of liberalization was 
the importation of unemployment.21 A few days later, the main textile BIAs 
formed an unofficial alliance against import liberalization which was the first 
direct and open challenge to it. 22 This development signalled a bitter public 
dispute within the business community that was not restricted to industry and 
commerce alone as was the case in 1950. This time it was the clash between 
industrial BIAs, almost on all fronts, which also came to the fore. Indeed, the 
FGI’s proposals were in the opposite direction from the PUTI’s demands.  
In late February 1954, the FGI president, Alexandros Tsatsos, had underlined 
that although quantitative restrictions had boosted industrial output in the past, 
they had also undermined industry’s basic terms of development. On the one 
hand, domestic industry, being almost entirely shielded from foreign 
competition by quotas, had accepted charges which had substantially increased 
production costs whereas the state had neglected to adapt the customs tariff. 
On the other hand, precisely because industry was exclusively an internal issue, 
industrialists were educated to orient production almost exclusively towards the 
internal market.23 No doubt, these claims were updated versions of arguments 
already underlined by Alexandros Tsatsos just a few days before the 
announcement of liberalization.24  
 
20 GR/BOGHA/A2/S3/Y4/F1, Zolotas Report to General Papagos, 19 April 1954.   
21 ‘With a new Memo to the Minister of Commerce’, Imerisia, 15 December 1953.  
22 ‘Meeting between representatives of depended industries and woollen-textile Industrialists’, 
Imerisia, 20 January 1954.  
23 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1953 (Athens: FGI, 1954), pp. 7-14, 19-20 and 73-6. 
24 ‘The Report of Al. Tsatsos for the proceedings of the FGI for the year 1952’, VE, April 1953, 
13-9. 
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At the Chambers’ conference in May 1954, he elaborated the conclusions 
following from the above analysis, leaving no room for misinterpretations in 
respect to FGI’s position toward import liberalization. In front of the whole 
business community, Alexandros Tsatsos argued that liberalization had situated 
domestic industry within the international framework of production and 
productivity, exposing it to international competition and to cost/quality 
comparisons. This development dictated the equalization of the, exceptionally 
high, domestic production costs to those prevailing internationally.  
This equalization, continued the FGI president, presupposed the activation of 
both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ factors.25 The former referred to external 
factors, mainly the state, and the latter to industrialists themselves. The 
principal objective factor was the state’s action aiming to eliminate the 
determinants of high production costs, which were familiar demands of the 
business community since 1945: capital scarcity and high interest rates, high 
parafiscal charges, high insurance contributions and obsolete mechanical 
equipment. The major subjective factor, emphasized by an FGI president in the 
post-war era for the first time, pointed directly to industrialists themselves and 
to what Alexandros Tsatsos called irrational firm organization. In this respect, 
Alexandros Tsatsos argued that import liberalization required industrialists’ 
‘active adaptation’ to the new circumstances, rather than their ‘passive 
contemplation’, because the latter was the practice that had accompanied 
import restrictions in the past and was proved to be ‘painful’ to the basic terms 
of industrial development. However, the FGI did not denounce tariff protection. 
Instead, for the federation, the internal market was the basis of domestic 
industry and thus a revised compensatory custom tariff, within Greece’s 
international commitments, was necessary to compensate for the handicaps of 
Greek industry. The renewed customs tariff had to be supplemented by anti-
dumping legislation and, importantly, with intensified public procurement. 
Implicit to FGI’s analysis was that the internal market was small and, among 
other things, prohibited industrial establishments from developing mass 
production lines. In this way, Alexandros Tsatsos had derived the necessity for 
exports and asked the government to extend the drawback right and to return 
 
25 ‘The speech of FGI’s President Al. Tsatsos’, in ACCI, First Conference, pp. 60-1 (60). 
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insurance charges for exported manufactures. Beyond this, he reiterated the 
responsibility of industrialists to find themselves export outlets for their 
products. Clearly, as it became evident at the Chambers’ conference, the FGI 
was closer to importers’ position, represented by the ACCI and the Athens 
Traders Association (ATA), rather than to the position of industrialists 
represented by the PUTI.26 Not surprisingly, the latter had refuted one month 
earlier the core FGI arguments, asking for a ‘circumspect and well controlled 
import system’.27 The common denominator between the two industrial BIAs was 
now reduced to the necessity of reducing the production costs by the state. 
Certainly, when the PUTI repeated these demands at the conference, the rift 
with the FGI was communicated to the whole business community.28  
4.1.4 A first warning and the exemption 
As soon as Greece was forced to comply with GATT’s rules for the revision of its 
customs tariff, the leading European economies had already embarked upon 
export led development which checked overproduction tendencies providing 
export outlets beyond the national borders. As expected, once France had 
rejected the European Defence Community in the summer of 1954, the Low 
Tariff Club returned within OEEC insisting this time to connect the proposed 
extension of the Code of Liberalization with scheduled tariff reductions. 
Considering also the renewed Beyen plan submitted in early 1955 to the Six 
which culminated in the creation of the EEC, the pressure upon Greece for tariff 
disarmament was incrementally transferred from the global to the regional 
level. In January 1955, the OEEC Council considered at ministerial level the 
reduction of the barriers to trade including agricultural products. At this 
meeting, coordination minister Papaligouras repeated the position elaborated by 
the PTC in the middle of 1953. He argued that, although Greece had been 
exempted from reducing quantitative restrictions, it was the most liberalized 
country within the organization. It was emphasized that Greece was determined 
to maintain liberalization by ‘all possible means’.29 However, he added that 
 
26 ‘The speech of ACCI’s president, D. Konstandinou, in ACCI, First Conference, pp. 50-3. 
27 ‘The Accountability PUTI’s Board of Directors’, Imerisia, 4 and 5 April 1954.  
28 ‘The speech of PUTI’s president, St. Tegopoulos, in ACCI, First Conference, pp. 117-21. 
29 OEEC, Council Minutes of the 270th Meeting, 13-14 January 1955, 
<http://archives.eui.eu/fonds/173983?item=OEEC.C-M-53> [accessed 3 January 2016].   
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industrial countries had not liberalized agricultural imports, and their demand 
for a more liberal tariff policy for industrial goods violated the principle of 
reciprocity which supposedly guided the organization’s action. Certainly, 
Papaligouras clarified that Greece would discuss any proposal for tariff reduction 
only after it had made certain modifications to her customs tariff.30 Indeed, the 
OEEC Council exempted Greece from any obligation to reduce tariffs.  
4.1.5 The FGI and BoG defend liberalization and define the adaptation 
of the protection regime 
Meanwhile, the developments within GATT in late 1954 had alarmed industry 
once more. The PUTI had already led consecutive meetings of almost all textile 
BIAs, which since the middle of 1954 were gathering data for import penetration 
and its consequences upon capital and employed labour.31 During the first days 
of December 1954, almost all textile BIAs were officially united against the 
‘fatal danger’ of import liberalization.32 These developments very soon 
culminated in a memo sent to Papaligouras.33 Textile representatives calculated 
import penetration for the whole sector and based upon these data, they asked 
without reservations, for the re-introduction of import quotas for all textiles 
produced domestically. As if they were sure that this could not happen, they 
added to their demands double tariff protection and the introduction of high 
import advances. The FMTI, dominated also by textile industrialists, backed this 
move immediately, employing identical arguments.34 For all these industrial 
BIAs, the likely effects of protection upon the balance of payments and 
employed labour were the core arguments. Certainly, the priority was the 
internal market and import substitution policies.35  
This insistence upon the restriction of liberalization made the rift between 
industrial BIAs even bigger. Even if the FGI president recognized the necessity 
for reasonably high tariff protection to compensate for high domestic costs, in 
 
30 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Memo for the Custom’s Tariff revision, Athens, 10 January 1955. 
31 ‘Industrialists’ Unions Telegrams’, Imerisia, 12 November 1954.  
32 ‘Tomorrow the meeting of PUTI’, Imerisia, 6 December 1954.  
33 ‘Perspectives of the Textile industrialists for the issue of import liberalization’, Imerisia, 23 
January 1955.  
34 ‘The FMTI’s view’ Imerisia, 29 January 1955; ‘Import Liberalization’, Imerisia, 11 February 
1955.  
35 ‘PUTI proceedings’, Imerisia, 5, 6 April 1955.  
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March 1955 he again made it clear that the reintroduction of import quotas was 
‘regression towards a closed economy’ which was not in the interest of the 
business community.36 Instead, the preconditions for industrialists to do their 
duty, which simply meant to orient themselves toward the international market, 
had matured. The FGI was in turn in substantive agreement with Zolotas, who 
had, meanwhile, been appointed by Papagos as the BoG’s governor. Indeed, in 
the first annual review of the BoG, Zolotas emphasized the necessity for 
industrial exports because the domestic market was small, and inventories were 
already abnormally high.37 As far as protection was concerned, the governor 
clarified that import liberalization had rationalized a number of companies, but 
he supported the reasonable protection of domestic production and especially of 
infant industries not only because foreign companies operated within advanced 
economic environments but also for balance of payments reasons. Indeed, 
payment accounts for 1954 had been eventually balanced only because the 
government had adopted restrictive measures and invisibles had significantly 
gained from devaluation. Zolotas’ fears in April 1954 for the level of imports 
were confirmed as imports had grown even faster than exports and the trade 
deficit had increased by more than 50% for this year.  
By late 1954 commercial policy was at a crossroads. As the expectations for an 
extensive revision of the customs tariff had not been fulfilled, the pressure for 
the re-introduction of import quotas naturally grew. The FGI’s position was a 
catalyst for the coherence of an internal bloc that publicly supported the 
continuation of the core of Greece’s commercial policy towards OEEC countries. 
Variations were evident in respect to tariff policy, though the FGI and the BoG 
had converged upon the necessity for a reasonable level of tariff protection 
within the formal obligations of Greece. Indeed, these were the main principles 
of the committee for the revision of the customs tariff.38 This alliance between 
the federation and the central bank guaranteed that the subsequent re-structure 
of the internal protection regime could relieve the pressure of competition on 
hardcore protectionists, represented mainly by the PUTI and FMTI which had 
 
36 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1954 and 1955 (Athens: FGI, 1956), p. 14. 
37 BOG, Bank of Greece Governor’s Annual Report for the year 1954 (Athens, 1955), pp. 16-9. 
38 GR/ELIA/IFA/UM, Customs Tariff Revision Committee to Finance Ministry, Athens, 31 March 
1955. 
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deep roots both within PTC and the Greek delegation, without simultaneously 
endangering Greece’s international commitments.  
This re-structure, another prime example of the way that state-business 
interaction had defined Greece’s post-war main economic policies, was 
extensive and took place within less than half a year. Beyond the undergoing 
tariff revision, a number of non-tariff barriers were updated including import 
advances, antidumping legislation and public procurement.  
To begin with, in the middle of February 1955, amid increasing tensions between 
Athens Trade Association and ACCI on the one hand and PUTI on the other, 
import advances for manufacturing, ranging from 10% to 50% of their CIF value 
were introduced.39 By October 1956, import advances for many products, such as 
textiles, had reached 100%. This measure was utilized as a substitute for tariff 
protection at least for the following two decades. The law for antidumping had 
first been discussed in December 1953, ratified in March 1954 and implemented 
in early 1955.40 The FGI’s vice president, who participated in the committee 
responsible for the evaluation of the applications, had attached primary 
importance upon antidumping. Following the federation’s familiar 
argumentation since the pre-war era for the development of industry in Europe, 
he insisted that the real cause of dumping was the endeavour of Western 
industries to dispose their ‘surplus production’ abroad at low prices, 
compensated by ‘economies of scale’ reaped internally.41  
Moreover, public procurement was upgraded.42 In the middle of 1955, the 
industrial ministry clarified both the objectives and means of the law, leaving no 
doubt that it was a response to imported competition and part of Greece’s 
European substantive strategy compatible with the FGI’s vision: 
We wish to underline the beneficial effects of full capacity utilization of the 
country’s industrial units upon the rapid increase of national income, the 
 
39 ‘‘The ‘controlled import liberalization’ is established’’, Imerisia, 17 February 1955. 
40 ‘Antidumping legislation in Greece’, ΔΔΤ, 1956, no 28, pp. 9-12.  
41 ELIA/IFP/UM, Minutes of the Antidumping committee, Session 15, February 1955. 
42 Law 3213/1955. State and public entities were obliged to prefer domestic industrial products 
when their price was no more than 8% (previously 5%) above the price of the analogous imported 
goods (CIF value plus all duties levied at the frontier).  
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provision of employment to a large number of workers and employees, the 
rationalization of the production process and finally to the reduction of the 
production costs. This latter constitutes the basic pre-requisite for the 
industrial development under free competition and the tendencies towards 
unification of the global market.43   
4.2 Upside down (1955 - 1956) 
The story of Greece’s integration to the EEC has been told essentially from mid-
1957, when the government reported to OEEC on the terms under which Greece 
would participate in an FTA.44 Significantly, the next step was to derive 
Karamanlis’ pro-European attitude almost exclusively from Pesmazoglou’s 
writings and correspondence with the government. Similarly, the consideration 
of business interests and their involvement in the formation of Greece’s 
European strategy has been restricted to exploration of the FGI’s public position 
since June 1957.45 In this way a crucial period of Greece’s European stance has 
been circumvented and crucial actors, like the BoG and business interests 
beyond the peak-level, have been ignored resulting in a partial and misleading 
picture with respect to the forces which informed Greece’s response to early 
European integration. The following sections aim to correct this picture.  
4.2.1 The delegation’s cautious stance and an unpredictable business 
manifesto 
Consistent with the line adopted since the middle of 1953, the Greek delegation 
at OEEC from early 1955 until early 1956 had reserved its position toward any 
initiative for tariff reduction, be that within European institutions or GATT.46 
This position led Greece into direct confrontation with the Low Tariff Club, 
which was still insisting to tie up the consolidation of the 90% stage of 
liberalization with the members’ commitment to reduce tariffs. The reaction of 
the Greek delegation was more dynamic against the proposed common market 
for textiles between OEEC members because, as it was explained by Christidis, 
 
43 ‘Domestic production items should be preferred’, Document 40071’ Imerisia, 24 July 1955.  
44 Minotou, ‘The European’, pp. 198-318; Verney, 'The Greek’.   
45 Moussis, Greek, pp. 138-40;152-3; Lavdas, The Europeanization, pp. 112-3.   
46 KKF/EAA/3/1/14, Report by Theodoros Christidis, Paris, 14 March 1956. 
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the crisis in this sector was acute in Greece. Simultaneously, the delegation 
refused the common stance of OEEC countries within GATT in respect of an 
automatic scheme for tariff reduction at the international level, proposed again 
by the Low Tariff Countries. In contrast, Greece had welcomed the incorporation 
of the Pool Vert procedure within the organization and the subsequent 
establishment of the Council of Agricultural Ministers and the Agricultural 
Directorate of the OEEC Secretary charged with dealing with the agricultural 
sector.  
At this stage, the FGI leadership, Alexandros Tsatsos, did follow developments in 
Europe and was clearly more liberal than were the state agencies. Its attitude 
toward European integration followed naturally from the analysis of the main 
problem of domestic industry. The FGI’s president, closely following 
Varvaressos’ suggestion in this respect, had attributed the revival of industrial 
production in 1953 to the increased agricultural income.47 However, in 1955 the 
federation’s president considered that almost all existing manufacturing sectors 
had unutilized productive capacity, and the internal demand was not sufficient 
to ameliorate the situation.48 The only long-term solution were exports, 
emphasized by the FGI as the ‘survival vent’ for domestic industry.49  
Hence, given the fact that domestic industrial production could not find 
adequate internal outlets, the solution was to invest in sectors which promised 
export expansion and diversification. Naturally, the FGI supported the promotion 
of large scale and export oriented industrial units. In sharp contrast to its policy 
up to 1952, and notably to PUTI’s insistence for an import substitution 
accumulation strategy, it now promoted the adoption of an export-led growth 
strategy. Not surprisingly, therefore, until January 1956, actually when Monnet 
had already launched the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, this 
stance had culminated in an early European manifesto: 
Western Europe, which did not abolish national borders, moves rapidly 
towards the complete abolition of tariff borders from Scandinavia to 
 
47 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1953 (Athens: FGI, 1954), p. 19.  
48 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1954 and 1955 (Athens: FGI, 1956), p. 9; ‘The FGI Memo’, VE, 
June 1955, p. 38. 
49 GR/NBGHA/33/10/1/10, FGI Circular 1111, Athens, 15 April 1953.  
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Germany, Austria and Italy, including, except for G. Britain which still 
resists, the whole Europe. Where will Greek industry be? With such a 
prospect, the duty of prudent entrepreneurs is to orient themselves towards 
this future reality. Years pass quickly; the abolition of tariff borders will 
take place. Labour is scarce in the West and within a kind of United States 
of Western Europe, Greek workers will offer the factor ‘capable labour’, 
improving the standard of living and catching up with the level of other 
peoples of Europe. Greek industry, if it is capable, will take its fair share of 
a much wider market of advanced standard of living […] Government and 
industry, should be prepared for this future in order to participate not as 
poor relatives but as active contributively elements to a wider economy. It is 
that time that Greek industry will see bright days of development and fair 
competition. 50    
This manifesto, a clear act of leadership, was the swan song of Alexandros 
Tsatsos as FGI president. After almost four years at the top of the federation, he 
was replaced by Nikolaos Dritsas and Christoforos Stratos was elected as vice 
president. They came from the Piraeus metalworking branch and textiles 
respectively, the sectors that had suffered the most by liberalization and who 
had asked for additional tariff protection. The turn of FGI’s strategy towards a 
protectionist position was obvious, thereafter, and even if it did not adopt 
PUTI’s hard positions, it did not criticize them either.51 Simultaneously, the rift 
between the FGI and ACCI deepened even more. The federation asked for the 
separation of the two representative functions of the chambers. In September, it 
went as far as to block the elections for the industrial section of ACCI.52 In 
contrast, the former FGI president now figured among the newly elected 
members of ACCI’s industrial section and had come even closer to the emerging 
business faction, participating in investments to the inward-looking faction of 
shipping capital. 
 
50 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1954 and 1955 (Athens: FGI, 1956), p. 27. 
51 Chr. Stratos, ‘Review’, Imerisia, 13 July 1956.   
52 ‘The FGI’s submitted Memo’, Imerisia, 8 June 1956; ‘The FGI recommends refraining. The 
Circular’, Imerisia, 5 August 1956.  
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4.2.2 The central structural problem resurfaced. The BoG diagnosis 
As soon as the plans for economic integration were becoming concrete in the 
middle of 1956, the circuit of capital in Greece was entering a new phase. 
Imports were growing faster than exports and the trade deficit was growing 
almost uncontrollably.53 For the BoG and its governor, behind this adverse 
development was excessive internal demand. 54 Such demand, induced by the 
income gains above the level of national production increases, could either 
affect prices threatening monetary stability or to disproportionately increase 
imports and thus to undermine exchange reserves.55 From 1956 onwards, prices 
were stable and restrictive policies, targeting them directly, were relaxed. 
However, the situation was not the same for the balance of trade. That year, as 
Zolotas had highlighted, an adverse trend observable since 1954, was 
consolidated: the largest portion of money income gains was translated to 
imports rather than to demand for domestically produced commodities. The 
implication was that Keynesian demand management was not conducive for 
Greece. In the words of the BoG’s economists, ‘demand elasticity’ for imports 
was 1.7 whereas for many imported manufactured goods demand was relatively 
‘price inelastic’.56 Increasing imports of consumer durables, registered as luxury, 
had exaggerated this trend. Thus, the real problem for the BoG governor was 
that agricultural and industrial production was largely unresponsive to increasing 
internal demand, hence his insistence upon supply side policies and intensified 
investments aiming not only to boost employment, but also to increase supply 
and productivity to all sectors. The conclusion of Zolotas, that Greek industry 
was still substantially uncompetitive and that a deteriorating balance of 
payments could further aggravate this problem naturally followed. Upon this 
BoG analysis, which had been officially adopted by the coordination ministry and 
defended internationally, were based Greece’s restrictive monetary, credit and 
fiscal policies.57 There is no doubt that these measures had influenced 
commercial policy. The real question was the extent to which these politico 
 
53 Appendix, table 8. 
54 BoG’s analysis is identical to Zolotas, see: Zolotas, Monetary. 
55 BOG, Bank of Greece Governor’s Annual Report for 1955 (Athens: BoG, 1956).  
56 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F69/Τ1, Bank of Greece, Balance of Payments Forecasts, Athens, 27 
November 1957.   
57 YDIA/1958/11/4, Coordination Ministry to Foreign Ministry, 21 January 1958.  
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economic developments and considerations had influenced the decision for an 
FTA.    
4.2.3 The FTA and Eastern Trade 
In July 1956, the OEEC council reconsidered agricultural liberalization in the 
light of the proposals made for an automatic plan of tariff reduction for 
manufactures between the OEEC members, supported not only by the Low Tariff 
Club, but also by the UK and the Federal Republic. Even if it was clear that 
divergent interests within the organization had paralyzed this prospect, it was 
now explicitly connected with the plans at Messina. Indeed, for several OEEC 
members, notably the Federal Republic and the UK, these two plans were not 
really alternative but complementary. The US delegate was of the same opinion. 
As expected, the Working Party 17 (WP17) was established to study their future 
relationship within a wider European free trade area. The Greek coordination 
minister, Helmis, reiterated at this Council meeting Greece’s well-known 
position. Even more vigorously this time, he directly linked the reduction of the 
tariff burden for industrial products without reciprocity, that is, without the 
simultaneous reduction of the barriers to trade for the main Greek agricultural 
exports, to the acute problems of underemployment and the balance of 
payments disequilibrium. He particularly grounded his claims on PUTI’s familiar 
arguments that this situation had hampered development fermenting 
‘unemployment by the freeing of imports of indirect labour’.58 If this problem 
was ignored, he added, it could lead Greece back to bilateralism. This was 
clearly a negotiating instrument, but it was not without real content.  
The first alternative to Greece’s export problem was the development of Eastern 
trade. Indeed, following Stalin’s death in early 1953, and within the framework 
of a western embargo on strategic exports, Greece contracted trade agreements 
with all Eastern countries, except for Rumania and Albania.59 The interplay 
between the implications of eastern trade for the rule of law on the one hand 
and its impact upon the circuit of capital on the other, was evident from the 
 
58 OEEC, C/M(56)29 (1st Revision), Minutes of the 334th Meeting, Paris, 17-18-19-20 July 1956, 
http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/174066?item=OEEC-66 [accessed 5 January 2016] 
59 YDIA/1954/108/4/2/1, Ministry of Commerce to all Diplomatic Authority, 17 February 1954.  
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very beginning. In early 1954, the foreign ministry was cautious to keep the 
balance ‘between economic interest and the potential political danger’, a 
concern that was translated to Greece’s unwillingness to align its production 
policy with the needs of eastern trade.60 Yet, trade as such was not free from 
complications. From the very beginning, Greece appeared cautious with this 
alternative because of its inability to match increasing agricultural exports with 
imports, especially because it could not sufficiently control the latter due to 
import liberalization. Certainly, from that time, Greek diplomacy utilized 
Eastern trade as a negotiating instrument to press western markets and states to 
absorb her agricultural products.61 As soon as the Cyprus issue had resurfaced in 
late 1955, the prospect of Eastern trade became even more complex. Within the 
framework of the ‘peaceful coexistence’, Khrushchev was quick to launch the 
USSR’s ‘friendly attack’ towards Greece to take advantage of the 
disappointment of its people against the US and UK’s adverse stance upon this 
fundamental of Greece’s geopolitical issue.62 It was within this framework that 
the USSR exterior minister, on his way from Egypt to Moscow, visited Athens. As 
the Greek foreign minister informed NATO, Sepilov had offered ‘much 
favourable terms’ for the development of trade and in general for economic 
relations between the two states.63 Whereas the USSR exterior minister 
reassured Karamanlis of the Soviets’ peaceful intentions, he simultaneously 
made clear that ‘we are not interested in the Greek market. We have 
everything.’64 Again, fundamental though this dimension is, it does not mean 
that trade, as such, did not have implications for Greece’s position toward the 
FTA, as it is usually assumed.  
Before the meeting, state managers had reminded Karamanlis that it was still a 
problem to match the growing agricultural exports with imports from the Soviet 
Bloc.65 An agreement that would include extensive machinery imports from the 
USSR had implications for Greece’s main supplier. As will be argued, it was 
precisely the time that the Federal Republic had intensified attempts for export 
 
60 YDIA/1954/111/7, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Permanent Delegation of Geneva, 31 March 
1954.  
61 YDIA/1954/111/7, N. Hatzivasiliou to Foreign Ministry, Geneva, 5 May 1954 and 31 July 1954. 
62 YDIA/1956/26/4, Greek Embassy at Moscow, 9 November 1955. 
63 YDIA/1956/26/4, Cryptographic Telegram Averoff to Melas, 6 July 1956. 
64 YDIA/1956/26/4, Minutes of Conversation. Karamanlis and Averoff with Sepilof, 29 June 1956. 
65 KKF/KKA/2A, Commercial Relations Greece-Russia, 23 June 1956, pp. 325-8.  
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outlets for capital goods through the proposed FTA, not only to Greece, but also 
to Middle East markets with the assistance of Greek companies. Yet it was very 
soon proven that this was not the only player dissatisfied with Eastern 
commercial relations. As textiles were in the midst of an acute crisis, Averoff 
had proposed to Sepilov cotton fabric exports.66 However, even if the new trade 
agreement, signed in January 1957 at Moscow, foresaw a doubling of trade 
between the two countries, highlighting its significance for Greece’s 
deteriorating export performance, no textile exports were ever included.67 
Instead, the PUTI had highlighted since late 1955 that Eastern bloc countries 
dumped textiles in Greece.68 Thereafter, Eastern bloc dumping became one of 
the main concerns of textiles’ main representative body. 
The first public business reaction towards the FTA reflected precisely the above 
state of affairs. It came from PUTI’s Board member, Gavril, who was Greece’s 
representative to the vertical Textile Committee at OEEC. His memo to this 
committee in October 1956, drafted in cooperation with the delegation’s head 
Christidis, reiterated the well-known position of Greece within OEEC from the 
perspective of textiles. The PUTI’s representative complained that Greece did 
not meet the spirit of reciprocity in respect to her agricultural exports. This 
development impelled her to contract bilateral trade agreements with the 
Soviet Bloc to dispose of tobacco surpluses, which bloc, in turn, dumped textiles 
in Greece destroying her industry.69  
4.3 The decision (Early 1957 - June 1957) 
4.3.1 The government’s surprise and the first coherent reactions 
Thereafter, European integration gained momentum but there is evidence that 
at least until early December 1956, the Greek government had not only 
underestimated developments but was also reluctant to participate. Certainly, 
there were signs that the process of integration could slow down or change 
direction, as the foreign ministry in October 1956 was aware that French 
 
66 YDIA/1956/26/4, Conversation Averoff-Sepilof, 28 June 1956. 
67 YDIA/1957/56/2, K. Himaros to Foreign Ministry, 30 January 1957. 
68 ‘The Issues of PUTI are presented’, Imerisia, 20 October 1955.  
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industry had asked for more safety clauses in respect of the customs union.70 In 
any case, the Karamanlis government’s stance was defensive if not negative. On 
3 December 1956 Christidis was complaining to the coordination ministry 
because he had not received updated instructions for the FTA. Yet, as he 
informed this ministry, he could not block the Six’s customs union as the trade 
ministry had asked. The reason was that, unlike the FTA, it was formed outside 
the OEEC.71 Thus, as far as tariff disarmament for industrial products was 
concerned, the delegate strictly followed the general position formed back in 
1953. In respect of the potential benefits of tariff reduction for agricultural 
exports, he was quite cautious and ambivalent. The main reason was that tariffs 
for tobacco and wine would be easily replaced by internal taxation whereas 
cotton, except for Italy, was already duty free. Even more, there were clear 
signs that state trading and purchase monopolies would remain in place. Only 
citrus fruits and vegetables would gain, although the distance factor rendered to 
Greece’s competitors, such as Italy and potentially Spain, a clear competitive 
advantage. However, the option of exclusion was ruled out not only because it 
could lead to the disaggregation of the OEEC, but also due to the anticipated 
losses from a future inclusion of agricultural products. Thus, Christidis proposed 
to the coordination ministry to utilize the veto threat to enter the FTA with at 
least a ten-year waiver for industrial products without any other commitment. 
This strategy served the primary objective in respect to industrial products, 
because asking for the inclusion of agriculture would simply weaken demands for 
the industry’s protection. In any case, as the German delegate had proposed to 
Christidis in late December, if negotiations within OEEC failed, then Greece was 
welcomed as an associate with the EEC directly.72 As it was revealed later on, in 
late December 1956 the German deputy foreign minister Schaerpenberg had 
submitted to Christidis a memorandum that underlined that the interest of 
underdeveloped states was lying in their direct association to the EEC rather 
than their inclusion to FTA.73 Particularly for the states where the bulk of their 
trade was contracted with the EEC countries, as was the case with Greece, the 
UK market was of little interest because agriculture was excluded whereas a 
bilateral agreement directly with the EEC would be specific enough to cover the 
 
70 YDIA/1956/11/5, Zamarias to Foreign Ministry, 22 October 1956. 
71 YDIA/1957/22/14, Th. Crhistidis to Coordination Ministry, Athens, 3 December 1956. 
72 YDIAEI, pp. 365-373.  
73 ‘The text of the Memorandum’, Eleftheria, 23 August 1959. 
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special needs of these underdeveloped countries. Certainly, this memorandum 
was in contrast to Erhard’s priorities. 
It seems that the Greek government became active only after it had clear signs 
that the Six had decided to go forward with the customs union.74 Certainly, the 
final draft of the report of the WP17 to the OEEC Council in late December and 
Spaak’s visit to London for the thorny agricultural issue in early January 1957, 
were definitely alarming. Thereafter, the FTA plan was commonly known in 
Greece as the problem of the FTA. When the OEEC secretariat, Cahan, visited 
Athens to prepare the crucial Council meeting for the middle of February 1957, 
he met at the BoG with its governor and key members of the Karamanlis 
government. There, Cahan, was informed of Greece’s main structural problems, 
primarily for the imbalance problem analysed by Zolotas. For the OEEC 
representative, all Greek officials were well informed and had adopted a 
common, quite cautious, stance towards FTA. In the words of Cahan:    
‘There was complete unanimity in their collective outlook. If this was to 
summed up in one sentence, it would be: The present proposals for a free 
trade area are totally unacceptable to Greece.’75  
There were two main reasons for this reaction. The first was the UK insistence 
on the exclusion of agricultural products and the second was the WP17’s 
proposal for the reduction of the tariffs for industrial products within a fixed and 
predetermined period. At the BoG, Zolotas had already asked his collaborate, H. 
Ergas, to report on Greece’s position within the FTA. In late January the report 
was ready.76 Based upon the WP17 proposals, it was clear that given the fact 
that tariff disarmament would substantially increase manufactured and capital 
goods inflows, if agricultural products were excluded, then Greece had no 
interest in the FTA. Even if it was recognized that agricultural exports had little 
to gain from tariff disarmament as such, a potential abolition of monopolies and 
a reasonable reduction of revenue duties upon these products from the other 
members would substantially boost exports. Moreover, even if these barriers 
 
74 YDIA/1956/11/5, Zamarias to Foreign Ministry, 12 December 1956. 
75 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y1/F74, The Free Trade Area, Report on a visit to Athens, 2 February 1957. 
Emphasis in the original.   
76 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F78/Τ1, I. H. Ergas to Zolotas, Athens, 26 January 1957.   
  191 
 
 
 
 
were not abolished but Turkey was to join the FTA, then it was imperative for 
Greece to participate. This was because export substitution between Greek and 
Turkish tobacco was high and the potential losses would be difficult to afford. 
Yet, the report pointed to a potential adverse development for domestic 
industry’s main handicap, already at the heart of the Zolotas analysis. 
Productivity rates in European industry would increase and, unless liberal steps 
were taken in Greece, the gap with Greek industry would widen. However, this 
did not mean for Ergas that Greece had to accept a scheduled tariff 
disarmament. There is no indication in the story until now to assume that this 
crucial concern was not shared by at least the majority of Greek industrialists 
who, without much fanfare, one day before the meeting with Cahan had taken 
their breakfast with Zolotas at the BoG.77  
This was indeed the period when businesses were becoming aware of the 
developments in Europe but not always with the developments with which 
Greece was directly involved. Interestingly enough, when industrialists visited 
Zolotas, the ACCI was prepared to discuss the ‘Report of the Six published in 
April 1956’, which had been the only document sent for consideration in respect 
to the FTA by the coordination minister, Helmis, to the chamber some days 
earlier.78 This could not have been done by mistake, for the Greek section of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, from which came the first coherent 
reaction for the FTA, had already reported but without considering the Report of 
the WP17, though it was explicitly aware of it.79 The business report accepted 
that the gains accruing from integration, that is increased specialization, 
reduction of production costs and higher investments, could be reaped only by 
countries that already over utilized their resources. In contrast, it questioned 
the ability of the countries that underutilized resources to gain from the 
process, especially if it was taken into account the limited benefits for 
agricultural exports anticipated from tariff disarmament.  
The second consistent business reaction came from PUTI’s board member, 
Gavril, who informed his colleagues at the FTA on 8 February 1957. Emphasizing 
 
77 GR/BOGHA/A1/S14/Y1/F5, Industrialists Breakfast, 31 January 1957.   
78 ‘The Plenary Session of the Board of Directors of ACCI’, ACCI Bulletin, January 1957, 139-47.  
79 ‘The Economic Union’, International Economy, January 1957, 91-2.  
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dumping from the Japanese and the Eastern bloc, he summarized the position of 
the traditional industry towards European integration:  
There is no doubt that a rush participation to the FTA would mean a death 
sentence for Greek industry. Therefore, our answer should be negative, but 
negative for the moment. We should not reject it. Greece cannot be 
unequivocally negative because this would marginalize her from the Western 
world. It should ask for the inclusion of agricultural products to the FTA and 
for a long transitional period before it leaves its industry unprotected. From 
the textiles’ perspective, almost all states were in favour of the FTA, except 
for Greece, Turkey and Portugal. Therefore, Greece will refuse. For the 
moment and for a future period it will refuse. However, some day it will 
come the time for Greece to go ahead, voluntary or involuntary.80 
For PUTI’s prominent member the position of Greece was clearly within Europe 
and the western capitalist bloc, highlighting also the two basic terms for 
entrance to the FTA yet it was equally clear that he had placed the decision for 
participation in the distant future. In contrast, within the BoG the discussion for 
the FTA continued apace, accurately posing the dilemma that Greece was facing 
at that time. Showing his intention, Zolotas had asked from Ergas a report for 
the terms under which Greece’s economic future within the FTA was 
guaranteed.  
The report considered the implications of both exclusion and inclusion.81 On the 
one hand, it was assumed that a unified Europe would be able to reap the 
benefits of a customs union, increasing competitiveness for its participants only. 
Under these circumstances, Greece’s exclusion, given her democratic regime, 
indicated two alternatives. It could lead either to a modest rate of growth 
combined with monetary stability but with crushing unemployment or to high 
rates of growth reducing unemployment but at the cost of monetary instability. 
Both alternatives implied a fatal danger for both the preconditions of capital 
accumulation, thus threatening Greece’s external orientation, and subsequently 
questioning the effectiveness and potentially the feasibility of the Atlantic 
 
80 Georgios Gavril, ‘The Textiles of the Countries of Europe and the EFTA’, VE, March 1957, 19-27 
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Alliance. On the other hand, if Greece participated in the FTA, the movement of 
factors of production would aggravate the existing disparities between its 
members, for there was no ‘free and unfettered unification’ between countries 
with different levels of development.82 For this reason, the report sketched out 
the main preconditions for Greece’s entrance, in respect of agricultural exports, 
industrial imports and external finance. It was upon these core considerations of 
the circuit of capital and its extra-economic preconditions, that the initial quite 
cautious reaction and the subsequent demands for special treatment were based 
at the OEEC Council in the middle of February.83 These demands were the 
inclusion of agricultural products to the FTA and a sufficiently long waiver for 
tariff disarmament in order to be able to take advantage of the requested 
capital inflows and the relief from labour outflows. Nevertheless, the decision 
seems that was not definite.  
It was not until late March that the government did eventually set up a general 
committee to examine the issue in detail. It is not known if the government was 
waiting for the Six to sign the Treaties of Rome or the clarification of the 
general framework for the inclusion of the underdeveloped states to the FTA, 
with which the WP23 had been preoccupied.84 What is certain is that the WP23 
on 9 April outlined the main characteristics of the countries in the process of 
development along the lines that Zolotas had analysed Greece’s economy in the 
annual reviews of the BoG for the years 1955 and 1956. Even more, it shared the 
main arguments of Ergas and Zolotas, not only in respect to the impact that 
integration might have upon underdeveloped agricultural economies with 
uncompetitive industry, but also for the necessary measures to ameliorate the 
inevitable discrepancies generated by the process. There was essentially only 
one, but crucial, different proposal. The WP23 had insisted that protection for 
both existing and future industries would be removed within a fixed and 
predetermined period.  
 
82 Ibid.   
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The intention of Greece was sketched out one week later, when Zolotas made 
public the state of affairs at that time.85 For the governor, in order to take the 
right decision, Greece had to consider the long-term and dynamic effects of both 
participation and exclusion, also taking into account its geographical specificity.   
Subsequently, it could consider the immediate economic consequences and 
specify accordingly her general position and its details. The main consequence of 
exclusion was summed up in a small phrase: it would increase the productivity 
gap. The governor claimed that economic unification of the Western 
industrialized countries meant further concentration of resources and 
technology. In turn, this would rapidly and inevitably lead to an accelerated 
development of the existing entrepreneurial organizations and to a higher 
rhythm of productivity gains further boosting the competitiveness of European 
unified industry. Under these circumstances, industries within the less 
developed states would not afford the intensified competition, neither at home 
nor abroad. This major consequence had to be considered in relation to the 
anticipated gains from agricultural exports. As far as the short-term 
consequences of integration upon industry were concerned, they could be 
addressed with the measures already outlined by coordination minister Helmis at 
the Council meeting in February. Furthermore, Zolotas made it plain that 
Greece’s inclusion dictated, beyond the safeguards asked, the FTA’ support for 
electrification and the adoption of export oriented and internationally 
competitive units for the processing of the mineral wealth, namely nickel-
chrome, bauxite and iron ores. For the BoG’s governor these units were feasible 
only if the FTA ‘guaranteed’ the appropriate technology and capital inflows.86 
Importantly, as it has been shown in the previous chapter, all these projects 
were the basis of the July 1957 Greek-German economic agreement.    
4.3.2 The formulation of the general committee for FTA 
Meanwhile, after two meetings, the general committee made public on 4 April 
1957 its intention to form two subcommittees to examine industry and 
agriculture in more detail. The first, beyond state managers, included FGI 
 
85 BOG, Bank of Greece Governor’s Annual Report for the year 1956 (Athens: BoG, 1957), pp. 15-
7;20-2.  
86 Ibid., p. 16.  
  195 
 
 
 
 
officials, particularly Katsabas, Iliopoulos and Alexandros Tsatsos. The fact that 
the main regional associations, namely the FMTI87 and FPI88, did not discuss the 
issue of the FTA at their annual meetings in late March and early April 
respectively, is an indication that big industry had handed this crucial 
competence to the FGI. In contrast, despite the fact that the WP23 had 
emphasized that induced competition would inevitably clear small and 
inefficient units, small-scale industries and craftsman had been excluded from 
the subcommittee. It is clear that the position of these small-scale industries 
and handicrafts, which employed about 400,000 people, was not specified either 
by the industrial subcommittee or within their main representative bodies. 
Indeed, Thessaloniki’s Chamber of Small Industries complained to the 
coordination ministry that they were not included in the committees and asked 
for their inclusion.89 Yet, the Piraeus Chamber of Small Industries called the 
Greek Union of Chamber of Small Industries to formulate the position of small-
scale industries because ‘the silence of craftsman’ would be ‘catastrophic’ for 
their interests and in any case, it was ‘unacceptable’.90 At the first PanHellenic 
meeting of craftsman in June 1957, convened amid a climate of much fanfare 
which attracted the whole political and businesses classes and was covered 
extensively by the press, the Union did not include on the agenda the issue of 
the FTA.91  As expected, the conclusions of the meeting, handed to Karamanlis 
himself, did not refer to European integration at all.92 In respect to the 
chambers’ representatives, who were also absent from the subcommittee, in 
early April the ACCI decided to conduct its own survey having now the WP17 
report.93  
The agricultural subcommittee included only state managers whilst agricultural 
organized interests, notably tobacco representatives, did not participate. The 
FGTT reacted publicly to this ‘omission’, blaming the government that had not 
called to the agricultural Committee the representative body of the ‘main 
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sector’ of the economy.94 As expected, the FGTT strongly supported Greece’s 
participation in an FTA because it was the only way to avoid exclusion from the 
customs union, where almost 55% of tobacco exports were directed.95 As it was 
claimed, the real danger was that the customs union would privilege producers 
from Italy and the French colonies and the participation of Turkey would have 
severe consequences.    
4.3.3 PUTI the FGI’s vice-president Stratos and the subcommittee 
reports 
Meanwhile, the PUTI had returned to the issue of FTA and to textiles’ dumping 
on 4 April 1957, indicating that, as Gavril had implied, a common stance at the 
European level could halt such imports. In the end, the textiles federation 
endorsed Gavril proposals for the FTA as such: 
The refusal of our participation within the framework of this free European 
Economy will not be useful, because this would fatefully drive us to the margin, 
but we are not an autarkic economy. Certainly, a rush to full participation 
without a prior study, gradual phases and preparations, would also be 
pernicious.96 
It was clear that whereas PUTI recognised the necessity for Greece to 
participate in European integration in principle, it simultaneously attempted to 
postpone the final decision asking for a prior study and safeguards. A few days 
later, this attitude was made even more rigid by the FGI’s vice-president 
Stratos. In an almost polemical article, he claimed that ‘overproduction’ and the 
ensuing ‘competition’ in Europe had ‘forced’ the industrially advanced countries 
to consider a solution for the ‘regulation’ of their common problems along the 
lines of the ECSC, and he added that in the process these countries had 
considered their selfish interests.97 Subsequently, he refuted one by one the 
arguments made by both the BoG and the WP17. For the former, he mentioned 
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that although the political dimension was dominant, it was wrong to accept a 
priori Greece’s participation and then to specify the precise terms of the 
entrance. The decision for participation or not, had to be based upon data from 
industry and the economy as a whole, which were missing at the time. For this 
reason, a long-term study should precede the decision. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, this demand was the catalyst for the transformation of the 
two subcommittees for the FTA to ROCEP’s basic committees, which paved the 
way for the five-year developmental programme published in 1960. As far as the 
WP17’s report was concerned, Stratos downplayed all its proposed measures. 
Particularly, the inclusion of agricultural products, with the simultaneous 
elimination of all the trade barriers involved, was indeed a prerequisite for 
Greece’s participation. However, there was the alternative of the Eastern and 
Middle East markets. Even the proposed fifteen-year transitional period was 
arbitrary because there was no study to determine if this was sufficient or not. 
What is more, Greek industry was in its infancy, and many sectors would 
collapse facing the competition from robust western industry which had a 
voracious attitude. Thus, unemployment would also increase and migration, the 
only feasible alternative, meant that the ‘nation would decline missing its more 
dynamic members.’98 Even the feasibility of capital inflows was questioned, and 
the precise capital needs could not be specified in advance, again due to the 
lack of an industrial programme. It was clear that FGI’s vice-president 
attempted not only to postpone the decision, but he had also questioned 
participation in principle. Certainly, this position was one extreme of the 
reaction of business. 
By the end of April, the Greek section of the International Chamber of 
Commerce had successfully summarized the position that had been embraced 
from business circles close to the ACCI and the PEA. Undoubtedly, it resembled 
BoG’s strategy, the other pole of business reaction. The president of the Greek 
section was clear enough:  
Under the assumption that exclusion will have more severe and adverse 
consequences than our participation to the ‘zone’, an opinion grounded 
upon strong arguments, what we should do is to consider which are the 
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terms for our participation to the ‘zone’ that could minimise these adverse 
consequences.99     
At the same time, the main shareholders of big industrial companies expressed 
their opinion within the industrial subcommittee of the FTA.100 They all judged 
the latter from the perspective of their own economic interest based upon their 
company’s ability to withstand future European competition, predominately 
after a period that varied from 15 to 25 years. From the thirty-two 
representatives of big companies belonging to all sectors, except for textiles, 
seventeen were reported to express opinions at the session on 2 May.101 Of 
those, seven considered that their companies would respond and survive, seven 
that they would not, and three were ambivalent. Clearly, big businesses were 
divided on the issue. Unit size, general costs, raw material and machinery supply 
along with the effective rate of protection, were the main criteria upon which 
their evaluations were based.   
Within a few days, the industrial subcommittee published its proposals. Its 
memo to the coordination ministry contained three reports.102 Having meanwhile 
withdrawn from the subcommittee, the previous FGI president Alexandros 
Tsatsos signed the first on 10 May 1957 and the second report was signed by the 
remaining majority of the subcommittee on 16 May 1957 and the third by the 
secretary general of the Federation of Greek Workers, Fotis Makris, on the same 
day. The former FGI president, directly targeting Stratos’ argumentation, 
claimed that the subcommittee should first consider if there were any a priori 
reasons for Greece’s participation in the FTA.103 Then, Alexandros Tsatsos 
summarized the results of the subcommittee’s enquiry for the status of industry 
which showed that domestic industry was dominated by small and inefficient 
production units with obsolete mechanical equipment and insufficient equity 
capital, unable to specialize and to adopt mass production methods hence with 
high general and average costs. For these inadequacies, argued Alexandros 
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Tsatsos, elaborating now upon what was a publicly salient criticism of the FGI to 
PUTI during the years of his presidency, industrialists were themselves 
responsible. It was due to irrational firm organization, virtually a black box for 
BIAs like PUTI, UII, FMTI and FPI. Indeed, these industrial BIAs had formed an 
official alliance with traders, the Council of Productive Forces, and had 
concentrated their efforts upon the reduction of labour costs resorting to 
outdated labour-intensive methods.104 The state, continued Alexandros Tsatsos, 
had its own responsibilities and he emphasized its institutional deficiencies. 
Given these deficiencies, the solution for Alexandros Tsatsos was not to pose 
terms to OEEC members for Greece’s participation to the FTA but instead, each 
part, namely the state and the industrialists, had to accept their own 
responsibilities for the reduction of the production costs. If these duties were 
fulfilled in time, then Greece could join the common market with a 5-year 
waiver and safeguards only for the free movement of agricultural goods and 
labour.   
It was clear that Alexandros Tsatsos had not only sided with the BoG and ACCI, 
but he had adopted a far more liberal attitude than that of the central bank and 
the government. Similarly, in February 1957, Stratis Andreadis had considered 
that the participation of Greece in the ‘big European market’ would ‘adjust’ and 
‘modernize’ its economy.105 A few months later, he claimed that the progress of 
European integration had ‘surprised’ the government which was essentially 
‘unprepared’.106 It was clear that the businesses concentrating around shipping-
capital were pro-European, pressing publicly for Greece’s participation to the 
FTA.  
The rationale of the majority’s report was that integration would promote 
economic development within industrially advanced countries but those in the 
process of development, such as was Greece, would face quite adverse 
consequences and deep structural changes. This was because Greek industry 
suffered from organic inadequacies, responsible for which was the small internal 
market, the state and the unskilled labour. For the majority, these inadequacies 
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were nothing more than updated versions of PUTI’s claims to the PTC back in 
May and June 1953, and almost the sole difference this time was that results 
were not measured. Moreover, it was these inadequacies, combined with the 
lack of export experience, for which domestic industry could not take advantage 
of the proposed big common market. For these reasons, the report predicted 
that the entry to FTA would be translated into a wholesale disaster. 
Nevertheless, it indeed considered that there might be a priori reasons for 
Greece’s entrance, sharing in this respect PUTI’s and Gavril’s fears of isolation 
as well as Alexandros Tsatsos’ main argument, namely that Greece should stay in 
the western capitalist bloc. Indeed, given the ‘political orientation’ and the 
‘structure of our trade’, the report continued, a marginalization from the 
Western markets, to which 85% of Greece’s exports are directed, meant that it 
had to adopt an ‘autarkic’ policy which, as experience has shown, would have 
adverse consequences. Subsequently the majority proposed that an association 
with the FTA was the appropriate first stage for integration to the common 
market. It proposed that Greece could reduce tariffs according to the schedule 
applied for the whole FTA but only for goods not produced domestically, such as 
heavy machinery. In return, it should receive preferential treatment, along the 
lines proposed by the WP23, for her agricultural exports. This was the content of 
the Greece’s association with an FTA. As far as domestically produced 
manufactures were concerned, the committee refused any obligation from the 
outset. It suggested that the possibility for Greece to undertake any such 
commitment, and thus to continue within the FTA, would be decided only after 
a three-year survey of the status of domestic industry and the appropriate 
revision of the customs tariff. The commitment was to follow a predetermined 
and scheduled reduction of tariffs only after a waiver of at least 20 years. During 
these 20 years, domestic industry could utilize capital inflows, proposed again by 
the WP23, on the basis of the industrial policy considered within the proposed by 
the FGI committee (ROCEP) for the industrial programme, analysed in the next 
chapter. The report concluded that the reduction of production costs would be 
undertaken by the state independently of the final decision.  
The workers’ largest representative body opened with a criticism of the 
government for its wage policy and its delay in dealing with the FTA. Thereafter, 
mentioning that the lack of data prohibited any thorough analysis, it reproduced 
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the arguments of the majority’s report. It was clear, the Federation of workers 
had not an autonomous view of the FTA but followed that of the majority of 
industry. 
However, to the press at the time, the report of the majority was published as 
the unanimous report of the industrial subcommittee, a move that gave 
Alexandros Tsatsos the room to deepen his criticism, this time of the published 
report. He now stated that, in any case, industry would face adverse 
consequences but, certainly, outside of the common market all present and 
future investments would be lost.107 What is more, industry had to take on its 
responsibilities and not blame labour for its low productivity, for which the 
irrational firm organization and the outdated mechanical equipment were 
largely responsible. For tariffs, Alexandros Tsatsos advocated that protection 
was not the appropriate measure to create a conducive environment for 
investments, but the major goal was now for both industrialists and the 
government to prepare Greece for participation by abolishing the adverse terms 
of production. Subsequently, targeting the heart of the majority’s demands, he 
argued that only a predetermined and fixed schedule for tariff reduction would 
oblige them to do so. As far as the proposed study was concerned, he agreed 
that it should start immediately, but it had not to take more than 12-18 months.   
Meanwhile, the agricultural subcommittee had received from the commerce 
ministry a cautious report for the prospects of both agricultural and industrial 
exports to the FTA.108 The conclusion for agricultural products was that if Greece 
was treated equally within the common market it had little to gain, except for 
citrus fruits and vegetables which had high demand elasticity. Yet, it 
recommended that no obligation should be undertaken at the outset. Instead, 
after a sufficiently long waiver, commitments would be decided within OEEC 
with the rule of unanimity. The subcommittee considered this report, and 
obviously Erga’s reports. Its recommendations departed from the assumption 
that an ‘autarkic’ policy towards a market which received about 70% of 
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agricultural exports, was simply unacceptable.109 This meant for the 
subcommittee that, despite the dangers for the internal agricultural market, an 
association with the FTA with safeguards, was the only solution. Special 
provisions and long-term contracts for agricultural exports, along the lines of the 
Treaty of Rome and recommended by the WP23, had to be granted. This mode of 
integration, continued the report, by recognizing mutual obligations and rights 
similar to the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome had, additionally, the 
merits to leave open East and Middle East markets. These safeguards were 
identical to those proposed by the majority of the industrial subcommittee, 
including the proposal for a prior three-year study.  
One week later the coordination ministry had considered the above reports.110 
Certainly, the basis of Greece’s formal strategy towards European integration 
was there. The ministry had endorsed all the recommendations of the majority 
of the two subcommittees, except those for a prior three-year study. The reason 
was that the latter demand would weaken the initial negotiation position of 
Greece. Instead, the report concluded that any commitment for tariff 
disarmament would be determined after a 25-year waiver, subject to the rule of 
unanimity. The Greek delegate to the OEEC also supported this 
recommendation, the origin of which can be traced back to Ergas report in 
January. Christidis, had based his suggestion upon the similar provisions of the 
EEC treaty toward third countries.111  
The conference at Piraeus University from 22 until 27 May illustrated the 
arguments of each side, namely the FGI and the BoG. The federation returned to 
the conference with an updated version of the industrial subcommittee’s report, 
essentially responding only to Alexandros Tsatsos’ arguments.112 In the first 
place, Stratos, grounded in geopolitical considerations the a priori reasoning of 
Greece’s participation in the FTA, showed that the political dimension was the 
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catalyst for the agreement between the different business factions. Importantly, 
he emphasized that Europeans had realized that Europe had ‘suffered’ from 
wars and was in such ‘decline’ only because in the pre-war era it was ‘divided’ 
and the national ‘competitors overproduced’.113 After 1945, encouraged by the 
US, Europeans decided that the solution was to emulate the American ‘systems 
and methods’ and to create a ‘vast market’ that could ‘cure’ Europe’s 
sufferings.114 For these reasons, Stratos concluded that the FTA was created 
primarily for political reasons. In respect to the Greek stance he mentioned 
that: 
If we consider the problem of Greece’s participation to the FTA from this 
point of view, the political, then I do not think that there is much room for a 
free choice. Politically, culturally and emotionally, we belong to the West. 
To move to the other side is impossible for national reasons. To stay in the 
middle enjoying a kind of neutrality of the Switzerland type, is even more 
difficult […] If, therefore, we are obliged by the circumstances to belong to 
the politico-military camp of the West, it is natural to orient ourselves and 
economically to the same side.115        
If participation was inevitable then, for Stratos, the ensuing responsibility of 
both industrialists and the state was to equalize the terms of production with 
European producers. However, the realization of this objective was not easy. He 
mentioned in some detail the data that were missing for an immediate decision 
and the subsequent necessity for the ‘three-year conference’ before the final 
decision. Yet, in case the FTA did not accept the terms for which Greece was 
asking, namely a long transitional period, capital inflows, labour movement and 
the special treatment of agriculture, Stratos reminded them of the alternative 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East markets. The cautious view of 
the FGI was supported by the PUTI which, from its side, highlighted that the 
European textiles market was shrinking due to competition from underdeveloped 
regions and Eastern dumping and, for these reasons, other European textile BIAs 
were equally cautious. The federation’s stance was supported not only by other 
 
113 Ibid., p. 127.  
114 Ibid., p. 127. 
115 Ibid., p. 128.  
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individual industrialists, but also by state agencies like the prominent 
economists Vassilios Damalas and Chrysos Evelpidis along with the previous 
industrial minister and Greece’s representative to the Council of Europe, Leon 
Makkas. At the same conference, the EDA supported the continuation of 
protectionism and stressed the need for the development of Eastern and Middle 
Eastern trade. Certainly, the communist left was in agreement with the FGI as to 
the necessity of protection but had also reminded the business community of the 
dangers that a decision to stay outside the FTA might have for Greek capitalism 
and its socio-economic base.  
Simultaneously, all the other political parties highlighted the political 
significance of the participation to the FTA stating, additionally, that exclusion 
would be dangerous because of the trade dependence and the need for European 
capital and agreed that participation required quite careful steps and special 
treatment from the FTA. The BoG’s arguments, as stated in April 1957 by 
Zolotas, were elaborated by the conference’s president Stavros Kostopoulos, 
who was a financier and liberal politician and had also served as the FGI’s 
president for some months in early 1945. He reiterated the familiar Zolotas’ 
arguments of the danger of a widening productivity gap in case of exclusion and, 
in any case, the increasing needs for European technology and capital inflows. 
The Piraeus and Athens chambers of commerce and industry employed more or 
less the same arguments. A few months later, the ACCI successfully summarized 
the importers’ main argument:   
If we stay outside, we will gain, or at least we believe we will gain, the 
largely obsolete and fragmented industrial units, with their well-known high 
production costs. However, as the cost of production in Europe (due to the 
unification of the consumer markets and the continuous adaption of their 
firms to the new circumstances) will be progressively reduced, it will 
become plain that today’s tariff walls would be powerless to protect the 
obsolete part of our productive equipment for which we will stay outside the 
EFTA.116  
 
116 ‘The Report of ACCI’s Vise-president Chr. Panagos, in ACCI, Second Conference, pp. 71-9. 
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4.3.4 The Memorandum: the viability problem within the new division 
of labour in Europe 
Eventually, on 30 May 1957, the government considered with BoG’s governor 
Zolotas and its economic adviser, Pesmazoglou, along with the presidents of the 
two subcommittees, Katsabas and Bernaris, a memorandum that presented 
Greece’s initial general position toward the FTA.117 This memorandum was 
submitted to the WP23 on 5 July with a statement that analysed and supported 
this position. These two documents not only successfully summarized the 
compromise reached between the FGI on the one hand and the BoG and the 
liberal business faction on the other but they also explained, with incomparable 
clarity, the position of the Greek political economy within the new and dynamic 
division of labour in Europe.118 It was the official foundation of Greek demands, 
sharing considerable affinities with Kouklelis’ report in 1949.119 In brief, it 
departed from the argument that when the freedom of movement of goods, 
capital and labour is matched with an already advanced economy, it exercises a 
powerful attraction upon the location of industry that offsets the advantages of 
the less developed economies, like cheap labour or the availability of raw 
materials. This attraction leads inevitably to the cumulative development of an 
advanced economy and to productivity gains that eventually widens the 
productivity gap between developed and underdeveloped states. As a result, 
intensifying competition puts strong pressure upon the balance of payments of 
the underdeveloped states. These states resort subsequently to restrictive 
internal measures that, in turn, undermine employment and production when 
they need exactly the opposite. They need an intensive investment policy in 
order to pave the way for their accelerated rate of development that can lead 
toward the convergence with the advanced economies. The demands of Greece 
were designed precisely to ensure the realization of this prime objective. On the 
one hand, capital inflows would boost investments in order to absorb the surplus 
population and to increase productivity and incomes. Labour outflows would be 
supplementary to this course. On the other hand, the waiver and the 
 
117 KKAFT, II, p. 352-3.  
118 Coordination Ministry and Foreign Ministries, Greece the European Economic Community and a 
European Free Trade Area (Athens: Coordination and Foreign Ministries, 1959), hereafter 
(G/EEC/FTA), Memorandum, June 1957, pp. 8-14; Ibid, Statement, July 1957, pp. 15-51.    
119 For Kouklelis report see chapter two, second section.    
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preferential treatment of Greece’s agricultural exports were necessary to 
establish the balance of payments defences for the realization of the same 
objective. If the above were not realized, the ensuing unemployment and 
monetary instability would be dangerous, not to Greece alone, but to the whole 
of Europe, leading Europe eventually to disintegration instead of integration. In 
the end, it was made clear that all these were complementary arrangements 
which formed a whole, targeting, in other words, both the circuit of capital and 
its formal preconditions.  
For the waiver and the rate of tariff disarmament, it did not ask for additional 
time to specify them, as the FGI had asked with a proposed three-year study. 
Instead, it asked for a sufficiently long period for the necessary structural 
adjustments. At the expiration of this period and, depending upon the extent to 
which the primary objective of adjustment would be fulfilled, Greece would 
discuss the rate of tariff disarmament. In this way, the commitment to 
scheduled tariff disarmament was essentially linked to the settlement of 
agricultural exports and the level of capital inflows. In respect to the former, 
the memorandum and the statement repeated the well-known demands for an 
expanding market for the main agricultural products, stating that the inclusion 
of agriculture was a prerequisite for participation. For the capital inflows, it 
asked for the adoption of a common European developmental policy charged 
with the allocation of resources according to the needs of a balanced growth 
within the FTA. Echoing the ambivalence of business interests and state manager 
concerns, the memorandum stated that unless all interested countries had 
agreed upon the content of these demands ‘no declaration of principle in favour 
or against a free trade area was possible’.120  
4.4  The first adjustment (Middle 1957 – 1958) 
4.4.1 Discussions at Bonn and the final settlement 
The first reaction of the WP23, driven primarily by Germany and France, was to 
ask Greece to accept the obligation to reduce tariffs from the outset and to 
 
120 G/EEC/FTA, Memorandum, June 1957, p. 8.    
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specify her capital demands.121 This was precisely the content of the bilateral 
discussions between Germany and Greece at Bonn two days later.122 At the 
meeting, coordination minister Papaligouras initially confirmed that Greece was 
ready to participate in the FTA but he then asked Erhard if it would be 
preferable for Greece to enter the EEC directly, provided that in both 
alternatives it would receive economic assistance and the appropriate 
timeframe to restructure her economy. Erhard initially accepted that the 
benefits of the wider agricultural market should not be restricted to the 
countries of the Commonwealth alone and that underdeveloped European states 
should also take their share. It was a clear indication that Erhard was ready to 
support a compromise between Greece’s main prerequisite for participation in 
the FTA and the UK’s proposal for the exclusion of agriculture. From this 
perspective, Erhard highlighted that it was in the interest of Greece to enter the 
EEC directly. However, he immediately ruled out this option, underlining that 
the EEC had a 12-year transitional period and he was convinced that this 
timeframe was sufficient for the adequate development of the Greek economy 
and, in any case, concluded Erhard, the Greek balance of payments was in 
equilibrium. This claim was responded to by Papaligouras’ stating that payments 
were in equilibrium only because the government suppressed social aspirations 
but this dangerous interplay between restrictive policies and social demands 
could lead Greece to shift its external orientation: not from the current 
government, clarified Papaligouras, but from her successor. At this point, the 
German delegate to OEEC, Schaerpenberg, confirmed his contact with Christidis 
and their agreement to find a ‘solution’ for Greece even beyond the OEEC 
framework, that is, for the EEC option directly.123 Still, in substantive agreement 
with the FGI position, he emphasized that it was in the interest of Greece to 
abolish tariffs for products which were not produced domestically at the time in 
order to reduce production costs. For the waiver, the coordination minister 
confirmed that its duration would obviously depend upon the size of economic 
assistance, opening the discussion for private and public capital inflows already 
discussed. No doubt, despite the different approaches within the German 
government, the Federal Republic was not happy to see Greece obliged to 
 
121 YDIA/1957/22/14, Cryptographic Telegram, Th. Christidis, Paris, 6 July 1957. 
122 KKF/KKA/3A, Negotiation Minutes at the Federal Ministry of Economic Co-operation, 7 July 
1957, pp. 961-74.  
123 Ibid.  
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import mechanical equipment from the Eastern Bloc in order to promote her 
agricultural exports but this did not imply that it was ready to sign a blank 
cheque.  
Indeed, the WP23 asked Greece to clarify if and which obligations it would 
undertake from the outset, what specific provisions would facilitate her 
agricultural exports and asked for an outline of the developmental programme 
and its proposed financing.124 Greece replied to the WP23 in September, making 
it clear that it followed a dual strategy. Until that time, the ROCEP was already 
in place and the government had applied twice to GATT for the re-negotiation of 
a number of items within the framework of the XXVIII article. As was explained 
in the reply, Greece would offset such increases by decreasing tariffs for 
selected industrial products only within the FTA. Yet, as a number of new 
industries were under construction, it insisted that new tariffs would be 
introduced for newly created industries and the delegation implied that it might 
be possible to reduce certain tariffs for existing industries within the waiver. 
However, this would be only for limited cases and substantive reduction would 
start only when the acceleration of economic progress ‘establish the conditions 
for full employment’.125 It was plain, as the chief negotiator Pesmazoglou had 
explained in September, the derogations for the waiver were essentially 
dependent upon the other two core demands i.e. the level of agricultural 
exports and capital inflows.126 For agricultural exports it proposed the 
discrimination of the FTA for the main exportable products and the 
establishment of fair trade practices which largely meant the elimination of non-
tariff barriers like quotas, monopolies and state trading. It was with these 
proposals that Greece entered the substantive phase of the negotiations within 
the Maudling committee in November 1957. Thereafter, Greece repeatedly and 
substantially withdrew from its initial position in respect of the waiver, 
simultaneously intensifying all the protectionist measures available at each step. 
This is a prime example of Greece’s substantive European strategy which was 
not restricted to negotiation demands alone but included the adaptation of her 
internal commercial policy.   
 
124 G/EEC/FTA, Working Party 23 to Theodoros Christidis, 19 July 1957, pp. 67-9.    
125 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F79/T1, Memo No 2, I. Pesmazoglou to President of the Government, 4 
November 1957.   
126 YDIA/1957/23/1, I. Pesmazoglou to G. Pesmazoglou, 16 September 1957. 
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Within the Maudling committee, Greece had indeed concentrated its efforts for 
the creation of the European Development Authority and formed an alliance with 
Turkey, Iceland and Ireland for this purpose.127 This Authority would be the 
instrument of a European Developmental Policy, aiming to finance, on 
favourable terms, the less developed countries with means derived from the 
budget of the developed countries which would benefit most of the process. 
Because the Federal Republic would be the main contributor, it proposed that 
the Authority would be headed by a German delegate and it was clear that 
Greece was ready to surrender sovereign prerogatives to this institution. From 
Christidis’ reports emerge that the creation of the Authority and the European 
Investment Bank were among the main preoccupations of Greek diplomacy and 
were presented as preconditions for the participation to the FTA. This insistence 
is natural, since the US bilateral economic aid was progressively reduced 
whereas the IBRD did not finance Greece due to its pre-war public debt. 
However, pressed by the Greek side, the US had supported the Authority and 
implied that it could contribute financially once it had been set-up. Instead, the 
Greek side had realized that Erhard preferred to finance Greece’s economic 
development on a bilateral basis and not through any multilateral scheme like 
the Authority.128 As Greek diplomacy had understood it, the granting of funds on 
a bilateral basis meant that only German businesses would undertake the 
realization of any financed project. It is important to mention here that 
Christidis had grounded the necessity for a bilateral association directly with the 
EEC on the difficulties for the establishment of finance institutions within the 
proposed FTA. In any case, Pesmazoglou and Christidis had repeatedly expressed 
to the Commission the government’s preference for a direct association, though 
this prospect had been discouraged, because, as was mentioned, not only the 
EEC’s institutions were not ready, but more importantly, this would disrupt the 
negotiations for the FTA.129  
 
127 G/EEC/FTA, OEEC, Working Party No 23 of the Council – Proposals of Greece, Iceland, Ireland 
and Turkey, 20 January 1958, pp. 116-20. The Authority was also known as the European 
Developmental and Readaptation Fund. Simultaneously, it was asked the creation of a European 
Investment Bank to finance businesses in the periphery with commercial criteria. The provision 
of finance with a ‘European’ interest rate was among the main business demands in Greece. 
128 YDIA/1958/8/1, Tsimikalis to Trade Ministry, Bonn, 31 January 1958; Ibid., Theodoros 
Christidis to Coordination Ministry, Paris, 30 May 1958. 
129 YDIA/1958/8/1, Theodoros Christidis to Coordination Ministry, Paris, 22 February 1958; Ibid., 
Theodoros Christidis to Coordination Ministry, Paris, 15 March 1958. 
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As expected, in a joint note with Irish and Turkish delegations in January 1958 
and, on the assumption that acceptable solutions would be found for all their 
collective demands and especially for the Authority, a first substantive step back 
in respect of the waiver was made. Within the transitional period, defined now 
to 14 years, all tariffs exceeding 50% ad valorem would be reduced by 5%. 
Thereafter, subject to escape clauses and within a twenty-year period called 
now waiver, all tariffs would be reduced by 5% annually until their final 
abolition. During the transitional period, for infant industries, and for those 
already existing who were facing problems, new or increased tariffs up to 50% ad 
valorem would be introduced.130 However, the EEC and other countries within 
the OEEC resisted these provisions and pressed for further commitments.131 In 
March 1958, the three countries again made one more concession, eliminating 
the transitional period to 10 years and accepting two tariff reductions within it, 
each one by 5%, always for the items for whose tariff exceeded 50%.132 Until July 
1958, the WP23 had, instead, proposed that these reductions should be applied 
to all items. The total period of the transitional period plus the waiver was now 
24 years within which, all tariffs would be eliminated.133 One month later, the 
Greek delegation was satisfied with the overall timeframe and, subject always 
to other adjustments, mainly capital inflows and agricultural exports, was ready 
to accept the proposed reductions within the first ten years.134  
The significance attached to these two compensatory provisions was beyond any 
doubt and, it seems, that it can explain the concessions. Certainly, if these two 
provisions were not finally included within the FTA, there is evidence that 
Greece would even veto tariff reductions. This became obvious when the 
Federal Republic proposed that the tariff reduction applicable to the Six on 1 
January 1959 could be extended to the OEEC as a whole and the discussions by 
the FTA would continue independently.135  
 
130 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F79/T5, Memo No 4 and Instruction to the Greek Delegation, 10 
January 1958.   
131 YDIA/1958/8/1, Tsimikalis to Trade Ministry, Bonn, 21 March 1958. 
132 G/EEC/FTA, Joint Note by the Greek, Irish and Turkish Delegations, Paris, 17 March 1958, pp. 
99-102.    
133 Ibid, Proposals by the Chairman, Paris, 15 July 1958, pp. 103-5.    
134 KKF/KKA/6A, I. Pesmazoglou to President of the Government, August 1958, pp. 474-9.  
135 YDIA/1958/8/2/3, P. Oikonomou-Gouras to Royal Embassies in Paris, Bonn, Brussels, Rome 
and Hague, 28 June 1958.  
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The reason for such insistence became apparent after the elections in May 1958, 
when the communist oriented EDA figured as the main opposition. Confirming 
the significance of the geopolitical reasoning, Christidis was clear enough. These 
two provisions would ameliorate the surplus population problem and save the 
rule of law: 
We made clear to everybody the dangers which Greece faces today as a 
result of the recent strengthening of the Communist left, adding that this 
development obliges us to stick even more to our demands. We highlighted 
at any opportunity that the only way to deal with such threats is the 
creation of employment opportunities and the increase of the standard of 
living, industrialization, etc. All these can be accomplished only with 
economic assistance to Greece and the opening of markets for her 
agricultural products. Upon this line, as it has been scheduled, we insist and 
return to it at every opportunity.136      
Of course, the elimination of the transitional period meant derogations and 
exchanges internally. Two weeks before the first concession, the Greek 
government had notified GATT of its intention to compose the new ad valorem 
customs tariff and to renegotiate even more items.137 When it was prepared for 
the second substantive withdrawal, finance minister declared that this revision 
was a part of Greece’s strategy toward European integration: 
The aim of this revision is not only the adaption of the custom’s tariff to 
today’s reality, but also to the conditions that the establishment of the 
Common Market and the studied FTA will create.138   
Meanwhile, the ROCEP’s industrial subcommittee considered the adaptation of 
the tariff protection. Since March 1958, at the forefront, was a survey for the 
effective rate of tariff protection that was never published by the ROCEP. 139 
Yet, until late 1958, PUTI’s proposal for the renewal of antidumping legislation, 
aiming particularly to halt imports from the Eastern bloc, had been adopted by 
 
136 YDIA/1958/8/1, Theodoros Christidis to Coordination Ministry, 17 May 1958. 
137 GATT/L/787, Continued Application, 20 January 1958.   
138 ‘To the Customs Tariff Revision Committee’, Imerisia, 1 March 1958.   
139 KKF/YSF/28/4, Minutes No 4, 3 March 1958.    
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the secondary committee of ROCEP. 140 In parallel, concrete protectionist 
measures were introduced. In July 1958, the government updated once more the 
main measures adopted in early 1955, notably credit barriers to industrial 
imports and public procurement.141 To the great satisfaction of industry, the 
deterioration in the 1958 export crisis had facilitated a commercial policy that 
had intensified protection for manufactures.142  
Yet it was clear that, until the collapse of the negotiations for the FTA, the issue 
of agricultural exports was virtually stagnant. Thus, Greece and Turkey jointly 
repeated their two main demands in November 1958. Firstly, agricultural 
products within the FTA had to be granted analogous to industrial product’s 
preferential tariff status. Secondly, for their main export products, they asked 
again for long-term contracts to bypass the remaining non-tariff barriers.143 
These developments had strengthened internally the criticisms of import 
liberalization because it was considered that this was the main cause of the 
substantially deteriorated balance of trade since 1953. For state managers and 
ministers alike, trade deficit was attributable mainly to the trade patterns 
within the EPU. It was pointed out that, throughout all these years, the Code 
had worked to the advantage of industrial states which had overlooked their 
commitments in respect of agricultural liberalization. As the BoG had 
emphasized, half of import increases after 1954 were coming from the 
continental countries belonged to the EPU, whereas only one third of export 
increases were directed to them.144 The result was that the trade deficit with 
OEEC members accounted for 52% of the total deficit in 1952 and in 1958 it had 
reached 66%.145 Nevertheless, it simultaneously highlighted the export 
dependence upon these European markets of which the prime example was the 
Federal Republic, to which exports covered 85% of imports in 1952 and only 56% 
 
140 ROCEP, Basic Committee for Secondary Production Committee, 5 vols (Athens, 1959), III, 
Issue 2, pp. 1-62.     
141 KKAFT, III, pp. 184-5 and 255-6. 
142 KKF/KKA/6A, G. Dertilis to K. Karamanlis, 31 July 1958, pp. 467-73.  
143 G/EEC/FTA, Joint Note from the Greek and Turkish Delegations on the special treatment, 
Paris, 15 November 1958, pp. 171-82.    
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in 1957, even though the latter were of primary importance for Greece.146 
Furthermore, in 1958 Greece had imported 45% of mechanical equipment (SITC-
7) from the Federal Republic and,147 as it will be argued later, these impressive 
trade flows had implications for Greece’s external orientation. 
4.4.2 The business reaction: a priori reasoning, early Europeanization 
and Greece as a bridge to Middle and Far East markets 
In August 1957, the FGI clarified to its members that the report of the industrial 
subcommittee was indeed not unanimous and stated that the a priori reasoning 
of Greece’s participation in the FTA and the creation of the EEC, were two 
realities that it could not ignore. In contrast, following European and national 
industrial BIAs in Europe, it had to adapt its strategy accordingly.148 Therefore, it 
was futile and harmful to consider if, in principle, it was desirable for Greece to 
participate in the common market as this preoccupation drew attention away 
from the main problem, the reduction of the production costs from both the 
state and industrialists. For the FGI, domestic industry was, in any case, obliged 
to become competitive because of the liberal commercial policy already applied 
and imposed by import liberalization and GATT’s pressure. European integration 
was then considered as a reason to speed up this adaption process which was the 
content of the federation’s updated strategy, namely the ‘Europeanization’ of 
domestic production.149 In the same direction, reluctantly and moderately, the 
PUTI had adjusted its position.150 As its President made clear later on, the 
prospect for a common defence to Eastern dumping had played a substantive 
role in its relatively more moderate stance towards European integration. 
Simultaneously, for the first time publicly, the PUTI had accepted that for the 
irrational firm organization industrialists were also responsible and, even more, 
it called on them to accept their responsibilities.151 The issue of business 
organization had dominated the discussions at the Chamber’s conference in 
 
146 KKF/KKA/7A, Informative Memo for the Greek-German economic and trade relations. To the 
President of the government, no date, pp. 838-59; Ibid, Minister of Commerce to K. Karamanlis, 
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148 ‘The official position of the FGI. The Circular.’, VE, August 1957, pp. 51-2. 
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October 1957. There, the coordination minister Papaligouras, who had agreed 
with Erhard the framework of Greek-German relations within the FTA, initially 
prepared the wider business community for the upcoming setbacks at the 
negotiations within the Maudling committee. Then, he was exceptionally caustic 
toward the anachronistic business administration practices, emphasizing that 
business modernization was the challenge of the FTA.152 Undoubtedly, the 
process of liberalization had questioned for the first-time prevailing business 
organization norms.  
It was now evident that the wide gap between the divergent positions of the 
main industrial BIAs had closed, and FGI’s view was compatible with ACCI’s 
approach. This was not to say that there was complete unanimity within industry 
towards the FTA. For example, the UWI still rejected any discussion with the 
FTA, using arguments not really far from those employed during the turmoil of 
mid-1953.153 Yet, there was a considerable portion of business representatives 
who had pointed to the direction that the FGI had proposed in its public 
interventions in April and May, as an alternative to the FTA: The Middle East 
markets. The head of ACCI’s industrial section was clear in this respect. If OEEC 
accepts Greece’s terms and certain preconditions were met during the 
transitional 20-year waiver, then participation would be useful. If these terms 
were not be accepted, then Greece would not be marginalized. There were the 
alternatives of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Arab Common Market.154 The 
UWFI argued similarly as it had already proposed that Greece should approach 
Arab states to form an alliance which would then negotiate with the advanced 
industrial states on equal terms.155 Even if, as previous experience indicated, it 
was clearly difficult to reach such an agreement, these proposals were not 
without merit.  
As we have seen, the FGI was interested in these markets since the inter-war 
period and after 1945 it was upon this basis that businessmen and state 
managers had pursued a preferential trade scheme with these countries and a 
 
152 ‘The speech of Trade and Industry minister Mr. P. Papaligouras’, in ACCI, Second Conference, 
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customs union with Turkey. By mid-1953, the customs union with Turkey had 
become disadvantageous for Greece because the former had intensified 
quantitative restrictions and the prospects for manufacturing exports had rapidly 
deteriorated.156 Additionally, import liberalization in Greece had toppled its 
state managers from negotiation instruments. In contrast, trade relations with 
Arab states were still on the agenda and positive signs came in late 1954 from 
the Arab Chambers of Commerce Conference.157  The Karamanlis government was 
quick to respond in early 1956 and attempted to consolidate trade relations by 
organizing an Economic conference of the Arab world in Athens as a feint to the 
rival Bagdad Pact.158 Additionally, the conference had the benefit that by 
facilitating Greece’s economic leadership in the Middle Eastern states, the Arab 
world would in turn assist Greece against Turkey and the UK over the Cyprus 
issue.159  
Yet Greece’s economic prospects in the region were closely related to German 
foreign economic policy and the foreign ministry was aware of its implications. In 
late 1955, state managers within the foreign ministry were anxious for an 
international solution to Greek economic problems which were in common with 
all underdeveloped states: underemployment, trade deficit and chronic capital 
scarcity.160 For these managers, all the initiatives adopted until that time within 
the OEEC, EPU and GATT for a common market for goods, capital and labour 
which could ameliorate or even solve these problems, had failed. Thus, the only 
solution was to side with the Federal Republic within NATO to resolve the 
politico-economic problems of Greece: to boost income and the standard of 
living as well as to stabilize the currency and the economy as a whole. Their 
proposals were based upon the observation that the Federal Republic, following 
US and UK initiatives in this respect, aimed to penetrate Balkan and Middle 
Eastern markets. It was argued that the German interest was strongly motivated 
by commercial concerns, for the Federal Republic had lost its pre-war Eastern 
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markets that absorbed her industrial ‘overproduction’.161 For Greece, it was an 
opportunity to ‘bridge’ this ‘economic penetration’, for it had traditionally good 
economic and political relations with the Arab world.162 Not surprisingly, the 
foreign ministry closely followed German foreign commercial and economic 
policies thus it was aware that the Federal Republic, during the Brussels 
Conference, had favoured both Euratom and the customs union.163  One month 
later, it was informed that the Bundesbank had shown that a wider European 
market was also in Germany's interest.164 As expected, Greece intensified its 
efforts toward the Middle Eastern markets. 
In mid-1956, the first trade conference between Greece and the Arab states took 
place in Athens and both the FGI and ACCI worked closely with Arab 
businessmen. The latter visited almost all the major industrial companies in 
Athens and Piraeus and lunched with Bodosakis.165 In January 1957, a committee 
which included the leading teams of FGI and the ACCI was established for this 
purpose and both BIAs regularly advised their members of the needs and the 
prospects in these markets.166 Following the secret protocol with the Federal 
Republic in July 1957, efforts intensified. In November, a German delegate 
visited Athens to discuss Greek-German business cooperation and subsequently a 
team of leading industrialists and merchants, from both the FGI and ACCI, 
departed for the Middle East.167 At the time, both BIAs consumed much of their 
efforts on the promotion of industrial exports to the region, whereas Greece was 
presented as a ‘bridge’ for German exports to the Middle East. 168 At the end of 
1958, the federation had published a study of the existing and projected 
industrial exports, putting the Arab countries well ahead of both the European 
 
161 Ibid. 
162 YDIA/1956/11/5, Syndikas, Greek Delegation at NATO, 3 March 1956. 
163 YDIA/1957/71/5, Kapetanidis to Foreign Ministry, 15 February 1956.    
164 YDIA/1957/71/5, Kapetanidis to Foreign Ministry, 27 March 1956. 
165 ‘The A’ Greek-Arab Trade Conference’, VE, July 1956, pp. 31-46. Arab businessmen visited 
the companies: Papastratos SA, Technica Malkotsis SA, AEEXPL, EPK, Chromatourgia Piraeus SA, 
Lararas Kyrtsis SA, Halivourgiki SA, Titan SA, and P-P. 
166 ‘Businesses in Middle east Countries’, Imerisia, 30 January 1957. 
167 ‘Departed for Middle east the members of the Greek Trade Delegation’, Imerisia, 27 
November 1958. 
168 ‘The Germans consider Greece as an export bridge to M. East’, OT, 24 April 1958. 
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and US markets.169 It is clear that the European strategies of Greece’s big 
businesses had evolved within this framework.  
This is the case with the Bodosakis group. Bodosakis had not expressed publicly 
his opinion on the FTA but, there is no doubt, that at the time the Bodosakis 
group and the Greek state shared common interests towards the Federal 
Republic. This was especially true with respect to the EPK, which was among the 
central considerations during bilateral Greek-German economic negotiations and 
its viability was explicitly dependent upon German orders. Yet the AEEXPL had 
expressed its confidence for the FTA because its renewed mechanical equipment 
‘guaranteed’ its future within the ‘common market’.170 Similarly, the EEOO 
stated that it had nothing to fear from the FTA.171 Later on, even the Hellenic 
Woollen Industry SA, which was coming from a sector which was against the FTA, 
considered Greece’s participation in the common market necessary, provided 
that the country would receive the special treatment for which the negotiation 
team had already applied.172 Indeed, the support of the FTA was the dominant 
trend between the companies that had received Marshall Plan funds and had 
adopted, or been scheduled to adopt, business relations with German industry.  
Malkotsis himself was quite confident in the prospect for domestic industry and 
reasonably confident in the development of its capital goods branch, to which 
his own business belonged.173 Moreover, the company from which the next FGI 
president came, was also clear in this respect. Izola’s chairman was confident in 
his company and in the whole industry, provided that Greece’s ‘quite aptly 
formulated demands’ would materialize, and industrialists would also do their 
duty with production costs.174 Even P-P had followed the same course. Katsabas, 
its main shareholder and former FGI president, reported to Karamanlis that 
German cotton industrialists, who had visited Greece in September 1958, had 
expressed their interest, not only in raw cotton purchases, but also in export 
oriented mixed German-Greek textile industries.175 It was in this context that 
 
169 ‘The List submitted to Trade Ministry by the FGI’, Imerisia, 9 December 1958. 
170 ‘Τhe AEEXPL’s Director-General for FTA’, Imerisia, 23 July 1957, p. 1. 
171 ‘The EEOO’s Director-General for FTA’, Imerisia, 25 August 1957, p. 3. 
172 ‘Hellenic Woollen Industry SA for FTA’, Imerisia, 4 April 1958, p. 3. 
173 ‘S. Malkotsis to FTA’, Imerisia, 17 October 1957, p. 3. 
174 ‘P. Drakos for FTA’, Imerisia, 17 October 1957, p. 3. 
175 KKF/KKA/7A, Katasabas Memo, 6 October 1958, pp. 881-2. 
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Stratos himself had publicly accepted that, if all the proposed measures were 
adopted, then the cotton industry had nothing to fear within the FTA.176 In order 
to appropriately consider this latter development, it should be added that in 
late March 1957, the Greek embassy at Bonn had attempted to promote textile 
exports to the federal ministry of defence.177 Until October 1958 Klockner, 
Demag AG and Siemens AG had all made concrete proposals for joint ventures 
with the above firms, aiming primarily to organize exports to the Arab states.178 
In contrast, there was a business faction that was quite cautious. This was the 
case with the main shareholder of SST Ltd, who had accepted that the adoption 
of the proposed measures could only ameliorate the situation.179 The same was 
true for the main shareholder of Halyvourgia SA.180 The attitudes of these 
businessmen, however, did not alter the fact that all the other major business 
factions within the FGI belonged exclusively to the group that had supported the 
FTA option. In January 1958, the FGI Board had adapted to the circumstances 
and all the main business factions were now represented at the highest level. 
FGI’s president was Georgios Drakos, and Bodosakis, Alexandros Tsatsos and 
Katsabas had been all elected vice-presidents.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated some important aspects of Greece’s participation in 
the second substantive phase of European integration which became feasible 
through the prism of state-business relations. Firstly, it has been shown how and 
why the consideration of business interests can cast light upon hidden 
dimensions of integration. Secondly, and related to this, the consideration of 
business action beyond the peak-level, enabled this research to follow the actual 
decision-making process. Thirdly, the political considerations of businessmen 
constituted a crucial part of business accumulation strategies and they can 
explain the formation and promotion of their interests as a propertied class.  
 
176 Chr. Stratos, ‘Greek Cotton Industry is a National Industry’, ΟΤ, 05 June 1958.  
177 YDIA/1957/72/4, Tsimikalis to Trade Ministry, Bonn, 03 April 1957. 
178 KKF/KKA/7A, G. Panas, Comprehensive Memo for Greek-German negotiations, Athens, 7 
November 1958, pp. 940-54.  
179 ‘S. Korais for FTA’, Imerisia, 7 August 1957, p. 3. 
180 ‘D. Efstratiou for FTA’, Imerisia, 11 August 1957, p. 3. 
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To begin with, the maintenance of import liberalization was exceptionally 
difficult because it had exposed traditional domestic industry to international 
competition and simultaneously had deprived state managers of negotiation 
instruments for the promotion of agricultural exports both within the OEEC and 
the GATT. Based upon this common ground between businesses and state 
agencies, Greece’s substantive European strategy unfolded: on the one hand the 
adaptation of its industrial policy and the protection regime in early 1955 and, 
on the other, the rejection of all proposals for tariff reduction within the OEEC 
framework until 1956.  
Instead, import liberalization was backed by the liberal business faction, which 
from early 1953 until January 1956, led the FGI. It had adopted a similar 
attitude to commercial BIAs, backing the government and BoG’s decision to 
continue with this policy. This stance had created a rift between industrial BIAs 
and, contrary to any prediction based upon the FGI’s policy until 1952, the 
federation had supported European integration until January 1956. Certainly, 
this was an act of leadership from Alexandros Tsatsos. 
As expected, the decision to abolish tariffs in mid-1957 and to join the FTA, was 
even more difficult. Tariff disarmament would aggravate the consequences of 
liberalization as currency devaluation had already ceased to ameliorate the 
pressure upon the trade balance. Again, the representatives of big business from 
the main sectors interacted with state agencies to steer the course of Greece 
toward the FTA. Importantly, craftsmen and agricultural organized interests 
were not consulted.   
Contrary to what has been implied by the bulk of the literature, the government 
was defensive until 1956 and it was the BoG which coordinated Greece’s 
response during the crucial first months of 1957. In any case, it was Zolotas who 
had insisted that the viability of Greek capitalism was threatened by the 
inability of industry to absorb the surplus population and to improve its low 
productivity. Within the BoG, an argument emerged that eventually guided the 
state’s action: a common market in Europe would exacerbate these two 
interrelated problems, because, as location theory suggests, it would widen the 
productivity gap because capital would be attracted to regions already 
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developed. Equally, the exclusion from European markets, and notably from the 
Federal Republic, would eliminate the import capacity for German capital goods 
and mechanical equipment.  
In 1956 big businesses relied primarily on the internal market and thus upon 
agricultural income and state purchases. For some of them, which had already 
adopted relations with German businesses, exports to Middle Eastern markets 
could improve their deteriorating performances. Equally, Greek-German business 
cooperation could assist them to withstand increasing European competition. 
Any disturbance to these parameters would question their viability. This was 
largely the basis for the formation of corporate interests in relation to the 
proposed FTA and, crucially, for a large part of companies financed by the ERP 
and represented within the high echelons of the FGI. The federation, as 
expected, asked for an association that would promote agricultural exports 
without any commitment for tariff reduction for internally produced 
manufactured goods. Instead, consistent with its accumulation strategy since the 
1920s, the FGI was eager to abolish tariff protection for mechanical equipment 
and heavy machinery. Certainly, capital inflows would necessarily accompany 
any such commitment. For the PUTI, the alternative to Eastern trade had 
implications for dumping, whereas the UWFI and the industrial section of the 
ACCI had also pointed to the Middle Eastern markets as an alternative.  
Simultaneously, the growing business faction represented by Alexandros Tsatsos 
and Andreadis, actively backed the BoG’s argumentation because not only did it 
not fear foreign competition but also because it was interested in the adoption 
of heavy industry with the assistance of German business. Beyond this, Tsatsos 
claimed that there were a priori political reasons for Greece’s participation in 
the FTA. If in early 1955, the federation’s vice-president Drakos considered that 
European industry dumped its surpluses, in early 1957 his successor added a new 
dimension claiming that overproduction had forced Europeans to create a large 
market. The realization of the FTI that this market, and the FTA, would boost 
economic development and act as a bulwark to communism was a catalyst to its 
attitude. Indeed, the traditional business factions understood that their wider 
political and class interests would be protected within the proposed scheme and 
this had smoothed diverse attitudes and ameliorated business fragmentation.  
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This state of affairs was accurately depicted in the Greek Memorandum which 
elaborated Greece’s formal European strategy. Once the decision for 
participation had been taken in principle, Greece had to accept the commitment 
in respect to scheduled tariff reduction embedded in the process of European 
integration in order to promote its two main demands, namely agricultural 
exports and capital inflows. Until the end of 1958, when exports particularly to 
OEEC members had deteriorated substantially, the arrangement of agricultural 
products was far from satisfactory and the prospects for a European 
Developmental Authority vague, the initial position for tariff reduction had been 
completely reversed. The industrial community, and particularly the traditional 
business factions, had meanwhile been compensated and had softened their 
attitude, adapting their strategy accordingly and supporting the whole 
endeavour. This was again part of Greece’s substantive strategy i.e. the 
interaction between businessmen and state agencies to steer Greece towards 
Europe was now fully fledged. 
Firstly, industry had been compensated with the adoption of consecutive 
protective measures. Above all, an internal reform, the revision of the customs 
tariff pending since 1948, had finally been launched as part of Greece’s 
strategy. Secondly, the core of the FGI’s leadership attempted to take 
advantage of the agreement with the Federal Republic in July 1957 which had 
opened the possibility for Greek-German businesses cooperation aiming for 
exports to Middle Eastern markets. The Bodosakis group had played a significant 
role here and there is evidence that it had played such a role before the Greek 
memorandum. Thirdly, the federation was working closely with state managers 
within the ROCEP aiming to adapt industrial and commercial policies along the 
formulation of a new industrial plan, all of which promised the reduction of 
production costs and the utilization of fresh capital. 
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 THE OUTCOME (1959-1962) 
The world-wide economic recession in 1958 exposed the weaknesses of Greek 
capitalism and brought its structural problem to the fore.1 Whereas in the core 
of Europe by early 1959 there were signs of recovery, in Greece the rate of 
economic growth from 1958 until 1960 was on average only 3.3% annually, which 
was almost half of the period discussed in the previous part. The same downturn 
tendency had shown the rate of growth of industrial output, which for the same 
years, was on average about 7%. Yet, even if investment capital was now 
available at commercial banks and the interest rate reduced, total investment 
was still low compared to core Europe whereas their composition had 
deteriorated. In 1959 private investment in manufacturing as a percentage of 
GDP fell even more from the already low level of the previous years and private 
investment was channelled to non-productive sectors, such as housing.2 There is 
evidence that business was waiting for the outcome of the negotiations with the 
EEC but, as will be argued, the corporate sector was already indebted, facing 
difficulties in both self-financing and borrowing. Manufacturing investment 
recovered only after 1962. 
What had certainly aggravated the situation was the intensification of the 
already acute export crisis which had hit Greece since 1956. The trade deficit as 
percentage of the GDP was growing continuously and the protectionist measures 
adopted had only ameliorated the problem.3 For this adverse trend responsibility 
largely lay with the declining share of exports of the main agricultural products, 
tobacco, raisins and oil, primarily to the Federal Republic and the EEC countries 
increasing, in turn, the trade dependence from the Soviet bloc.4 Behind this 
deterioration was the fact that for Greece’s main exportable products 
international prices were declining whereas the prices for manufactured and 
capital goods, such as consumer durables and machinery for which Greek 
industry was unresponsive, were increasing steadily because they enjoyed high 
income elasticity of demand.  
 
1 Fragiadis, Greek, pp. 167-72.   
2 Appendix, table 3. 
3 Appendix, Tables 8;9;11. 
4 Halikias, The Economic, 43-62. 
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The inability to utilize efficiently the, low for the European standards, 
investment in the secondary sectors of the economy during the 1950s, combined 
with the deterioration of the trade balance, had two severe social 
consequences. Poverty and unemployment were still persistent when in core 
Europe these phenomena had been more or less eliminated. Certainly, the 
government was aware that western consumer patterns, which largely meant the 
consumption of consumer durables on an increasing scale, were progressively 
adopted by the Greeks. However, the structure of the economy along with the 
skewed distribution of income, prohibited their realization by the ‘working 
classes’ which remained poor.5  Only the ‘propertied classes’, whose profits 
were largely undertaxed were able to consume what were called luxury 
products.6 The result was that the importation of luxury items, a category which 
included, primarily, consumer durables, was growing at double the rate than 
general imports. In respect to unemployment, the absorption of the idle rural 
population, which was flocking to the urban areas, proved an impossible task. 
Between the years 1951-1961 the increase in the total population was about 
10%, whereas the percentages for the two main urban regions of the country, 
the wider Athens and Salonica industrial districts, was 35% and 27% 
respectively.7 The labour force employed in manufacturing, including artisans, 
was roughly the same both for the years 1951 and 1961. In absolute numbers, it 
was less than half a million people whereas, as a percentage of the available 
labour force, it was declining.8 In 1961, one million people, or more than one 
quarter of the active labour force, was registered as unemployed or 
underemployed.9  
The elections in May 1958, where ERE re-gained a majority vote but the 
communist EDA became the main opposition largely because of the continuing 
poverty and unemployment, released forces which temporarily challenged the 
anti-communist politico-economic edifice and the external orientation of 
 
5 GR/GL/CIT/092/59/2/17, Economics, no date; ‘The meeting with the council of productive 
forces’, OT, 31 July 1958.  
6 GR/GL/CIT/092/59/2/17, Economics, no date. 
7 ESYE, Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1962 (Athens: National Printing Office, 1963), pp. 15 and 
23.      
8 Annendix, table 6. 
9 ESYE, Results of the Population Census of 7 April 1951, 3 vols (Athens: National Printing Office, 
1958-1961), III (1958), p. 224; and Results of the Population-Inhabitants Census of 19 March 
1961, 3 vols (Athens: National Printing Office, 1964-1968), III, (1968), p. 122 and 116.       
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Greece. The government’s first reaction was to intensify the persecution of the 
communist left10 although the army and conservative political circles were still 
not satisfied and considered, frequently with US state agencies, that a coup 
might be necessary to contain communism.11  The problem, as the US embassy 
observed, was aggravated because the centre was fragmented so could not 
prevent the polarization between the right and the communist left.12 
Additionally, the controversial settlement of the Cyprus issue in early 1959 had 
once more released anti-American sentiments and the left pressed the 
government to exit NATO, following the nonaligned path that Tito and Nasser 
followed, rather than to associate with the EEC.13 Furthermore, people were 
receptive to the calls of the Soviet bloc for a neutral Balkan zone free from 
nuclear weapons and missiles (IRBM).14 Certainly, the viability of Greece as a 
capitalist state and economy was threatened when the Six’s customs union made 
its first steps. How Greece could fit into this reality was still open and the 
competitive plans for European integration made it more complicated. 
The FTA, proposed by the British and supported by the BDI and Erhard, never 
materialled mainly because ‘French industry, like the French government, was 
hostile’15 and thus De Gaulle in late 1958 effectively vetoed this endeavour. The 
British reaction was led by the CBI which was working for an industrial free trade 
association, consisting of six countries outside the EEC and Britain. In November 
1959 the industrial European Free Trade Association (EFTA) had been formed 
which had not only ‘intrinsic benefits’ to British business but it was also a means 
to press the EEC for a compromise, which still meant an open trading bloc 
embracing all OEEC members.16 This initiative was backed by the CED and 
German big businesses, which were always supported by Erhard, as a scheme 
compatible with the Atlantic community; because this community was based 
upon liberal transatlantic trade, which EEC’s external tariff tended to 
 
10 Nicolakopoulos, The Cachectic, pp. 256-7. 
11 Rizas, Greek Politics, pp. 227-38. 
12 Ibid., pp. 209-26. It was only in early 1961 that Papandreou was able to rally the centre with 
the encouragement of the US, forming the Democratic Centre. Thereafter, the polarization 
between communism and anticommunism was progressively replaced by the polarization 
between the right and the centre. 
13 Rizas, Greek Politics, pp. 241-7. 
14 Pelt, Tying, 177-8.  
15 Rollings, British, p. 122. 
16 Ibid., p. 126. 
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undermine, it presupposed the wider trading bloc pursued by the British.17 
Again, French and Italian big businesses, being on average more protectionist 
than those represented by the BDI, opposed this prospect and opted instead for 
accelerating the process of economic integration of the inner Six. It was this 
policy which, backed by the French and Federal governments, eventually 
prevailed and shaped European integration.18 Thereafter, the EEC has 
incrementally deepening negative economic integration, the core of which was 
always centred upon the removal of the barriers to the movement of capital, 
labour, goods and services. Such integration induced a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions within the customs union and, along the common external tariff, 
encouraged US direct investment. Very soon, American multinational businesses 
dominated several industrial sectors. The reaction of European big businesses 
had been influenced from the first supranational policy adopted, the 
Competition Policy which aimed to ban cartelization and restrictive practices 
which still prevailed in Europe.19  
Moreover, the EEC adopted a set of common policies, the most important of 
which by far was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).20 The Treaty of Rome 
had set only general goals and the situation was not clarified during the Stresa 
meeting in the mid-1958 but intense negotiations continued between the 
Commission, the member states and agricultural organized interests. This delay, 
as will be shown, was one of the reasons for the negotiations of Greece with the 
EEC lasting almost two years. The formation of CAP was essentially at a 
standstill until it was linked with the acceleration of the customs union in early 
1960. On the one hand, the Commission proposed, in May 1960, low support 
prices and a market driven policy and, on the other, the French insisted on 
bilateral long-term contracts for specific products whereas the Germans 
supported high support prices because their agriculture was uncompetitive. In 
December 1960 the Council decided to set relatively high support prices with 
external protection in the form of varied levies at the frontier along with 
subsidies. It was in early 1962 that an agreement was reached on this basis, and 
 
17 Pérez, ‘The European’, pp. 73-8. 
18 Moravcsik, The Choice, 206-8.  
19 Neil Rollings and Laurent Warlouzet, ‘Business history and European integration: How 
EEC competition policy affected companies’ strategies’, Business History (2018), 1-26. 
20 Milward, The European, pp. 312-7. 
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the CAP emerged progressively as a protectionist and interventionist policy, 
shaped primarily by French agricultural interests.  
The Greek historiography on economic development and European integration 
has concluded that the government’s response to the unfavourable situation - 
for Greek capitalism - after May 1958 was the decision to boost economic 
development within the framework of an association with the EEC’s customs 
union aiming to modernize politically and economically.21 For this literature the 
answer to this challenge was to tie Greece to European integration, promoting 
an export led growth model based upon the attraction of FDI that would provide 
appropriate capital and technology inflows. Certainly, this explanation has 
highlighted an important dimension of Greece’s association with the EEC but it 
has downplayed, or even neglected, other important dimensions which are 
imperative for a more rounded evaluation.  
In the first place, this literature has not incorporated in the analysis the mass 
emigration to the Federal Republic which took place in the 1960s but has only 
mentioned parenthetically that it was the ‘dark side of economic 
development’.22 Equally, it has ignored the bilateral Greek-German business 
relations which had framed Greece’s economic development. However, both 
these relationships played a substantive role in the way that Greece participated 
in European integration. In any case, as was argued in chapter four, the decision 
for Greece’s participation in the customs union was essentially taken from early 
1957 and the government had shown its preference for an association directly 
with the EEC rather than with the FTA. As will be shown in chapter six, when the 
prospect for an FTA became blurred in 1958, the government pressed for a 
bilateral association with the EEC, but Erhard insisted on the multilateral 
solution and had essentially prevented Greece from applying for an association 
with the EEC. For this reason, Greece applied only in mid-1959, actually when 
the British had decided on EFTA. Thereafter, Greece negotiated the general 
framework of the association essentially only with the Federal Republic.  
 
21 Kazakos, Between, 231-40; Minotou, ‘The European’, pp. 258-323; Botsiou, ‘The US’.  
22 Kazakos, Between, p. 224.  
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Secondly, the formal association strategy was close to Zolotas’ proposals and 
was essentially an updated version of the European policy formulated with the 
cooperation of businessmen back in 1949. Certainly, Zolotas’ argument that 
Greece’s main economic problem was its low productivity and that European 
integration would increase the productivity gap between Greek and European 
industry, guided the action of key state agencies. Even more, in 1960 the BoG’s 
governor made it clear that agricultural exports to the EEC would enable the 
organic association of Greece with a wider competitive market which, above all, 
promised the reorganization and modernization of domestic industry and its 
subsequent external orientation in the long-term.23 Clearly, Zolotas had outlined 
the modernization argument. 
Thirdly, during the period 1959-1962, Greece not only negotiated the terms of 
its entrance to the EEC, but it had also updated its industrial and commercial 
policies for the transitional period. It was the unfolding of Greece’s European 
strategy which had largely specified Greece’s future developmental path. The 
consideration of the major business interests is again the catalyst for an 
understating of this strategy. At the Chambers’ of Commerce conference in 
October 1959 the FGI, along with the ACCI and the FGTT, had illustrated the 
twofold character of this strategy.24 On the one hand, the federation had backed 
the official negotiation position of Greece which asked for a long-transitional 
period, capital inflows and support for the preferential treatment of Greek 
tobacco within the EEC. The unique study which considered the FGI’s attitude, 
has grasped only this dimension, arguing that the similarity of the federation’s 
demands with the basic terms of the association agreement was ‘striking’.25 
However, the FGI’s stance was still informed by the need to defend its class 
interests and to protect the property rights of its members as part of the 
federation’s wider accumulation strategy but this dimension has been neglected 
by Moussis. On the other hand, the FGI had additionally defended its corporate 
interests pursuing an import substitution policy, highlighting the necessity to 
adapt the industrial and protectionist policies in order to facilitate the 
 
23 BOG, Bank of Greece Governor’s Annual Report for the year 1959 (Athens: BoG, 1960).  
24 ‘Conclusion: Problems created by the functioning of the common market and Greece’s 
association’, in ACCI, Third Conference of the Greek Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(Athens: OCCC, 1960), pp. 475-6. 
25 Moussis, Greek, p. 140.   
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adjustment of industry to the new competitive environment. At the same time, 
the liberal business faction had actively backed association with the EEC for both 
economic and political reasons and was undoubtedly more liberal than the 
government. Again, this dimension has not been addressed by Moussis, 
preventing his work from appropriately evaluating business influence. Indeed, 
this liberal faction had actively promoted the cooperation with German and 
French business. This was important, because the government negotiated not 
only with national governments, but also with German, French and Italian big 
businesses which were interested in participating in Greece’s economic 
development. Even more, it substantiated the policy for the attraction of FDI 
which was among the basic aims of state agencies from 1953. At the political 
level, the liberal business faction framed the whole endeavour upon the need to 
adopt large scale competitive businesses as a bulwark to the communist bloc.  
Clearly, state policies and concerns were intertwined with the strategies of big 
business indicating that Greece’s association with the EEC was an effort for 
bourgeois modernization which, however, did not prescribe a common pattern 
of economic development with core Europe. Instead, the adaptation of the 
distinctive features of Greek capitalism, mainly close industry-bank relations and 
state aid, was an integral part of Greece’s response to European integration. 
Overall, the prospect of participation in the customs union would further 
increase the competitive pressure upon Greece’s productive base hence it was 
necessary for the government and business to intensify efforts to efficiently 
increase both production and employment. As a result, Greece updated its 
industrial policy and formulated a new developmental programme which was 
combined with the strengthening of Greek-German economic relations upon 
which the government and prominent businessmen had based their hopes for the 
solution of the viability problem of Greek capitalism. This story and its evolution 
are the main themes of chapter five. Largely as result of this reliance upon the 
Federal Republic and German big businesses, in June 1959, the Greek 
government was quick to apply for an association agreement with the EEC. 
Chapter six examines the unfolding of the association strategy as a response to 
early European integration and the relevant negotiations along with the 
commercial policy for this period.   
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 The renewed effort to boost investments 
and the evolution of Greek-German 
economic relations  
This first section reviews ROCEP’s recommendations in respect of industrial 
policy and industrial planning by exploring the contribution of the FGI. It 
identifies that corporate industry was over-indebted and industrial policy was 
adjusted accordingly, consolidating and updating the fiscal and credit incentives 
which had been tentatively introduced during the previous period. It also shows 
that the new developmental plan had deep roots within ROCEP which aimed at 
introducing Greece to the new competitive environment and was thus part of 
Greece’s substantive European strategy.  
The second section explores the evolution of Greek-German economic relations 
and particularly the November 1958 economic agreement and its 
implementation. Relations in the public sectors strengthened even more but 
private cooperation stalled because the FGI refused the terms under which 
German capital was eager to invest in Greece. Businesses around shipping capital 
stepped in and participated in the new developmental organization which aimed 
to advance Greek-German economic relations and to enforce the November 1958 
agreement. This organization was to become the vehicle, not only for the 
emergence of the Andreadis group, but also for the attraction of FDI which was 
at the heart of Greece’s association strategy.  
The last section casts light upon the origins of these developments examining 
the evolution of the Bodosakis group and its turning towards French business. 
Moreover, it examines the response of traditional industry to the new business 
environment specified by the association with the EEC and the rejection of the 
German FDI, by exploring the corporate strategies of representative big 
businesses.     
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5.1 Industrialization plans, industrial policy and capital scarcity 
In early 1959, the low level of industrial investment had attracted the attention 
of both the economic press and prominent economists.1 It was stressed that this 
investment inertia was not attributable to the so-called scarcity of capital any 
more for the BoG had accumulated undistributed funds. In particular, Zolotas 
had advocated that there was a lack of entrepreneurship in Greece which, 
combined with the technological and organizational deficiencies in both the 
private and public sectors, accounted for this inertia. In March 1959, the prime 
minister discussed the ensuing deterioration of investments with the 
representatives of peak-level BIAs emphasizing that, if necessary, the 
government would introduce all the appropriate measures to increase 
‘production’.2 From its side, the FGI had related the need for investment to the 
imminent association with the EEC, emphasizing the inability of industry to self-
finance.   
The federation had asked particularly for untaxed profits to be channelled to 
investments, the reduction of the interest rate for long-term finance and the 
reduction of companies’ participation in new investments financed by EDFO.3 It 
added that it expected that, ‘The cost of money and its availability will become 
equal across the United Europe’.4 In this conjecture, the federation’s tactic was 
to ask for fiscal and credit incentives based upon the results of the ROCEP to 
finance domestic industry in order to face European competition.  
In contrast to the FGI demand for an institution that would guide economic 
development in the long-term, the ROCEP was a short-lived committee. By the 
end of January 1959, it had finished its basic tasks and two months later it had 
published its results and recommendations. During the one and a half years of its 
life, the endeavours of the ROCEP were concentrated upon two main issues.5 
First, cooperating with the National Statistical Service (ESYE) and the local 
 
1 ‘An Unjustified level of Capital’, ΟΤ, 9 April 1959; Hellenic Society of Economic Sciences, 
Reports for Greece’s Economic Development (Athens, 1960). 
2 KKAFT, IV, p. 30.  
3 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1958 (Athens: FGI, 1959), pp. 19-20.   
4 Ibid., p. 18. 
5 Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, Georgios Spentzas Archive (hereafter KKF/GSA) 28/1, 
ROCEP Secretary-General to Prime-minister, 2 February 1959. 
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authorities, it contracted two major studies and six large scale censuses. 
Second, its various committees contracted several studies and made 
recommendations as to the future of almost all of the sectors of the economy.  
The first major study was concerned with the methodology of the future 
economic programme and the second with consumption needs. In respect to 
primary production, the censuses collected data for irrigated land, land 
reclamation works and, of particular importance, the enumeration of the means 
for the cooling and transportation of agricultural production. This last census 
was carried out with the participation of German experts who had undertaken a 
consultancy role for the whole endeavour of a cooling chain.6 In respect to 
secondary production, the Committee for Secondary Production initially guided 
the process for the second post-war substantive industrial census.7 This census 
was the main concern of the Committee’s vice president, Katsabas, who 
considered it as the basis for any future industrial policy.8 The industrial census 
for the year 1957 included 760 industrial companies and collected data on their 
employment, expenditures, investments, production costs and their balance 
sheets. The ROCEP received these results in December 1958.9 From that year 
onwards, the ESYE contracted annual industrial surveys. 
The results of this survey were important because they depicted, for the first 
time, the liability structure of Greek manufacturing. They showed that in 1957 
about 65% of the liabilities of industrial companies was foreign capital which was 
a permanent feature of post-war industry. These results were similar to those of 
a survey contracted by the NBG for the year 1955 which had also shown that, 
with the exception of the tobacco industry, the financial leverage in 1955 had 
been significantly higher in relation to the year 1939.10 The situation had further 
deteriorated during the years 1959-1962 which is confirmed by the analogous 
survey for the year 1963 which showed that, on average, the foreign capital of 
1.139 industrial companies had climbed to 74% of their total liabilities for that 
 
6 KKF/GSA/27, Correspondence of General Secretary with German companies, May-July 1958. 
7 The first industrial census was contacted in April 1951, and its results were published at the 
Statistical Yearbooks for the years 1954 and 1955.   
8 KKF/GSA/28/4, Minutes No 2, 20 October 1957; Ibid., Minutes No 5, 15 May 1958.   
9 ESYE, Statistics in Greece (Athens: National Printing Office, 1961), p. 26. 
10 Yeorgios Tr. Mirkos, State, Bank, Industry: from the History of National Bank of Greece 
(Athens: Livanis, 2010), pp. 79-80. 
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year.11 As expected, the issue was of primary concern for the FGI. From 1959 it 
published annually the results of an analogous survey which included the balance 
sheets of all the industrial corporations which had published their financial 
statements from the financial year 1956 onwards. Its results confirm that, 
according to the balance sheets, the industrial corporate sector had almost 
identical problems. Both percentages and their trends are compatible with the 
ESYE surveys.12     
Two findings are of importance here. First, corporate industrial firms relied 
more and more upon the more expensive circulating capital thereby increasing 
interest payments disproportionately. For the BoG a considerable portion of this 
short-term capital was utilized for fixed capital assets and credit sales or even 
for building.13 Second, the ratio of equity to foreign capital was problematic. It 
is reasonable to assume that a considerable part of manufacturing was over-
indebted. This seems especially true for big industry. Indeed, for the 23 larger 
industrial corporations which employed half of the total assets in manufacture in 
1959, equity capital was one quarter of their total liabilities.14 As expected, 
according to the data presented in the balance sheets, the ability for self-
finance was quite moderate and equally limited was their borrowing capacity for 
investment capital. Until 1958 the EDFO, still the main internal source of long-
term finance for industry, required the borrowers’ contribution to the project to 
be 50%. This percentage could be lower only in ‘special cases’.15  
5.1.1 Industrial Policy 
It is impressive that the studies which have addressed Greece’s economic 
development during the 1960s have ignored the contribution of key institutions, 
where big business participated, in the formulation of industrial.16 As shown in 
the chapter three, such institution was the Research and Organization 
Committee for Economic Planning (ROCEP), which was largely an FGI initiative. 
 
11 ESYE, Annual Industrial Survey for the Year 1963 (Athens: National Printing Office, 1967), 
table 20.   
12 Appendix 1, table 14.   
13 BoG, Annual Report for 1958 (Athens: BoG, 1961), p. 74.  
14 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1960 (Athens: FGI, 1961), p. 80.   
15 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE1/SS5/FI2, EDFO, Report of Activities for the year ended December 31 1958, 
Athens 1959, p. 18.  
16 Kazakos, Between, pp. 185-9; Pagoulatos, Greece’s, p. 48-79. 
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One of the main considerations of the ROCEP committees was the analysis of the 
investment environment and the measures appropriate for the attraction of 
funds to industry. The sub-committee for industry was preoccupied with the 
terms of the financing of industry, its production costs and its protection 
levels.17 The Committee for Fiscal and Credit Issues, and particularly its sub-
committee for fiscal issues, assessed the status of the existing tax incentives to 
industry and recommended tax measures to improve its productivity.18 Their 
recommendations had three axes. First, both committees emphasized the 
importance of the modernization of mechanical equipment and asked for its 
exemption from any import duties and domestic taxes. Secondly, they 
emphasized the necessity to facilitate the expropriations appropriate for the 
extension of industrial facilities within the wider production cluster of Athens. 
Thirdly, the sub-committee for fiscal issues went a step further, asking for a) the 
complete tax exemption of the retained earnings channelled to investments and 
the acceleration of depreciation rates b) tax exemptions for merging industries 
with the aim of encouraging big industrial establishments so as to take 
advantage of economies of scale c) tax incentives for the strategic sectors of the 
economy d) new legislation for public procurement e) the facilitation of public 
savings f) the development of the stock market, and g) provisions for the 
taxation of foreign companies according to the taxes applied by the country of 
origin. These recommendations constituted a virtually complete set of measures 
in respect to industrial policy. In March 1959, the FGI emphasized the 
importance of the data collected and embraced almost all the recommendations 
of the ROCEP, expressing the wish for their translation into state policies.19   
Looking at the components of subsequent industrial policy, it seems that the 
ROCEP’s demands had been largely embraced. First, the new industrial policy 
established the logic of fiscal incentives to the whole of industry. The Law 
3949/1959 published in April 1959 was the first step in this direction.20 Its main 
 
17 ROCEP, Central Committee: Proceedings Report, 5 vols (Athens, 1959), I, Issue 1, p. 41; 
KKF/GSA/28/4, G. Spentzas to Coordination Ministry, 3 March 1958 and 6 May 1958. The 
president to this sub-committee was Katsabas, its vice president Gavriil, and its rapporteur 
Papadimitriou. They were all prominent industrialists and among the leading figures of the FGI, 
PUTI and UCI.  
18 ROCEP, Basic Fiscal and Credit Committee: Tax Incentives, Special Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs, 5 vols (Athens, 1959), V, Issue 1.  
19 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1958 (Athens: FGI, 1959), pp. 8-15.   
20 KKAFT, III, p. 369.  
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provision was the exemption of taxes and duties for new imported mechanical 
equipment. Four months later it published the Law 4002/1959, which considered 
mainly domestic industry and updated, and granted to the whole industry, tax 
incentives which at the time were applicable only to regional industries. Its main 
provision was that an equal to new investments amount was deductible from 
income tax. Moreover, it halved all charges for the capitalization of deposits or 
loans from shareholders and third persons. The government’s new policy 
continued with the Law 4171/1961, which updated the previous Law 2653/1953 
for the attraction of FDI. Importantly, it granted analogous tax incentives to 
domestic industry also and the provisions were applicable for new large-scale 
investments, for the expansion of existing facilities and for mergers. Secondly, 
the BoG eased its credit policy. The Currency Committee reduced the interest 
rate for long-term finance and from 1959 the EDFO applied the new interest rate 
policy and accepted that borrowers’ contribution for a new project could be 
‘even below 40%’.21 The reaction of the FGI was positive. 
Assessing the new measures in January 1960, the president of the federation 
highlighted that the industry did not suffer from the so-called ‘scarcity of 
capital’ anymore, which was the first time in the post-war period. 22 The issue 
was further elaborated at the annual meeting of the federation in April: 
Indeed, it should be confessed, the law for the tax incentives provide 
options from which the private initiative should benefit […] The conditions 
for long-term finance were adjusted to the old claims of the industrial class. 
The cost of the finance only partially differs from the cost of the long-term 
finance from abroad.23 
Of course, despite the fact that some business recommendations were 
introduced unchanged to the new developmental policy, not all of the claims of 
the ROCEP committees were embraced by the Karamanlis government. Equally, 
not all business associations were completely satisfied, or they ceased 
thereafter to ask for further incentives. For example, a few months later the 
 
21 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE1/SS5/FI3, EDFO, Report of Activities for the year ended December 31 1959, 
Athens 1960, p. 16.  
22 ‘Georgios Drakos’, OT, 07 January 1960. 
23 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1959 (Athens: FGI, 1960), p. 11.   
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PUTI, despite its expressed satisfaction of the Law 3949/1959, asked for a 
‘European’ interest rate in order to invest and renew the mechanical equipment 
for textiles.24 
However, the logic of the subsequent developmental policy was imbued 
throughout with principles which had been underlined by ROCEP’s committees. A 
prime example of this influence is the logic which informed the new tax policy. 
The state accepted and consolidated the principle that the utilization of tax 
policy as an instrument for economic development could be superior to the fiscal 
function of taxation. This was particularly the logic of the recommendations of 
the sub-committee for fiscal issues which proposed that the ‘fiscal utility’ of the 
tax should be ‘sacrificed’ for the ‘optimum employment of the productive 
resources’.25  
Above all, the state had embraced the FGI’s demand, going back to 1945, for its 
formal and active participation in the formulation of industrial policy. This was 
also true for the formulation of industrialization plans. The reiteration of the 
same demand in early 1957 aimed at the formulation of an economic programme 
based upon reliable data particularly in order to shape Greece’s European 
policy. Indeed, the new Five Year Programme for Economic Development for the 
years 1960-1964, explicitly built upon the recommendations of the ROCEP.26 Its 
main aim was to ‘respond to the need for production units able to face 
international competition’ and thus to prepare the country for its active 
participation to the ‘process of integration of the EEC.27 It was a crucial part of 
the state’s strategy in respect to European integration. 
5.1.2 The developmental Plan 
The new economic plan updated the original plan submitted to the OEEC in 
1948, but it was far more coherent and plausible than the latter. It estimated 
that for the next five years Greece would need about 110 billion Drs in 
 
24 ‘The Memo’, OT, 04 August 1960, p. 10. 
25 ROCEP, Basic Fiscal and Credit Committee: Tax Incentives, Special Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs, 5 vols (Athens, 1959), V, Issue 1, p. 4. 
26 Coordination Ministry, Five-Year Economic Development Programme of the Country 1960-1964 
(Athens, 1960) p. 4. 
27 Ibid., p. 1. 
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investment funds, of which 18 billion would have foreign origin. Approximately 
half of the need from abroad had already been asked for from the EEC. The plan 
evidently prioritized the secondary sector in relation to the agricultural and 
service sectors as investments, output and productivity rates were deemed 
higher for industry. The justification had been given by the prime minister one 
year earlier when he had introduced the provisional programme. Rapid 
industrialization was the primary objective because ‘only this will enable the 
country to address the demographic problem and absorb the surplus and 
unutilized labour force.’28 The same month the BoG had emphasized that 
unemployment was still the ‘most acute problem of the country’.29 Two months 
earlier the FGI’s president had justified the need for industrialization in the face 
of ‘economic unions’ on the terms that it was the only sector that would absorb 
labour and ameliorate the overpopulation problem.30 Based upon these two 
priorities, this new plan made detailed proposals for each sector. 
The energy sector was now clearly part of state policy aiming to reduce the 
overall production costs, especially for the proposed energy intensive industries 
which had not yet been fulfilled. The lignite reserves which were nationalized in 
February 1959, were still at the centre of the programme which aimed to further 
develop the Ptolemais facilities adding a new power plant and exploiting the 
Megalopolis reserves. For the Achelous hydroelectric project, envisaged in the 
original plan, it had already published an international tender and offers had 
been received in early 1959. In addition, considerable public investments were 
proposed for the improvement of the basic infrastructure.  
For the creation of new industries, the state accepted the principle that it 
should step in and complement the private initiative when the latter was 
inactive or insufficient. This principle, firstly expressed by Markezinis back in 
1953, had been underlined by the BoG again in 1958, because private industrial 
investments for 1957 were below its expectations. The central bank had 
particularly emphasized that the state had to adopt this principle, aiming to 
build strategic ‘internationally competitive and export oriented firms.’31 In April 
 
28 KKAFT, IV, p. 54.  
29 BoG, Annual Report for 1958 (BoG: Athens, April 1959), p. 15. 
30 Georgios Drakos, ‘In the Face of Europe’, OT, 05 March 1959, p. 11. 
31 BoG, Annual Report for 1957 (1958), p. 14.  
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1959, the prime minister officially announced that this would be the guiding 
principle of the big strategic investment.32 The core of the new projects took 
final form in June 1959.33 It was actually the updated version of the plan 
submitted to the OEEC in 1948 and was now based upon the November 1958 
German-Greek economic agreement, examined in the next section. The 
programme discussed each project separately. Metallurgy was dominated by the 
blast furnace along with the magnesium, aluminium, zinc and pyrite plants. With 
heavy chemicals, the production of nitrogen and superphosphate fertilizers along 
with the soda plant were once more the top priority and with foodstuffs, it was 
proposed that the production of citrus juices and the processing of fruit-
vegetables and livestock products were the most important. The list was 
completed with the wood and straw cellulose plants. 
For existing traditional industry, it was recognized that it should expand and 
modernize with the creation of big facilities and vertical integration. 
Simultaneously, it accepted that industry had limited capacities for self-finance 
so, for this reason, the programme embraced the principle of fiscal ‘incentives’ 
for the promotion of private investments and ensured the ‘favourable’ finance 
conditions of industry.34 Clearly, the state promoted the strategic sectors of the 
economy, insisting particularly upon heavy industry hence it proposed that the 
rate of annual development of chemicals and the metal making/using sectors 
should be higher than that of the traditional sectors.  
As was the case with the measures for the fiscal and credit policy, the FGI 
welcomed the new developmental plan assessing that it was balanced and 
expressed its satisfaction because the promotion of industry was emphasized. 
Particularly, the federation was delighted because the programme estimated 
that private industrial investments would be 73% and public only 27%.35 
However, the programme also emphasized that inward private individual capital 
was a basic component of Greece’s European policy which was among the main 
concerns for the FGI. 
 
32 KKAFT, IV, p. 54.  
33 KKF/KKA/9A, Momferatos to Karamanlis, 30 June 1959. 
34 Co-ordination Ministry, Five-Years, pp. 118 and 119. 
35 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1960 (FGI: Athens, 1961), p. 35.   
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5.2 The evolution of Greek-German economic relations 
5.2.1 The new agreement 
In August 1958, the Greek government framed its expectations with the Federal 
Republic in respect of the imminent negotiations between the two countries for 
a new economic agreement contracted at the highest level. It asked for Greece’s 
‘preferential’ treatment to resolve her ‘overpopulation’ problem because this 
issue threatened political stability at the periphery of Europe.36 Particularly, it 
asked for a state loan, credits for public and private industries, finance for 
techno-economic surveys for new industries, German FDI, assistance for the 
development of tourism, orders for the EPK and assistance for its demands for 
the FTA. It was clear that Greece had identified its viability with the further 
development of economic relations with the Federal Republic and German 
industry. From its side, the Federal foreign ministry confidentially pressed again 
for the issue of the war criminal Merten, underling that it might be an ‘obstacle’ 
for the new ‘economic agreements’.37 Simultaneously, the German Embassy sent 
a list of eight private properties which asked for their return free of charges. On 
11 November 1958 Karamanlis met Erhard and discussed the above well-prepared 
agenda. The final agreement consisted of two parts. 
The first part was confidential, embodied in a protocol signed on 13 November 
1958 and in a secret memorandum signed five days later. The protocol included 
a DM 200 million public loan for the state’s infrastructure projects and tourism, 
the favourable examination of the remaining confiscated German private 
properties, the consideration of an establishment agreement to frame German 
FDI to Greece and an agreement for the utilization of German properties by the 
Federal Republic.38 The memorandum committed Greece to return Merten to the 
Federal Republic.39 Very soon, the Greek government resolved the issues of 
 
36 KKF/KKA/6A, Greek Government Memo, Athens, 14 August 1958, pp. 501-9. 
37 YDIA/1958/1/8, Minutes of a conversation between German ministers and Triandafillis, Bonn, 
25 September 1958. 
38 KKF/KKA/7A, Confidential Final Protocol, Bonn, 13 November 1958, pp. 905-7.    
39 YDIA/1958/1/8, Memorandum-Confidential, Athens, 18 November 1958. 
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properties and war criminals according to the commitments arising from the 
agreement.40  
The second part included the general economic agreement which was signed on 
27 November 1958 and had three main provisions.41 First, it guaranteed credits 
up to DM 400 million to both private and public sectors whereas Greece was 
obliged to grant, on terms of an international tender, the construction of these 
projects to German businesses. It included the core projects of the provisional 
developmental plan published early the following year. Second, it included free 
aid in the form of techno-economic studies contracted by German companies for 
a number of basic industries and infrastructural works. In return, these projects 
would be included in the agreement and thus constructed by German business. 
Third, it reiterated the need for an establishment agreement to frame German-
Greek business cooperation and proposed that concrete steps should also be 
taken over the migration agreement.  
5.3 The alternative road to salvation: migration and German FDI 
The projects which the Greek government aimed either to finance with the 
German loan and credits or to contract technical studies as a first stage of their 
construction, were updated versions of those included in the original plan 
submitted to OEEC in 1948. The core was the energy programme, where the 
Achelous project figured, once again, at the top, infrastructural works, mainly 
the new Athens-Salonica road, tourist facilities and basic industries of both 
public and private interest.42 The German public loan would finance the 
Achelous project along with the US developmental fund DLF, to which the Greek 
government had applied in December 1957, and with the Italian reparations.43 In 
respect to basic public industries, the construction of two of them was agreed 
within the following months. The first was the nitrogen plant, and in January 
1959, its construction was eventually granted to Ammonia Casale SA of Lugano 
 
40 KKF/KKA/7A, Foreign Ministry Memo, 18 December 1958, pp. 937-9; KKF/EAA/6/8/2, For the 
Foreign Minister, Athens, 20 July 1959.  
41 KKF/KKA/7A, Agreement, Bonn, 27 November 1958, pp. 1389-92; Ibid., Letters between L. 
Erhard and P. Papaligouras, pp. 1393-1409. 
42 KKF/KKA/7A, Issues of the German agreements, no date, pp. 934-6. 
43 For the association of the Achelous project with Italian reparations see section four in chapter 
one. In 1958 the reserved amount was still $15 million.  
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and to Friendrich Uhde GMBH of Dortmund (Law 3946/1959). Italian offers had 
been rejected for a project which amounted to approximately $60 million.44 The 
same outcome befell the tender for the second sugar refinery, where German 
companies, Buckau R. Wolf AG and Lunch Und Co GMBH were preferred to an 
Italian.45 Certainly, these decisions had dissatisfied the Italian side and, as it will 
be shown in the next chapter, they played a role during the negotiations for the 
association with the EEC. The situation in the private sector was more complex. 
Before the negotiations in November 1958 the coordination ministry had 
proposed joint ventures for Malkotsis SA and Izola SA with Siemens AG for the 
production of machines and electrical equipment respectively.46 It also proposed 
cooperation between the EKP and ‘Klockner-Humbolt-Deuz’ to produce farm 
tractors, which targeted exports to the Middle East utilizing AEEXPL’s extensive 
network in the region. Additionally, the EPK discussed with Demag AG the joint 
production of pipes and machinery for mines. Last but not least, it was 
mentioned that Niarchos had discussed with Krupp the iron metallurgy and the 
proposed credits to finance this project. Textiles and P-P were not out of the 
picture. In early October 1958, German industrialists had visited Greece and 
they discussed the prospect for export oriented mixed German-Greek cotton 
industrial products. Katsabas, who met them, informed the prime-minister that 
the proposal was an opportunity for Greece because of the domestic raw 
materials and the abundant work force. He concluded that the prospect was of 
‘great importance for the country’ showing that P-P was prepared to 
participate.47 Indeed, a joint venture for the production of cotton textiles had 
been included in the proposals. Importantly, the main shareholders of the Greek 
companies mentioned above, except for Niarchos, composed the leading team of 
the FGI at the time. They participated in its Administrative and Steering 
Committees representing the big businesses of the main traditional 
manufacturing sectors: textiles, chemicals (Bodosakis group) and consumer 
 
44 Nicos Kitsikis, ‘The Industry of Nitrogen Fertilizers’, OT, 09 April 1959. 
45 ‘Two German companies were chosen’, Eleftheria, 17 July 1959; ‘The contract with the 
German companies was signed’, Kathimerini, 11 December 1959. 
46 KKF/KKA/7A, Co-ordination Ministry: Issues for discussion at Bonn, 6 November 1958, pp. 919-
33. 
47 KKF/KKA/7A, Memo on the trip of German cotton industrialists to Greece, Chr. Katsabas, 6 
October 1958, pp. 881-2. 
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durables. All available sources confirm that they colluded with the BDI over the 
terms of their cooperation.   
Following the agreement, the main issue for Greek businesses and banks was the 
allocation of German credits and the initiation of the technical studies. For this 
purpose, the NBG and the Deutsche Bank, supported by their national 
governments, had signed an agreement in November 1958 establishing a council, 
headed by the presidents of the two banks and with the participation of 
businessmen from the two countries, which aimed to enforce the agreement in 
the private sector.48 The issue was of importance for the government, and in 
early January 1959 Karamanlis discussed the agreement with the FGI and the 
ACCI.49 However, until late February 1959 the signs were not encouraging.50 
Whereas the Deutsche Bank had established all the administrative machinery 
required, the NBG had not made the appropriate steps.  
Under these circumstances, the powerful minister of presidency, Konstantinos 
Tsatsos, supported the placement of Thomas Ypsilandis at the Greek embassy in 
Bonn with the instruction to promote the agreement.51 Very soon, Ypsilantis 
reported confidentially to Tsatos that the Federal Republic and ‘German 
economic circles were very disappointed’ with regards the delay in the 
enforcement of the agreement and the absorption of credits from both the 
public and private sectors.52 For this reason, he considered that further 
coordination was necessary, preferably from a new ‘autonomous organization’ 
and not the NBG.53 
At the time, both Erhard and German industrialists appeared at the Greek 
embassy in Bonn quite anxious about the shortages of labour in the Federal 
Republic. For a solution to this problem, they proposed that either labour should 
be attracted, as was the case with Italian workers, or new investment should 
 
48 KKF/KKA/7A, Issues of the German agreements, no date, pp. 934-6. 
49 KKAFT, III, pp. 339-40. 
50 GR/NBGHA/1/2/26/211, Herman J. Abs to D. E. Helmis, Frankfurt, 1 March 1959. 
51 GR/GL/CIT/092/60/1/24, Thomas Ypsilandis to Konstantinos Tsatsos, Addis Abeba, 19 April 
1959; GR/GL/CIT/092/60/1/25, Konstantinos Tsatos to Thomas Ypsilantis, Athens, 27 April 1959 
[unsigned letter]. Thereafter, Ypsilantis reported not only to the Foreign Ministry, but also to 
Tsatsos confidentially.  
52 GR/GL/CIT/092/60/3/13, Th. Ypsilandis to K. Tsatsos, Bonn, 7 July 1959.   
53 Ibid.   
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take place where labour was abundant.54 Particularly, German industrialists 
were quite interested in utilizing the Greek labour force but they were 
disappointed by the refusal of Greek industrialists to cooperate with German 
businesses. According to Ypsilandis sources, German businesses were aware that 
Greek industrialists were not eager to grant them the ‘management rights’ 
which they esteemed appropriate for a ‘good cooperation’.55 As will become 
clear, this was true for the FGI but not for businessmen such as Andreadis and 
Alexandros Tsatsos. 
In 1959, Andreadis was not only a shipowner but also the head of three banks 
and the owner of two insurance companies, the Andreadis group.56 As has been 
shown in chapter three, he had made his first steps to enter heavy industry at 
least in early 1957 when he participated in the first shipyard and made plans for 
the iron metallurgy plant with Niarchos. For unknown reasons, he stepped back 
from his cooperation with Niarchos, but the German agreement opened the door 
for his entrance to manufacturing. In November 1958, Andreadis had informed 
the BoG that Emporiki Bank had signed contracts with ‘big German banks’, 
aiming to promote ‘Greece’s interests’ with its participation in the agreement 
with a percentage analogous to its ‘share’ of the domestic banking market.57 In 
June 1959, Andreadis criticized the little progress which had been made for the 
realization of the agreement, mentioning that Greek businessmen feared that 
German businesses will probably take advantage of domestic cheap labour and 
raw materials only to compete with Greek industry and repatriate profits. 
Simultaneously, he stressed the need to overcome these difficulties and 
reminded that his bank should participate on ‘equal terms’.58  
Meanwhile, the concerns of German business, as they had been expressed to the 
Greek embassy in Bonn, were at the centre of discussions when Erhard visited 
Greece in late August 1959 with the declared aim to discuss the prospect of 
 
54 Archives in the Gennadius Library, Constantine Tsatsos and Ioanna Tsatsou Papers (Hereafter 
GR/GL/CIT) 092/60/3/19, Th. Ypsilandis, Ambassador at Bonn, to Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 10 
August 1959.   
55 Ibid. 
56 Stratis Andreadis, Stratis Andreadis Business Group: Today-Yesterday-Tomorrow (Athens, 
1986). 
57 ‘Within the Frame of Greek-German agreement’, To Vima, 15 November 1958, p. 6.  
58 Stratis Andreadis, ‘In order for Greece to benefit from the Cooperation’, ΟΤ, 25 June 1959, p. 
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association. It was clear that the capital needs of Greece were considered in 
relation to the labour needs of the Federal Republic.59 Certainly, bilateral 
negotiations for these two vital issues were running in parallel and, at the time, 
both capital and labour flows were considered within the framework of Greece’s 
association with the EEC but the emphasis form the Greek side upon these two 
dimensions was not equal. On the one hand, the Greek government considered 
that the establishment agreement with the Federal Republic would serve as the 
basis for the relevant negotiations with the EEC. Thus, as the agreement was not 
signed after Erhard’s visit, the leak to the press was that the relevant 
discussions would resume because they were related to the negotiations with the 
EEC.60 On the other hand, fearing the reaction of Italy which as will be shown in 
the next chapter posed difficulties to Greece’s association with the EEC, Greece 
did not ask from the EEC the facilitation of the emigration of Greek workers 
according to the Treaty of Rome provisions.61 This was a sign that in this field 
where positive expectations for a solution on a bilateral basis with the Federal 
Republic.  
By contrast, the issue of German FDI was perplexed for the friction between the 
FGI and the BDI triggered developments which were proved of paramount 
importance for Greece’s economic development and its association with the 
EEC. A few days after Erhard’s visit, the government announced the formation of 
the Industrial Development Corporation SA (IDC), an organization in which the 
state held a majority participation.62 The IDC’s equity capital was $40 million, of 
which 65% was the state’s direct participation and 20% was contributed by the 
NBG. Andreadis participated with 10% through the Emporiki and Ioniki Banks. Not 
surprisingly, Karamanlis in October asked Alexandros Tsatsos to become the head 
of the IDC.63 The prime minister, at their first meeting, outlined the nature and 
the aims of the IDC, mentioning that its creation was necessary because the 
state did not have the capacity to work fast and independently. For this reason, 
it was necessary for the IDC to function as a private corporation. Its basic task 
was simple. Once the IDC had received the German technical studies, it had to 
 
59 KKAFT, IV, pp. 146-8; ‘Mr Erhard underlines the necessity for the rapid industrialization of 
Greece’, Eleftheria, 27 August 1959, p. 5. 
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61 KKAFT, IV, Note on the basic principles, 5 August 1959, pp. 162-3.  
62 ‘The Statue’, OT, 07 January 1960, p. 7. 
63 KKF/KKA/10A, Memorandum, 31 October 1959, pp. 609-620. 
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assist domestic or foreign capital to undertake the project and, if necessary, the 
IDC would participate in the provision of equity capital. In case that there was 
no private interest, then the IDC would undertake the project itself and, later 
on, it would sell its shares to the private sector. Alexandros Tsatsos replied that 
this was indeed a national challenge because the developments in Western 
Europe underlined the necessity for ‘competitive business’.64 However, 
Alexandros Tsatsos, stated that he had resigned as vice president of the FGI 
because he had disagreed with its policy, proposing that the IDC should also 
assist existing industries because they had high production costs. He added that 
foreign capital faced difficulties investing in Greece because, in some cases, 
domestic industries resisted. Karamanlis replied that the government welcomed 
FDI for the production of goods not produced at the time in Greece. Instead, he 
was sceptical of foreign investment for goods already produced domestically, in 
this respect sharing the concerns of the FGI. 
Five days later Alexandros Tsatsos, having discussed the issue with Zolotas, 
accepted the post on the condition that the IDC would work as a private 
company and that he would have absolute control.65 He also elaborated the 
basic tasks of the IDC as discussed with Karamanlis. When these tasks were 
discussed between Karamanlis and the heads of the economic ministries on 10 
February 1960, the IDC had already started its operations and Alexandros Tsatsos 
was its chairman.66 The terms were publicly announced one week later.67  
Meanwhile, in early January 1960, the vice president of the government, 
Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, the minister of industry, Martis, and Alexandros 
Tsatsos, travelled to Bonn for discussions with Erhard and German business. The 
agenda included the association of Greece with the EEC along with the pending 
main bilateral issues.68 The members of the delegation met Erhard and the BDI 
and the terms for the German FDI in Greece migration were discussed along with 
 
64 KKF/KKA/10A, Memorandum, 31 October 1959, pp. 609-620. 
65 KKF/KKA/10A, Al. Tsatsos to Karamanlis, 5 November 1959, pp. 601-607. 
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the terms of Greek workers to West Germany which were further specified and 
agreed but the agreements were not signed.69  
As expected, Alexandros Tsatsos confirmed at Bonn that he would facilitate 
German FDI to Greece. However, this was not an easy task. One month later, the 
BDI president, Berg, reminded Ypsilandis that cheap labour in Greece was 
attractive for German businesses and that they were particularly interested in 
joint-ventures.70 The aim was to stabilize the ‘liberal regimes’ in South-East 
Europe in order to safeguard German investments in Africa and Asia.71 To this 
end, the German side was particularly asking for guarantees and provisions 
beyond those already provided by the Law 2687/1953. 72 The FGI reported on the 
issue to the government, stressing particularly the importance of two dimensions 
in respect to the proposals of FDI.73 First, it emphasized that investments for 
inward looking industries from German companies alone were not welcomed. 
German capital was welcomed only for export-oriented investments. Second, it 
determined that the participation of German capital to any joint ventures would 
be less than 50%. The possibility for cooperation had not yet been rejected, for 
the federation had asked for the contribution of the BoG to meet the capital 
needs on the Greek side. The position of the FGI was discussed by the 
government on 8 February 1960.74 Karamanlis instructed its delegates to inform 
the German side that it had to reply if it would accept the principle of 50-50% 
participation or not. The minutes of the meetings do not provide any more detail 
but the outcome was that the Greek side rejected the German proposals and the 
agreement was not signed. Nevertheless, it is confirmed from sources that, as 
the FGI’s president had highlighted later, the federation had ‘resisted’ the 
German proposals and the ‘government had agreed’ with the FGI.75  
 
69 KKAFT, IV, pp. 242-3. 
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As expected, the German side pressed for the migration agreement which was 
eventually signed on 30 March 1960.76 As Ypsilandis had mentioned one day 
before its singing, this was the solution to the so-called ‘surplus labour force’.77 
However, the background of this agreement is not known.78 Perhaps this is 
explained by the fact that the agreement was a reminder of Greece’s failure to 
deal with unemployment and, expectedly, had faced the criticism of both the 
centre and the communist left.79 In any case, the agreement was certainly of 
decisive importance with long-term consequences. The previous five years had 
seen less than 145 thousand workers migrating permanently from Greece of 
which only 5.5% had declared that its destination was the Federal Republic.80 
During the next twelve years, migrated approximately one million people from a 
population which was less than nine million and about 60% of them had migrated 
to the Federal Republic.  
Since the agreement was secret initially, four days later the FGI, at the annual 
meeting for the year 1959 on 3rd April 1960, did not refer to it directly. Instead 
the federation mentioned that economic progress in Europe presupposed the 
‘simultaneous economic development of the centre and the periphery.’81 Upon 
this basis the federation criticized the German stance:     
Dr. Erhard’s statements to the Greeks were undoubtedly a reflection of 
these theories, his position being the most desirable form of cooperation 
between a prospering West Germany and an economically weak Greece 
should be the flow of capital in the direction of labour rather than, as was 
heretofore thought inevitable, the flow in the reverse direction, of labour 
towards capital.82 
 
76 Anna Machaira, ‘Migration and Economic Development in Post-War Greece: The Centre-Left 
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The FGI pressed for ‘equal terms’ for foreign and domestic investments and 
during these months the federation, indeed, shaped and elaborated its policy 
towards inward FDI. This policy was first expressed clearly and publicly at the 
same meeting, specifically in respect to the establishment agreement. For the 
federation the beneficial provisions of the law 2687/1953 should be applicable 
only in two cases. First, the incentives would be granted to foreign investments 
aiming to produce goods exclusively targeting foreign markets. Second, they 
would be also applicable for inward looking investments but only for goods which 
were not produced domestically. There was no objection to foreign investments 
aiming to produce goods already offered by domestic companies and targeting 
the internal market although in the latter case the law for FDI would not be 
applicable.83 As expected, this policy had deep roots in the existing traditional 
branches and was supported by the representatives of almost all BIAs, including 
UCI, PUTI and UII.84  
The German side remained dissatisfied. Ypsilandis reported that ‘German 
industrialists, bankers and officials of Economics Ministry’ were all disappointed 
by the rejection of both the ‘German proposals for profit, interest and capital 
repatriation’ and the ‘foundation of new administrative instruments to check 
productivity’.85 Negotiations with the Federal Republic resumed but in July 1960 
they were again interrupted by Averoff.86 It was not until the end of 1960 that a 
common ground was found, but the insistence of the German delegation on the 
retrospective application of the agreement which would, apparently, include 
mainly Ptolemais and Larymna, prevented the final signature.87 Indeed, in June 
1960 the Greek State Railways did not deliver briquets from Ptolemais and the 
government considered asking for compensation from ‘Krupp’ and ‘Humbollt’ for 
their failure at Ptolamais.88 At the same time, the experiments at Larymna had 
failed once more. Eventually, the establishment agreement was signed at 
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Athens, three days before the conclusion of the negotiations for the association 
with the EEC but its terms were not made public.89  
5.4 The Industrial Development Corporation SA (IDC) and the 
emergence of the Andreadis group  
The first reaction of the FGI for the creation of the IDC was negative. The 
federation’s vice president expressed the fear that this would open the way for 
the progressive nationalization of industry and pointed out that the IDC was not 
the right way to meet the scarcity of capital. Instead, the federation proposed 
the direct utilization of the funds by the private sector in order to undertake the 
whole effort.90 Fears of the state’s participation were expressed from liberal 
economists who invoked their experience from analogous efforts in Latin 
America.91 The same attitude was adopted by the editorial of the journal 
Industrial Review, which expressed the policy of the FGI.92 Two months later the 
federation was still cautious. Speaking for ‘regression’ to statism, emphasized 
that the association with the EEC guaranteed the private initiative because the 
customs unions was built upon liberal principles.93  
The opinion of the FGI’s leader Drakos about IDC did not change over time.94 
However, it seems that the issue was more complex as the IDC was a rival 
organization which cooperated with the inward-looking fraction of shipping 
capital. The participation of the Andreadis group in the IDC enabled him to 
expand its operations into manufacturing. What followed the establishment of 
the IDC, is a prime example of state-business interaction within the framework 
of Greece’s European strategy. One main problem for Andreadis’ plans was that, 
at the time, Greek banks could not participate in the equity capital of new 
industries, however, the lifting of this restriction was decided at the meeting of 
the IDC on 10 February 1960. Simultaneously, it was decided that the banks 
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controlled by Andreadis should improve the ratio of equity capital to their 
deposits.95 This provision was rejected by Andreadis on the grounds that the 
ratio was much better in his banks compared to major European banks of 
developed states.96 The provision did not eventually materialize but the lifting 
of the restriction was discussed with the BoG a few days later and announced in 
May 1960.97 In March 1960, Andreadis publicly defended the IDC and emphasized 
the necessity of FDI for the Greek economy.98 
By the end of 1962, the Andreadis group had founded three new companies 
which remained the core of its manufacturing operations until the 1980s plus the 
first private investment bank in Greece.99 The superphosphate and the 
fruit/canning plants were proposed to the new programme and were supervised 
directly by the IDC. The third was the new shipyard at Elefsina bay which was 
decided at the same meetings.100 The funds for the above industries were 
imported through the banks of the Andreadis group under the provisions of the 
Law 2687/1953.101  
This business faction soon expanded opening the road for FDI to sectors which 
had been identified by the developmental plans as strategic. This was true for 
the two shipyards, to which the shipowners Niarchos and Andreadis had majority 
participation. The exploitation of the first oil refinery in Greece had already 
been granted to Niarchos. Yet the prime example was the aluminium plant. 
After adventurous negotiations which lasted from late 1959 until the middle of 
1960, it was undertaken by the French company ‘Pechiney’ with the minority 
participation of Niarchos and IDC. Moreover, in early 1960, Alexandros Tsatsos 
and Andreadis had also attempted to build the blast furnace through the IDC but 
they eventually withdrew leaving the project to Halivourgiki SA.102 As argued in 
chapter three, the market was growing very fast and it had been accepted that 
iron metallurgy was not only viable, but necessary. Following the signing of the 
association agreement in March 1961 and the updating of the incentives to FDI, 
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the investment climate changed considerably. Now, the government discussed 
with the Greek-American citizen, Tom Pappas, who represented the interests of 
Standard Oil, the construction of a second blast furnace and a second oil 
refinery along with a petrol-chemical complex at Salonica.103 Simultaneously, 
Alexandros Tsatsos, informed foreign investors for the association with the EEC 
and Greece’s favourable environment for foreign investment.104 The road to the 
golden age of FDI and Greek capitalism had opened.  
Undoubtedly, the precondition for the construction of these plants was the 
provision of energy at competitive prices. As will be shown below, the Greek-
German economic relations were again the catalyst here. In 1959 the energy 
programme had two main parts. The first included the adoption of two more 
thermic power plants at Ptolemais both of which were included in the November 
1958 agreement with the Federal Republic. The second included the exploitation 
of Megalopolis lignite reserves at Peloponnesus and the realisation of the 
Achelous project. This latter project was directly related to the aluminium plant 
because only these facilities could provide energy at a cost acceptable to 
Pechiney. Indeed, the agreed price for the provision of energy to Pechiney was 
significantly below the production costs at existing facilities and it was only the 
Achelous facilities that could produce energy at costs approaching the agreed 
price.105 This favourable provision, combined with the controversial procedure 
for the acceptance of this settlement by the PPC Board, faced sever criticism as 
the low energy price was deemed an unacceptable subsidy to a foreign 
multinational. 106 Following the ratification of the agreement by the Greek 
parliament in September 1960, the energy programme was supplemented with 
additional facilities at Achelous and the energy programme was estimated to be 
about $120 million of which $20 million would come from the US developmental 
fund DLF, $65 million from German sources and PPC would contribute $35 
million.107 An important dimension here is that the Greek government proposed 
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this finance scheme to the Federal Republic in January 1960 at a critical 
moment for Greece’s negotiations with the EEC.  
However, both public and private projects, and especially those supervised by 
the PPC, were accompanied by serious allegations from both the main opposition 
party and EDA for corrupt practices and extensive privileges. Certainly, these 
allegations had contributed to the destabilisation of the Karamanlis 
government.108 Beyond the Pechiney contract, severe criticism faced the 
assignment of the study and supervision of the Achelous works at Kremasta to 
the US firm ECI109 and the direct assignment for the procurement of machinery 
for Ptolemais to Alfried Krupp.110 Certainly, direct assignments to German 
industry was a precondition for the finance of the major infrastructural works 
from the Federal Republic. Indeed, Erhard had made it clear that he would not 
accept an international tender for the construction of Megalopolis facilities and 
the third power plant at Ptolemais.111 
5.5 The reaction of traditional industry 
The common denominator of the above private projects was that their 
realization was based upon exceptional tax concessions and favourable 
provisions for input costs beyond those provided by the law for FDI. For the FGI’s 
president, this treatment had proved the necessity for ‘concessions to capital’ 
and opened the road for the developmental laws 4002/1960 and 4171/1961 
which concerned domestic industry.112 These laws contributed to the new 
investment environment designed to assist Greek businesses within the customs 
union.   
For textiles, the prospect for the participation in the customs union was indeed 
a competitive challenge because most of the mechanical equipment was 
obsolete. In the cotton subsector, the situation appeared better than at 
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woollens but both subsectors faced similar challenges. The EDFO had calculated 
that in 1960 about 40% of the mechanical equipment in the cotton industry was 
automatic, whereas the respective numbers for the EEC and the UK were 49% 
and 58% respectively.113 In 1959 the PUTI had emphasized the problem, 
considering that the modernization of the mechanical equipment was ‘of 
paramount importance’ because textiles were facing an ‘extremely difficult and 
worrying’ crisis induced by foreign competition. Thus, it welcomed the law 
3949/1959, which provided duty free imported machinery.114 The same was true 
for the UCI. In July 1959, it was alarmed by the prospect of the participation in 
the common market, emphasizing that the cotton industry should take 
advantage of the long transition period to modernize its equipment to meet the 
‘international competition within the large field of the EEC.’115 The way that big 
businesses in this sector financed their investments is again illustrated by the P-
P case.  
In 1959 the company processed about 20% to 25% of the total cotton 
manufactured in Greece. It operated four plants, two of which were within the 
wider Athens production cluster and two were located at Patras. The mechanical 
equipment at Patras plants was outdated having been constructed before 
1930.116 The same was true for the Kallithea’s weaving plant. In contrast, with 
the investments in 1952 and 1956, the spindle machines at the plant of Nea 
Peramos were relatively modern. On the one hand, these investments did enable 
the company to expand its output more rapidly than the average expansion of 
the whole textile sector.117 On the other, these projects had consequences for 
its financial structure.  
In 1959 and 1960, P-P equity capital was only 18% of total liabilities, for it was 
untouched since 1956 but, in the meantime, loans had grown 2.66 times.118 For 
the fiscal years 1958 and 1959, despite the low depreciation levels, operating 
results were negative with interest payments having quadrupled from 1955. As a 
result, accumulated reserves were limited, hence, both its borrowing capacity 
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and its ability for self-financing were limited. Indeed, from early 1957 until early 
1959, according to its general director Katsabas, the company was obliged to 
receive loans from the private market with annual interest rates ranging 
between 20% and 30%.119 In 1959 the company was able to service its immediate 
obligations only with two urgent short-term loans by the NBG and the US bank 
Manufacturer Trust Co. 
Under these circumstances, the German FDI was an opportunity. Indeed, in 
September 1959 Katsabas confirmed that there was still an active interest from 
Germany for a joint venture in the cotton industry120 although the discussions 
had not been restricted to P-P alone for there was a rival plan. The Union of 
Weaving Industrialists was also considering a joint venture with German 
companies for a big cotton spinning mill plant.121 The aim was to supply the 
domestic weaving industry with raw materials, an endeavour for the vertical 
integration of the weaving subsector that could undermine P-P’s dominant 
position.   
Thus, the rejection of the terms for the German FDI by the FGI was a mixed 
blessing for the P-P. On the one hand it avoided a new source of internal 
competition. On the other, it was obliged to finance its investments from 
internal sources. Indeed, by the end of 1960, the company embarked on a plan 
to expand organically, primarily aiming to respond to European competition. The 
rationale was to concentrate its facilities at Patras, to modernize the existing 
equipment there and to build a new spinning mill. The strategy was to take 
advantage of economies of scale with the utilization of the provisions for 
regional industry and the new investment laws.122 
The EDFO council, considering the application, underlined the company’s 
growing financial risk and stressed that its future obligations, compared to its 
anticipated revenue, were high and thus the repayment of the loan was not 
guaranteed. Subsequently, the director general concluded, initially, that the 
 
119 Christoforos A. Katsabas, Believing in the Future (Athens, 1966), pp. 313-5.  
120 To Vima, 24 September 1959, p. 6. 
121 ‘Greek-German cooperation for a spinning mill’, OT, 14 April 1960, p. 9. 
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application did not justify the financial criteria of the EDFO. However, because 
P-P was a ‘big’ company with potentialities within the ‘common market’, the 
council decided to consider its application on two conditions.123 The first obliged 
the company to increase its share capital. Indeed, in May 1961 the company 
issued new shares through a public offering and became the first post war 
industry to successfully utilize this instrument for the increase of equity 
capital.124 The second was to provide a bank guarantee for the loan although this 
was circumvented and the loan was granted three months later.125 Yet, the 
Auditors’ report, which had preceded the decision, identified several 
weaknesses in the company which, among other things, emphasized the 
problematic liability structure of the firm and its low annual depreciation levels 
which enabled it to distribute profits and to present an inflated equity capital.126 
However, the prospects were not deemed unfavourable as the new investments 
would enhance its productivity and its performance. Furthermore, assuming that 
the company would deliberately not meet some future obligations and would not 
distribute profits, it estimated that its cash budget guaranteed the repayment of 
the loan. The EDFO council considered the Auditors’ results but ignored the 
preconditions for the cash budget. For the council the prospects of the company 
weighed more than its limitations adding that it was ‘the biggest cotton industry 
of Greece’ and it was for this reason that it agreed to finance the project.127   
However, there was a significant part of big businesses which cooperated with 
foreign companies. The reasons behand this corporate strategy are illustrated by 
Izola SA. In early 1959, the EDFO Council was pressing the company to increase 
its share capital in order to restructure its outstanding debt.128 Indeed, in 1959 
its equity capital was less than 10% of its total liabilities and its ability for self-
finance was limited.129 Under these circumstances Izola SA was completely 
unable to proceed with the modernization of its facilities at a time when that 
was more than necessary due to the prospective association with the EEC. The 
road which Izola SA followed was to increase its equity capital with the 
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participation of the US company Rheem Manufucturing Co with 30 million Drs, a 
cooperation which offered the appropriate technology for its future plans.130 In 
1961 the share capital of Izola SA jumped from 7.5 million Drs to 37.5 million 
and it was agreed that the Drakos family, which owned only 7.5 million Drs of 
the share capital, would maintain the management.131 With this cooperation 
Izola SA was finally able to restructure its debt, and to receive a new loan from 
the EDFO which enabled it to diversify thereby responding to the challenges of 
the common market.132  
This same route was followed by the Bodosakis group, the position of which in 
the internal market deteriorated. Indicative of future developments, in late 
1958, Bodosakis withdrew from the company which exploited the oil refinery in 
which he participated with 43%. The shipowner, Niarchos, acquired his shares 
and the majority of the company, managing the refinery with the assistance of 
Nikolaos Vlangalis, who had stakes in the power group and cooperated with 
Andreadis.133 At the same time, Bodosakis was not able to cover overruns at 
Ptolemais and its prospects, as we saw in chapter three, were ominous. In early 
1959, the EDFO rejected a new loan and all facilities at Ptolemais were 
nationalized.134 Bodosakis himself felt ‘relieved’ with the development.135 One 
year later, Bodosakis also withdrew from the business group which controlled 
the AEEXPL at Cyprus. After a decade of over-expansion, the group was 
shrinking. 
The AEEXPL also faced acute difficulties. Even if fertilizers were still absorbed 
and distributed exclusively by the ABG, its sales since 1957 were stagnant.136 The 
problem for the group was aggravated because the furnaces for the production 
of iron pebbles and iron nickel at Larymna facilities were still not operational. 
Thus, for the years 1958 and 1959 net results were negative and, thereafter, 
recovered only because depreciations were simply curtailed. The ratio of its 
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133 ‘Under which terms Bodosakis withdrew from the oil refinery’, Imerisia, 22 October 1958; 
‘The corporation for the refinery was founded’, Eleftheria, 18 December 1958. 
134 GR/PIOP FOA3/SE6/SS7/FI72048/SFL22, Chartered Accountants’ Report, 5 March 1959, 
Athens, pp. 167-85. 
135 Hatziotis, Prodromos, p. 309. 
136 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3/FI3P102/SFL5, Various documents.  
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equity capital to total liabilities was 20% in 1958 and it became 26% in 1961 only 
because the company was shrinking. Importantly, its share capital was 
untouched from 1956 whereas its capital reserves were roughly the same until 
1961. As expected, the company had difficulties in meeting its obligations and to 
circulate its capital and, for that reason, its loans had been repeatedly 
restructured by the EDFO.137 Τhe inability of the company for both external and 
self-financing was obvious but AEEXPL responded to this unfavourable situation 
and its strategy, launched in the middle of 1959, was based upon three main 
projects. 
First, it attempted to operationalize the furnaces at Larymna again. This 
endeavour was initially financed by Alfried Krupp with an agreement in June 
1960.138 However, the results were once more moderate and the AEEXPL 
renewed its efforts. In 1962 it had founded the Larco SA but this time, the 
AEEXPL cooperated with the French company Le Nickel, which became the 
minority participant in the new company, offering not only capital but also the 
appropriate technology which Krupp missed.139 The second project aimed to 
modernize the main facilities at Drapetsona and the third was to build the new 
plant for superphosphate fertilizers proposed by the new economic programme. 
For the financing of these projects, the AEEXPL had initially approached the NBG 
and the government was positive.140 However, it seems that its limited ability 
for self-finance inhibited the progress with the NBG alone. Until late 1960 
Bodosakis had agreed cooperation with the French chemical company Saint-
Gobain for.141 The next year Saint-Gobain agreed to finance along with the 
AEXXPL the modernization and extension of the Drapetsona facilities. For the 
new superphosphate plant, it participated with 40% of the equity capital whilst 
the NGB participated with 20% and the AEEXPL with 40%.142 The cooperation of 
the Bodosakis group with the French companies was indeed decisive. It enabled 
the exploitation of the Larymna mines for the production of iron-nickel, to 
modernize its facilities at Drapetsona and to build the new chemical plant during 
a period in which the financial position of the group had deteriorated 
 
137 GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32064/SFL2, Various documents.  
138 AEEXPL, Annual Report for the year 1960 (Athens, 1961), p. 18.  
139 AEEXPL, Annual Report for the year 1962 (Athens, 1963), p. 16.  
140 KKF/KKA/14A, Meeting, 19 January 1961, p. 250. 
141 Hatziotis, Prodromos, pp. 358 and 379-80.  
142 AEEXPL, Annual Report for the year 1961 (Athens, 1962), p. 15.  
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significantly. Certainly, the necessity for capital and technology inflows was 
among the main motivations for Bodosakis to support an association of Greece 
with the EEC.143 Importantly, these developments confirmed the deterioration of 
relations between the group and German industry.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that crucial aspects of the industrial policy and of the 
developmental plan had emerged from an FGI’s initiative in response to early 
European integration. The post-war developmental policies, which had informed 
Greece’s short-lived industrial boom after 1960, had not been defined 
unilaterally from above, as the bulk of Greek literature has argued. Rather, it 
was the outcome of the interaction of businessmen and state agencies.   
The November 1958 Greek-German agreement had included the financing of the 
core projects of the developmental plan, additionally proposing German FDI and 
a migration agreement. The German side aimed to resolve its labour scarcity and 
to strengthen its position in Greece, considering that this would also protect its 
expansion beyond Europe and the customs union. The Greek side considered that 
this agreement would solve the country’s viability problem. Crucially, the 
migration agreement was signed in early 1960, providing the solution to the 
much-discussed imbalance problem which had existed since the 1920s. Also, the 
relations of the public sector with German business strengthened even more. 
Until 1960 German businesses had undertaken the construction of almost the 
entire energy programme and of core state industries, such as the nitrogen and 
sugar refinery plants. Additionally, Greek business was prepared to cooperate 
with their German counterparts.  
However, following Erhard’s visit to Athens in August 1959, business cooperation 
stalled because the FGI refused the special treatment of German investment in 
Greece and the majority participation in the proposed joint-ventures. The 
adverse course of the Bodosakis group and the cases of Izola SA and P-P cast 
light upon this development. However, their financial position could not support 
 
143 GR/GL/KAV, Bodosakis Athanasiadis, ‘What is needed for our country’s development’, 
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their investment plans, so they turned either to French or US capital or they 
were financed by the NBG and EDFO. Representative of future developments, 
the EDFO financed P-P’s investment plans ignoring sound financial criteria 
because such a company was too big to fail. In all cases, the state followed its 
declared priority to promote big businesses and, along with inward FDI, 
prevented the collapse of the so-called tariff dependent industries within the 
customs union.  
The adverse course of business cooperation between the two countries was a 
development that opened the road for the formal incorporation of the businesses 
represented by Alexandros Tsatsos and Andreadis to public institutions and the 
decision-making process. In late 1959 they stepped in, cooperating within the 
IDC which initially aimed to implement the Greek-German agreement but very 
soon it undertook the implementation of the whole industrial programme and 
became the vehicle for the attraction of FDI. Essentially, it formed a rival to the 
FGI and the Bodosakis business group remaining close to shipping capital. 
Indeed, from this initiative emerged the Andreadis group and signalled the 
golden age for inward FDI in Greece.  
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 The political economy of Greece’s 
association with the EEC 
This chapter follows the implementation of Greece’s association strategy. The 
first section briefly examines the competitive strategies of France and the 
Federal Republic in respect to the nature of the EEC and its relations with the 
UK, situating Greece’s European policy within this broader picture. It shows that 
France facilitated bilateral negotiations with the Eleven to avoid the more 
competitive, wider free trade zone which, nevertheless, was still pursued by 
Erhard. Subsequently, it approaches the dominant business interests in Greece 
and the Federal Republic, depicting their corresponding European strategies 
which implied an import substitution and export led growth model respectively.  
The second section examines how the dominant internal strategies, in respect to 
the commercial policy, emerged and unfolded during the first three months of 
1959. It initially follows the first steps of Greek diplomacy which pursued an 
association with the EEC along the lines agreed within the OEEC and supported 
by the Commission. It will be argued that the implementation of the Greek-
German agreement was among the main incentives for the application to the 
EEC and then elaborates upon the coexistence of the alternative strategy which 
promoted, with limited but concrete steps, Eastern trade and an import 
substitution policy. This was rooted in the traditional business factions and 
notably the FGI. It then shows that the negotiation team and the BoG shared 
affinities with this coalition in respect to the temporary necessity of Eastern 
trade and suggested, initially, the continuation of a limited import substitution 
policy within Europe. However, it strongly disagreed that these two options 
would constitute the long-term organic solution to Greece’s substantive 
problems. This was so because, not only did they threaten Greece’s geopolitical 
orientation directly, but also because Eastern markets were uncompetitive and 
could thus further deteriorate competitiveness. This was Greece’s initial 
negotiation position. These two internal strategies were intertwined and 
subsequently confronted the priorities of the Federal Republic and its internal 
supporters and were forged with France’s European policy. The outcome was the 
general framework - essentially the rhythm of tariff disarmament within the 
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customs union and the provisions for agricultural exports - of the association 
regime and the updating of the customs tariff. 
This story is the main theme of the third section. It particularly elaborates the 
core demands of Greece and the German liberal counterproposals which were 
eventually adopted by the Council and formed the EEC’s policy towards Greece. 
In the face of Erhard’s pressure and the support of liberal businessmen, the 
Greek side, step by step, abandoned any thoughts of the protection of infant 
industries which was consistent with the Law 3949/1959 and the demands of the 
traditional business sectors for tax-free imports of machinery and transportation 
items. Simultaneously, the government compensated business increasing the 
protection of existing manufacturing with the new customs tariff during the 
transitional period aiming to prolong the transitional period for as long as 
possible.  
The last section evaluates the terms of the association, showing that they fell 
quite short of the initial demands which was true for both agricultural exports 
and finance. Then, elaborating upon the difficulties which Greece faced during 
the negotiations, it elaborates the exchanges which member states made and 
how big business was involved in the final settlement.  
6.1 The collapse of the negotiations for FTA and business 
strategies 
Until late October 1958 it had become clear that a multilateral association of 
the EEC with the remaining Eleven OEEC members was not feasible. Despite 
Erhard’s efforts to the contrary, it was proved impossible to reach an agreement 
reconciling UK’s interests towards the commonwealth and France’s prioritization 
of a protectionist common market compatible with its vulnerable industry and 
its persistent agricultural surpluses. As was shown in the introduction of this 
part, the result was that Europe was split to two trading blocs, the Six which had 
formed EEC and the Seven which formed EFTA whereas the OEEC’s four 
underdeveloped countries, namely Greece, Turkey, Iceland and Ireland, 
remained outside these blocs and thus economically and politically isolated. An 
important dimension here is that the British inspired industrial EFTA was a 
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scheme which aimed to press EEC for a compromise and, since this scheme was 
compatible with an open trading bloc across Europe and/or an Atlantic 
community, it was supported by Erhard and German big business.1 By contrast, 
the French and Italians favoured the EEC largely as a neo-protectionist bloc. It is 
important to show how the Greek government and big business responded to this 
development because Greece became the first country to associate with the EEC 
on a bilateral basis which meant that the multilateral association of EEC with all 
OEEC members aiming in the formation of an open trading bloc was essentially 
undermined. In other words, the Greek case can illustrate the dynamics behind 
European integration at a critical phase. However, Greek literature has failed to 
appropriately embed Greece’s endeavour for an association with EEC within this 
context. In fact, it has been claimed that EEC was the preferred option for 
Greece because, unlike EFTA, it covered agricultural products and had wider 
political implications but there is simultaneously a confusion in respect to its 
stance towards the open trading bloc which has been also presented as Greece’s 
preferred solution without, however, explaining the reasons for this attitude.2  
Other have understood that the EEC was the preferred option since mid-1957 but 
have ignored the open trading bloc and the German aims in this respect.3 
Significantly, the attitude of Greek business has not been incorporated in the 
analysis.4 The following three sections aim to fill this gap, arguing that due to 
Greece’s dependence upon German economy and business, the Greek 
government supported the open trading bloc only for tactical reasons and 
continued to pursue Greece’s association with the EEC backed, although with 
reservations, by Greek big business. 
The Greek delegate at OEEC, being prepared for the breakdown of the 
negotiations for an FTA, was quick in early November 1958 to propose that this 
was the appropriate time to resume efforts for a bilateral association with the 
EEC. For Christidis, Greece’s trade dependence with the EEC countries, notably 
with the Federal Republic, and the already formatted finance institutions within 
the EEC, were the two indispensable factors which made the association with 
 
1 Pérez, ‘The European’, pp. 74-5; Rollings, British, p. 120; Buhrer, ‘German Industry’, p.108. 
2 Ifantis, ‘State interests’, pp. 80-1; Verney, 'The Greek’, pp. 149-50; Tsoukalis, The European, 
p. 28.   
3 Minotou, ‘The European’, pp. 287-92. 
4 Moussis, Greek.   
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the EEC urgent.5 Meanwhile, the fear of marginalization materialized, 
strengthening and reinforcing this position. As Christidis informed the 
coordination ministry, the UK and the Scandinavian countries, along with 
Switzerland and Austria, were now moving more decisively towards a separate 
industrial free trade zone to avoid discrimination and to press the EEC for a 
compromise.6 Since peripheral underdeveloped states remained out of the 
picture in both of these regional schemes, Greece’s delegation attempted to 
form a bloc with Portugal, Iceland, Ireland and Turkey. This attempt very soon 
crashed due to their divergent interests and only Turkey responded positively. 
For these reasons, in late November, Christidis pressed again for the EEC option 
asking the coordination ministry for permission to approach again the 
Commission unofficially to check intentions for a separate bilateral agreement. 
He considered that this tactical move also had the merit of improving Greece’s 
future negotiating position, be that for the wider free trade zone or the bilateral 
association with the ECC.  
This latter option, however, had been ruled out by Erhard in the middle of 
November 1958. The German finance minister and German big business were still 
devoted to the promotion of a multilateral wider scheme compatible with the 
needs of German industry for export outlets beyond the limited market of the 
Six.7 The means utilized by Erhard for the realization of this objective were 
indisputable. Once he had confirmed the first post-war state loan to Greece and 
smoothed the road for further cooperation between Greek and German industry, 
he pointed out that the separation of Europe, due to French intransigence, was a 
‘tragic’ development, asking Karamanlis to avoid any move which would make 
the situation even more complex.8 The result was that Greece continued the 
double strategy followed since the middle of 1957: on the one hand, it officially 
supported the creation of the wider open trading bloc according to Erhard’s will 
and, on the other, it simultaneously promoted a ‘constant association’ with the 
EEC.9 This latter option was preferable because, as the foreign ministry 
 
5 YDIA/1958/8/2/1, Th. Crhistidis to Coordination Ministry, 25 October 1958. 
6 YDIA/1958/8/2/1, Th. Crhistidis to Coordination Ministry, 10 November 1958. 
7 Moravcsik, The Choice, p. 199. 
8 KKF/KKA/7A, Proceedings of the Negotiations at the Federal Office, 11 November 1958, pp. 
998-1005.  
9 YDIAEI, P. Oikonomou-Gouras, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the 
Embassies of Brussels, Hague, Rome and Paris, Athens, 24 November 1958, 280-281.   
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explained, Greece was commercially and economically dependent on the Six. 
Christidis, who had shared this belief at least since late 1956, primarily because 
of the existing Greek-German bilateral relations, at his very first meeting with 
the Commission as Greece’s representative to the EEC, hinted for this option and 
received an implicitly positive response.10 For Christidis, the quite cautious 
stance of the Commission was rooted in member states reservations. On the one 
hand, Germany’s permanent representative, who had sided with the FTA option, 
was afraid that the Commission might opt for bilateral negotiations with 
interested states, undermining the multilateral solution. In contrast, the Belgian 
and French representatives feared that the Commission would utilize Greece’s 
association to press the Eleven for the realization of the wider free trade zone. 
11 Indeed, France considered that the EEC should promote bilateral associations 
and clearly opposed the multilateral option.12 The compromise between these 
divergent policies was not an easy task and both options coexisted on a 
competitive basis, framing Greece’s endeavour to participate in European 
integration. Even if these strategies were intertwined, they were still visible.    
First, the EEC Council endorsed on 3 December 1958 an initial compromise 
hammered out by Adenauer and De Gaulle at Bad Kreuznach. It proposed an 
interim regime from January 1959 onwards which ameliorated discrimination 
primarily for industrial products. It aimed not only to reach an agreement with 
the Eleven and notably the UK, but also to prevent reactions within the GATT, 
notably by the US which was interested in the multilateral and more liberal 
solution.13 Indeed, the US had already called for a new round within GATT to 
deal with the common external tariff and stated its intention to reduce customs 
duties on a reciprocal basis.14 In respect to quotas, the State Department stated 
that the US was ready to accept discrimination for balance of payments reasons 
but not for commercial ones.15 Second, the permanent multilateral solution was 
 
10 YDIA/1958/8/2/1, Th. Crhistidis to Coordination Ministry, 2 December 1958. 
11 YDIA/1958/8/2/1, Th. Crhistidis to Coordination Ministry, 24 November 1958. 
12 FRUS/1958-1960, Volume XII, Part 1, Western European Integration, 1958-1960, eds. Daniel J. 
Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 38. 
13 Commission, Second General Report, Brussels, 31 March 1959, pp. 27-36.  
14 GATT/398, Speech by the Hon. C. Douglas Dillon, 21 October 1958. 
15 FRUS/1958-1960, Volume XII, Part 1, Western European Integration, 1958-1960, eds. Daniel J. 
Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 46. 
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not abandoned by the EEC. Instead, the Council simultaneously charged the 
Commission with the task to report on its feasibility by February 1959.  
Within the OEEC, in a dramatic session in the middle of December, the UK 
refused the EEC’s proposal as discriminatory.16 It particularly rejected France’s 
decision not to extend to the Eleven the increase of quotas up to 3% of national 
production applicable to the Six from 1 January 1959 onwards. Instead, the 
British representative asked to globalize the provision declaring the UK’s will to 
provide compensation or, otherwise, he warned that his country would resort to 
retaliations. This counterproposal faced fierce French resistance. Greece’s 
position, as Erhard had asked, did not made the issue more complex. In 
particular, foreign minister Averoff emphasized that Greece was committed to 
the multilateral solution and the unity of Europe. Yet Averoff and Pesmazoglou 
sided with West Germany and particularly Erhard who, in contrast to France’s 
foreign minister, insisted that the UK proposal should be considered within the 
OEEC. Simultaneously, the Greek foreign minister condemned the fact that the 
EEC’s proposal for the elimination of discrimination had ignored agricultural 
products, so vital for the peripheral states. Averoff particularly mentioned 
tobacco and citrus fruits as two major examples of the EEC’s discrimination, 
explicitly blaming Italy for such an unfavourable outcome. Amidst the acute 
export crisis, the fear of discrimination was growing.  
There is no doubt that Greece’s double strategy was rooted in its bilateral 
relationship with the Federal Republic and, for this reason, a comparison 
between the strategies of Greek and German dominant business organizations 
casts light upon their respective policies and objectives. To begin with, the FGI 
substantiated the necessity for Greece’s participation in the EEC upon direct 
political considerations, showing that the a priori reasoning, discussed in 
chapter four, had been digested by the federation and informed its European 
strategy.17 It was the criterion upon which it judged Greece’s position. This core 
argument was rooted in the federation’s vision of the forces which were driving 
 
16 OEEC, C/M(58)31(Final), Minutes of the 423th Meeting held in Chateau on 15th December, Paris, 
18 June 1959, <http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/174186?item=OEEC-84> [accessed on 16 January 
2016].   
17 Dionisios Mantzoulinos, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the European 
Economic Community (Athens: FGI, 1959). 
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European integration, in particular, it considered that the post-war increased 
industrial production was seeking to transcend national borders and the EEC had 
institutionalized these commodity flows. Simultaneously, the political necessity 
to compete with the USSR smoothed the reconciliation of the divergent 
commercial interests for the regional schemes but the outcome was not 
determined by this factor alone. Western states had also competitive 
relationships, in particular, the FGI’s official considered that France was right to 
protect the core of the EEC rejecting the UK counterproposal. He advocated that 
the inclusion of new and divergent interests did not fit with the Six’s common 
market which needed to strengthen itself rather than to expand. Even more, the 
UK was not prepared to harmonize costs, at least to the extent that France had 
discussed, but it was ready to reap the benefits of the large European market, 
namely the productivity gains accruing from the new and improved division of 
labour. In respect to Greece’s stance, the FGI’s official stated that it was 
equally wrong to unequivocally side with the Eleven because its trade interests 
were pointing instead to the Six. Yet, its vulnerable industry necessitated 
delicate steps.  
In the first place, FGI’s representative was satisfied with the collapse of the 
negotiations for FTA because it provided the appropriate time to adopt measures 
to promote existing and new industry, in other words, to continue the import 
substitution policy.18 Since the preferred bilateral relations were not feasible 
due to trade liberalization and the political reasons mentioned above, the 
vulnerability of Greek industry dictated careful manoeuvres within the 
multilateral organizations. In particular, Greece had to participate in the new 
round at GATT with the updated customs tariff. On the grounds that quotas had 
been abolished and OEEC had recognized the necessity to strengthen its 
economy before its entry to any liberalization scheme, Greece had not only to 
refuse the reduction of tariff duties for domestic manufacture It also had to ask 
to increase the tariff burden for finished and semi-finished goods produced 
internally and, even more, the right to re-introduce quantitative restrictions. 
This meant that Greece was obliged to re-negotiate many bounded tariffs and in 
turn to provide compensation. The FGI proposed that Greece would compensate 
 
18 Ibid, pp. 83-9. 
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the interested parties with the abolition of the tariff burden for both raw 
materials and machinery not produced internally. It was an opportunity to 
promote its permanent demand for the improvement of the supply chain which, 
in the circumstances, implied the abolition of the infant industry right. The final 
aim was to enter the transitional period, the length and the necessity of which 
had been recognised by the OEEC, to any regional or even global liberalization 
scheme with a reasonably high level of protection.  
However, the proposed advanced engagement of Greek industry with German 
private and public capital prescribed that the accomplishment of such a strategy 
would not be an easy task. This became clear to business circles in Greece when 
the Deutsche Bank presented to the NBG’s leadership and high-ranking managers 
the agreed Greek-German business arrangement within the proposed 
multilateral trade scheme.19 Its representative shared the FGI’s perspective in 
respect of the driving forces of European integration and its likely effects upon 
productivity for the advanced industrial regions in Europe. In contrast, he made 
it clear that only negative integration within a wider free trade zone was 
compatible with Europe’s long-term interests. What is more, intervention from 
above had to be restricted to regulation policies aiming to stabilize negative 
integration. The only exception to this rule was the need to provide financial 
assistance to the less developed regions because those already developed would 
become even more attractive to capital, widening the productivity gap. 
However, if these former regions, namely those in South Italy and France or 
Greece, were to reap the benefits of integration along with the advanced 
regions, then any kind of intervention had to encourage competition rather than 
postpone it. This was because competition was the only means to alarm and 
rationalize business rendering them efficient and thus viable.  
This central tenet, clearly not compatible with the FGI’s strategic vision for 
existing industry, resulted in two conclusions. First, the transitional period asked 
by underdeveloped states within the OEEC was too long. In principle, it would be 
preferable for them to follow a rhythm of tariff disarmament similar to the Six. 
 
19 GR/NBGHA/A1/S2/Y26/F212, Dr R. Meimberg, European Economic Integration, January 1959. 
This view presents the European policy of the Federation of German Industry (BDI) which the 
Deutsche Bank had embraced and was additionally supported by the ordo-liberal minded Ludwig 
Erhard. 
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Second, European and international finance had to be granted primarily for 
infrastructural projects and secondly to industries which had a clear advantage 
that guaranteed their immediate and permanent international competitiveness. 
Clearly, the protection of both existing and infant industry was not welcomed.   
6.2 The internal strategies deployed   
6.2.1 The formal association strategy  
After the turbulent session within the OEEC in December 1958, Greece pursued a 
double aim. First, it entered bilateral negotiations with the EEC countries for 
the establishment of an interim regime until June 1960, aiming to eliminate 
discrimination against its main agricultural products. It pressed Italy asking not 
only for equal treatment but also to increase imports of products subject to 
state or monopoly trade.20 In return, Greece promised that it would examine 
Italy’s ‘closer’ participation in its economic development.21 From the Federal 
Republic it asked it to provide unilaterally equal treatment for its main 
agricultural products and to consider the amendment of the EEC’s Council 
decision in the same direction. It received a clear refusal for the first demand 
and a vague promise that they would consider the second.22 The truth was, as 
the trade ministry had calculated, until June 1960 discrimination would be quite 
limited, except for wine exports to the German market, however, the problem 
would become severe after that date.23 In early February, it was plain to 
Pesmazoglou that the equal treatment asked from the Six on a bilateral basis 
conflicted with the preferential system of the EEC which was the very essence of 
the customs union. For this reason, the chief negotiator proposed to Karamanlis 
that he intensify efforts for a permanent and multilateral solution. This was the 
second aim. Pesmazoglou emphasized that it was imperative to pursue 
simultaneously all the demands which, according to his sources, the Commission 
intended to embrace in its proposal for the multilateral solution. These were the 
 
20 YDIAEI, I, Government of the Hellenic Republic, to the Italian Government, AIDE – MEMOIRE, 
Athens, 30 December 1958, pp. 282-3.   
21 KKAFT, III, p. 342.  
22 YDIA/1959/13/5/1, Cryptographic Telegram 179, Greek Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Ministry, 
28 January 1959. 
23 KKF/KKA/8A, Differences on tariffs and quotas for Greek products in each of the countries 
following the launch of the Common Market, I. Komitsas, 4 February 1959, pp. 2-1959-2-2164.  
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provisions agreed for the less developed states within the OEEC and were 
decisive for the prime objective of industrialization. Importantly, Pesmazoglou 
expected that the association would advance the utilization of German credits 
and the initiation of business cooperation agreed in November 1958. 
Simultaneously, in case that this preferred option was finally wrecked by April, 
he pressed Karamanlis to prepare the road for the EEC directly.24 Indeed, 
Pesmazoglou’s information was accurate.  
The Commission had publicly attempted to ride two horses simultaneously.25 It 
stated that the preferred mode of integration was the multilateral, more liberal 
option, known since Ockrent’s report, as the European Economic Association. 
However, at the same time, its report undermined the latter by opening the 
road for the EEC’s separate bilateral negotiations with individual states. To top 
it all, it stated that free trade would widen the disparities between unequal 
partners and proposed that the Council should recognize the special status of 
underdeveloped states according to the decisions of Working Party 23 within the 
OEEC and encouraged it to act accordingly. Pesmazoglou was quick to inform 
Karamanlis of this desired and anticipated development, urging him to utilize at 
the highest possible level the Commission’s suggestion defending Greek demands 
as a whole.26 It was evident that France’s objectives and Adenauer’s strategy 
were gaining ground and a few days later Hallstein confirmed it, making it public 
that Greece was welcomed as an associate of the EEC.27  
Indeed, the Greek government had intensified efforts for the bilateral option 
and France’s European strategy fitted perfectly with this goal. The same day, 
Greece’s ambassador to France informed De Gaulle that Karamanlis wished to 
tighten economic and commercial cooperation with his country because the 
Federal Republic had monopolized both trade and finance with Greece.28 Within 
this framework, he asked his support for the association of Greece with the EEC 
and discussed France’s participation in the new developmental plan. 
Simultaneously, since the Cyprus issue had been resolved, the ambassador 
 
24 KKF/KKA/8A, Note by I. Pesmazoglou and I. Komitsa, 4 February 1959, pp. 2154-7. 
25 EEC, Commission, First Memorandum from the Commission of the EEC to Council of Ministers 
of the Community, Brussels, 26 February 1959. 
26 KKF/KKA/8A, Additional Note, 28 February 1959, p. 2/2158.  
27 ‘The President of the EEC declares', ΟΤ, 5 March 1959.  
28 KKAFT, IV, F. Filon to Foreign Ministry, 5 March 1959, pp. 20-3.  
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promised a friendlier stance towards France over the Algerian war. Such an 
exchange took place in Italy two months later.29 The Italian minister of foreign 
affairs, Pella, was clear in this respect and he linked the support of his country 
to Greece’s demands for a special status within the EEC with the participation of 
Italian industry in the developmental plan. He stated that Italian industrialists 
were particularly dissatisfied by their exclusion from nitrogen fertilizers’ and 
sugar plants, as well as from the Achelous project. As the Italian foreign minister 
claimed, he would only be able to suppress the internal dissident voices if he 
could present satisfactory results in respect of Italy’s participation in Greece’s 
developmental programme. 
6.2.2 The alternative path: the traditional business sectors, 
bilateralism and protection 
It was a well-known fact that in underdeveloped economies the tendency of 
imports to be quite sensitive to the increases in the level of production and 
employment had been exacerbated by the 1958 world recession.30 In this 
respect, Greece had followed this general path. As the BoG had calculated, this 
trend was evident primarily for capital goods and secondly for raw materials and 
consumption goods.31 As a result, the intensification of the developmental effort 
had faced the balance of payments constraint in the past. The substantive 
increase in import capacity was thus a precondition for the accomplishment of 
the endeavour to stabilize capitalism in Greece. Undoubtedly, the problem in 
early 1959 appeared acute. In March 1959, the BoG had estimated that the 
prospects for that year were ominous and the bank’s reserves were threatened 
for a third consecutive year.32 This was so because invisibles had been affected 
by the world crisis and they could not cover the projected growing trade deficit.  
 
29 KKAFT, IV, Minutes of Talks, May 1959, 95-7.  
30 United Nations, World Economic Survey 1958 (New York: United Nations, 1959), pp. 3-13.   
31 BoG, The Greek Economy during the Year 1958 (Athens: BoG, 1959), pp. 97-108. Income 
elasticity of import demand was estimated 1.8 in constant prices. Other studies had calculated 
that this elasticity was 2. See: Stavros M. Theophanidis, ‘Econometric Analysis of the External 
Trade Sector of Greece 1948-1960’, Archives of Economic and Social Sciences, 43-3 (1963), 545-
628.   
32 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F69/Τ16, BoG, Balance of Payments Forecast for 1959, Athens, 20 March 
1959.   
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As has been argued, the option of Eastern trade was on the government’s agenda 
and trade minister Dertilis had proposed, in the middle of 1958, to further 
increase commercial ties by linking imports with exports. As the protectionist 
measures adopted in August 1958 had not reversed the deteriorating course of 
external trade, in late 1958 Dertilis returned to the prime minister with the 
same proposals.33 Once more, the trade minister condemned the huge 
imbalances with OEEC countries. Instead, in complete agreement with the main 
opposition EDA, he claimed that Eastern markets could absorb the persistent 
agricultural surpluses and almost any future increase in agricultural production. 
For this reason, he proposed a list of items which included mainly raw materials, 
cars and textiles, that could be imported and suggested that the importation of 
capital goods should also be promoted on this bilateral basis. Furthermore, he 
advocated that industrial exports were feasible only to Eastern and Middle 
Eastern countries. In anticipation of reactions from the West, he stated to 
Karamanlis that the huge imbalance with OEEC members and particularly with 
the Federal Republic, made it churlish to receive complaints from them.34 Under 
pressure by the acute export crisis, his recommendations were finally endorsed, 
though to a limited extent. In early April 1959, quotas for a number of 
significant raw materials and finished goods were introduced whereas the 
importation of textiles and vehicles were licenced as if luxury items.35 The 
measure, which subsequently received sharp criticism from the GATT and IMF, 
targeted the reduction of imports by at least $14 million particularly from OEEC 
members, the US and Canada, providing the room for the equal development of 
Eastern trade.36  
The solution that the ROCEP’s import subcommittee had suggested, claiming 
that it was the only compatible one with the main aim of reducing 
unemployment with rapid industrialization, was to continue the effort to 
substitute imports with internal production.37 Certainly, this was also the prime 
 
33 KKF/KKA/7A, G. Dertillis to K. Karamanlis, 29 December 1958, 1475-85.  
34 KKF/KKA/7A, Report- G. Kontogiorgis, 20 December 1959, 1491-523.  
35 Council of Foreign Trade, Decision No 15540, 7 April 1959. The first category included frozen 
meat, wood, coal, ingots, iron bars and sheets, sewing machines, electrical appliances, paper, 
newsprint and tires. The second included all fabric textiles, cars, trucks, buses and vehicle 
components. 
36 GATT, Delegation Release, Statement by Mr Leonidas Dertilis, 27 October 1959.  
37 ROCEP, Basic Committee for Public Works, Transport and Trade: Imports, 5 vols (Athens, 
March 1959), ΙV, Issue 2, p. 48. 
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objective of the provisional five-year plan published in April 1959 although this 
target did not apply to agricultural production alone. Since its major projects 
were those first proposed back in 1948, this was also true for the secondary 
sector including the energy programme, the new oil refinery, the soda, 
fertilizer, sugar, refractories and cellulose plants, as well as the majority of the 
private investments all of which targeted the substitution of imports.38 The only 
exceptions were the export oriented industries promoted by the BoG, which 
enjoyed the competitive advantage of local raw materials or they were labour 
intensive utilizing cheap domestic labour. Into this limited category fell mainly 
the significant ore processing plants, notably for aluminium and Ferro metals, 
agricultural industries processing citrus fruits and vegetables as well as the 
cotton industry. Similar conclusions for the prospects of industrial exports and 
the necessity for a prior import substitution policy had reached the ROCEP’s 
export subcommittee.39 Yet, reviewing Greece’s post-war export performance, it 
had reached the additional conclusion that, as the Harbeler report had firmly 
stated within the GATT, the deteriorating terms of trade for primary producers 
was a permanent phenomenon. For the subcommittee this implied that, unless 
trade was diversified, and the country become able to export goods with high 
income elasticity in order to take advantage of the anticipated rapid economic 
development within Europe, Greece would not balance its external account. It 
would remain an underdeveloped state, obliged to permanently resort to 
restrictive policies. As was the case with industrial policy, ROCEP’s conclusions 
resembled the business strategy of the traditional business sectors.  
In March 1959, the FGI officially embraced Matzoulinos’ report on European 
integration.40 It was clear that the federation still treated the process of 
economic integration as irreversible and Greece’s participation as inevitable. In 
particular, it considered that the creation of the Common Market had such a 
powerful influence upon the European economy that, combined with the 
tendency toward competitive economic and trade coalitions, reinforced 
internationally from political considerations, it would inevitably lead to one or 
 
38 Presidency Ministry, Interim Five-Year Economic Development Programme of the Country 
1959-1963 (Athens, 1959); KKF/KKA/9A, Momferatos to K. Karamanlis, Summary data of key 
industries, 30 June 1959, pp. 210-6.    
39 ROCEP, Basic Committee for Public Works, Transport and Trade: Exports, 5 vols (Athens, 
March 1959), ΙV, Issue 4, pp. 1-41. 
40 FGI, The Greek Industry during the year 1958 (Athens: FGI, 1959), 17-20.  
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other form of an economically unified Europe. The federation had accepted the 
political necessity, but the superiority of European industry meant that Greece 
should be prepared before its entry in order to eradicate business uncertainty. 
Thus, before its inevitable association Greece had to increase tariff protection 
and even to raise quotas to withstand competition. The federation’s main 
argument, in sharp contrast to that delivered by the Deutsche Bank and German 
business circles, was that domestic industry could not become internationally 
competitive at once, bypassing the appropriate intermediate stage which was 
the prior conquest of the internal market. However, the federation presented 
some advantages that would improve its position internally, namely, the 
equalization of the terms of production with Europe, notably the reduction of 
interest rate.  
More clearly in this respect were the traditional and dominant branches of 
consumer goods. For example, the three dominant wine companies which 
formed the wine cartel, had been asked by the commercial minister to intensify 
efforts for exports. They replied that, unless the domestic market was protected 
and rationalized, they could not compete with foreign industry and become able 
to export. High domestic costs were prohibitive of any attempt to compete not 
only internationally but, above all, internally.41 Other branches stated that the 
protection of the domestic market was imperative because of the 
overproduction encouraged by imported competition. Woollen industrialists 
underlined that modern plants were out of business and the sector had 
‘abnormally high inventories’.42 The protection of the internal market was still 
their priority. The same was true for the PUTI which asked for additional 
protection because an ‘unprecedented crisis of oversupply’ had affected plants 
with new equipment.43 The problem of ‘overproduction’ which had affected 
newly created plants was also emphasized to Karamanlis by Katsabas.44 The 
president of UCI asked particularly for additional protection either with tariffs 
and quotas or with higher import advances, claiming that the cotton industry 
was able to substitute imports of approximately $8 million. Indeed, two months 
 
41 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS6/FI15, Memorandum on the promotion of exports of wine and spirits, 
Athens, 21 January 1959, pp. 49-54. 
42 ‘Announcement of the Association of woollen industrialists of Greece, To Vima, 23 January 
1959. 
43 ‘The Full Report of the President of PUTI for the year 1958 ', VE, June 1959, pp. 31-5.   
44 KKF/KKA/9A, Chr. Katsabas to K. Karamanlis, 5 May 1959, pp. 64-72.  
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later import advances for almost all textiles were doubled.45 As will be shown 
below, additional tariff protection was considered and eventually granted with 
the new customs tariff. This emphasis upon the protection of the internal 
market did not mean that exports to Europe were not on the business agenda. 
Instead, the cotton industry emphasized that since it enjoyed the competitive 
advantages of domestic raw material and cheap labour, it was able to channel to 
the EEC its surplus production, if assisted by the state. Consistent with the FGI’s 
accumulation strategy since the 1920s, this presupposed the prior safeguard of 
the domestic market:  
We are the only cotton producer within Europe and we should, therefore, 
have the ambition not only to cover the internal needs for cotton products, 
but also to promote their export on a large scale. And this is possible only if 
we adopt brave and direct protectionist measures for the cotton industry. 46 
There was no doubt that traditional industry and segments of the government 
supported the classic path of import substitution policy which was compatible 
with the development of bilateral trade. This tendency was counterbalanced by 
the BoG, the negotiation team and the liberal business faction. 
6.2.3 BoG: setting the limits between the alternatives 
In his memo to Karamanlis, the chief negotiator underlined the reasons for which 
a quick association with the EEC was necessary. 47 The same arguments were 
repeated to the prime minister in a second memo, in view of his visit to Italy, 
advising him to emphasize that any delay would threaten the ‘progress of 
Hellenic economy’.48 Three aspects of the association were deemed 
indispensable for Greece’s economic development which explain the urgency 
and elaborate upon the extent to which the association strategy was considered 
as an alternative to the import substitution policy. Firstly, only an association 
could guarantee the finance for the new developmental programme with a long 
term, low interest loan of approximately $300 million. This would be granted by 
 
45 Council of Foreign Trade, Decision No 33100, 7 July 1959.   
46 ‘UCI Announcement, OT, 29 July 1959.   
47 YDIAEI, I (2003), I. Pesmazoglou to K. Karamanlis, Athens, 9 April 1959, pp. 291-4.   
48 YDIAEI, I (2003), I. Pesmazoglou to K. Karamanlis, Athens, 9 April 1959, pp. 295-6.   
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the European Investment Bank (EIB) or, preferably, from the proposed 
developmental Fund. Secondly, the association was considered a unique and 
significant opportunity to discuss and perhaps to substantially promote the issue 
of agricultural exports to European countries and, above all, to the Federal 
Republic. Thirdly, it would facilitate FDI. 
The underlining rationale was elaborated by Zolotas. There is no doubt that 
BoG’s governor considered that the formation of a regional multilateral trading 
system obliged industry to develop on a competitive basis. 49 Within the 
unfolding international crisis, this necessity was confirmed by the fact that the 
dominant sectors of industry already experienced an acute overproduction crisis 
combined with severe underutilization of their mechanical equipment. 50 This 
was the foundation upon which the governor based his policy recommendations. 
The solution promoted by the BoG was a commercial policy capable of dealing 
with the underutilization crisis in the long term. Greek industry had to take 
advantage of the big European market which promised economies of scale in 
order to reduce production costs. This would enable affected industries to 
channel their surpluses abroad and avoid liquidation. FDI, facilitated by the 
structure of the association regime were destined to play a substantive role in 
this respect as they would provide, not only the appropriate capital and 
technology transfers but, also, as it had been always advocated by Zolotas, 
organizational and administrative improvements. Even if direct geopolitical 
considerations were also implicitly invoked, it was on these terms that Eastern 
trade was rejected as an alternative: bilateral trade with uncompetitive eastern 
markets would increase domestic incomes and prices and hence production 
costs, further deteriorating competitiveness and export performance. This 
commercial policy was consistent with Zolotas’ prioritization of monetary 
equilibrium which called for wage increases according to productivity gains as 
well as for restrictive credit and monetary policies in order to stabilize prices 
and to manage internal demand and investments according to the balance of 
payments needs. As will be explained later, the proposals for subsidies to 
agricultural exports were rejected by Zolotas for similar reasons. From these 
considerations it followed that eastern trade, significant as it could be for the 
 
49 BOG, The Greek Economy during the year 1958 (Athens: BoG April 1959), pp. 11-3 and 55-60.   
50 Ibid., pp. 141-52.    
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disposal of agricultural surpluses and the balance of external accounts, could not 
develop at the expense of multilateral trade and its recent increase had to be 
temporal. However, the governor concluded that eastern trade could be utilized 
for negotiation purposes. All in all, the BoG claimed that only the substantive 
increase of agricultural exports to the EEC would increase import capacity on a 
competitive base which combined with the appropriate capital inflows, would 
open the road for the specialization of industry within a wide competitive 
market. For Zolotas, this would contribute to the solution Greece’s chronic 
structural problems.  
This was the basis of the association strategy and Pesmazoglou elaborated the 
appropriate steps for its realization. The same day that Karamanlis announced 
the provisional five-year plan, he clarified the core argument upon which Greece 
subsequently based its negotiation strategy. Within the framework of the 
association, Greece would provide preferential treatment to EEC industry, 
primarily for machinery and transportation equipment (SITC-7), necessary for 
the realization of its developmental plan. In return, it asked for preferential 
treatment of its agricultural exports aiming to ameliorate the already 
deteriorating balance of payments with the Six.51 Yet, the association structure 
would advance Greece’s industrial development with the stimulation of FDI. On 
the one hand, Greece’s substantive tariff disarmament would start after a 
period of 10 or 12 years and the tariff burden would be gradually abolished 
within a total transitional period of approximately 25-30 years. Since this period 
would be subjected to only 10-15% of Greece’s imports by the EEC, there was 
room for a limited import substitution policy and the protection of selected 
infant industries. On the other hand, the EEC would abolish tariff duties within 
10 or 12 years, as agreed within the OEEC. Certainly, this structure implied a 
preferential treatment for industry in Greece capable of stimulating FDI from 
both Europe and the US.  
 
51 KKAFT, IV, Memorandum of I. Pesmazoglou to K. Karamanlis, 27 April 1959, pp. 38-9.  
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6.3 The Federal Republic, the general framework and the 
substantive strategy 
6.3.1 Preliminary negotiations with the Federal Republic and the EEC: 
the general framework and the acquis communautaire   
A distinct feature in the process of association and enlargement of the EEC and 
EU is the acquis communautaire because it is a set of law and rules which the 
new entrants should accept at the outset and progressively adapt to it.52 The 
Greek case can illustrate upon the origin of the acquis because it was the first 
country to associate with EEC when the direction that European integration 
would take was open because the French pressed for deepening the customs 
union whereas Erhard and German big business opted instead for widening it 
through its multilateral association with all OEEC members. In the 
circumstances, the acquis was largely the mode of Greece’s association with EEC 
and concerned particularly the extent to which Greece would accept CAP’s 
future rules and the pace of tariff disarmament as specified by the Treaty of 
Rome. As this mode had wider implications for the direction that European 
integration would take because it would serve as a model for EEC’s future 
expansion, the actors involved, mainly the European Commission and the 
member states along with the Greek government, were interested in shaping it. 
As will be argued in the remining of this section, the European Commission, 
which largely substantiates the supranational character of European integration, 
was clearly in the back seat and was the Germans, and particularly Erhard, who 
had largely defined Greece’s mode of integration to the EEC.   
In May 1960 the negotiations for the creation of the industrial European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) were entering their substantive phase at Stockholm. 
Greece complained to London and Stockholm because, despite its endeavours, it 
had not been invited to these negotiations.53 Certainly, this move was not 
 
52 Wolfram Kaiser, ‘Transnational networks in European governance: The informal politics of 
integration’, in The History of the European Union Origins of a trans- and supranational polity 
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motivated by any desire to join EFTA and it seems that it was made under 
Erhard’s pressure and/or for tactical reasons. In any case, Christidis did not 
appear dissatisfied by the fact that, according to his sources, the Seven simply 
wanted to ‘get rid’ of the four underdeveloped states because of the financial 
burden which their inclusion implied.54 Instead, taking advantage of this 
‘turmoil’, he departed for Brussels to officially apply for an association of 
Greece with the EEC.55  No doubt, the de-facto disruption of the unity of the 
Eleven had provided this long-awaited opportunity. Certainly, the coordination 
ministry instructed Christidis to emphasize to the Commission that the imminent 
formation of EFTA meant that the negotiations for the wider free trade area 
could not further be utilized as an excuse for the delay in Greece’s association 
to the EEC. Instead, a quick start of the negotiations was urgent, continued the 
coordination ministry, because the issue had already created uncertainty and 
undermined economic development, threatening ‘severe economic, social and 
other consequences of wider importance for Greece.’56 This was precisely the 
basis of the application submitted to the Commission for the association.57 The 
same arguments were repeated to the governments of Belgium, Netherlands, 
France and Italy with the adverse effects framed within the need for bourgeois 
modernization: the exclusion of Greece from the reorganization and the far-
reaching reforms of the European economy which the implementation of the 
Treaty of Rome entailed would, in the long-term, have the serious consequences 
mentioned above.  
These consequences were also spelt out by Karamanlis to Adenauer.58 The road 
for a positive response had been paved by the Greek government which had just 
rejected the USSR’s proposals for a neutral Balkan zone free of nuclear 
weapons.59 The Chancellor, who was very interested in the establishment of 
intermediate ballistic missiles (IRBM) in Greece capable of carrying nuclear 
weapons, reassured the Greek prime minister that he would exercise his 
 
54 YDIAEI, I (2003), Th. Christidis to the Ministry of Coordination, Paris, 4 June 1959, pp. 299-302.   
55 Ibid., p. 302.   
56 YDIAEI, I (2003), P. Sakefris, Permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign Ministry, to the Embassy of 
Paris, Athens, 8 June 1959, pp. 303.   
57 YDIAEI, I (2003), Th. Christidis, Representative to the EEC, to W. Hallstein, President of the 
Committee of the EEC, Paris, 8 June 1959, pp. 304-5.   
58 YDIA/1959/13/5/1, Cryptographic Telegram (1348) of the Greek Embassy in Bonn to the 
Foreign Ministry, 23 June 1959. 
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influence for the accomplishment of Greece’s demands in respect to the EEC. 
However, Adenauer’s position once more collided with Erhard’s objectives. The 
finance minister opposed the exclusion of Greece and the other underdeveloped 
states from EFTA and reaffirmed that he expected that the new tariff reduction 
within the EEC would press the UK for a multilateral solution. Otherwise, Erhard 
warned, the consequences would be severe.  
As expected, on the eve of the Council meeting to discuss Greece’s application, 
both the business community and state agencies sent a public message to 
Erhard: a quick association would advance the bilateral economic and trade 
relations based upon the November 1958 agreement.60 The common denominator 
was that only a quick association would remove business uncertainty for 
investments and encourage agricultural exports. It was emphasized that this 
would encourage Greek-German business cooperation which aimed to utilize 
Greece as an export base for Middle East markets and provide the means of 
exchange to import capital goods from the Federal Republic. Importantly, the 
reliance of Greece upon the Federal Republic and German business for the 
solution of its viability problem had been translated into a public plea for a 
quick integration to the EEC. Diplomatic channels confirm that this was also the 
case behind the scenes.  
As Ypsilandis and Pesmazoglou confirmed, the fact that Scandinavian markets 
were far more significant for German industry than that of Greece, weighed 
decisively in Erhard’s strategy. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Federal Republic 
postponed the Council meeting that would discuss Greece’s application on 29 
June 1959.61 However, France’s permanent delegate reassured Christidis that 
the EEC would finally accept the application, but negotiations would not be easy 
because everybody within the Community realized that this association would 
set a precedent. What followed is not difficult to imagine. 
The foreign ministry instructed Ypsilandis to meet Erhard again and reiterate the 
well-known Greek arguments reminding him that West Germany and Adenauer 
personally, had assured Karamanlis of support with Greece’s association to the 
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EEC back in July 1957.62 The same day, the foreign minister informed Ypsilandis 
that the Greek government was ready to discuss with Erhard during his 
scheduled visit to Greece in late August, the urgent necessity of an association 
based upon the principles agreed within the OEEC for the less developed 
states.63 The response from Germany signalled a shift of attention from the 
multilateral dimension to the liberal framework of Greece’s participation to 
early European integration and Turkey’s application had certainly pressed in the 
same direction. 
The foreign ministry was informed in the middle of July 1959 that Adenauer and 
Erhard had reached an agreement to accept Greece’s application on the 
condition that its terms would not disturb the formation of the wider free trade 
area.64 The former would be satisfied with Greece because it had decided to 
accept IRBM bases but the decision was not yet reportable.65 For the latter, the 
recovery of the French economy after the devaluation in late 1958 implied that 
it might accept the multilateral solution from July 1960. This meant that, as the 
Greek ambassador made clear, if Greece was to join the EEC it had to amend its 
demands according to Erhard’s suggestions during his visit to Athens.66 The terms 
of Greece’s association with the EEC had to be compatible with those of the 
planned multilateral association by the Federal Republic otherwise each 
underdeveloped state would have its own terms within the wider free trade 
area, a grotesque situation for Erhard which had to be avoided. Ypsilandis 
summed up the German position:   
Summarizing the above, I realize that the Germans consider that the essential 
condition for the success of our economic policy within the framework of the 
Common Market is the unreserved adoption and understanding of the doctrines 
 
62 Ibid., Economou-Gouras to Embassy of Bonn, Athens, 11 July 1959, pp. 323-6.   
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of liberal economic policy, which is [the policy] followed by the Six countries of 
the Common Market.67 
As Ypsilandis reported, for Erhard this meant that Greece had, in principle, to 
follow the EEC’s rhythm of quota reductions and tariff disarmament. Only for a 
limited number of industries which were not able to face competition 
immediately, a transition period 18 or 20 years would be granted. In any case, 
newly created industries had to be competitive from the very beginning. In this 
respect, Tsimikalis had also prepared the Greek government for Erhard’s 
intentions during his visit to Athens, stating that import substitution industries 
were no longer feasible.68 The news was equally discouraging for agricultural 
exports. The demand that the EEC would undertake commitments for Greek 
agricultural products contradicted both German liberal economic principles and 
GATT rules. As far as economic aid was concerned, finance would be granted 
only for specific projects within the framework of a long-term economic plan 
which was the initial position of the German side. 
It was plain that the Federal Republic had now replaced almost completely the 
US as the principle international actor which pressed Greece to open its borders 
and liberalize its foreign trade. As was confirmed by German state managers, 
the association of Greece with the EEC was of ‘German interest’. 69 The US had 
not yet formed a clear stance because it was waiting to see the direction which 
the ‘Economic unification’ would take.70 In principle, the State Department 
recognized the necessity to assist Greece’s integration to the international 
economy and was thus sympathetic to its association with the EEC albeit with 
association terms that respected both GATT rules and US’s foreign economic 
policy. All these presaged that the negotiations would not be easy, and the 
Greek government and the negotiation team were prepared accordingly. 
Because it was obvious that Ypsilandis had fully endorsed German liberal 
proposals, on 30 July 1959 Pesmazoglou reminded him that Greece aimed to 
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start negotiations based upon the terms agreed within the OEEC and adopted by 
the Commission’s first memorandum.71 To leave no doubt, he stated that this 
was the prime minister’s instructions. Indeed, the draft memo attached for 
Erhard reiterated Greece’s well-known arguments and replied to the German 
proposals. It emphasized the quite adverse balance of trade between Greece 
and EEC countries and particularly with the Federal Republic and it emphatically 
stated that the trade deficit in 1955 was $10 million and in 1958 it had reached 
$40 million, an amount which accounted for four fifths of the state loan granted 
to Greece in November 1958. This state of affairs was described as a ‘severe 
anomaly’ which legitimized Greece’s demands which meant that tariff 
disarmament would, in principle, start after 10-12 years as agreed within the 
OEEC, whereas the substantive increase of exports would be guaranteed.72 The 
memo concluded with the principal argument, namely, that Greece would be 
able to provide the EEC, notably Germany, with preferential status in respect to 
industrial products only if the association provided the means to do so.  
Indeed, in a letter to Karamanlis the chief negotiator particularized the demands 
according to the principles agreed within the OEEC which was the initial 
negotiation position.73 Greece, in order to establish the preferential treatment 
for the EEC’s industry, would undertake three obligations. First, it would adopt 
the common external tariff. Second, it was eager to accept, in principle, the 
complete tariff disarmament for all goods within a time frame twice that 
applicable to the Six. Third, it would follow the 12-year rule for a number of 
items, notably for capital goods and raw materials which accounted for 
approximately 15-20% of Greece’s total imports from the EEC in 1958.  Fourth, it 
would consolidate the liberalization of 50% of private imports according to the 
Code and would then follow the EEC’s schedule for quota reduction. This was 
the general framework requested which provided room for the protection of 
infant industry and, in return, the EEC would undertake three obligations. First, 
it would automatically extend to Greece all the tariff and quota reductions 
applicable to the Six - the so-called equal treatment which had been requested 
for both industrial and agricultural products (List A). In respect to agricultural 
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products, it was additionally requested that, at least for those which would be 
treated equally, the participation of Greece in the formation of the common 
agricultural (CAP) and trade policies. Second, the EEC would treat, 
preferentially, a number of Greece’s main agricultural exports (List B), primarily 
tobacco and cotton. Specifically, for France and Italy which retained state 
monopolies, there were proposed long-term contracts aiming to double tobacco 
exports within the following five years. For the German and Benelux markets, 
Greece asked for the adjustment of their internal consumption taxes for 
cigarettes and the appropriate increase of the EEC’s common external tariff for 
both products. Since the penetration of US Virginia tobacco was still 
considerable, this was an opportunity to reverse this unfavourable trend. Third, 
the EEC would recognize, in principle, the need for capital inflows for 
infrastructural works and productive investments which had to specify the 
appropriate mechanisms. This demand was aimed particularly at financing the 
new five-year programme with $300 million.    
The response from the Federal Republic was again not encouraging, whereas 
Turkey’s application in late July 1959 had complicated the issue even more. The 
Federal foreign ministry warned the Greek ambassador that Turkey’s 
problematic economic course obliged the EEC to ask for more guarantees in 
relation to those asked from Greece. This difference could make negotiations 
more complex in respect to the EEC’s exchanges.74 Simultaneously, Van 
Scherpenberg, reassured Ypsilandis that even if the proposed terms would not be 
accepted by the Federal Republic, the Greek side should not be disappointed. 
This was because, if the Federal Republic’s interests were to be advanced by the 
association, the latter had to be beneficial for the Greek economy as well. It 
would be a win-win agreement. For this reason, Ypsilandis reiterated that 
Greece should align its demands to Erhard’s suggestions.75 Indeed, beyond his 
interest for the migration and establishment agreements along with the 
formation of the IDC, the Federal minister asked for the reconsideration of the 
commercial policy.  
 
74 YDIA/1959/13/5/1, Th. Ypsilantis, Ambassador in Bonn, to the Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 5 August 
1959. 
75 YDIA/1959/13/5/1, Cryptographic Telegram 1741, Greek Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Ministry, 
Bonn, 10 August 1959. 
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Firstly, Erhard recognized the necessity for reasonable tariff protection of 
existing manufacturing but with a customs tariff compatible with Greece’s 
international commitments (GATT). Secondly, he rejected the protection of 
infant industries. Thirdly, he was dissatisfied with the apparent shift towards 
protectionism and bilateralism and, in this respect, he rejected the industrial 
ministry’s proposed measure to introduce a levy upon industrial imports which 
would finance exports. Above all, he was dissatisfied with the measures adopted 
in April 1959 which had affected trade particularly with Western countries.76 
Indeed, according to Tsimikalis’ information from Reinhardt, this development 
was very high on Germany’s agenda. The ‘main issue’ that Erhard aimed to 
discuss during his trip in August ‘would be the development of the commercial 
links between Greece and Eastern countries and their impact upon foreign trade 
as a whole.’77 At the same time, however, the German side had made clear that 
agricultural exports to Europe would be promoted on a competitive base and 
state intervention, like long-term guaranteed contracts, was not compatible 
with the free market economy.78  
After his visit to Athens, Erhard had warned that during the negotiations at 
Brussels the Greek government would become fully informed about Europe’s 
view of Greece’s association with the EEC. If it wanted to proceed, it had to 
adjust its developmental programme to Europe’s realities.79 Indeed, the first 
official contact with the Commission in the middle of September 1959 
disappointed Greece’s negotiation team and the government.80 In respect of the 
general framework, the Commission now proposed a scheme for tariff 
disarmament which shared considerable affinities with the German proposals. It 
stated that Greece had to accept, in principle, the 12-year rule and only for 
products mentioned in a separate list would an additional 10-year period be 
granted. This list would not be fixed, and Greece could add unilaterally a 
 
76 ‘A Change to our economic policy was suggested’, ΟΤ, 27 August 1959; ‘Economic policy should 
be revised’, Eleftheria, 26 August 1959. 
77 YDIA/1959/13/5/1, A. Tsimimilis, Greek Embassy in Bonn to Ministry of Commerce, Bonn, 10 
August 1959. 
78 GR/GL/CIT/092/60/3/20, Th. Ypsilantis, Ambassador in Bonn, to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Bonn, 10 August 1959.   
79 GR/GL/CIT/092/60/3/24, Th. Ypsilantis, Ambassador in Bonn, to the Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 15 
September 1959.   
80 YDIAEI, I (2003), P. Economou-Gouras, to the Embassies of Bonn and Rome, Athens, 24 
September 1959, 337-41; Ibid., Greek Government to the French Government, October 1959, 
341-4.  
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number of new items up to a limited level, whereas escape clauses for products 
under the 12-year rule were applicable according to the EEC Treaty. This 
framework aimed at a deep integration of Greece to the EEC.81 Indeed, it was 
consistent with the EEC’s new orientation towards an acceleration of the 
implementation of the Treaty of Rome and perhaps the shortening of the 
transitional period.82 The same response was true in respect to agriculture. On 
the grounds that the customs union for agricultural products was linked to the 
formation of the CAP, which was at the centre of the discussion within the 
community at the time, equal treatment for agricultural products was rejected 
out of hand. The special provisions asked for would be discussed by the Council 
later. For the moment, the priority was the agreement upon the general 
framework and the adjustment of agricultural exports according to the CAP’s 
future settlement. The acquis communautaire had just been born.  
For both Christidis and Pesmazoglou, the Commission aimed to utilize this strict 
framework for two purposes. The first and principal aim was to differentiate the 
Greek case primarily from that of Turkey and secondly from Spain and Tunisia 
whilst the second aim was to enable itself to press member states to accept the 
equal treatment for agricultural exports. It was evident that the negotiation 
team, which was close to the EEC’s new institutions, considered that the 
Commission was able to work in the advance of Greece’s association with the 
terms proposed by the Greek government. In any case, these terms resembled 
the Commission’s own suggestions which were close to Greece’s demands 
spelled out by Pesmazoglou.83 Its president, Hallstein, was still under the direct 
influence of Adenauer and thus closer to Germany’s foreign ministry rather than 
to the objectives of Erhard and German industry. Its vice president, Marjolin, 
advanced France’s objectives supporting particularly the speedier 
implementation of the treaty and the strengthening of the EEC and thus he 
considered that Greece’s association would enhance the prestige and the 
negotiation position of the Community. In addition, the Chairman of the external 
relations directorate general, Rey, was the former finance minister of Belgium 
and always sympathetic to Greek demands.   
 
81 YDIA/1959/13/6/1, Th. Christidis to the Ministry of Coordination, Paris, 9 November 1959.   
82 Commission, Third General Report, Brussels, 9 June 1960, pp. 27-40;162-82.  
83 KKF/KKA/10A, Memo, 13 October 1959, pp. 528-30. 
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However, the European Council, and specifically Germany’s finance minister, 
was not of the same opinion. Ypsilandis reported that Erhard, at the first Council 
meeting engaged with the evaluation of Greece’s application, considered the 
political significance of the association and accepted that it would not serve as a 
‘model contract’ for the formation of the wider free trade area.84 This was not 
given for nothing. Firstly, this concession was made only after the Council had 
reassured Erhard that in case the wider trade area was formed, the association 
treaty would be amended accordingly. Second, Erhard posed his red lines in 
respect of the association terms by insisting that the transitional period was too 
long, and it contrasted with the new effort for shortening the time frame for the 
implementation of the Treaty of Rome. As far as agricultural exports were 
concerned, Erhard stated that the treatment of Greek agricultural products 
would be analogous to the settlement of CAP within the EEC and thereafter it 
would be amended on the same terms. Finally, finance would be restricted to 
specific projects already under bilateral contracts. As was proven during the 
course of negotiations, this was indeed the basis from which the EEC’s general 
stance vis-à-vis Greece’s association emerged. 
From the very beginning, negotiations took the well-known form of Greece’s 
post-war economic history: the provision of external finance and the promotion 
of agricultural exports were conditional upon the degree to which Greece would 
open its borders to foreign competition. Certainly, this was Greece’s 
interpretation of the EEC’s intention and it was to this challenge that it was 
preparing to respond. The instructions to the delegation for the EEC’s proposed 
scheme for tariff disarmament left no doubt: 
The below mentioned new instructions constitute the maximum concessions 
which the Greek Delegation can provide, always under the unequivocal 
reservation of the complete satisfaction of Greek demands for agricultural 
products and tobacco as well as for the sufficient finance of Greece’s 
economic development.85 
 
84 YDIA/1959/13/6/1, Cryptographic Telegram 2494, Greek Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Ministry, 
15 October 1959. 
85 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F75/Τ6, Negotiations of Greece with the European Economic 
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With some minor amendments, the Greek government had decided to accept the 
EEC’s proposals in respect to the general framework after explanatory 
negotiations in the middle of October 1959 at Athens.86 In particular, the Greek 
side, always on the condition of the complete satisfaction of the other two 
demands, was eager to accept the 12-year rule for goods amounting to 40-50% of 
total imports from the Six in 1958. This percentage covered three main 
categories. First, capital goods not produced and not scheduled to be produced 
internally in the near future, primarily machinery and transportation equipment. 
Second, raw materials not available internally. Third, goods for which duties 
were levied for fiscal purposes and their tariff burden could be replaced by 
internal consumption taxes. An escape clause was applicable for the above 
arrangement. The exception list for which the 22-year period was applicable, 
including manufactured goods mainly produced internally. Attention was paid to 
the inclusion of oil, sugar and nitrogen fertilizers, all products for which 
production had already started or was imminent. For newly created industries, 
Greece would have the right to protect them unilaterally during the 12-year 
period and, in agreement with the EEC, for the 10 years following. With two 
further derogations at two critical moments during the initial stages of 
substantive negotiations, this was the general framework finally agreed and 
embodied in the Association Treaty. The characteristic of these derogations was 
that they curtailed the right to protect infant industries but certainly the 
negotiation team was ready to accept them from December 1960. Indeed, until 
May 1960 Greece had accepted to include in the 12-year period 52% which it 
considered fulfilled the principle of the customs union. Until July 1960 this 
amount had reached 60%. Upon the insistence of the Greek side, which resisted 
decisively the Council’s demand for the contrary, this percentage did not include 
any domestic manufacturing. The latter was thus included on the 22-year list 
which did not include any scheduled production. Instead, the right to 
unilaterally protect infant industries was restricted to 9 years with the ability to 
apply custom duties up to 25% ad valorem and for products amounting to less 
than 10% of Greek total imports from the EEC in 1958. Indeed, the room for an 
import substitution policy was quite limited whereas the right to protect infant 
industries was abolished. As Erhard had asked, these latter industries had to be 
 
86 YDIA/1959/13/6/1, Th. Christidis to the Ministry of Coordination, Paris, 3 December 1959.   
  287 
 
 
 
 
competitive from the very beginning, however, he was not alone in asking for 
such a liberal developmental policy.  
6.3.2 The domestic liberal business bloc 
At the other end of the spectrum were domestic enclaves which were aligned 
with Germany’s liberal economic strategy as expressed by Erhard and the BDI. It 
shared the latter’s dissatisfaction with the FGI’s refusal to accept the terms 
which German industry proposed for FDI in Greece and for the government’s 
protective and autarkic commercial policy in relation to the association. It 
advocated that Greece pursued association aiming to find a new source to 
finance the development of an autarkic economy behind a long transitional 
period and to effortlessly export its low quality and expensive agricultural 
production.87 In this category mainly fell the presidency minister, Konstantinos 
Tsatsos, the Greek ambassador at Bonn, Ypsilandis, supported by state managers 
like Georgios Kondogiorgis, who belonged to the commercial ministry and who 
were engaged with the negotiations. Indeed, the messages that were coming 
from the Federal Republic were negative for the quality of Greece’s products 
which lacked standardization, emphasizing exporters’ opportunistic practices.88 
The conclusion was that exports to uncompetitive Eastern markets reproduced 
and perpetuated these problems. Certainly, this argument supported by 
Kondogiorgis, who insisted that Eastern exports had increased domestic prices 
making it hard to export to core Europe.89 
This liberal bloc was aligned to businessmen who had been detached from the 
FGI and cooperated with the inward-looking fraction of shipping capital. As has 
been shown, their leaders, Alexandros Tsatsos and Stratis Adreadis, were both 
active within the IDC. Certainly, the BDI and the IDC had met in January 1960 at 
Bonn and the Greek embassy there facilitated their cooperation.90  Certainly, 
the IDC had emerged because of the dissatisfaction of German businesses and 
 
87 GR/GL/CIT/ 092/60/3/28, Th. Ypsilantis, Ambassador in Bonn, to the Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 
19 October 1959.   
88 GR/GL/CIT/092/60/3/30, A. Tsimimilis, Greek Embassy in Bonn to Ministry of Commerce, 
Bonn, 2 December 1959.   
89 KKF/GKA/208, Commercial Policy, 16 December 1959.  
90 GR/GL/CIT/ 092/60/4/69, Th. Ypsilantis, Ambassador in Bonn, to Konstantinos Tsatsos, no 
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the Federal Republic from the stance of the FGI and the NBG in respect to the 
terms under which Greek-German businesses would cooperate within the 
framework of the November 1958 bilateral agreement. Andreadis was still among 
the main supporters of Greece’s European prospect within the industrial business 
community and often propagandized the benefits of the ‘European Economic 
Union’ for the economic development of Greece.91 He considered that the 
stability of the Drs, along with the appropriate economic policy, would attract 
the much needed FDI.92 In this respect, the IDC’s future president, Tsatsos, 
claimed to Karamanlis that he intended to promote industrialization according to 
Erhard’s suggestions: 
Al. G. Tsatsos declared his belief in the rapid realization of the economic 
unity of Western Europe as a counterforce to the Eastern bloc […] Being a 
loyal follower of the liberal capitalist economy, as it is enforced by the 
western democratic countries, Mr Al. G. Tsatsos believes in competitive 
firms and not those aiming to develop under protection or with subsidies.93  
He then asked the prime-minister if the government, indeed, aimed to promote 
competitive companies or not. Karamanlis replied that although this was 
preferable, he nevertheless was eager, to the extent that they would absorb a 
sufficiently high number of workers, to grant protection to newly created 
companies. Karamanlis had distanced himself from this quite liberal doctrine 
which was also true for both the majority of the Karamanlis government and big 
businesses within the FGI. The coordination minister and the negotiation team 
rejected the proposals of the liberal bloc reminding them of the huge trade 
deficit.94 This was the link which connected them with to the protectionist bloc.  
There is no doubt that the import substitution policy, consistent with bilateral 
trade, was still backed by the industrial, commercial and finance ministries 
which were not engaged directly in the negotiations. Such demands were also 
supported by the main opposition EDA but with different objectives. All 
 
91 Stratis Andreadis, ‘Greece hopes for serious benefits from the European Economic Union’, OT, 
5 February 1959, p. 8.  
92 Stratis Andreadis, ‘Favourable prospects for the Greek Economy in 1959’, OT, 22 January 1959, 
p. 7.  
93 KKF/KKA/10A, Memorandum, Visiting Al. Tsatsos, 31 October 1959, 613. 
94 GR/GL/CIT/092/60/3/30, Ministry of Coordination to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 12 
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advocated that industry had to develop within the domestic greenhouse and 
proposed the connection of imports with exports as a solution to the severe 
export crisis.95 These political forces essentially duplicated FGI’s strategy and, 
undoubtedly, the name of Friedrich List was the thread which connected such 
divergent political and business forces.  
6.3.3 The formal association strategy elaborated: a compromise 
Elaborating on the evolving rationale of Greece’s association strategy, 
Pesmazoglou, at the end of 1959, sketched out the reasons for which this 
general framework had been accepted by Greece.96 First, it was the only means 
of avoiding discrimination although the anticipated increase of agricultural 
exports were limited and actually restricted to tobacco. Second, expectations 
for the long-term loan were moderate but, as indications for the utilization of 
Greece as an entry point for the EEC’s market from multinational corporations 
were growing, the attraction of private capital became one of the prime 
objectives and it was precisely the time that the liberal business bloc had 
stepped in through the IDC. Third, the acceptance of this framework 
differentiated substantially Greek from Turkey’s potential association. Indeed, 
Pesmazoglou claimed that Turkey was not eager to accept the 12-year rule 
because it was interested in flexible procurement of capital equipment not 
restricted to the Six alone, whereas its demands for agricultural exports were 
more moderate. Instead, Greek authorities estimated that machinery from the 
core European countries was cheaper whereas, the common external tariff, on 
average 15%, was not prohibitive for such imports. Yet, especially for state and 
public entities, there was a necessity for duty free machinery imports that would 
finally reduce production costs. These substantive concessions from the Greek 
side meant that its association was more attractive to the EEC and thus 
conducive to bigger exchanges by the Six. Thus, the joint negotiations which 
Turkey had proposed to Greece, were eventually rejected to avoid the extension 
of these exchanges and, additionally, to shorten the timeframe of the 
negotiations but the common efforts of the two countries at the political level 
 
95 See the speeches of the respective ministers and the general secretary of EDA, who explicitly 
agreed and cited each other at chambers’ conference: ACCI, Third Conference, 53-77.   
96 KKF/KKA/8A, I. Pesmazoglou to K. Karamanlis, 23 December 1959, pp. 2165-75.  
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and their mutual support were meant to continue.97 As it became clear later, 
these concessions to the general framework were also utilized to bypass the 
reservations of member states, notably Italy’s and the Netherland’s objections, 
in respect of a precedent that the association would establish for agriculture and 
finance provisions, not only for Turkey but for Spain too. Fourth, it was expected 
that business circles would not resist this settlement because all existing 
industry would be included in the 22-year period. Fifth, the association 
guaranteed Greece’s substantive participation in the anticipated further 
integration of Europe be that in the form of deepening or widening.  
6.3.4 The substantive strategy deployed: the traditional business 
sectors and the new tariff policy  
By October 1959 the FGI had a clearer picture of the EEC and had clarified its 
strategy even more.98 The federation considered that the elimination of the 
barriers to trade not only entailed the simultaneous free movement of capital 
and labour but it also presupposed the adoption of a set of common policies and 
the equalization of the production costs. These were the foundations of 
European integration, whereas Competition Policy and the proposed social 
harmonization were conceived by Drakos as secondary regulatory aspects of the 
process. From the whole procedure, the federation discerned both positive and 
negative implications for Greece. To begin with, labour outflows were presented 
as the great danger threatening Greece with desertification which would be 
eliminated only if the new European division of labour in agricultural production, 
awarded to Greece from the core Europe, would increase employment. Instead, 
capital inflows were welcomed and, undoubtedly, the great advantages 
expected from unification were the reduction of interest rates and the 
equalization of the terms for the provision of capital. Advantages were also 
expected from the core of negative integration, notably the unhindered and 
duty-free import of raw materials and machinery. From the enforcement of 
Competition Policy, the FGI expected the elimination of European dumping and 
estimated that despite the tendency towards the equalization of labour 
 
97 YDIA/1959/13/6/1, Cryptographic Telegram 6094, E. Averoff to K. Karamanlis, Paris, 13 
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98 ‘The Report of the President of FGI, Mr. Georgios Drakos', in ACCI, Third Conference, pp. 106-
11. 
  291 
 
 
 
 
remuneration, the latter would continue to constitute the main competitive 
advantage to Greek industry. All in all, the FGI estimated that the abolition of 
duties and import formalities implied the improvement of the supply chain and 
the reduction of production costs, both of which were still quite problematic 
within the Athens’ industrial cluster. These improvements would enable Greek 
industry primarily to compete internally but also to potentially take advantage 
of the big European market and the economies of scale attached.  
The issue at stake for the federation was, therefore, to reap these potential 
benefits shouldering as few obligations as possible. This objective was translated 
into an association strategy based upon the highest possible level of protection 
of domestic manufacturing during the transitional period.99 The argument 
utilized for the overall strategy was based upon the federation’s thesis that 
foreign industry had reached economies of scale based, initially, on large 
internal markets which, thereafter, were utilized as export platforms. For the 
federation, foreign industries taking advantage of their large internal markets, 
were able to export because they would set the so-called export prices which 
did not include general and depreciation costs, or they simply utilized dump 
prices. These costs would then be added to production channelled to their large 
domestic markets. Echoing clearly the FGI’s arguments back in 1929 examined at 
the beginning of chapter two, this analysis now resembled the successful 
corporate strategy utilized by the cement industry.  
The vulnerable Greek industry had to face these export prices within its own 
small national market and this meant that it could not follow this practice unless 
its internal market was adequately protected to serve as an export base. The 
new customs tariff and the pending renewal of the antidumping law were the 
appropriate instruments for the realization of this strategy. It had two legs. 
Firstly, it aimed to increase the level of the tariff burden from which 
disarmament would start. Secondly, for the thorny issue of intermediate inputs 
produced internally, because there was no comprehensive study to indicate the 
effective level of tariff protection, the federation asked that the guiding 
principle of the new customs tariff should be the abolition of the tariff burden 
 
99 ‘The Report of the FGI’s Secretary-General, D. Papadimitriou’, in ACCI, Third Conference, pp. 
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for raw materials not produced domestically. In respect to duty free import of 
mechanical equipment, an old and persistent demand of the FGI, it was already 
a basic component of the industrial policy (Law 3949/1959). That the federation 
prioritized the internal market was confirmed by the fact it was satisfied with 
the export incentives already attached to the drawback right which covered not 
only the tariff duties of imported inputs but also indirect taxes as well as 
parafiscal and insurance charges. Thus, it did not ask for export subsidies.100 This 
was in substantive agreement with the traditional and dominant sectors of 
industry. 
At Champers of commerce conference in October 1959 the PUTI reiterated that 
imported competition had resulted in abnormally high inventories and low 
capacity utilization. This was a European phenomenon, stated its president, for 
the European textile industry had lost its pre-war colonial markets and was now 
interested primarily in protecting its internal markets.101 Yet the European 
cotton industry also suffered from both labour and domestic raw material 
shortages which implied that the road that textiles in Greece had to follow was 
exports to Europe. However, exports presupposed a prior safeguard of the 
domestic market. It was imperative to resume full capacity utilization internally 
in order to reach economies of scale and to reduce general costs. It would serve 
as the basis for the conquest of the European markets whose industries had 
considerably higher wages and processed more expensive cotton. In April 1960 
PUTI went a step further with this rationale asking not for special export 
incentives but clarifying that export promotion to the EEC had to be based first 
and foremost upon the equalization of the terms of production with foreign 
competitors. To this end, to increase the tariff burden for finished goods and to 
deal decisively with dumping were considered as the two first appropriate steps   
before the entry came into force as part of the association agreement with the 
EEC.102 
This view is confirmed by the reservations expressed by the European Federation 
of Cotton Textiles to UCI in early 1960: the transitional period was too long and 
 
100 FGI, The Greek Industry during the year 1959 (Athens: FGI, 1960), p. 16. 
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distorted integration, whereas, the protective measures had affected intra-
European trade. It stated that if the Greek government retreated from these two 
practices, negotiations would be facilitated, and, in the end, it called the UCI’s 
president to discuss these two problems.103 Katsabas replied that Greece asked 
for a 22-year transitional period when the more superior European industrial 
states had agreed to a 12-year period. Within this short time-frame Greek 
industry had to overcome low technical education and the lack of both capital 
and export experience. Above all, Katsabas stated that domestic manufacturing 
was obliged to catch up with European industry. Thus, the ex-president of the 
FGI concluded that the timeframe was not long but it was instead a sacrifice 
undertaken because: 
This sacrifice was made consciously by Greek industrialists to assist the 
problem of agricultural exports to a wider European community because the 
bulk of our exports are agricultural.104  
Subsequently, he explained that the low export performance undermined 
employment and the domestic standard of living, utilizing the main argument of 
the negotiation strategy by encouraging Germans to:  
Buy our agricultural products in order to enable us to purchase your 
industrial products, and especially mechanical equipment, in order to 
improve employment and consequently the standard of living, thus becoming 
importers and consumers on a wider scale of the incessantly discovered and 
produced new goods which cover now the needs of the rich people.105 
Of course, agricultural income was still the major source of internal demand and 
the FGI had attributed the crisis in industry during 1958 and 1959 to several 
reasons ‘the principal of which was the reduction of agricultural income.’106 The 
increase of such income would undoubtedly advance the accumulation strategy 
advanced by the FGI because it additionally provided the internal basis for 
exports.  
 
103 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS5/FI1041, Leon H. Dupriez to Chr. Katsabas, Ghent, 11 January 1960, 
pp. 54-57. 
104 GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS5/FI1041, UCI, 4 March 1960, pp. 57-65. 
105 Ibid. 
106 FGI, The Greek Industry during 1959 (Athens: FGI, 1960), p. 27.  
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A prime example that illustrates this strategy was the way that the cotton 
industry attempted to boost exports. In March 1961, the UCI decided that its 
members would contribute with a levy charged on raw cotton processed from 
each member firm to a fund that exclusively subsidised cotton product 
exports.107 In this way, the internal market was destined to finance exports and 
to provide the room for the utilization of the ‘idle productive capacity’.108 It 
aimed to duplicate foreign industries’ practices which was the dominant business 
practice supported by the FGI, and the government was eager to promote it 
within the limits posed by the rule of money and the law. 
The instructions of the finance ministry for the formulation of the new customs 
tariff were clear having a double aim that left no doubt that its rationale 
followed FGI’s strategy as had been elaborated by Matzoulinos in December 1958 
and repeated thereafter.109 First, it aimed to increase protection primarily for 
finished goods. For semi-finished intermediate inputs, the new tariff burden had 
to be calculated in relation to the ability for protection of the final product. In 
principle, as the European Council had asked because of the Federal Republic’s 
reservations, the tariff burden would not exceed 50% ad valorem although 
instructions clarified that, if necessary, tariffs would exceed even this level. 
Second, it had to provide duty free imports for raw and subsidiary materials as 
well as for machinery.  In order to be able to achieve the first aim, tariff 
reductions for raw materials and machinery would be moderate so as to be 
utilized later to provide both the appropriate exchanges within the GATT and 
the room for manoeuvre at the negotiations with the EEC. This priority was 
indeed defended within GATT when the Greek delegate asked for the 
implementation of the new customs tariff before the beginning of the official 
negotiations within the organization.110 If tariff disarmament was to start from a 
higher level, this ability was necessary. Indeed, when negotiations entered the 
substantive phase in April 1960, the new customs tariff was in place and 
negotiations within GATT had been postponed until September of that year. For 
the structure of the new customs tariff and the level of protection, coordination 
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ministry had considered the proposals of the BoG, the industrial ministry and the 
revision committee which had officially consulted BIAs and big industries.111 As a 
rule, the tariff burden for finished goods increased from 50% to even more than 
100% whereas, for intermediate inputs, it did not change significantly. Instead, 
tariffs for raw materials and machinery were reduced moderately. As the 
finance ministry clarified, this tariff structure was dictated by the fact that 
domestic industry suffered from ‘organic deficiencies’ and particularly from 
‘high production costs’ and the problematic ‘supply chain’.112 Until June 1960, 
antidumping legislation had also been amended. The normal price was now 
calculated according to PUTI’s suggestion, simplifying and facilitating the 
specification of dumping practices from both eastern and western countries. 
Until that time, Greece had agreed to include 52% to the 12-year rule and was 
ready to increase this percentage to 60%, on the condition that ‘all domestic 
manufacture would be exempted’. 113 Negotiations within GATT took place in 
September 1960 and their outcome confirmed Greece’s aims in respect to 
exchanges.114 It was clear that the formal association strategy was just a part of 
Greece’s overall European strategy and the adaptation of the protection regime 
was a substantive component. 
6.3.5 Industrial exports 
Yet another basic component of this strategy was the promotion of exports. 
Since 1955 industrial exports were already subsidized with the extended 
drawback right but it had become plain that it was not enough to boost such 
exports. For this reason, at least from early 1959, the commercial ministry 
considered granting them additional fiscal and credit incentives.115 Since the 
export problem was acute, initial proposals included the extension of the 
abolition of fiscal and parafiscal charges to agricultural exports as well. 
Comparisons were made particularly with EEC countries in respect to subsidies 
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and the institutional arrangement which promoted exports.116 The proposals for 
subsidies to agricultural exports were rejected for fiscal and monetary reasons 
by the BoG but incentives for industrial exports were deemed by Zolotas to be 
indispensable for the promotion of an export led growth and the concomitant 
specialization. Certainly, Zolotas expected that the rationalization of production 
within the competitive big European market was the only solution in the long-
term but, until this organic solution, he proposed particularly to ‘privilege’ 
export-oriented industry.117 As expected, the BoG was the institution which 
specified and calculated the fiscal burden for the state’s heavy artillery to 
promote industrial exports.118 This was made within a proposed framework for 
the overall institutional reorganization of exports by the BoG.119 Once the terms 
of the association had been specified, the BoG’s main proposals for fiscal and 
credit incentives were incorporated into legislation and their logic accompanied 
the development of industrial exports during the next decades.120 Certainly, the 
subsidization logic could not be different from that of UCI: internal production, 
and consequently internal consumption was levied in order to subsidise industrial 
exports.121 Since 1963, for a company that could channel half of its sales abroad 
both the direct annual tax and the interest rate could be more than halved. To 
this picture, should be added two more sets of export incentives. First, the 
privileges granted to all FDI which were, in principle, more efficient and capable 
to export than domestic producers. Second, the additional special ad hoc 
provisions for export oriented FDI. A prime such example was Pechiney which in 
order to be internationally competitive from the very beginning, beyond the 
availability of abundant raw material and cheap labour, energy costs were 
substantially lower than those granted to domestic energy consuming industries.  
 
116 KKF/GKA/208, The Fiscal burdens and the export trade of our country, December 1959. Fiscal 
and parafiscal charges were estimated that constituted on average 5.4% of export prices of nine 
main exportable agricultural products. The respective percentage for industrial products was 
higher.  
117 BOG, Bank of Greece Governor’s Annual Report for the year 1958 (Athens: BoG, April 1959), 
pp. 55-60   
118 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F29/Τ2, BoG, Analysis suggested in a report on tax measures for 
exports, July 1960.  
119 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F29/Τ1-2, BoG, Basic Proposals of an Examination Research Report, 
July 1960.    
120 For a comprehensive synopsis see: PUTI, The Existing export aid measures in Greece (Athens: 
PUTI, 1963).  
121 KKF/GKA/208, ‘Contract for the ‘Creation of a Special Account’’, 19 March 1962.   
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6.4 The settlement of agriculture and finance. State-business 
relations and the geopolitical reasoning revisited  
The general framework of the association had been essentially agreed since 
December 1959 according to German demands. At the time, there was a sense 
that negotiations would conclude very soon and the EEC would provide an early 
relief to Greece’s politico-economic problems mainly with the revival of 
agricultural exports and capital inflows. However, this did not happen. Instead, 
until mid-1960 Greece had well exceeded the maximum concessions initially 
envisaged in respect of the general framework as it had abolished the right to 
protect infant industry.122 At the same time, exchanges by the EEC were still 
deemed quite limited and Pesmazoglou had frequently utilized the word ‘colony’ 
in the past, to describe how he evaluated the EEC’s treatment of Greece.123 
Certainly, Karamanlis and Averoff utilized the same word to the ambassadors of 
the Six to Athens in March 1960.124 The problem for the Greek side was that the 
EEC proposals for agriculture and finance fell short of its initial demands and 
expectations, as they had been framed and agreed during the negotiations for an 
FTA in 1957 and 1958.  
The endeavour to overcome these difficulties has been largely depicted as an 
act of leadership of the Karamanlis government with an emphasis upon the 
invoking of geopolitical reasoning.125 Certainly, Karamanlis had highlighted that 
the communist ‘threat’ was fed by unemployment and poverty asking for the 
generous stance of European countries and specifically from Adenauer and De 
Gaulle. However, there are two dimensions missing from this picture. The first is 
the involvement of Greek business to Karamanlis’ endeavour to approach the     
Germans and French. The second is the way that Greek state agencies dealt with 
the demands of European business interests as these were mediated by their 
national government during the negotiations.   
Italy was the state which continued to pose difficulties because its agricultural 
exports, primarily vegetables and citrus fruits for which the anticipated demand 
 
122 KKF/KKA/13A, Th. Christidis to the Ministry of Coordination, 27 July 1960, pp. 2168-73.  
123 KKF/KKA/8A, I. Pesmazoglou to K. Karamanlis, 4 December 1959, pp. 2176-83.  
124 KKAFT, IV, pp. 264-6.  
125 Minotou, ‘The European’, pp. 305-18.  
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was high, would be affected especially if Spain was to join the EEC and granted 
a status analogous to Greece This policy materialized with the so-called Italian 
‘safe clause’ which aimed to pose an upper limit on Greece’s respective exports 
to the EEC, above which, the provisions of the association treaty for equal 
treatment would be suspended.126 It is not coincidental that Karamanlis’ first 
trip to ask for the support of Greece’s demands in respect to the association 
terms, particularly for agricultural exports, was made in November 1959 in 
Italy.127 In return for Italy’s support, the Greek prime-minister proposed the 
participation of Italian industry in the new developmental plan. However, the 
Italians were already dissatisfied with Greece because their industry was 
excluded from the construction of sugar and nitrogen fertilizer plants as well as 
from the Achelous hydroelectric facilities thus Italy was not among Greece’s 
allies. As expected, what mattered to the Greek side in this respect was the 
stance primarily of the Federal Republic and secondly of France. 
What emerges from the Greek archives is that German support was also 
conditional upon the opening of the Greek market and the participation of 
German businesses to economic development. As we have seen, the president of 
the IDC participated in the Greek delegation to Bonn in January 1960 which 
asked for German support for the EEC and attempted to settle the issues of 
Greek-German economic and business relations. During the negotiations the 
government’s vice president Kanellopoulos reported that:  
Three moments during the meeting were especially difficult for me, actually 
when Mr Erhard, who had otherwise shown an excellent mood, pinpointed 
three issues, as had also the deputy foreign minister in the morning. The 
first issue was the measures for the restrictions of imports and the scheduled 
increase of tariffs, secondly the issue of public procurement of 
telecommunication material from Czechoslovakia and, thirdly, the issue of 
Achelous and essentially the exclusion of German businesses from its 
construction.128  
 
126 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F79/Τ6, I. Pesmazoglou to the President of the Government, Paris, 12 
May 1960.   
127 KKAFT, IV, Proceedings of Greek-Italian talks, 10 November 1959, pp. 195-9.  
128 YDIA/1960/8/3, Cryptographic Telegram 67, Embassy at Bonn to Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 13 
January 1960. 
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The salient feature of this trip was that the Germans had conditioned their 
stance to Greece’s demands in relation to the EEC on the above three issues, 
namely protection, bilateral economic and commercial relations with the 
Eastern bloc and the participation of German business to Greece’s energy 
programme and in general economic development. Indeed, there is evidence 
that the reservations of the Federal Republic for Greece’s protectionist 
commercial policy resembled those of its own affected business interests. As 
suggested in the previous section, German cotton textile industrialists had 
reacted through their business organization to Greece’s protectionism, and 
especially the April 1959 measures, warning that such policies would have 
consequences in respect to the outcome of the negotiations with the EEC. The 
reason for this reaction is obvious; in 1959 fabric textile imports had fallen by 
17%. German state managers employed the same strategy using identical 
arguments. Indeed, in November 1959 Reinhardt sent three letters to the Greek 
government expressing Germany’s business discomfort about both the high 
import advances for textiles as well as for the April 1959 measures. At the same 
time, he continued to press Greece regarding coal imports.129 Utilizing 
diplomatic channels, he warned that the reform of Greece’s ‘economic and 
commercial policies’ according to the German demands was a precondition for 
the continuation of its support for the EEC.130 It seems that economic reasons 
can explain this pressure. In 1959 imports from the Eastern bloc were already 
about 10% and its members pressed for their participation in the five-year plan 
and the adoption of trade relations on an ‘equal’ basis.131 This prospect was 
made even clearer in mid-1960 when Greece agreed to exchange tobacco for 
coal and refrigerator wagons with China and East Germany, respectively. 
Simultaneously, Dertilis travelled to the peripheral states of the bloc in search 
of similar agreements and in February 1960 Greece had signed an agreement 
with Czechoslovakia for the procurement of telecommunication material in 
exchange for tobacco. Even if these initiatives were limited in scope, the 
German side was clearly not satisfied with them. In January 1960, Erhard and 
Siemens AG had pressed for the latter’s participation in the Achelous 
 
129 ‘The eighth Additional Greek-German Agreement’, ACCI Bulletin, November 1959, 44-6. 
130 YDIA/1959/13/6/2, Cryptographic Telegram 20121, I. Touloupas, Greek Embassy of Bonn, to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 27 November 1959.   
131 ‘East Germany submitted to the Greek government a long-term plan’, ΟΤ, 01 September 
1960. 
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hydroelectric facilities and the procurement of telecommunication material 
from OTE and the Greek minister of industry proposed to the same company the 
production of telephones in Greece.132 For Ypsilands, the settlement of these 
issues where inextricably related to the German stance, illustrating the 
relationship between the political reasoning of the association and the 
consolidation of German business interests in Greece. In March 1960, he wrote to 
Konstantinos Tsatsos that: 
I am very concerned about the issue of the intercity telephone network. 
During his stay here, Mr. Kanellopoulos gave an explicit promise both to the 
officials and to Siemens that this work would be entrusted to this firm […] In 
case that Germans lose, beyond the Achelous, and this project - to which 
admittedly they are alone in having such experience – then we cannot 
expect their support, because the foreign ministry will invoke in vain 
political reasons which are necessary for such a support.133  
Certainly, the political reasoning of the association was intertwined with the 
interests of economic and social forces which was to become clear once more 
with Italy. As the participation of its industry in Greece’s economic development 
was limited, the Italian stance was rigid and, after the Council meeting in May 
1960, the ‘safe clause’ shadowed the course of negotiations. This was the main 
reason for which Greece, in July 1960, had accepted the 12-year rule for 60% of 
its imports from the EEC, guaranteeing that Spain’s future association terms 
would not be the same. This was because it was estimated that Spain was not 
able to accept such a strict framework.134 Certainly, Karamanlis was particularly 
distressed about this outcome and the fact that Italy’s support for the 
association was conditional upon satisfying of the demands of Italian industry.135 
Particularly, as the prime minister had highlighted to the Italian ambassador in 
Greece, Italy ‘had conditioned its attitude in Brussels’ from the ‘establishment 
 
132 YDIA/1960/8/3, Cryptographic Telegram 67, Embassy at Bonn to Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 13 
January 1960; ‘The participation of Siemens to Achelous works is discussed’, Imerisia, 15 January 
1960.  
133 GR/GL/CIT/092/60/4/23, Th. Ypsilantis, Ambassador in Bonn, towards Kon. Tsatsos, Bonn, 22 
March 1960.   
134 KKF/KKA/77A, Cryptographic Telegram of Filon to the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 3 January 1961, 
pp. 270-5.  
135 KKAFT, IV, Memo, 4 July 1960, pp. 336-7.  
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of a plant for radio items.’136 It was clear that Greece needed further support to 
overcome these difficulties and the attitude of France played a decisive role. 
In July 1960 Karamanlis travelled to France aiming to ask support for agricultural 
exports, especially for the equal treatment of wine, for Greece’s participation in 
the finance scheme within EEC and its assistance to overcome Italy’s 
reservations.137 However, that this was a coordinated effort by businessmen and 
state agencies is beyond any doubt as the IDC leadership had travelled to Paris in 
late May 1960 to discuss the cooperation of France and Greek business along 
with the prospects of the ‘common market’.138 Until June, Alexandros Tsatsos 
and Adreadis had framed the agreement with Pechiney for the aluminium plant 
and had secured the minority participation of Niarchos and IDC in the project.139 
Certainly, Tsatsos did not act autonomously but he cooperated with the prime 
minister. For example, he contacted him directly regarding the crucial issue of 
the energy cost for the aluminium plant asking him to press the PPC to clarify its 
position for the project.140 Furthermore, Alexandros Tsatsos and Andreadis 
mediated the takeover of HEAP by PPC. This was a precondition for the 
agreement with Pechiney, for HEAP was the biggest customer of PPC and 
enjoyed the most favoured customer clause. This meant that HEAP could buy 
energy from the PPC at the -low- price agreed with Pechiney, which was 
certainly out of question. Beyond this, the IDC had already signed contracts for 
technical cooperation and research with French companies. It was within this 
framework that Andreadis considered the joint production of superphosphate 
fertilizers and the processing of citrus fruit, both of which were materialized the 
following year. The rival of Andreadis within the domestic market was not out of 
the picture as Bodosakis had already initiated preliminary discussions for 
cooperation with Saint-Gobain, which belonged to the same business group as 
Pechiney, for the joint production of the second plant for superphosphate 
fertilizers.141 This project also materialized. Moreover, in late May 1960, the 
state, as part of its oil policy, granted the France Oil Institute both research and 
 
136 Ibid, p. 337.  
137 KKF/KKA/13A, I. Pesmazoglou to K. Karamanlis, 10 July 1960, Paris, pp. 2061-4.  
138 ‘There are conditions for the cooperation of Greek and French capitalists’, OT, 31 May 1960; 
‘French economic managers’, OT, 9 June 1960.  
139 GR/NBGHA/1/2/26/246, IDC, Board Report for the year 1960, Athens, 11 March 1961.  
140 KKF/KPA/7/1/4, Alexandros Tsatsos, IDC, to Konstantinos Karamanlis, Athens, 20 April 1960.  
141 KKF/KKA/12A, Minutes, 14 June 1960, p. 1831.  
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drilling rights.142 All of this had been accomplished before Karamanlis’ visit to 
Paris and Greece’s ambassador to Paris was working toward the same direction, 
preparing the field for economic cooperation with France which he proposed to 
name the ‘Paris agreements’ presenting it to the Greek people as analogous to 
the ‘Bonn agreements’.143 After all, Karamanlis was clear to Debreu proposing 
the participation of French capital in the five-year plan. Indeed, this prospect 
was welcomed by the French prime minister.144 It was within this context that 
the next day, as requested by Adenauer, the Greek prime minister was ready to 
present to De Gaulle Greece’s support for the Algerian issue at the United 
Nations.145 It was indeed a stance which France’s president ‘recognized and 
appreciated’.146  
However, the French attitude was not enough to bend neither Italian resistance 
nor the Netherlands’ refusal to finance Greece’s economic development. Indeed, 
in August 1960, Pesmazoglou considered that Greece had gained little for either 
agriculture or finance.147 The view that exchanges were limited was also shared 
among business circles close to the ACCI which had backed the association 
strategy from the very beginning. The Chamber claimed that the association was 
desirable only if its terms would advance economic development and now it 
estimated that those agreed at the time would not do so.148 In September 1960 
the distance between Greece and the EEC was still too wide and the 
government, along with the negotiation team, agreed that the terms of the 
association were unacceptable because they were loss-making for the Greek 
economy.149 Karamanlis’ initiative in November 1960 to personally contact 
separately each member at the highest level in order to remind them of the 
political significance of Greece’s association was motivated precisely by these 
results. The argument was clear cut. The association was meaningful only if it 
 
142 KKAFT, IV, p. 307.  
143 KKF/KKA/13A, Telegram 766, Filon to Prime-minister, 09 July 1960, Paris, pp. 2053-5.  
144 KKF/KKA/13A, Meeting minutes, 12 July 1960, pp. 2102-15.  
145 KKAFT, IV, Note, Greek-French Relations, 14 June 1960, 339-40.  
146 KKF/KKA/13A, Meeting minutes, 12 July 1960, pp. 2102-15.  
147 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F79/Τ7, I. Pesmazoglou to K. Karamanlis, Athens, 29 August 1960.     
148 ‘Memorandum of the Chamber for the association’, ACCI Bulletin, October 1960, 44-5.  
149 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F79/Τ9, Main disagreements, Athens, 4 January 1961; KKAFT, IV, pp. 
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would provide the means for an organic solution to Greece’s politico-economic 
problems within the framework of the Western European economy.150  
For agriculture, the main difficulties were the EEC’s refusal to accept Greece’s 
participation in the formation of the CAP for the main agricultural products and 
the ability of each member state to suspend equal treatment at the European 
level when it considered that its interests were affected. The structure that 
Greece had accepted in the middle of 1960 implied the annual preferential 
treatment of approximately $130 million of imports from the EEC at the expense 
of trade with third, primarily eastern, countries. The latter would decrease their 
agricultural imports from Greece accordingly, exacerbating the already difficult 
situation with the tobacco surpluses which, meanwhile, were growing 
dangerously.151 Given that the total exports of Greece in 1959 were $205 million 
and, to the EEC alone $80 million, the issue had crucial implications.   
For finance the situation was equally difficult. At the time, the UK and the IBRD 
pressed for the settlement of the pre-war public debt and the Netherlands was 
willing to mediate. The reason was that it was afraid that the EEC’s contribution 
would set yet another precedent and insisted that the US should share the 
burden for the financing of Greece’s economic development.152 Thus, during the 
first substantive round, it linked EEC’s loans with the settlement of the public 
debt and wiped out any prospect for the Fund asked by Greece and even 
questioned a loan by the EIB.153 Despite the efforts and further concessions in 
respect to the general framework in May 1960, both France and the Federal 
Republic had refused to increase their contribution beyond $125 million and 
declared that the EIB would provide the additional amount asked for. The 
problem was that the EIB had also conditioned Greece’s finances precisely on 
the settlement of the public debt.154 Once negotiations with the creditors for 
this settlement collapsed in August 1960 the financing of Greece’s economic 
development by the EEC was further complicated. At the time, Greece, 
frustrated and reluctant though it was, had compromised with this amount 
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derived from the EIB but channelled through an EEC special agency.155 The 
Netherlands now threatened that unless the Greek side resumed negotiations 
and committed itself to concluding these negotiations within the following five 
years, it intended to veto even the granting of the $125 million.   
The third severe difficulty emerged in the second half of 1960, infuriating the 
chief negotiator because the EEC changed its position on the general escape 
clause for industrial products.156 The EEC’s new position was to extend its own 
right for the application of the general escape clause for Greece’s industrial 
exports for a period which exceeded that of the completion of the Six’s customs 
union. With this provision, the EEC could, essentially, suspend the equal 
treatment of industrial exports, annihilating the immediate advantages expected 
from FDI which targeted the EEC market. The EEC’s new demand coincided with 
the growing interest of UK companies, such as the conglomerate ICI, in using 
Greece to gain access to the common market.157 This was an unpredicted 
development for Greece’s negotiation team. 
All these issues were resolved during the first three months of 1961. As will be 
argued, the Council’s decision in December 1960 to proceed with a closed and 
protectionist market for agriculture, the stance of the new Kennedy 
administration for the EEC’s external tariff for tobacco, the growing signs that 
the UK could apply for its accession to EEC, had all contributed to the successful 
conclusion of the negotiations. However, the decisive force in this outcome was 
the agreement between De Gaulle and Adenauer in early 1960 to assist Greece 
on the condition that it would soften its own attitude.158 
Indeed, in January, Greece made a step back in respect to the Italian safe-
clause but Italy’s industrial circles remained dissatisfied. Certainly, Karouzo 
remained firm that, in view of the association, he expected a solution in respect 
 
155 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F79/Τ7, I. Pesmazoglou to K. Karamanlis, Athens, 29 August 1960.     
156 GR/BOGHA/A2/S1/Y4/F79/Τ10, Note on the continuing difficulties, Athens, 10 January 1961.     
157 YDIAEI, I (2003), G. Seferiades, Ambassador in London, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 
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to the utilization of the war-time reparations.159 Finally, after mutual 
concessions, the agreement with Italy was reached in February. Representative 
of the realities accompanying bilateral negotiations for the association, the 
agreement for the third sugar refinery was signed with an Italian company only 
days after the conclusion of the negotiations with the Commission.160  
The final agreement for agriculture was clearly below the initial expectations 
and far from the August 1959 negotiation position but, certainly, Greece avoided 
discrimination. With respect to common policies, Greece would participate in 
the formation of the CAP’s for tobacco only. Equal treatment for agricultural 
products of secondary export importance, listed in Annex II of the Treaty, would 
be granted after Greece had harmonized its agricultural policy with the CAP. 
Instead, for the main exportable agricultural products, listed in Annex III of the 
Treaty, equal treatment was granted before harmonization. For this latter 
category there were exceptions mainly in the form of two escape clauses, the 
first applicable to the EEC and the second to member states. To begin with, 
equal treatment for citrus fruits, grapes, peaches and wine, all of which had 
high income elasticity and were produced within the EEC, would be suspended 
by the EEC when Greece’s respective exports affected those of any member 
state. This right was applicable only for quantities above a certain limit which 
was above Greece’s respective exports to the EEC at the time (Protocol No 18). 
This settlement reflected the insistence, particularly of Italy and the 
Netherlands, not to disturb the agreed division of labour within the community 
for these products. With respect to tobacco, raisins, olives, resin and turpentine, 
which constituted the bulk of Greece’s exports to the EEC and were not 
produced within the community, member states would grant tariff quotas 
(Contingent Tarifaires) to third countries. Greece would block this clause only 
for quantities above a certain limit which, for tobacco, was below the respective 
exports to the Community. Special treatment for tobacco and raisins was equally 
limited. For tobacco the association treaty guaranteed exports to the state 
monopolies at the average level of the previous three years. For both tobacco 
and raisins, it was granted a limited preferential tariff status. The US was 
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responsible for this latter settlement having repeatedly intervened throughout 
1960 to lower the external tariff of the customs union, the aim of which was to 
protect its Virginia tobacco exporters and its cigar industries within the Federal 
Republic. It was only the new Kennedy Administration which, in early 1961, 
finally gave the green light for a higher external tariff.161  
However, Greece was obliged to channel agricultural surpluses not absorbed by 
Europe to Eastern markets. To avoid being threatened by the Soviet bloc for this 
reason, even more so because agricultural exports to Eastern states in 1960 had 
increased dramatically, the government insisted on increasing the tonnage for 
the application of the two safe clauses for agriculture mentioned earlier.162 But 
to leave the way open for such exports, Greece was simultaneously obliged to 
ask the EEC for tariff quotas for industrial imports to be able to match these 
increasing exports.163 This problem was difficult for the government, and the 
foreign ministry highlighted the inability of the Greek market to absorb goods 
from Eastern countries corresponding to respective rapidly growing exports.164 
This issue casts light upon the role played by the Federal Republic, illuminating 
the forces which enabled the creation, and not diversion, of the machinery trade 
within the EEC and the political reasoning of the association. Importantly, this 
dimension was not restricted to the locomotive of European integration alone. 
To evaluate the import capacity added by this settlement, much depends upon 
the base year. In any case, until 1964 the customs union had not provided the 
anticipated exchange earnings and certainly tobacco exports were almost 
stagnant until that time and thereafter they dropped.165 With respect to food-
stuffs (SITC-0), exports until 1964 had increased as rapidly as expected but 
similar imports from the EEC increased at the same, if not at a higher rate. By 
the end of the 12-year period this had improved only slightly but since the early 
1980s agricultural trade with the EEC had become deficient which was an 
unforeseen development.  
 
161 KKAFT, IV, pp. 465-7.  
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The provision of finance was also far below initial demands, though the 
settlement pressed Greece to compromise with its pre-war debtors and to finally 
re-access international finance markets after thirty years. In particular, the EEC 
did not form the Fund asked emphatically by Greece from 1957. Instead, in 
February and March 1961 both the Federal Republic and France pressed the 
Netherlands to compromise and eventually Greece was granted $125 million 
loans on the condition that it would declare publicly its intention to resume 
negotiations over the pre-war debt.166 Indeed, Greece complied very soon, and 
in 1962 it reached an agreement with debtors which opened the road for new 
public loans. Moreover, the proposal for a general safe-clause that could 
discourage multinationals from investing in Greece in order to jump the EEC’s 
external tariff did not materialize.167  
These final arrangements were discussed with the Commission in Athens from 9 
to 14 January and in Paris from 23 to 25 January. However, as their settlement 
was dependent on the member states, it was the Council meetings on 31 January 
and 23 February 1961 which were decisive for the final agreement. Here, the 
stance of the Federal Republic and France weighed considerably. The 
mechanism at work behind the scenes had been described by Yspilandis and it is 
clear that Greece had responded accordingly. In order to accept the German 
proposals made in Brussels, the Italians and the Dutch asked from the Germans 
‘exchanges’ which were politically feasible only if Greek-German economic and 
business relations were improved according to the will of German businesses.168 
Indeed, the Greek side replied that it ‘understood the German government's 
delicate position vis-à-vis industrial circles.’169 It is within this framework that, 
as we have seen in section four of the previous chapter, the government 
approached the Germans in early January 1961 asking them to undertake, 
beyond the thermoelectric plants at Megalopolis, the additional hydroelectric 
facilities at Achelous which were necessary due to the energy needs of Pechiney. 
And it was in this setting that Karamanlis and Averoff on 17 February 1961 
visited Paris and asked once again that the French participate in the energy 
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programme following which De Gaulle supported Greece in the EEC council. In 
particular, after explaining the need to overcome the difficulties which Italy and 
Netherlands still posed for the conclusion of the association, the prime minister 
was clear enough in associating once more the France stance with its 
participation in the energy programme:     
The President of the Government subsequently explained to the French for 
the supplement of the energy programme of the Greek Government and he 
mentioned that there are positive assurances that the Germans will 
undertake within the framework of the granted aid about ¾ of the projects, 
amounting to 120 million dollar and expressed his wish that France can 
participate for the remaining part; on the one hand because he wants to see 
the development of Greek-France economic cooperation and on the other 
because he estimates that the monopolization of such a significant project 
from only one big european country is not in the interest of Greece for many 
and obvious reasons and asked the French Government to facilitate the 
contribution of French industry to the execution of these projects.170    
Evidently, the support of Greece’s entry to the EEC with geopolitical criteria 
alone is not confirmed by the sources consulted for this study. A mere look at 
trade statistics casts light upon the underlying reasons. Following the April 1959 
measures, machinery and transportation equipment (SITC-7) imports from the 
Six were stagnant for two consecutive years and particularly from the Federal 
Republic they had dropped by 15% in 1959 and 3% in 1960 whereas during the 
previous two years they had grown by 35% annually. The issue was significant for 
Greek standards as the five-year plan estimated that such imports (SITC-7) 
would increase annually thereafter by more than 15%. For the period 1960-1969 
it was estimated that they could amount to $2,400 million, a calculation that 
was proved to be accurate.  
These inflows assisted the restructuring of the economy which was already on 
track. Indeed, from about 11% of GDP which the manufacturing industry had 
accounted for in 1948, by 1960 it had reached about 17% and in 1970 21%. 
Moreover, the share of the traditional branches within manufacturing, such as 
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textiles, had been reduced considerably.171 By 1970 industrial exports (SITC5-8) 
had skyrocketed, accounting for more than one third of the total exports for that 
year.172 From 1958 they had increased by about twelve times and exports had 
eventually diversified but the problem was essentially displaced. On the one 
hand, chemicals accounted for 14% and manufacturing for 83% of this increase. 
Capital intensive industries covered more than half of manufacturing exports, 
with Pechiney to figure at the top.173 As scheduled, industrial exports grew more 
rapidly within the EEC than globally but on the other hand, machinery and 
transportation exports (SITC-7) accounted for less than 3% of this increase and in 
1970 this SITC alone accounted for about 58% of the total trade deficit. It 
remained the least complete sector of Greek manufacturing but to what extent 
the abolition of infant industry protection was responsible for this development 
is of course a historical counterfactual. The reality is that, despite Japan’s 
astonishing industrial boom, the respective imports (SITC-7) from the EEC to 
Greece grew over time.174 Among EEC countries, Italian industry gained 
considerably at the expense of the UK, whereas German industry was still able 
to dominate the field. Unequal partners had been integrated within the EEC, but 
their asymmetrical relations had not been abolished. Rather, they had been 
reproduced on a different scale.  
6.5 Conclusion 
It has been argued in this chapter that in early 1959 there was an internal 
consensus between businessmen and state agencies that the association with the 
EEC would promote the November 1958 Greek-German economic agreement, 
upon which, Greece had based its expectations for the solution of the imbalance 
problem. It has also been shown how, during the years 1959-1962, Greece’s 
substantive European strategy unfolded, establishing the main patterns of 
Greece’s developmental model. Moreover, it has been argued that this strategy 
is conceived only through state-business relations. 
 
171 Appendix 1, Table 5. 
172 Appendix 1, Table 9. 
173 Within manufacturing industry, processed furs accounted for 8%, textiles and clothing for 16%, 
iron and its main products for 26%, whereas aluminium alone accounted for 20%.  
174 Appendix 1, Table 13. 
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This was obvious with the association regime and the basic paraments for the 
development of Greek industry. Tariff disarmament was postponed for about ten 
years within the EEC but only for existing manufacturing whereas the customs 
tariff was revised upwards once more and the law for antidumping was updated. 
Thus, domestic industry would retain, for some more years, its preferential 
access to internal market in order to utilize its productive capacity and to form 
a base for future exports. Instead, for items not manufactured at the time, 
notably machinery and transport equipment (SITC-7), the FGI was happy to open 
the borders and to abolish the right to protect infant industries. Actually, this 
was a constant demand by the federation and a main component of its 
accumulation strategy since the 1920s which aimed to improve the supply chain 
and to reduce input costs by duty free import of raw materials, intermediate 
goods and mechanical equipment. There is no doubt that the abolition of the 
protection of infant industries and the tariff free importation of machinery was 
in harmony with the priorities of German industry and the Federal Republic. If to 
these insights we add the input of the FGI to the formulation of the industrial 
and developmental policies, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is a 
comprehensive picture of the influence which traditional industry had exercised 
upon Greece’s European strategy. 
Equally important to the formulation and implementation of this strategy were 
businesses centred around shipping capital. These businesses had 
counterbalanced the influence of the FGI and had supported both directly and 
indirectly one of the main aims of the formal association strategy, perhaps the 
most important, namely the attraction of FDI. Indeed, the involvement of 
business was multidimensional and had many implications.  
During the negotiations, as it became clear to the Greek side, a decisive factor 
for the position of the EEC’s states towards Greece’s main demands was the 
extent to which their domestic industry cooperated with Greek businesses and 
/or participated in the Greek developmental plan. Italy and the Federal Republic 
had clearly stated that this cooperation was indeed related to their ability to 
support Greece’s entry to the EEC with political criteria as it had been asked by 
Karamanlis. The Achelous project and the continuous interest of Siemens AG cast 
light upon this dimension. Similar considerations prevailed during bilateral 
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negotiations with France in mid-1960. Certainly, the role of the IDC and the turn 
of Bodosakis to French industry illustrates the involvement of big business to the 
turn of Greece to France in mid-1960. Moreover, the Federal Republic and 
German industry was anxious that Eastern trade may jeopardize their position in 
Greece and its potentiality to bridge their expansion to the Balkans and the 
Middle East, revealing how geopolitical considerations were inextricably linked 
to economic forces and business strategies.  
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 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to examine Greece’s participation in early European 
integration through the lens of the interaction between big business and state 
agencies. The evidence presented here supports the view that the course of 
Greece toward Europe was a complex politico-economic process influenced 
considerably by big business and its interests. Certainly, the involvement of 
Greece in European integration can be traced back to the US intervention and 
the Marshall plan period. The US aid had assisted European economies to revive 
and had linked them commercially within the EPU framework and, indeed, 
Greece was no exception to this general trend. Simultaneously, the US had 
promoted the economic leadership of the Federal Republic which, very soon, 
became the locomotive of European integration. Within this framework, based 
upon the links which had been forged during both the inter-war and occupation 
periods, Greece and the Federal Republic restored the patterns of their pre-war 
economic, business and commercial relationships. In turn, considered by 
contemporaries as indispensable to the solution of the country’s viability 
problem, these relationships played a substantive role in the participation of 
Greece in the process of European integration and the formulation of its 
European strategy. Certainly, the fear of exclusion from the common market was 
mainly a fear that these bilateral relationships would be disturbed. Equally, 
participation implied the adaptation and consolidation of these relationships and 
this became clear from early 1957. Finally, Greece negotiated the terms of its 
association with the EEC primarily with the Federal Republic. 
This complex course had not been guided exclusively from above, as the bulk of 
Greek literature has argued. Instead, the evidence that this thesis has provided 
suggests that both BIAs and individual big business had considerably influenced 
Greece’s road to Europe at all the above stages. The participation of 
businessmen in the process which ended with the official call for US 
intervention, is a prime example that state agencies had not acted 
autonomously but in close cooperation with big business. Indeed, the argument 
utilized by Greece to ensure the flow of funds from the US in 1946, namely that 
the main obstacle for reconstruction was the lack of capital, emanated from 
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business and was the cornerstone of the FGI’s proposals in 1945. Even more 
clearly, was the significance of businessmen to the rehabilitation of Greek-
German economic and business relationships. This study has confirmed Pelt’s 
suggestion of the importance of the Bodosakis group in this respect.1 Yet it has 
also shown that Greek-German business relationships were not restricted to 
Bodosakis alone. Evidence suggests that various businessmen were in contact 
with their German counterparts and were cooperating well before 1953, as was 
the case with the industrialist Gertsos and the prominent shipowner Onassis. In 
many cases, as the background of both the 1950 and 1953 Greek-German 
agreements demonstrates, state agencies were guided by the initiatives of such 
businessmen. The fact that forms of Greek-German business and economic 
relations during the Nazi occupation continued after 1944, confirms the 
suggestion that there were ‘darker continuities at stake’ which indicate that the 
‘standard story’ of liberal forces pursuing a united Europe should be 
‘complicated’.2  
The formulation and deployment of Greece’s European strategy has been equally 
influenced by business interests. During the years 1948 and 1949, the rejection 
of the customs union and the proposal for a European Fund within any future 
liberalization scheme, were based upon considerations for the consequences of 
free trade upon the tariff dependant industries. Certainly, Greece’s European 
policy reflected the internal consensus between businessmen and state agencies 
with respect to the appropriate solution to the imbalance problem; the first 
coherent response to the early plans for a European economic ‘Union’ emerged 
in 1949 from a committee composed of state agencies, on the one hand, and the 
vice president of the FGI and the head of ACCI on the other. State agencies had 
reiterated Zolotas’ analysis of the imbalance problem and businessmen 
highlighted the need for capital inflows. In contrast to what Greek literature has 
claimed, the core of Greece’s formal European strategy had been formed by 
1949 and was the outcome of the interaction of big business and key state 
agencies. 
 
1 Pelt, Tying, 63-81.  
2 Kiran Claus Patel and Wolfram Kaiser, ‘Continuity and Change in European Cooperation during 
the Twentieth Century, Contemporary European History, 27-2 (2018), pp. 165-82 (175). 
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The economic reforms in 1953, which marked the high point of US direct 
influence in the formulation of core economic policies, framed Greece’s 
economic development and its European stance during the following years. 
Indeed, trade liberalization in 1953 increased the competitive pressure upon 
industry whereas the law for FDI privileged not only foreign investors but also 
Greek shipowners interested in investing in Greece. In response, tariff 
disarmament within the OEEC was rejected, the protection regime was reformed 
and the first investment incentives, particularly for domestic industry, 
appeared. It has been argued in Part II, that this stance and public policies were 
the outcome of state-business interaction and had not been decided and 
implemented unilaterally by state agencies. The analysis of business interests 
within the Permanent Tariff Committee (PTC) and of business demands for a new 
developmental policy after 1953, substantiate this claim.  
When European integration gained momentum and Greece was pressed to 
respond in late 1956, the FGI initiated and led, for the business side, a process 
which formalized state-business relations at the highest level. As the 
examination of ROCEP has shown, this initiative resulted in the adaptation of 
industrial and commercial policies as part of Greece’s European strategy. From 
1957 onwards, the complementarity of the developmental and commercial 
policies with the negotiation aims was consolidated, showing that Greece would 
retain substantial aspects of its distinctive model. The main examples here are 
the new investment incentives to big business and the fact that the tariff policy 
and the demands for a long transitional period were fused and became part of a 
single strategy. The FGI’s report on European integration in late 1958 is 
indicative of the rationale of this fusion.3 In particular, the federation’s 
rationale was that Greek industry had to emulate the developmental path of 
European industry which had, in the pre-war era, utilized closed markets to 
reach economies of scale and after the war it overproduced and, for this reason, 
dumped its surplus production abroad and pursued the creation of the customs 
union. At the same time, the head of the BoG, Zolotas, and its economic adviser 
who was simultaneously Greece’s chief negotiator, Pesmazoglou, in consultation 
with big businesses, adapted Greece’s formal European strategy to the 
 
3 See chapter six, section one. 
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circumstances based upon the assumption that the customs union would 
inevitably increase the productivity gap between Greek and European industry. 
Greece’s initial response for an FTA was framed within the BoG and was not 
guided by the government. This dimension has been neglected even from studies 
which have considered the BoG’s history.4 The evidence suggest that Greece’s 
European strategy was not solely driven from above. It is also evident that 
development policies were not simply state-driven either, as Pagoulatos has 
argued.5 This is especially true if it is considered that post-war shipping policy 
was also the outcome of the interaction between shipowners and state 
agencies.6 Certainly, the above is an indication that geopolitical reasoning is 
inseparable from business activity. Similarly, as the last section of chapter six 
has argued, the members states weighed the geopolitical demands of Greece 
with the interests of their domestic business.   
For the identification of business influence the thesis considered four major 
business factions and confirmed Rollings’ suggestion of the necessity to go 
‘beyond’ the analysis of ‘peak-level business’ representation.7 Evidence 
presented throughout the thesis supports this claim. The endeavour to adopt 
heavy industry, which is among the main features of Greece’s post-war 
economic and business history, is not comprehensible with the analysis of the 
FGI’s strategy alone. Instead, this endeavour makes sense only if the Marshall 
Plan and the November 1948 developmental plan are analysed in relation to 
Bodosakis’ plans and his cooperation with German business. Equally, the 
government’s cautious stance within the OEEC for tariff disarmament until early 
1956, is illustrated by the accumulation strategy promoted by textile BIAs and 
not by the FGI’s attitude which, at the time, was pro-European and supported 
instead an export led-growth model. Even more significant for the appropriate 
evaluation of Greece’s European strategy was the cooperation between 
prominent industrialists and shipowners which took place beyond the FGI 
framework. Greek historiography on European integration has ignored the 
decisive role of this business alliance which was consolidated through the IDC in 
late 1959 and substantiated one of the main components of the government’s 
 
4 Psalidopoulos, History, pp. 42-3;220-1.  
5 See Introduction, section two.  
6 Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners, pp. 160-7.  
7 Rollings, British, p. 262. 
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formal association strategy, the policy for the attraction of FDI. This analysis 
thus failed to establish the continuities of Greece’s contemporary economic and 
business history which has highlighted the significance of shipowners for 
Greece’s economic development, at least since the 1860s.    
Moreover, in contrast to what Moravcsik has claimed for business in Europe,8 this 
thesis has presented evidence supporting the view that, as was the case with the 
UK which has been analysed by Rollings,9 big businesses did not consider their 
commercial interests alone. Rather, as Harvey’s geographical political economy 
indicates, they considered the broader conditions that would safeguard their 
position within the evolving division of labour in Europe.10 These broader aims 
enabled big business to overcome its fragmentation and to influence Greece’s 
European strategy through a relatively coherent business accumulation strategy. 
In the first place, big businesses were always interested not only in the 
procurement of intermediate goods and machinery free of charges, but also for 
capital and technology inflows. These were among their main corporate interests 
and they were aware that the customs union would improve the ability to 
modernize by emulating European industry. The main examples here are 
Bodosakis and Andreadis, who had repeatedly underlined the necessity for 
cooperation between domestic businesses and foreign companies, targeting not 
only capital inflows but, above all, the utilization of much-needed technology. 
Secondly, and related to this, was the endeavour to bridge German business 
interests to Middle East markets. Indeed, the cooperation with German 
businesses aimed not only to modernize but also to jointly export to these 
markets; it was deemed that this cooperation would increase capacity utilization 
and substantiate the FGI’s accumulation strategy pursued since the 1920s. 
Certainly, these were prime incentives and informed the FGI’s position towards 
an FTA in 1957 and 1958. But it was not only these corporate interests which 
informed big business attitudes. The complementarity between domestic public 
policies and the negotiation aims, supported by evidence throughout this thesis, 
highlights the common denominator of the different business sectors, namely 
the reduction of the production costs by the state. The need for the 
 
8 Moravcsik, The Choice. 
9 Rollings, British, p. 265. 
10 Harvey, The New. 
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‘Europeanization’ of production costs had united businessmen from all factions 
who asked for state intervention, reinforcing one of the main characteristic of 
Greek capitalism which marked its distinct developmental path. Last but not 
least, business action was framed by political and wider class interests. The 
significance of this dimension, which has been neglected by the Greek studies 
which considered Greek business during the 1950s,11 is explained by Greek 
politics.  
The main political characteristic of the period under discussion was 
anticommunism which had framed state-business relations. Thus, there was a 
virtually general agreement between businessmen and state agencies with 
respect to the imbalance problem and the attached ‘communist danger’. At the 
same time, the proposed solutions diverged - sometimes considerably. On the 
one hand, the communist threat or danger, as it had been named by 
contemporaries, became the glue which united businessmen, politicians and 
state managers, constituting the grounds for a substantive community of interest 
between them. On the other hand, there were different corporate strategies and 
conflicting interests. Importantly, fragmentation existed only in respect to the 
means which were appropriate to achieve the main aim which was to remain 
within the capitalist bloc, not for the aim as such. State agencies were 
concerned with this vital political dimension and existing historiography has 
highlighted its significance. This thesis has confirmed this significance but it has 
also shown that businessmen were also motivated by such concerns. This was 
plain not only during the civil war and the call for US economic and military aid. 
Significantly, at a critical moment in 1957 the communist threat forced almost 
all the main business factions to overcome their fragmentation and unite to back 
the government’s strategy for an FTA. This was the a priori political reasoning, a 
suggestion that businessmen acted as a capitalist class considering their 
corporate interests within the broader political conditions that would safeguard 
their property rights in the long-term. Certainly, Greek businessmen were not 
alone in Europe to have such concerns. For example, anticommunism was among 
 
11 Moussis, Greek; Lavdas, The Europeanization.   
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the ‘strong’ motivations of German big business to support European 
integration.12  
As the FGI was at pains to emphasize, anticommunism in Europe framed the 
endeavour of businessmen and state agencies to deal with the surpluses 
generated within the national economies; for the federation, it was this 
endeavour that had ultimately entailed the creation of the EEC. Certainly, the 
FGI’s understanding of the process of European integration can be explained by 
Harvey’s analytical framework. Greek-German relationships can cast light upon 
this point. During the 1950s, enjoying exceptionally high productivity in relation 
to its European counterparts, German industry heavily invested in manufacturing 
and was able to utilize, on average, 90% of its productive capacity.13 The high 
rate of investment was sustainable because export outlets provided not only the 
field for economies of scale accruing to German industry, but also because, as 
Harvey’s analysis indicates, they removed the possibility of an overaccumulation 
crisis within the Federal Republic. Indeed, during this decade, the Federal 
Republic registered massive surpluses in its external accounts.14 As the Greek 
case shows, a portion of these surpluses were utilized by German business for 
guaranteed finance primarily of exports and secondarily of investment abroad. A 
mere look at the bilateral treaties between the two countries and the Greek-
German business cooperation during the 1950s, confirms this claim. However, 
the reduction of barriers to trade, which the Federal Republic and German big 
business pursued in order to realize their objectives, presupposed, in turn, shifts 
in the geographical distribution of both capital and employment. The forces at 
play behind these shifts are exemplified by the demands of the Greek side and 
its aims; the important dimension here is that imported competition altered the 
terms for the solution of the imbalance problem. This was a mixed blessing for 
Greek big business because it could withstand increasing competition only with 
further utilization of German capital and technology upon which it was already 
dependant. Certainly, since the late 1940s it was clear that the inflow of 
German capital and the outflow of Greek labour ‘surpluses’ were the issues at 
stake for Greece; during the negotiations with the Federal Republic, this became 
 
12 Buhrer, ‘German Industry’, pp. 94. 
13 Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence (London: Verso, 2006), p. 70. 
14 Milward, The European, p. 117. 
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explicit. In any case, since 1949 these were among the main expectations of 
Greece from an economically integrated Europe. Indeed, these flows intensified 
during the following years. With the formal association of Greece to the EEC, 
these increasing cross-border exchanges were not institutionalized smoothly at 
the European level, prescribing a one-way road to supranationalism.15 In other 
words, their institutionalization would not simply ‘trigger processes that 
generate movement toward increased supranational governance’.16 Instead, as 
Harvey’s political economy has implied, countervailing tendencies had also been 
released: because these exchanges were between unequal partners, the 
relationships between business and the state in Greece were strengthened and 
redefined, informing Greece’s substantive European strategy, which, in turn, 
marked its distinctive developmental path. The direction that the European 
edifice, and its relationships with Greece, would take in the future was thus 
open.  
The Asia Minor debacle in 1922 and the Great Depression in 1929 had 
strengthened state-business relations and privileged import substitution 
industrialization, a model constantly pursued by the traditional faction of 
Greece’s propertied classes. These close relations survived the occupation 
period and were thereafter informed by anticommunism. However, as the 
survival of post-war Greek capitalism was proven impossible without external 
aid, since early 1947 the US intervened and its mission questioned the existing 
close state-business relationships because they reproduced a speculative 
character in the economy and thus it took the major decisions in respect to core 
developmental and commercial policies without officially consulting the FGI or 
the wider business community. During the Marshall Plan the state organized the 
financial system and planned industrialization though it did not invest itself in 
industry but, in this respect, it followed liberal policies leaving such investment 
entirely to the private initiative. It is characteristic that the state nationalized 
telecommunications (OTE) and founded the Public Power Corporation (PPC) in 
1950 only because it was pressed to do so by the US mission. Subsequently, the 
 
15 Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Integration, Supranational Governance, and the 
Institutionalization of the European Polity’, in European Integration and supranational 
Governance, ed. by Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp. 1-26. 
16 Ibid., p. 2. 
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PPC absorbed the entire private energy sector because of its inability to 
undertake major infrastructural projects, as was the case with Bodosakis and the 
Ptolemais facilities. After the liberal measures in 1953, the general picture is 
that the FGI progressively regained its position in the formal decision-making 
process. At the same time, Greek shipowners re-entered the domestic economic 
and political scene and those who cooperated with the domestic liberal faction 
utilized the IDC to pursue its plans for participation in manufacturing.   
The above considerations can frame an overall evaluation of the association 
agreement and Greece’s path to Europe in the long-term. Seen from this 
perspective, there is no doubt that the association agreement signalled a new 
era. Indeed, by 1962 the patterns of the politico-economic developments in 
Greece had been largely established. The environment for the solution of the 
perceived substantive problems of Greece’s politico-economic edifice since the 
1920s, namely overpopulation and capital scarcity, along with the balance of 
payments constraint, had been radically modified. Significantly, the association 
terms and participation in the customs union had also framed the future 
development of domestic industry thereby resolving an old dilemma.  
To begin with, the so-called imbalance between population and land which had 
been exacerbated after 1922 was essentially addressed by the migration 
agreement signed between Greece and the Federal Republic in 1960. It was an 
admission of the fact that industrial policy had failed to fulfil its main task and 
that the state could not invoke the ‘allegiance’ of its citizens along the lines 
suggested by Milward.17 Instead, mass emigration underlined Greece’s 
dependence upon the process of integration, as it was exemplified by its 
relations with the Federal Republic. The second problem was mainly dealt with 
by two developments. On the one hand, it was the settlement of the pre-war 
public debt, another neglected dimension of Greece’s participation in early 
European integration which was a by-product of the negotiations with the EEC 
since 1959. From 1962, the Greek state could again access foreign capital 
markets. On the other hand, it was the privileged treatment of FDI which the 
association had particularly advanced. This policy, with the simultaneous 
abolition of infant industry right, which German industry had insisted upon and 
 
17 Milward, The European, p.3. 
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which the FGI was more than eager to accept, had resolved the old 
disagreement with respect to the feasibility of the adoption of heavy industry 
and the concomitant development of machinery production. It would be left to 
foreign investors and producers thus resolved within the division of labour and 
specialization prescribed by the customs union which was indispensably 
dominated by German industry. The third problem was resolved only with the 
increasing invisible earnings accruing from migration remittances, shipping and 
tourism, covering the trade deficit which continued to grow uncontrolled. The 
Greek diaspora, along with international shipping activity, had provided the 
balance of payments defence for industrial investment and the consumption of 
imported consumer durables, marking the specificity of Greek capitalism in 
relation to core Europe. Again, this development resembled the structure of 
capital inflows of the period before the Great Depression. It was this deus ex 
machina which increased import capacity.  
Certainly, the association to the EEC and the subsequent attraction of foreign 
capital which were supportive to the establishment and development of export-
oriented industry, was marked by the return of shipowners to domestic economic 
activity after three decades. However, the FGI was not satisfied with the 
privileged treatment of foreign owned industries. It did not hesitate to align 
with KEPE’s vision, and particularly with that of Andreas Papandreou, the future 
dominant figure of the socialist experiment in Greece during the 1980s, who in 
1962 called for the alternative strategy of import substitution.18 As expected, his 
conclusion that an ‘efficient export sector cannot be grafted upon an inefficient 
economy’ had been embraced by the FGI because it implied that the 
‘modernization’ of domestic oriented industry ‘should be equally assisted’.19 The 
reasons for which the FGI opposed these privileges were thus clearly stated, 
showing that the Greek developmental model would be a hybrid one, lying in a 
grey zone between import substitution industrialization and export-led growth.  
The road to Europe was not free from economic and political complications. In 
the early 1960s the FGI was dissatisfied with raised social aspirations and the 
subsequent increase of labour remuneration as well as with the new fiscal and 
 
18 Andreas Papandreou, A Strategy for Greek Economic Development (Athens: KEPE, 1962).  
19 ‘Greece’s appropriate Industrial Policy’, FGI Bulletin, 1 December 1962, p. 15-6.  
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parafiscal charges which added to production costs.20 There was an indication 
that if the competitive advantages of domestic industry were challenged, above 
all cheap labour, Greece’s integration into the customs union would be 
disturbed. Beyond the rationalization and specialization of industry, the 
transition period implied the reduction of production costs, not the opposite. 
This being the case, given that the drachma was pegged to the dollar and the 
bulk of the private sector was already indebted and uncompetitive, Greece 
could follow one of two paths. It could relapse towards either a more autarchic 
and suppressive regime, as it was during the ensuing dictatorship (1967-1974), 
aiming to curtail demands for higher labour remuneration while privileging 
capital or it could opt for a redistributive model, such as the one tentatively 
introduced in the country from the late 1970’s and established after 1981 with 
the victory of PASOK, that would induce production costs and overturn the fiscal 
and external accounts. In this latter case, the subsequent increase of private 
and public debt would lead inevitably, soon or later, to internal asset 
devaluation. The multilateral competitive path toward a ‘golden age’ could be 
necessary to save Greek capitalism but it would not be unclouded.  
This thesis has not provided definitive answers to the main questions that have 
been raised with respect to Greece’s trajectory to Europe. In any case, this 
would be impossible within the confines of a single study. However, this study 
has illustrated neglected dimensions of Greece’s involvement in European 
integration and has tentatively outlined the directions that future research in 
the field might take. Firstly, it has shown that there is a need to consider 
Greece’s European path in the long-term. In this respect, it has been argued 
that the identification of patterns of continuity and change between the post-
war era and both the pre-war and the occupation periods, is a prerequisite for 
an adequate historical explanation of Greece’s participation in the process of 
European integration. Secondly, the incorporation of business in the analysis and 
its interaction with the concerns and the priorities of state agencies is equally 
important. It has been argued here that business, and especially big businesses 
below the peak level, have considerably influenced Greece’s path to Europe, 
overcoming the one-sided emphasis on the role of state agencies and providing a 
 
20 ‘The increase in cost factors is worrying the industrial world’, FGI Bulletin, 1 November 1962, 
p. 6.  
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long-term and what is a more rounded picture of Greece’s turbulent economic 
and political relationships with Europe.  
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Appendix 1 
Table 1 Percentage participation of external and internal savings to 
the finance of internal investments (Drs, current prices) 
  
 
Table 2 Ratio of increased gross fixed capital to increased gross 
national income per sector and period, 1948-1962 (Drs, current 
prices) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1948-1952 1953-1957 1958-1962
External 70.1 15.9 13.3
Internal 29.9 84.1 86.7
Source: Coordination Ministry, The Course of Investments in 
Post-War Greece 1948-1962 (Athens: National Printing 
Office, 1964), p. 26.
1948-1951 1952-1955 1956-1959 1959-1962
Agriculture 0.83  0.49      1.88      1.76      
Manufucture 2.19  1.10      1.93      1.60      
Energy 8.20  10.40      11.10      8.70      
Housing 14.72  10.86      10.05      10.55      
Source: Coordination Ministry, The Course of Investments in Post-War 
Greece 1948-1962 (Athens: National Printing Office, 1964), p. 5.
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Table 3 Total gross Investments in Drs and public-private investments per sector as percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product, 1948-1970 (1958 prices, million Drs)
Sector 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1966 1970
All Sectors 6,256 7,072 10,674 9,530 8,967 9,467 10,335 10,973 13,283 13,321 17,768 20,478 26,528 26,015 25,196 39,882 57,497
Agriculture 0.64 1.18 1.78 1.31 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.36 0.49 0.66 0.97 1.05 1.73 1.94 1.78 1.28 1.69
Mines-Quarries 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.27 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.14
Manufucture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.40 0.43 0.04 0.34 0.34 0.77 0.81 0.06 0.03
Energy 0.00 0.02 0.11 1.05 1.46 1.46 1.50 1.30 1.20 0.80 1.27 1.64 1.37 1.31 1.74 2.04 2.23
Trans.-Comm. 3.20 1.74 2.65 1.34 1.18 0.65 0.68 0.75 0.94 1.15 1.82 2.02 2.77 2.75 2.62 3.19 3.85
Ship 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Housing 1.87 1.62 2.30 0.67 0.08 0.54 0.52 0.96 1.15 0.75 0.75 0.44 0.33 0.19 0.24 0.52 0.37
Public Adm 0.51 1.00 1.26 0.13 0.78 0.71 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.12 0.25 0.32 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.41
Other 0.27 0.78 0.61 0.57 0.32 0.32 0.52 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.40 0.63 0.53 0.64 0.56 0.68 0.85
Total public 6.49 6.36 8.72 5.33 4.62 4.38 4.15 4.17 4.84 4.43 5.38 6.38 7.39 7.85 7.99 8.10 9.57
Agriculture 0.63 0.44 0.71 0.97 1.04 0.68 0.85 0.90 1.11 1.54 1.95 2.09 2.24 1.83 1.54 2.01 2.07
Mines-Quarries 0.10 0.02 0.23 0.49 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.26 0.27
Manufucture 2.67 2.09 4.22 3.40 3.31 1.89 1.59 1.55 1.49 1.68 2.48 1.85 1.71 1.51 1.83 3.15 3.52
Energy 0.24 0.42 0.52 1.12 0.02 0.22 0.16 0.28 0.86 0.27 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.05
Trans.-Comm. 0.60 0.86 1.31 0.40 0.19 0.37 0.61 0.78 0.97 1.18 1.47 1.12 1.55 1.61 1.84 2.92 2.93
Ship 0.60 0.21 0.16 0.10 0.28 0.24 1.29 0.63 0.89 1.02 2.53 4.74 8.56 5.65 2.78 2.55 2.53
Housing 3.11 3.18 4.11 4.68 5.42 6.09 5.87 5.98 6.10 5.17 6.21 5.87 6.24 6.17 6.83 8.35 8.93
Public Adm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other 0.49 0.59 1.13 1.03 1.26 1.44 1.49 1.72 1.88 1.46 1.76 2.32 2.82 2.44 2.95 3.43 4.39
Total private 8.44 7.80 12.40 12.19 11.73 10.98 11.99 11.94 13.51 12.59 16.86 18.35 23.48 19.43 18.06 22.78 24.69
Public Investments % of the GDP
Private Investments % of the GDP
Total private and public investments, Drs
Source : National Statistical Service of Greece, National Accounts of Greece, 1948-1970  (Athens: National Printing Office, 1972), table 24.
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Table 4 Sectoral allocation of reconstruction plans and loans granted 
to private entities (US $, current prices) 
 
 
RO 
(2nd/47)
FGIa       
(12th/47)
Nevrosb 
(9th/48)
ECA  
(11th/48)
ASA 
Revision 
(1st/50)
CLC  
(Until 
6th/54) 
EDFO 
(7th/1954-
1958)
EDFOc 
(1959-
1962)
Energy total 146,129 0 0 86,500 66,600 10,032 0 153
Hydro Electric 70,886 0 0 55,000 33,970 0 0 0
Thermo Electric 75,242 0 0 31,500 32,630 10,032 0 153
Ptolemais Facilitiesd 10,553 8,000 0 14,200 12,000 0 13,836 1,300
Manufucture total 200,208 65,766 101,796 136,269 95,075 51,160 11,868 26,712
Metallurgye 50,070 0 0 26,200 20,695 4,808 2,500 5,483
Metalworking 12,266 9,098 14,000 20,390 9,530 9,035 428 7,480
Construction 9,824 9,050 6,500 5,000 4,500 7,163 1,366 1,770
Textile 21,073 29,750 30,380 4,690 900 3,689 3,775 3,921
Foodstufff 33,076 1,800 0 40,589 18,250 10,206 2,216 1,684
Chemicals 73,899 14,444 46,166 36,550 38,050 12,574 683 75
Leather industry 0 0 2,000 0 0 685 132 0
Paper industry 0 1,625 2,750 400 0 373 60 6,200
Clothing 0 0 0 200 0 0 0 0
Wood industry 0 0 0 0 0 144 0 0
Tobacco industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Recearch/Other 0 0 0 2,250 3,150 2,483 707 100
Mines 51,125 23,800 0 13,535 11,400 4,322 0 45
Total Secondary 408,014 97,566 101,796 250,504 185,075 65,515 25,704 28,210
Sources : RO, Reconstruction Program of the country (Athens: RO, 1947), 245-85; FGI, The Greek 
Industry during 1947 (Athens: FGI, 1948), pp. 72-97; NIRSEV/SVA/226/28/138, Report to ASA by 
K.I. Nevros, September 1948; ECA/G, Four-Year Reconstruction Plan for Greece  (Athens: ECA, 
1948), table 1;GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE1/SS4/FI4, EDFO Calculations, 14 March 1959, pp. 95-104; 
GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS1/FI1, CLC-EDFO General Recapitulation, 31 December 1958, pp. 1-73; 
GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS7/FI72048/SFL18, AEEXPL Application, p. 62.
Reconstruction Plans of the Secondary Sector, US 
$ Portion only
a. It was included to the Plan of the Marshall Plan Committee 
CLC and EDFO Loans, 
including $ and Drs 
Portions 
c. Include the approved loans
b. The plan included $24,960 million to existed industry  
d. The EDFO Loan to Ptolemais in 1955 was allocated: Mines $5,52 -Βriquette plant: $3,53 -Coke 
plant: $1,13 and Energy plant: $3,46
e. The FGI had calculated that half of investments at foodstuffs were agricultural
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Table 5 GDP in Drs and in percentages per sector and percentages per branch within Manufacturing industry, 1948-
1970 (1958 Prices, million Drs) 
 
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1966 1970
All sectors 44,144 52,591 53,342 56,861 60,442 64,250 69,228 70,920 75,180 80,943 82,955 86,529 89,238 98,698 100,833 129,172 167,859
Agriculture 28.5  33.0  28.6  30.3  27.0  31.8  33.1  30.4  29.2  30.7  27.7  27.8  25.0  27.7  25.1  21.9  18.1  
Mines 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.4  
Manufucture 10.8  11.1  13.7  13.6  12.9  13.6  14.1  15.1  15.8  15.6  16.6  16.2  17.3  16.8  17.3  19.0  20.8  
Electricity-Gas-Water 0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.6  2.1  2.5  
Construction 4.0  3.7  4.9  4.2  4.7  4.4  4.1  4.6  5.0  4.8  5.5  6.1  6.9  6.7  6.7  7.5  8.1  
Services 55.6  51.0  51.4  50.5  53.9  48.4  46.9  48.0  47.8  46.6  47.9  47.4  48.2  46.3  48.1  48.3  49.2  
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Foodstaff-Tobacco 25.1  25.6  23.7  27.6  27.5  27.3  28.8  27.4  28.3  26.2  25.1  26.0  22.6  22.4  21.9  22.5  18.4  
Textiles 19.4  19.8  20.9  20.3  16.8  18.9  18.1  19.4  17.6  17.8  17.7  15.8  16.7  15.9  16.3  14.9  15.5  
Clothing and Footwear 22.6  20.9  21.0  20.4  21.9  17.7  17.7  16.2  16.0  16.5  16.1  13.8  13.4  13.2  12.3  9.9  6.4  
Wood and furniture 5.5  5.5  5.8  5.2  3.8  4.7  4.7  5.1  5.3  5.9  5.9  6.0  6.0  6.1  6.0  5.8  6.4  
Paper 3.1  3.1  3.4  3.4  5.7  3.9  3.4  3.7  4.0  3.8  4.1  4.2  4.2  4.3  4.5  4.9  4.9  
Chemicals 4.4  4.3  4.5  4.9  4.9  5.1  5.3  5.7  5.9  6.3  6.7  8.9  10.4  9.5  9.1  10.7  13.6  
Non metallic minerals 6.2  5.9  6.6  5.1  5.1  5.8  5.2  6.3  7.1  6.6  6.3  6.2  6.5  6.5  7.0  7.5  7.3  
Metallurgy Basic 0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.7  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.3  1.4  1.6  2.1  2.1  2.2  4.1  8.8  
Metalworking-Machines 7.9  9.7  9.4  9.9  10.1  11.3  11.2  10.7  10.3  11.1  12.0  12.1  12.9  14.0  14.3  14.2  13.6  
Transportation 2.1  1.7  1.4  1.3  1.4  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.2  2.1  2.3  2.6  2.7  3.5  3.8  3.4  3.0  
Other Manufucture 3.3  3.0  2.6  1.3  2.2  2.5  2.3  2.2  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.7  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.2  2.0  
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Allocation within manufucturing industry %
Sector allocation %
Evagellos Prontzas, ‘National Accounts', in Economic History of the Greek State , ed. by Thanasis Kalafatis and Evagellos Pontzas, 3 vols (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group 
Cultural Foundation), III, pp. 185-6.
GDP - million Drs
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Table 6 Estimated Labour Force: Total and in Manufacture 
(thousand people) 
 
 
 
Table 7 Finance of main projects on the base of the Greek-
German agreement of November 1953(DM, current prices) 
 
Year Total           
Manufacture and 
Handicraft (2) 2/1
1928 2,603.6 368.4 14.1
1940 2,995.0 434.4 14.5
1945 3,065.0 439.0 14.3
1951 3,189.4 450.4 14.1
1955 3,374.0 462.2 13.7
1961 3,671.4 484.4 13.2
Source: Coutsoumaris, The Morphology , p. 368.      
Project Million DM
Ptolemais 113,475
Larymna 18,397
Oil Refinery 59,910
Telecommunication material 11,641
Megdovas Hydroelectric Facilities 25,170
Other electrical equipment 11,030
Total 239,623
Source: YDIA/1956/10/3/2, S. Kapetanidis to Foreign 
Ministry, Bonn, 27 March 1956.
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Table 8 GDP, Exports and Imports, 1938-1974 (Million Drs, 
Current prices)
 
Year GDP
Imports 
(M)
Exports 
(X) M-X X/M (%)
M/GDP 
(%)
X/GDP 
(%)
M-X/GDP 
(%)
1938 67 15 10 5 68.75  22.03  15.15  6.88  
1948 18,864 1,823 450 1,373 24.69  9.66  2.39  7.28  
1949 25,139 2,024 576 1,449 28.44  8.05  2.29  5.76  
1950 29,589 2,142 451 1,691 21.07  7.24  1.53  5.71  
1951 35,793 5,974 1,526 4,448 25.55  16.69  4.26  12.43  
1952 37,245 5,198 1,798 3,400 34.59  13.96  4.83  9.13  
1953 48,744 7,156 3,396 3,760 47.46  14.68  6.97  7.71  
1954 56,137 9,902 4,556 5,346 46.01  17.64  8.12  9.52  
1955 64,512 11,465 5,484 5,981 47.83  17.77  8.50  9.27  
1956 74,706 13,911 5,698 8,213 40.96  18.62  7.63  10.99  
1957 79,598 15,734 6,588 9,145 41.88  19.77  8.28  11.49  
1958 84,414 16,916 6,953 9,962 41.11  20.04  8.24  11.80  
1959 86,448 17,010 6,127 10,882 36.02  19.68  7.09  12.59  
1960 92,460 21,051 6,096 14,955 28.96  22.77  6.59  16.17  
1961 104,339 21,422 6,700 14,722 31.28  20.53  6.42  14.11  
1962 110,390 21,038 7,503 13,534 35.67  19.06  6.80  12.26  
1966 166,354 36,686 12,180 24,506 33.20  22.05  7.32  14.73  
1970 239,586 58,750 19,276 39,474 32.81  24.52  8.05  16.48  
1974 507,328 132,181 60,891 71,290 46.07  26.05  12.00  14.05  
Sources:  Coordination Ministry, National Income and Investements in Greece 
during the years 1945-1949  (Athens: ASA, 1950); National Statistical Service of 
Greece, National Accounts of Greece, 1948-1970  (Athens: National Printing 
Office, 1972); National Statistical Service of Greece, Monthly Bulletin on the 
Special Trade of Greece with Foreign Countries, various issues; National 
Statistical Service of Greece, Foreign Trade of Greece , various years.
 
 
330 
 
Table 9 Percentages of imports and exports per year and sector, 1948-1974 (Drs, Current prices) 
 
SITC 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1966 1970 1974
0 Food 21.77  23.25  16.77  21.29  22.06  19.23  16.83  16.21  14.62  15.28  12.63  14.48  12.17  11.16  
1 Beverage and tobacco 0.01  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.12  0.16  0.22  
2 Crude materials, inedible except fuels 16.75  14.30  14.88  12.51  11.95  13.15  11.50  10.69  12.75  11.19  10.75  11.86  10.61  9.65  
3 Mineral fuels and lubricants 14.92  16.50  14.04  14.05  12.11  13.31  11.69  10.93  10.21  8.92  8.19  8.00  8.67  22.66  
4 Animal and vegetable oils and fats 0.18  0.82  0.13  0.46  2.09  1.18  0.50  0.13  0.18  1.25  0.48  0.19  0.86  0.32  
5 Chemicals 6.55  6.47  9.23  8.61  7.86  8.09  10.04  10.71  10.56  10.45  11.17  10.20  10.21  9.09  
6 Manufactured goods, 17.91  19.32  23.82  21.53  21.78  22.47  22.31  23.02  24.08  23.10  23.09  19.85  19.74  18.13  
7 Machinery and transport equipement1 19.07  15.93  17.34  18.29  18.97  19.77  24.27  24.84  24.18  26.50  30.14  31.65  33.87  26.21  
8 Miscaleneous manufactured articles 2.53  2.92  3.57  3.20  3.12  2.73  2.79  3.37  3.33  3.22  3.46  3.61  3.69  2.55  
9 Miscaleneous 0.32  0.46  0.18  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.01  
0 Food 23.82  27.97  24.96  22.23  23.62  25.60  23.48  30.19  25.60  24.35  26.55  31.75  22.92  19.31  
1 Beverage and tobacco 46.43  41.12  42.77  44.03  35.96  44.44  44.55  34.67  37.12  38.50  30.04  29.25  17.48  9.75  
2 Crude materials, inedible except fuels 18.47  17.78  15.68  23.17  29.09  19.22  22.76  26.90  25.18  26.29  29.75  18.69  16.90  10.60  
3 Mineral fuels and lubricants 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.23  0.85  1.00  9.00  
4 Animal and vegetable oils and fats 0.94  3.55  6.72  3.18  2.67  4.32  2.42  1.12  2.12  0.10  2.36  1.52  0.77  1.45  
5 Chemicals 2.96  3.77  3.38  3.10  3.83  2.46  2.41  2.88  4.14  4.01  2.46  1.81  7.18  4.99  
6 Manufactured goods, 6.28  4.92  5.36  3.52  4.22  3.08  3.33  2.91  4.06  4.38  5.61  12.46  28.57  34.59  
7 Machinery and transport equipement 0.88  0.46  0.71  0.29  0.19  0.26  0.29  0.48  0.87  1.42  1.97  1.72  1.49  2.67  
8 Miscaleneous manufactured articles 0.23  0.43  0.43  0.46  0.42  0.58  0.69  0.74  0.88  0.95  1.02  1.95  3.68  7.64  
9 Miscaleneous 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Imports
1. Ships are not included.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Exports
Source : National Statistical Service of Greece, Monthly Bulletin on the Special Trade of Greece with Foreign Countries , various issues;National Statistical Service of 
Greece, Statistical Yearbook of Greece , various years; 
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Table 10 Tobacco exports in metric tons and percentages per country, 1938-1974
 
Year
Metric 
Tons EEC
West 
Germany UK USA Italy France USSR Other
1938 48,894  60.09 52.81  1.03  20.35  2.88  0.44  22.50  
1948 18,319  33.80 12.39  0.26  25.31  15.99  5.40  40.65  
1949 27,686  37.63 16.24  9.62  23.03  4.93  14.54  31.64  
1950 25,487  43.32 25.06  1.97  20.25  5.62  11.89  35.20  
1951 31,441  56.51 24.96  2.32  15.70  8.02  22.83  26.18  
1952 41,397  61.39 33.60  2.26  15.13  1.69  14.22  33.10  
1953 48,958  45.78 32.21  3.56  12.30  3.24  9.09  39.60  
1954 52,446  51.29 32.82  2.14  12.37  8.21  9.19  35.27  
1955 54,868  55.66 34.32  2.59  18.73  6.37  11.02  26.97  
1956 48,549  48.59 28.74  1.10  19.76  5.18  9.73  35.49  
1957 69,000  55.30 36.15  1.24  19.46  7.49  7.35  4.45  23.87  
1958 62,371  48.96 31.61  0.02  22.34  5.69  7.58  8.59  24.17  
1959 54,914  51.53 29.47  0.30  21.55  7.66  9.25  6.58  25.19  
1960 58,990  43.04 28.38  0.22  21.75  4.68  6.71  12.96  25.31  
1961 65,912  35.46 25.21  0.21  24.23  0.09  6.09  9.70  34.48  
1962 47,408  49.58 26.03  0.41  9.62  11.07  8.77  9.20  34.89  
1966 73,217  49.17 35.68  0.00  17.41  3.97  6.26  7.81  28.87  
1970 63,154  46.58 34.05  0.00  7.91  2.90  5.27  15.27  34.60  
1974 67,169  40.08 25.79  0.00  11.66  3.96  4.56  9.77  44.25  
Sources: National Statistical Service of Greece, Statistical Yearbook of Greece , various years.
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Table 11 Percentages of imports, exports and trade deficit 
per region/country and year, 1938-1962 (Drs, Current 
prices)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1938 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
OEEC 54  30  41  48  51  60  67  69  62  61  62  62  59  51  57  65  
EEC 37  14  20  24  31  41  44  47  41  36  41  43  38  34  38  43  
W. Germany 29  5  4  8  9  12  13  16  17  16  19  20  19  16  18  19  
France 2  2  5  4  5  8  7  7  6  5  6  5  4  5  6  8  
Italy 3  5  4  6  9  12  17  16  11  9  10  9  7  6  6  8  
UK 13  8  9  12  10  10  11  11  11  14  11  10  12  10  11  12  
USA 7  47  41  33  30  22  16  14  18  17  16  14  10  14  11  10  
Middle East 4  7  5  5  4  1  1  1  2  3  2  2  6  4  5  4  
East Countries 21  2  1  0  0  1  3  4  5  7  8  10  10  11  10  9  
Other 14  14  13  15  15  16  13  12  13  13  12  13  15  21  17  12  
OEEC 61  61  65  62  68  76  68  68  71  65  63  56  54  49  46  54  
EEC 50  28  31  33  43  48  45  48  53  48  47  42  39  33  30  35  
W. Germany 38  3  10  20  20  30  26  24  25  20  26  20  20  19  19  18  
France 3  6  11  5  11  9  6  7  9  13  7  13  7  5  5  5  
Italy 5  15  7  5  9  6  9  13  15  11  8  6  7  6  3  8  
UK 8  22  21  15  15  16  12  13  10  9  9  8  9  9  8  10  
USA 17  15  19  17  14  13  12  10  13  12  14  14  13  13  14  8  
Middle East 3  7  4  5  5  3  6  4  4  3  5  3  1  4  3  3  
East Countries 12  9  1  1  2  1  10  9  8  13  15  20  22  26  29  27  
Other 7  8  11  16  11  8  4  9  4  7  3  7  10  8  8  8  
OEEC 38  20  31  44  46  52  67  70  53  58  61  66  61  52  62  71  
EEC 8  9  15  22  27  37  44  45  30  28  36  43  37  34  42  48  
W. Germany 8  5  1  5  6  3  2  9  9  13  14  20  19  15  18  20  
France -1  0  2  3  3  7  8  6  4  0  5  0  2  4  7  9  
Italy -1  1  3  7  9  15  24  18  9  8  11  11  7  6  8  7  
UK 23  3  4  12  8  7  10  10  12  18  13  11  13  19  23  13  
USA -14  58  49  37  35  27  20  17  23  20  18  14  9  14  10  11  
Middle East 6  7  5  4  3  0  -4  -2  0  3  0  1  8  5  5  4  
East Countries 41  0  1  0  0  1  -3  0  2  2  4  3  4  4  1  0  
Other 30  15  14  14  16  20  21  15  22  17  18  16  18  25  22  15  
Trade deficit %
Export share %
Import share %
Source : National Statistical Service of Greece, Monthly Bulletin on the Special Trade of Greece with Foreign 
Countries , various issues;National Statistical Service of Greece, Statistical Yearbook of Greece , various years.
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Table 12 Total Machinery imports and shares per country 
and year, 1938-1953 (US $, 1938 prices) 
 
 
Table 13 Percentages of machinery and transportation (SITC-
7) imports per country and year, 1956-1974 (Drs, Current 
Prices)
 
 
 
Year
Thousand 
US dollars
West 
Germany UK USA Italy Other
1938 7,854  69.64  5.73  12.41  1.86  10.36  
1948 10,228  26.49  17.41  38.24  4.70  13.16  
1949 11,968  7.33  27.26  48.49  3.79  13.13  
1950 20,777  14.38  27.42  33.73  9.56  14.91  
1951 16,025  21.95  20.54  34.98  8.83  13.70  
1952 15,845  33.60  17.53  25.83  10.88  12.16  
1953 9,625  31.36  17.74  18.08  18.48  14.34  
Source: Petros Floros, 'Post-war Mechanical Equipement Imports', 
Imerisia , 5 January 1954
EEC
Federal 
Republic France
Belgiou
m-Lux
Netherl
ands Italy UK USSR US Other
1956 48.36  35.86  3.26  2.02  1.84  5.38  28.77  0.31  10.92  11.64  
1957 54.55  40.98  3.15  1.46  2.06  6.89  17.10  0.48  11.95  15.92  
1958 57.53  45.00  2.92  1.12  2.45  6.03  13.56  0.97  13.73  14.21  
1959 56.70  41.05  3.35  1.70  2.09  8.52  12.91  1.47  12.38  16.54  
1960 57.76  37.61  6.25  1.38  3.12  9.41  18.19  1.10  11.26  11.68  
1961 59.18  40.28  7.05  1.50  1.76  8.58  12.83  0.97  10.99  16.03  
1962 60.17  37.50  9.54  1.55  1.91  9.67  15.61  1.60  7.90  14.73  
1963 57.20  37.84  5.22  1.34  2.07  10.73  16.76  0.89  10.61  14.54  
1964 56.71  35.95  6.09  2.08  1.82  10.77  15.13  1.16  11.66  15.34  
1965 59.90  32.97  10.39  2.43  1.64  12.46  13.35  1.74  10.77  14.25  
1966 56.84  33.01  5.49  1.71  1.72  14.91  13.74  1.15  14.96  13.31  
1966 56.65  32.88  5.39  1.71  1.71  14.96  13.82  1.16  14.75  13.62  
1970 64.25  36.19  8.04  2.95  1.46  15.61  9.83  1.44  7.41  17.07  
1974 64.45  34.77  9.92  1.90  2.00  15.87  5.78  0.78  7.50  21.49  
Note : Ships are not included
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Statistical Yearbook of Greece , various years; 
National Statistical Service of Greece, Foreign Trade of Greece , various years
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Table 14 Asset and liability structure of corporate industry 
in thousand Drs and percentages (Current prices) 
 
 
ESYE 
Census
Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Firms Surveyed 435 394 391 421 447 461 571 1,139
Fixed Capital 3,956 3,988 4,411 4,330 5,194 5,928 8,680 12,591
Circulating Capital 5,086 6,062 6,917 7,388 9,247 10,742 13,323 25,583
Total Assets 9,042 10,050 11,328 11,718 14,441 16,670 22,003 38,175
Equity Capital 3,397 3,428 3,555 3,710 4,403 4,962 7,038 10,067
Foreign Capital 5,645 6,623 7,774 8,008 10,038 11,708 14,966 28,098
Total Liabilities 9,043 10,050 11,328 11,718 14,441 16,670 22,003 38,165
Retained Profits n.a 40.9 37.6 92.4 209.9 195.0 406.8 n.a
Distributed Profits n.a 140.1 158.6 178.8 255.9 221.1 251.6 n.a
Net Profits n.a 181.0 196.2 271.2 465.8 416.1 658.4 n.a
Fixed Capital 43.8 39.7 38.9 37.0 36.0 35.6 39.4 33.0
Circulating Capital 56.2 60.3 61.1 63.0 64.0 64.4 60.6 67.0
Total Assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Equity Capital 37.6 34.1 31.4 31.7 30.5 29.8 32.0 26.4
Foreign Capital 62.4 65.9 68.6 68.3 69.5 70.2 68.0 73.6
Total Liabilities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Retained Profits n.a 22.6 19.2 34.1 45.1 46.9 61.8 n.a
Distributed Profits n.a 77.4 80.8 65.9 54.9 53.1 38.2 n.a
Net Profits n.a 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n.a
FGI Survey
Million Drs
Source: FGI, The Greek Industry , various years; ESYE, Annual Industrial Survey for the 
Year 1963  (Athens: National Printing Office, 1967), table 20.  
%
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Table 15 Asset and liability structure of selected companies in percentages (current prices)
 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Fixed Capital 52.5   58.0   63.8   62.5   59.2   40.7   41.5   38.1   34.4   32.1   32.5   37.0   
Circulating Capital 47.5   42.0   36.2   37.5   40.8   59.3   58.5   61.9   65.6   67.9   67.5   63.0   
Total Assets 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Share Capital 14.4   12.6   7.8   12.0   16.1   17.8   18.8   17.3   19.3   20.1   21.6   22.8   
Capital Reserves 5.0   4.4   2.7   2.3   2.4   6.5   4.1   3.0   3.4   3.7   4.9   5.8   
Long term Liabilities 53.8   50.8   56.2   43.3   43.5   37.7   29.8   26.9   28.2   26.9   37.7   37.3   
Short term Liabilities 26.8   32.2   33.2   42.5   38.0   38.0   47.3   52.8   49.1   49.3   35.9   34.1   
Total Liabilities 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Fixed Capital n.a. n.a. 44.0   32.0   35.6   31.5   20.8   12.5   8.1   8.7   11.1   12.7   
Circulating Capital n.a. n.a. 56.0   68.0   64.4   68.5   79.2   87.5   91.9   91.3   88.9   87.3   
Total Assets n.a. n.a. 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Share Capital n.a. n.a. 4.8   3.3   3.7   -1.4   14.5   7.7   5.7   3.9   15.4   12.9   
Capital Reseves n.a. n.a. -2.9   -1.1   11.7   11.7   2.0   2.2   3.2   4.2   1.0   2.0   
Long term Liabilities n.a. n.a. 67.9   48.3   43.5   53.1   44.4   24.1   17.3   10.0   7.1   9.0   
Short term Liabilities n.a. n.a. 30.1   49.4   41.1   36.6   39.1   66.0   73.7   81.9   76.5   76.0   
Total Liabilities n.a. n.a. 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Fixed Capital n.a. n.a. n.a. 20.5   41.3   57.8   46.5   42.2   40.5   37.7   33.6   32.2   
Circulating Capital n.a. n.a. n.a. 79.5   58.7   42.2   53.5   57.8   59.5   62.3   66.4   67.8   
Total Assets n.a. n.a. n.a. 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Share Capital n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.9   12.0   14.4   11.3   10.2   8.3   8.1   12.8   11.4   
Capital Reseves n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.0   10.3   11.7   5.5   5.4   4.4   4.6   4.5   4.2   
Provisions n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.7   12.2   10.3   7.9   6.8   5.3   5.2   2.3   4.4   
Long term Liabilities n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.9   26.4   38.6   37.7   43.7   39.5   34.2   20.9   18.2   
Short term Liabilities n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.5   39.1   24.9   37.5   33.8   42.5   48.0   59.4   61.8   
Total Liabilities n.a. n.a. n.a. 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Source: GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3, Varioius documents
P-P
AEEXPL
Izola SA
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Table 16 Structure of production costs in percentages for selected companies, 1952-1962 (current prices) 
 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Industrial costs 81.89  76.25  78.15  64.72  69.48  63.25  60.36  59.42  67.74  71.21  66.22  
Distribution 0.00  0.00  0.00  11.49  11.39  12.59  20.84  17.05  16.45  14.24  9.88  
General costs 8.58  6.19  7.07  6.04  4.91  4.71  3.61  3.24  3.61  6.05  16.13  
Interest 3.46  8.13  4.79  3.81  2.57  2.14  3.02  3.69  2.72  3.03  3.87  
Depreciation 6.07  9.43  9.99  13.94  11.64  17.31  12.18  16.61  9.48  5.49  3.91  
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
Industrial costs n.a. 76.62  77.98  82.21  84.10  84.69  89.44  82.16  86.65  85.07  81.50  
Distribution n.a. 0.41  1.04  1.55  1.32  1.76  1.32  1.20  2.39  2.75  2.93  
General costs n.a. 9.59  4.58  4.44  3.63  2.16  2.20  1.88  1.52  3.17  4.15  
Interest n.a. 7.51  4.12  2.65  2.87  1.51  2.67  1.63  1.03  1.55  5.08  
Depreciation n.a. 5.87  12.28  9.15  8.07  9.89  4.37  13.14  8.42  7.46  6.34  
n.a. 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
Industrial costs n.a. n.a. 79.93  77.79  75.34  73.13  69.26  65.92  71.52  69.23  67.69  
Distribution n.a. n.a. 0.00  0.00  1.79  7.48  8.74  10.61  10.36  11.30  9.91  
General costs n.a. n.a. 9.56  12.16  7.45  6.95  9.36  10.09  7.11  6.77  7.57  
Interest n.a. n.a. 6.61  6.38  8.46  6.18  7.43  7.58  7.43  9.62  11.03  
Depreciation n.a. n.a. 3.90  3.67  6.96  6.27  5.20  5.80  3.57  3.07  3.81  
n.a. n.a. 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
Industrial costs n.a. n.a. 88.16  89.67  85.24  83.26  79.62  77.26  77.18  79.08  81.66  
General costs n.a. n.a. 4.59  4.20  4.55  3.55  4.22  5.62  5.55  5.51  5.33  
Interest n.a. n.a. 3.35  3.77  4.95  7.15  10.68  14.50  12.27  10.20  7.30  
Depreciation n.a. n.a. 3.90  2.36  5.27  6.04  5.48  2.62  5.00  5.21  5.71  
n.a. n.a. 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  
Source: GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3, Varioius documents
P-P
Izola SA
Halivourgiki SA
AEEXPL
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Table 17 Structure of iron and steel industry, 1953-1959 (thousand tons) 
 
 
Table 18 Machinery Equipment of P-P (1959) 
 
 
Table 19 Machinery equipment at textile industry according to its oldness (%)
 
 
Year
Product
ion (P)
Imports 
(M)
Import 
Penentra
tion2 (%)
Producti
on (P)
Imports 
(M)
Import 
Penentra
tion2 (%)
Product
ion (P)
Imports 
(M)
Import 
Penentr
ation2 
(%)
Producti
on (P)
Imports 
(M)
Import 
Penentra
tion2 (%)
Imported 
semi-
finished 
steel Scrap
1953 36 n.a. n.a. 2    25  92 n.a. n.a. n.a. 41    107 72 n.a. n.a.
1954 56 n.a. n.a. 8    18  70 n.a. n.a. n.a. 67    104 61 n.a. n.a.
1955 59 32 35 8    17  68 6 1    7   73    133 65 22 51
1956 68 36 35 8    19  69 4 10    71   80    164 67 25 55
1957 67 31 31 12    20  63 1 12    92   80    174 69 26 54
1958 76 49 39 14    24  62 9 16    64   99    198 67 46 53
1959 81 32 29 18    22  55 9 13    60   108    183 63 50 58
1. Sheet steel imports included items not produced internally
2. Import penentration is calculated as the ratio of imports to total consumption M/(P+M)
Reinforcing Bars
Origin of internal raw 
steel production
Sources : GR/PIOP/FOA2/SE2/SS3/FI32012/SFL22, Elliniki Chalivourgia SA to EDFO, Athens, 17 January 1961, p. 30; EDFO Technical Survey, 27 February 
1961, pp. 237-40.
Sheet steel1 Wire Total
Before 1930 1951/1952 1956 Before 1930 1950/1951
A. Patras 14,504 - - 93 56
D. N. Peramos 2,720 22,692 17,488 - -
E. Patras - - - 376 -
B. Kallithea - - - 225 3
Total 17,224 22,692 17,488 694 59
Spindle machines Weaving machines
Plant
Source:  GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE6/SS3/FI33263/SFL10, Auditors’ Report, 2 March 1962, table 3.
Machinery
Before 
1930
1931-40 1950-60 Total
Before 
1941
1942-49 1950-56 Total
Spindles 40.00 19.00 41.00 100.00 56.20 4.80 39.00 100.00
Weavings 30.75 22.00 47.25 100.00 65.40 8.40 26.20 100.00
Cotton Industry Woollen Industry
Note: The EDFO had calculated that in 1960 40 percent of the mechanical equipment at
cotton industry was automatic, whereas the respective numbers for the EEC and the UK
were 49 and 58 percent respectively.
Source:  GR/PIOP/FOA3/SE5/SS5/FI547, EDFO, Study: Cotton Industry – Market conditions, 
Athens, 12 March 1962, p. 9; NBG, Developments and Problems of Greek Industry: B’ 
Woollen Industry  (NBG, July 1960), p. 20.
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Appendix 2 
Konstantinos Karamanlis (1907-1998). He studied Law serving as minister to 
the post-war governments in 1946-1949 and in 1952-1955. He was prime minister 
in 1955-1963 and in 1974-1980 then President of the Hellenic Republic (1980-
1985). He was a conservative politician and leader of the Right after 1955. He is 
known for his pro-European stance and his influence is compared to that of 
Charles de Gaulle in France and Konrad Adenauer in Federal Republic. 
Xenophon Zolotas (1904–2004). Professor of Economics in 1928-1967 and 
Governor of the Bank of Greece in 1944–1945, in 1955–1967 and in 1974–1981. He 
was actively engaged with internal economic policy from 1944. He represented 
Greece at several international organizations, including the International 
Monetary Fund and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. He 
was a liberal minded economist, known for his emphasis upon the stabilization of 
the currency as a precondition for long-term economic development and his 
preference for supply side economic policies. 
Kyriakos Varvaressos (1884–1957). Professor of Economics and economic 
advisor to the National Bank of Greece (1924–1933). He was minister of finance 
(1932), Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece (1933–1939) and Governor (1939–
1945) and again the minister of finance (1941–1943).  He was also deputy prime 
minister, minister of coordination and minister of supply (1945). He represented 
Greece at the UNRRA Conference (1943), Bretton Woods (1944) and San 
Francisco (1945). He was Executive Director and then Advisor in International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1946–1957). He was known for his 
Keynesian economic ideas, influenced by the ‘New Deal’. 
Ioannis Pesmazoglou (1918-2003). Professor of Economics in 1950-1967, 
general secretary of the coordination ministry (1951-1955), economic advisor to 
the Bank of Greece (1955-1960) and vice president (1960-1967). He was also the 
minister of economics (1974). He was Greece’s chief negotiator for the Free 
Trade Area (1957-1958), the Association (1959-1961) and the Accession (1975) 
with the EEC. He was known for his Keynesian economic ideas and his preference 
for macroeconomic programming. 
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Dimitrios Helmis. He studied Law and was deputy minister of finance (1933-
1935) and minister of finance (1946-1949), coordination minister (1956-1958). He 
was governor of the National Bank of Greece (1958-1964), a conservative 
politician with a strong pro-business attitude.  
Spyros Markezinis (1909-2000). He studied Law and Political and Economic 
Sciences. He was coordination minister (1952-1954) and prime minister (1973). 
He was a right-wing politician with liberal economic ideas, supporting trade 
liberalization in 1953 and the full accession of Greece to the EEC in 1957. 
Panagis Papaligouras (1917-1993). He studied Law and International Relations. 
He was deputy trade minister (1952-1953) and trade minister (1953-1954), 
coordination minister (1954-1955), minister of trade and industry (1956-1958), 
coordination minister 1961-1963 and in 1974-1977. He was also foreign minister 
in 1978 and governor of the Bank of Greece (1974). He was known for his liberal 
economic ideas adapted to Greek realities, described as ‘Realistic Liberalism’. 
He was influenced by Ludwig Erhard and ordo-liberalism. He was among the 
main supporters of Greece’s integration to the EEC. 
Evangelos Averoff (1910-1990). He studied law and economics in Lausanne. He 
was minister of supplies (1949), minister of national economy and supplies 
(1950), deputy minister for foreign affairs (1951) and minister of agriculture 
(1956). He was also minister of aoreign affairs 1956-1963 and again in 1977-1980 
and the minister of defence (1974-1977). He participated in the negotiations of 
Greece for an association to the EEC. 
Leon Makkas (1892-1972). Diplomat and politician. He was minister of the 
presidency (1932), General Governor of the Ionian Islands (1944-45), marine 
minister (1950), minister of industry (1951) and minister of commerce (1954-55). 
He was Greece’s Permanent Representative to The Council of Europe, a 
conservative politician with a pro-business stance who had reservations 
regarding Greece’s participation to an FTA. 
Leonidas Dertilis (1904-1980). Economist and politician. He was deputy finance 
minister (1955-1956) and minister of commerce (1958-1961). He supported the 
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protection of industry and the adoption of moderate economic relationships with 
the USSR. 
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